Kaiserreich supports merchant subs in 1914

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Dave Bender
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Historical Data Reality Check.

#16

Post by Dave Bender » 05 Aug 2010, 19:17

bottleneck in German shell production was explosive powder
Time for a reality check by consulting the historical data. This is from Niall Ferguson.

1914 explosives production (tons)
14,500 Germany
5,000 Britain

1915 explosives production
72,000 Germany
24,000 Britain

1916 explosives production
120,000 Germany
76,000 Britain

Approximately 2/3rds of British ammunition production went to Russia. A considerable quantity of chemicals for the manufacture of explosives also went to France.

WWI Germany would certainly make use of additional explosives if they were available. However compared to the Entente they have no shortage at all.

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Re: Kriegs-Rohstoff-Abteilung

#17

Post by Baltasar » 05 Aug 2010, 20:11

Dave Bender wrote:If you want to know exactly what resources Germany lacked during WWI then I suggest using Google to research the Kriegs-Rohstoff-Abteilung (War Resource Department of the German War Ministry). Almost all the source material is written in German. A good job for a native German speaker like Baltasar. :)
I'll take that as a mild hint :P


Let's introduce the Kriegs-Rohstoff-Abteilung first, since I assume I'm not the only one who, up until now, lived in the blissful ignorance of this organisations existance.

Created on August 13th 1914 by order of Erich von Falkenhayn, Walther Rathenau was the first president of this organisation. Because of the organisation of the German empire, the Kriegs-Rohstoff-Abteilung (KRA) was part of the Prussian ministry of war. Again, due to the federal organisation of the German empire, the KRA initially ran into conflicts with the ministry of interior. The former was trying to shove resources towards war production, the latter tried to emphasize supplying the civilian population. The Ministry of interior had the right to do so according to the Ermächtigungsgesetz from August 4th 1914 (I didn't read through that law yet, so I'll for now assume the source is correct).

Following a first sampling in 900 companies, the KRA concluded that the stocks of important resources for the war would last about half a year with the British effectively nullifying imports. An immeadiate reaction was the confiscation of metals in ~5,000 companies. The metals were not taken away, but the companies had to abide strict instructions on how to use them, so they could be used in the war industry. When it became evident that the war would last longer than anticipated, the KRA recorded all resources in Germany between spring 1915 and summer 1916 and oversaw their usage.


Lack of Resources

Germany was 100% dependent on imports of: wolfram / tungsten, chrome, nickel, aluminium, tin, mangan. Almost all the chemical industry was dependent on imports of sulfur, salpetre, rubber and crude oil. The textile industrie almost exclusively processed imported cotton.

On the other side, iron ore and coal were available in infinite amounts and cotton was imported through Italy until the latter entered the war. Coal became a problem during the Hindenburg Programm, when coal production didn't meet the requirements of the industry and among other actions, 40,000 front line soldiers, who had been miners before the war, had been returned to their jobs by the KRA.

source: website of the Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin (http://www.dhm.de)


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100% dependent on imports of

#18

Post by Dave Bender » 05 Aug 2010, 20:58

Bear in mind that some of these imports were filled by Austria-Hungary and other neighboring nations. For example Italy provided Germany with copper which was sold back to Italy in the form of electrical wiring, electric motors etc. Austria-Hungary produced sizable amounts of petroleum (in Galicia) and Romania produced a lot more. Between Italy and Austria-Hungary there is plenty of bauxite for aluminum production. The Ottomans produced chromium.

Spain produced tungsten. However I'm not sure how it got to Germany after August 1914. Perhaps it was trans-shipped via Italy and/or Rotterdam.

Nickel, tin and rubber were always in short supply. Hence they were the primary cargo of SS Deutschland.

http://books.google.com/books?id=PbzUAg ... ny&f=false
German nitrate production is a major topic all by itself. The nitrate supply was solved by a massive investment in Haber process plants. BASF had a pilot plant in production at Oppau during 1913. After some quick negotiation the KRA payed for a large expansion of the existing factory complex.

Oct 1. Rough plans prepared. Ground breaking on new construction before the end of the month.
Feb 1915. Two of the new nitrate plants begin production.
May 1915. The third new nitrate plant begins production.
-- Construction on a scale and speed which rivals Russian construction of Tankograd during late 1941 and early 1942!
April 1916. BASF begins construction of a new and even larger nitrate plant at Leuna.

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almost exclusively processed imported cotton.

#19

Post by Dave Bender » 05 Aug 2010, 21:10

One more tidbit for those of us who like WWI era economic data. Germany was making a serious effort to produce their own cotton in Ost Afrika and Togo. Those colonies weren't quite as worthless as the History Channel would have us believe.

http://www.spinnerei.de/an-african-adventure.html
Cotton had by now become one of the most important products on the world market. Germany was becoming the second biggest importer after Great Britain, and cotton products were the biggest import item. In an effort to end its dependence on these cotton imports, the Leipziger Spinnerei tried to set up its own cotton plantations in German East Africa (today Tanzania), hoping to eventually derive its entire annual cotton requirement – 30,000 bales – from its own plantation. It was calculated that this would require 30,000 hectares of land. Put paid to by the First World War, this adventurous undertaking looked like a good prospect only at the outset.

The agriculturalist John Booth supervised the plantation project. As a former commissioner of the Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komitee (or “colonial economic committee”), he had personal experience of Africa. Land laws provided for a step-by-step development. After protracted negotiations, the administration leased the Leipziger Baumwollspinnerei a 10,000-hectare packet of land, with two adjoining areas in reserve.

The Spinnerei also bought a cotton ginnery (a facility where cotton fibre is separated from the seeds) in Sadani and took over an existing plantation of 1,118 hectares plus an additional 1,900 hectares of land.

Large tracts of uncultivated land, mostly steppe country covered with trees, scrub and grass, had to be cleared before cotton could be grown there. The soil, the climate, what sort of cotton to grow – everything was new territory, requiring research and experimentation. Irrigation, roads and tracks and infrastructure for shipping the cotton also had to be provided. On 12th December 1908, the first 300 bales of cotton arrived in Leipzig. In the following year, the area under cultivation was tripled, but pests destroyed two-thirds of the harvest.

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BDV
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How about skilled Labor?

#20

Post by BDV » 05 Aug 2010, 21:10

However, things like importing aircraft engines (or car engines, light bulbs, electromotors, vacuum tubes, radios, optics, etc.), frees skilled workers to work on fixing stuff, both on the front and on the homefront.

So if you can import skilled-labor-intensive products, that helps Germany too, particularly as they have a skilled labor shortage, with the men on the front. See the above coal miner issue...
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Kaiserreich supports merchant subs in 1914

#21

Post by Dave Bender » 05 Aug 2010, 21:16

importing aircraft engines (or car engines, light bulbs, electromotors, vacuum tubes, radios, optics, etc.),
Importing them from where? Germany produced more aircraft engines, electrical equipment, optical equipment and industrial chemical then anyone else during 1914. I suspect they weren't far behind the USA in automobile production before WWI derailed civilian industrial production.

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stg 44
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Re: Historical Data Reality Check.

#22

Post by stg 44 » 05 Aug 2010, 23:03

Dave Bender wrote:
bottleneck in German shell production was explosive powder
Time for a reality check by consulting the historical data. This is from Niall Ferguson.

1914 explosives production (tons)
14,500 Germany
5,000 Britain

1915 explosives production
72,000 Germany
24,000 Britain

1916 explosives production
120,000 Germany
76,000 Britain

Approximately 2/3rds of British ammunition production went to Russia. A considerable quantity of chemicals for the manufacture of explosives also went to France.

WWI Germany would certainly make use of additional explosives if they were available. However compared to the Entente they have no shortage at all.
Post 1916 is when the problems set in, Germany peaked early and couldn't expand beyond the 1916 levels without major difficulties and planning. The nitrates had to be taken from food production, which is why I stated they would be useful to import. The Hindenburg program screwed up this delicate balance when it was attempted by Ludendorff's OHL.

A large number of these subs would be more useful than the 10 that were produced and converted historically. 50+ would be feasible, especially if the American offer holds up:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_sub ... eutschland
"American submarine pioneer Simon Lake visited the Deutschland while she was in Baltimore, and made an agreement with representatives of the North German Lloyd line to build cargo submarines in the US, a project which never came to anything"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_Bremen
"The Bremen departed Bremerhaven in September 1916 for Norfolk, Virginia, commanded by Kapitaenleutnant Karl Schwartzkopf, and reportedly carrying financial credits for Simon Lake to begin building cargo submarines for Germany."

It appears that the reason the offer fell-though was the loss of the Bremen and the decision to convert the other merchant subs into cruiser submarines.
If the Germans recognized the value early, worked out the offer and converted some of their own submarine production over to building merchant subs, Germany could build up a decent fleet (50+), which could then make a dent in shortages.

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Re: Kaiserreich supports merchant subs in 1914

#23

Post by phylo_roadking » 05 Aug 2010, 23:09

Stg, just getting abck to this after 48 hours. Keyes' changes at Dover weren't limited by any means to JUST the Dover Barrage - Bacon's monitoring regimes, night patrolling etc. seem to have been pretty excreble :wink: Simply by improving reaction times to reports of transiting submarines dashing through on the surface at night, more frequent patrols and pickets etc. he reduced the number of uboats successfully making it into the Western Approaches phenomenally. The Zeebrugge Raid was planned to cut down even further the number of uboats attempting the transit :wink:

I'll need to check in Barrie Pitt, but IIRC the difference was BEFORE Keyes arrived....only two uboats intercepted in TWO YEARS - after he took over...five in two MONTHS! 8O

The problem with coming to rely on an American source for strategically-vital materiel is....it's just TOO easy to interrupt the flow! 8O The loss of just one or two cargo submarines in a short time, for whatever reasons, means a severe bottleneck in war production in Germany in industried depending on those transatlantic resources. It's really JUST too slender a lifeline...
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Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

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BDV
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Re: Kaiserreich supports merchant subs in 1914

#24

Post by BDV » 05 Aug 2010, 23:25

Dave Bender wrote: importing aircraft engines (or car engines, light bulbs, electromotors, vacuum tubes, radios, optics, etc.),
Importing them from where? Germany produced more aircraft engines, electrical equipment, optical equipment and industrial chemical then anyone else during 1914. I suspect they weren't far behind the USA in automobile production before WWI derailed civilian industrial production.
DB,

A mechanic can be on the front, repairing MG08s and other machinery, or in the Daimler workshops. But not in both places.

OR

A mechanic can be on the front, repairing Albatroses or in the plant building them. But not in both places. Imagine, if you will, a "Bloody April" with 9 Jastas, instead of 5...

etc. etc. etc.

It's not about American wares being better, it's about them being cheaper - they only cost bullion, not scarce skilled labor.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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scarce skilled labor.

#25

Post by Dave Bender » 06 Aug 2010, 00:15

The KRA worked aggressively to insure that munition workers with essential skills were exempted from military service and in fact 10s of thousands of reservists who mobilized during August 1914 were discharged within a few months for that reason. 1.2 million German skilled workers were exempted from military service by early 1916. The number climbed to 2.2 million by the end of the war. Over 5 million German women entered the labor force during WWI, more then any other nation. Rosie the Riveter worked for Krupp during WWI.

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BDV
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Re: scarce skilled labor.

#26

Post by BDV » 06 Aug 2010, 15:17

Dave Bender wrote:The KRA worked aggressively to insure that munition workers with essential skills were exempted from military service and in fact 10s of thousands of reservists who mobilized during August 1914 were discharged within a few months for that reason.
But this, by necessity, did decrease the quality of mechanical service to frontline implements. And the german airplane shortage was an unfortunate (for them) historical fact. This is only one facet (of many) where Allied plight of WWI would be improved by a small merchant sub flotilla.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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german airplane shortage was an unfortunate

#27

Post by Dave Bender » 06 Aug 2010, 15:33

This is WWI not WWII. The most important aircraft consist of tethered artillery spotting balloons. Germany has plenty of them, unlike Britain which began WWI with no artillery spotting balloons at all.

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stg 44
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Re: german airplane shortage was an unfortunate

#28

Post by stg 44 » 06 Aug 2010, 17:47

Dave Bender wrote:This is WWI not WWII. The most important aircraft consist of tethered artillery spotting balloons. Germany has plenty of them, unlike Britain which began WWI with no artillery spotting balloons at all.
For 1914 and 1915 you are right, but once 1916 rolls around and dedicated fighter planes are organized into squadrons, then things change dramatically. Balloon busters can come over to your side and deny your artillery of its eyes very easily, unless you can fight back. The Germans started this at Verdun in February, achieving air superiority, with the British effectively realizing air supremacy at the Somme for the rest of the year, heavily hampering German artillery observation activities there. The technology battle swung back and forth, but by the end of the war the Allies had won it by sheer numbers and could range behind German lines attacking anything they wanted (despite the Germans reaching technological dominance right before the end of the war, inflicting heavy losses right before the armistice). It proved to be very demoralizing for the side so afflicted, something the Germans noted and used in WW2. Remember, by 1918 the armies had more in common with the 1939 armies than the 1914 ones.
And a happy little tidbit of information: over 10% of German aircraft in 1918 were armored ground attack aircraft. Ground support, strategic bombers, and air superiority fighters were all crucial to the battlefields of WW1; though they wouldn't achieve the same dominance that they did in WW2 and beyond, they doesn't mean they weren't crucial in WW1.

As you can see, aircraft production a big industry during the war:
http://books.google.com/books?id=-EVdYq ... &q&f=false

http://www.theaerodrome.com/aircraft/statistics.php

http://www.ww1-world-war-one.info/world ... rength.htm
"As an indication of the comparative air strengths of the belligerents in combat aircraft, those with the armies at the time of the armistice were as follows: French, 3,321; German, 2,730; British, 1,758; Italian, 812; American, 740; Austrian, 622; and Belgian, 153."
"When the United States entered the war, the Americans were urged by the French and British to concentrate on the production of engines and bomber planes, for designs of fighter planes were changing too rapidly to initiate production of any one type. The 12-cylinder Liberty engine was accordingly designed and adapted for mass production. A superb engine, it was in great demand by the Allies, and more than 30,000 units were built during the war. The Liberty engine was the greatest single contribution of the United States to World War I aviation."

http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsh ... asp?id=682
America's greatest technological contribution to the war effort was the development and mass production of the 12-cylinder Liberty engine. During a five-day period beginning May 29, 1917, Mr. J.G. Vincent of Packard Motors and Mr. E.J. Hall of Hall-Scott Motors redesigned an experimental 8-cylinder engine previously built and tested by Packard. Weighing only 710 pounds but delivering 410 hp, the Liberty far surpassed all other aviation engines in the world. Production lines were set up by various automobile manufacturers and by the end of 1918, they had built 17,935 Liberties, 5,827 of which had been sent to Europe.

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Balloon busters

#29

Post by Dave Bender » 06 Aug 2010, 18:21

Entente propaganda aside, that effort was not effective. About 5% of German artillery observation balloons were lost to enemy action during WWI. I suspect they lost at least as many to accidents.

Historical tidbit on a related item....
http://www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng/petroczy.php
Helicopters were invented by Austria-Hungary during WWI. They were intended to replace balloons for artillery observation. Modern day armies still use helicopters for that purpose.

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BDV
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Germany - the Technological Frontrunner

#30

Post by BDV » 06 Aug 2010, 22:47

That may well be nice and true, but still Germany war effort would have benefited from importing the end product of skilled labor - from mechanical to electric/electronic.

And really I do not understand what your point is with the airplanes - Germany and KuK would have demonstrably benefited from more airplanes.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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