June 1940. Italy invades Malta.

[John T]

"As Cunningham did not reinforce Malta"

But he did...http://www.naval-history.net/xAH-MaltaS ... .htm...and continued to do so in the face of assorted Axis efforts to stop him.

Sure he did, eventually but Initially Commonwealth forces where concentrated at Alexandria.
so to phrase myself better

As Cunningham did not initially reinforce Malta, it was no threat when it could not be defended and then both the defensive and offensive capacity where built up so when it started to be a pain it was too late to remedy for the Italians.

In June 1940 his WIFE was on Malta so suggesting that the RN would simply not bother is lunatic!

Never said "not bother", I think it would be consistent with my initial post to clarify as
"By not using it's strategic position for serious offensive actions until the defensive capacity where reinforced,
Malta did not trigger an Italian assault. "
Intentional or not, Malta kept a low profile until the limitations of Italian air power where proved.

When this WI/WTF is set the Italian navy does not have the strength to risk a surface action (see Calabria) and was not noticeably successful at using it's notional advantage in Air power and submarines to mug assorted British (and french) raids on it's own actual bases!

alan

One point to consider is that during a landing at Malta the initiative would been on the Italian side ,while the raids on Italian bases where often unopposed due to the Italian lack of reconnaissance. This is one of the few times where the Italian Navy could have a set piece battle. And for once be able to get her light forces to bear on RN.

Cheers
/John

[phylo_roadking]

One point to consider is that during a landing at Malta the initiative would been on the Italian side

Actually - not really; during an operation like this, there are many points at which the initiative would pass to the british;

1/ if ANY of the many and various large-scale preparations/exercises/training mentioned previously are noticed/detected by the british - the initiative on how to conduct the defence or whether to conduct one at all passes to them...as long as they keep the fact that they know what's afoot secret from the Italians

2/ As soon as the invasion is launched - and the incoming forces detected....locally, the initiative of how the garrison chooses to react to the invasion is on the defenders' side - for at THAT point the Italians are tied into TWO options only - to go or to cancel

3/ once amphibious or airborne troops land - they are committed to attempting to exploit that bridgehead; the initiative THEN passes to the defenders as to what forces they wish to deploy where, how/when they wish to counterattack etc. etc.

That's the problem with a major operation requiring multi-layered preparations and timetabling, inter-service cooperation, strict timetabling etc. - once you give the order to go, your forces are TIED to the operational plan. You can halt it mid-stream if something goes wrong, you can amend on the spot once Clausewitz impacts but once you've set it in motion, all the variables/initiatives are with your enemy. You can HOPE he doesn't know you're coming....and you can HOPE he reacts/chooses to react the way YOU hope/think he will...but you have no guarantees. Once started - unless it's halted prematurely - an operation like this has a momentum all of its own.

[John T]

IF only attack Gozo, it would been as a bait to kill RN with subs and Air

lol - with the Italian airforce and navy? I think not. More likely an own goal which guarantees the loss of any forces landed on Gozo, and any ships sent to their aid.

To interfere on your own patent -
lol - I see the Italians have once again turned into the typical AHF inert-punching-bag enemy force. That really should be patented.
Do you have a problem to see why this debate goes in circles?

But as I want it to move on -

Let's assume it needed 250 tons of bombs to hit a ship by level bombing the way Italians did it during 1940.
If RA where able to fly two sorties a day with 250 bombers each carrying 1 ton RN will be hit twice a day.

How long would RN maintain such a damage rate?

Why didn't RN stay put at Malta during 1940?

the 6" at fort cambell where in open gun pits and I suppose you could at least supress them with an attack sqn.

Maybe. If the Italians had one of those.

Depends on how you define attack, where Hs 123 an attack aircraft ?
Italians had Ba.65 and Ca.309

Then when RN shows up the Italians moves away most surface ships from the direct vicinity and let a sigificant group of the ~100 subs and ~60 MBT's available to take their toll of Royal Navy

lol - I see the British have once again turned into the typical AHF inert-punching-bag enemy force. That really should be patented.

My problem is that I expects that both sides of a discussion should apply the same standards to their own arguments as they demands of their opposition.

RN have to move and stay in a small zone for shore bombardment.

Ok, I was prepared to give you the benefit of the doubt but unfortunately it seems that you, too, are a clueless twonk.

Ok, then at least I learned something from your post,
"twonk" in the meaning "Thought to originate in the Victorian Era meaning a lower-class foreigner"

But your a foreigner, I'm a http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iS2N1mBsEdM

The primary target for the RN is the RM.

But for the Italians the main interest is to maintain Sea Lines of Communication with Libya and maintain a force in being to keep RN from the Italian mainland.
So they had different goals.

On the other hand, once one side has naval supremacy in the central Med, then it's all over for the other sides forces still on Malta. And, as a hint, it won't be the RM gaining naval supremacy.

My doubt is that RN could maintain sufficient presence during long enough time to force a decision.
Naval supremacy isn't binary and persistent, You don't flip the switch and then you got it it for ever thereafter.
RN would have to patrol in the vicinity to blockade the Italian beachhead.
And Italian subs just need to patrol a very small area - almost act as a intelligent minefield.

I think If Italians get a foothold there is little chance to get them out of it

How the hell do you think they're going to be able to keep it?!

One regiment, defending on the reverse slope, attacked by 2-5 British Bn's with limited artillery support.
Whats the question?
how long the Italians supply will last or do you think British firepower would sweep them into the sea?

Actually, more to the point, the British wouldn't even need to evict them. Just string up a couple of strands of barbed wire, and start referring to the 'foothold' as POW Camp No.01.

Wait ... where have I heard that before? Oh that's right - it was me. On page 11 of this thread. Yep, we really are going in circles on this one now.

This might be seen as OT but anyhow.
In the seventies FIAT tried to brush up their rumor in UK with a slogan of
"Designed by Computers,
Silenced by Laser
and built by Robots"

And "the Not Nine o'clock news" made this:


It's funny and I feel it is slightly more advanced than the average level of argumentation in this tread.
Cheers
/John

[Gooner1]

You are right from an organisational perspective but from a tactical perspective these destroyers where in Valetta harbour.

Many of them would be there soon again.

"Tuesday, 9 July BATTLE OF CALABRIA or PUNTA STILO
A convoy of merchant ships, MF.1, consisting of Egyptian steamer EL NID (7769grt), British steamer KNIGHT OF MALTA (1553grt), and former Italian steamer RODI (3220grt) put to sea from Malta at 2300/9th escorted by destroyers VENDETTA, JERVIS, and DIAMOND.
Light cruiser GLOUCESTER and destroyer STUART also arrived for refuelling. After refuelling, they joined the convoy which was covered by light cruisers ORION and NEPTUNE.
Destroyers STUART, DAINTY, DEFENDER, HYPERION, HOSTILE, HASTY, ILEX, and JUNO were detached to Malta to refuel late on the 9th. They arrived at 0530 and departed at 1115 on the 10th.
In turn, destroyers HERO, HEREWARD, DECOY, VAMPIRE, and VOYAGER were sent to Malta to refuel.
A slow convoy, MS.1, of four merchant ships, British steamers KIRKLAND (1361grt), TWEED (2697grt), and MASIRAH (6578grt), former Dutch steamer under British flag ZEELAND (2726grt), and Norwegian steamer NOVASLI (3204grt), departed Malta early on the 10th escorted by destroyers DECOY, VAMPIRE, and VOYAGER.
At 2030/10th, battleship ROYAL SOVEREIGN with destroyers NUBIAN, MOHAWK, and JANUS were to detached to refuel at Malta.

Will RN resupply in Valetta?
What capacity had Valetta to handle during one night or would you expect ships to remain in harbour during daytime?

An infantry battalion could disembark from a couple of cruisers quite rapidly I suggest.

[phylo_roadking]

Let's assume it needed 250 tons of bombs to hit a ship by level bombing the way Italians did it during 1940.
If RA where able to fly two sorties a day with 250 bombers each carrying 1 ton RN will be hit twice a day.

How long would RN maintain such a damage rate?

John -

1/ "hit" is NOT the same thing as sink - take a look back through the thread at the detailed discussion of how well the RA did NOT perform at Calabria, how well the LW did NOT do off Norway at various times etc.

2/ Two hits a DAY? How many days do you think its going to take for the RN to fight a major gun engagement with the RM??? Cunningham would have been crowing at the thought of having to take two hits a DAY...

Why didn't RN stay put at Malta during 1940?

Because static, moored shipping is ....landscape...and thus far easier to hit, even just by chance, than moving ships able to avoid fall of ordnance etc. See back up through the thread in many places.

The primary target for the RN is the RM

But for the Italians the main interest is to maintain Sea Lines of Communication with Libya and maintain a force in being to keep RN from the Italian mainland.
So they had different goals.

Hardly! That "force" they have to keep "in being" IS the RM! Exactly the force thats going to be threatened by its participation in this operation.

My doubt is that RN could maintain sufficient presence during long enough time to force a decision.
Naval supremacy isn't binary and persistent, You don't flip the switch and then you got it it for ever thereafter.
RN would have to patrol in the vicinity to blockade the Italian beachhead.

John, just how big do you think the Italian bridgehead is going to BE on an island the size of Malta - if its consists of single files of Aplini winding their way up beach paths??? Once the RM is driven off or withdraws of its own accord to avoid a gun action with the RN....it takes just a single destroyer to blockade said bridgehead!

And Italian subs just need to patrol a very small area - almost act as a intelligent minefield

John - losses off Norway to Uboats were actually relatively small given that the Allied Fleet was many times restricted to stationkeeping off various bridgeheads, and especially when reckoned across two months...also, as discussed in a number of WIs, look at the number of submarines the RN gathered for CERBERUS, the Channel Dash - and how useful they - weren't.... Plus....you have to factor into this that the RN operating off Malta isn't a convoy of dumb freighters steaming along at 6-8 knots - it's a flotilla/fleet of naval vessels including a LARGE ASW capability; conversely, look at how many uboats were sunk during WESERUBUNG!

how long the Italians supply will last or do you think British firepower would sweep them into the sea?

How much do you think they're going to be able to LAND in 36 hours or so....with ONLY the same flock of small boats that put the initial landing forces ashore? AFAIK the average Italian soldier's load-out didn't include more than a day's rations...how much do you think they're going to be able to carry up cliffs?

[Gooner1]

Couple of bits from Adm. A.B. Cunningham

May 1940
"I was still perturbed About Malta. It had no fighters, and the full scale of anti-aircraft defence had not arrived. I was doubtful how the island would stand up to bombing, with the possibility of parachute troops and other aerial visitors. It was no more than sixty miles from Sicily. I was not so anxious about seaborne attack. Malta had originally been armed with 9.2-inch guns, one or two of which had been modified to equal the range of any ship's guns which could be brought against them. To these had now been added the two 15-inch guns of the monitor Terror, which ship was incorporated into the defences."
July 1940
"..the Navy had always regarded the island as the keystone of victory in the Mediterranean, and considered it should be held at all costs. It had its first-class dockyard for the refit and repair of the heaviest ships and was amply stocked with naval stores and ammunition. ...
..the Navy and Army had built up sufficient supplies in case the island were cut off and virtually besieged, .."

[phylo_roadking]

"I was still perturbed About Malta. It had no fighters, and the full scale of anti-aircraft defence had not arrived. I was doubtful how the island would stand up to bombing, with the possibility of parachute troops and other aerial visitors.

It's worth noting that after Belgium, Norway and Holland - everyone was panicking about paratroops. However - as we know, the Italians had only one fully-trained, formated para battalion at that point...while the FJ was in June a spent force...as discussed previously; 3/5s of its aircraft out of action or lost, a handful of gliders left, a shortage of parachute silk, a shortage of trained dispatchers....and of course VERY large manpower losses to replace and train up.

I.E. no paratrooper threat in real terms...which leaves the seaborne threat - which as we can see, Cunningham was not as concerned about.

July 1940
"..the Navy had always regarded the island as the keystone of victory in the Mediterranean, and considered it should be held at all costs. It had its first-class dockyard for the refit and repair of the heaviest ships and was amply stocked with naval stores and ammunition. ...

John - this is the element you forgot about in your last post; once the RM is driven off/withdrawn, and the RN are protecting the islands, and FAA/RAF air assets put onto Malta...and protecting the RN in harbour adequately...Cunningham can BASE his "blockade of the beachead"/patrols of Malta waters BACK at Malta! He can THEN fight the naval campaign from Malta he WANTED to at the outbreak of war - but simply thought for a time he couldn't!

A failed Italian attempt on Malta doesn't just protect Malta - it puts the British in control of the Central Med!

[Gooner1]

But as I want it to move on -

Let's assume it needed 250 tons of bombs to hit a ship by level bombing the way Italians did it during 1940.
If RA where able to fly two sorties a day with 250 bombers each carrying 1 ton RN will be hit twice a day.

How long would RN maintain such a damage rate?

You want to move the discussion "on" by stating complete bollocks? Par for the course I guess.

Anyway, Taranto night
" a force consisting of the cruisers Orion, Sydney, Ajax and the destroyers Nubian and Mohawk, under the command of the Vice-Admiral, Light Forces, was raiding the convoy route between Albania and the Italian mainland. Keeping his force concentrated on account of the bright moonlight, Admiral Pridham-Wippell steered up the middle of the Straits of Otranto, crossed the Brindisi-Valona line, and at 1 a.m. turned to the southward. A few minutes later a convoy of four merchant vessels with two escorts was sighted about eight miles away on the port bow, steaming in line ahead towards Brindisi. In the short engagement which followed, all four merchant vessels (totalling 16,938 tons) was sunk, though the escorts managed to escape." Playfair.

[Gooner1]

It's worth noting that after Belgium, Norway and Holland - everyone was panicking about paratroops. However - as we know, the Italians had only one fully-trained, formated para battalion at that point...while the FJ was in June a spent force...as discussed previously; 3/5s of its aircraft out of action or lost, a handful of gliders left, a shortage of parachute silk, a shortage of trained dispatchers....and of course VERY large manpower losses to replace and train up.

Yes. Cunninghams key fear was how well the Maltese would stand up to bombing - which of course they did, very well.

[JonS]

IF only attack Gozo, it would been as a bait to kill RN with subs and Air

lol - with the Italian airforce and navy? I think not. More likely an own goal which guarantees the loss of any forces landed on Gozo, and any ships sent to their aid.

To interfere on your own patent -
lol - I see the Italians have once again turned into the typical AHF inert-punching-bag enemy force. That really should be patented.
Do you have a problem to see why this debate goes in circles?

Yeah, that's a fair point ... except that this is the Italians we're talking about, a force memorably described as "not a military that should be playing with grownups."

Apart from all the other issues dogging an invasion of Malta in 1940, the proposed for is the Italians, a force that was right then in the midst of demonstrating to all and sundry just how spectacularly ineffective they were - in the air, on land, and at sea. Expecting them to be able to mount - let alone carry off - what is perhaps the single most complex joint operation in the playbook within a couple of weeks from a standing start is hardly realistic.

[BDV]

Bypassed "Nazi-occupied fortified ports?

The Channel Islands and Dunkirk.

Um, no, it doesn't work that way...governments and militaries rarely measure the cost differential that way...and in any case, they never have the slightest clue really as to what might be paid... :roll:

Word.

[PeterOT]

Yeah, that's a fair point ... except that this is the Italians we're talking about, a force memorably described as "not a military that should be playing with grownups."

ooh, ooh, ooh...I think that was me. Nice to know someone is listening.

[LWD]

... Let's assume it needed 250 tons of bombs to hit a ship by level bombing the way Italians did it during 1940.
If RA where able to fly two sorties a day with 250 bombers each carrying 1 ton RN will be hit twice a day.
...

A number of question and points in regards to this:
1) Where did the numbers come from? Or in other words why would we want to assume that?
2) Just because a plane takes off with a bomb doesn't mean that it gets dropped on target.
3) Just because a plane takes off doesn't mean it safely lands.
4) How many such days did the Italians have fuel for?
5) Just how many bombers did the Italians have at this point?

[BDV]

Italians ... memorably described as "not a military that should be playing with grownups."

[/quote]

On the flip side, who will face these Italians?

The military that gifted the Axis Krete and Singapore, and got pushed by the same italian infantry with its backs to Alexandria. Twice.

The militay that had the Australian PM state:

Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.
John Curtin

To test a military of such mediocre land prowess (pedestrian performance maintained all the way to 1945), even by Italian army, is not a "completely bollocks" proposition. And in any case, even an epic Italian failure at Malta, would be a much cheaper lesson than what transpired in Cyrenaica, few months later.

[LWD]

Italians ... memorably described as "not a military that should be playing with grownups."

On the flip side, who will face these Italians?

The military that gifted the Axis Krete and Singapore, and got pushed by the same italian infantry with its backs to Alexandria. Twice.
[/quote]
That's a rather one sided view of things now isn't it? Especially as you rather ignore both tactical and strategic considerations. One could equally point out for instance that they also had considerable success against both the Italians and Germans indeed at the end of the day who won in North Africa?

... To test a military of such mediocre land prowess (pedestrian performance maintained all the way to 1945), even by Italian army, is not a "completely bollocks" proposition. And in any case, even an epic Italian failure at Malta, would be a much cheaper lesson than what transpired in Cyrenaica, few months later.

Would it? I'm not so sure. Especially if the Italians loose the majority of their fleet and cargo ships in the process.