This wassuch an interesting post, I just thought I had to resurrect it. I like the #'s game at the beginning. There are only 2 things that I can truely aregue against is that there is one area that might be critical to the thinking. These are more speculative, as I think Tim reasoning on the losses is pretty sound, although in practice the ratio of losses to uboats, losses of uboats is not so simple as the ratio of hypothetical to actual would suggest. In fact, the # of boats is higher, it suggest saturating the escorts on the convoys, which means lower losses, and possibly higher losses for the convoys if escorts have to spend more time shooing uboats away and cannot proescute attacks to conclusions.
1). Did Germany posses the facitilities to train that many more crews and officers quickly enough to man those boats? I don't know, but I suspect actually having the boats, and some extra time allows them to do so.
2). Germany had a huge problem with their torpedo's. This is a double edged sword. On the one hand, more boats in action means a wider variety of engagements, so that maybe they cannot actually sink as many ships. On the flip side, more engagements means they realize the extent of the problem sooner, switching to contact pins sooner, and getting the magnetic fuses put as a higher priority. Again a wash.
The increased threat to the UK is probably not a big problem to the British. The English realized that there was threat to them from Uboats. They where quite content that the ASDIC would be sufficient to ward off the Uboat threat. I am not sure what the British military (RN and RAF especially) did during the inter-war years, but there is little doubt in my mind that they rank among some of the most poorly prepared military organziations for the task with which they where faced. THe RN proved how well convoys worked in WW1, and yet went into WW2 convinced that they where not the way to go. WW1, no ships where sunk in convoys in which air cover was present, despite the fact that at the time, aircraft had no way of actually attacking uboats. WW2, the RAF and RN have few long range patrol aircraft, no depth charges that can be dropped from the air, and very little idea of how to use radar to extend the range of a ship or plane in searching for a ship or uboat. I also think the RN has always been more nechanted with the idea of being a raiding, and aggressive group. The act of gaurding convoys was not a very dashing way for them to earn their living, but was in fact the only realistic way Germany had of beating the British.
If the British wanted to reduce losses initally, simply organzing large convoys at the earliest oppurtunity would be the most cost effective way. The difficulty in early sub warfare for the merchant ships to avoid detection. Even if a convoy has no escorts, it will not be detected if it doesn't randomnly run into a uboat. A convoy is just as likely to pass between the adjacent uboats patrol areas as a single ship. In addition, a small convoy of 15 ships might be arrayed in 5 rows of 3 columns, 250m between (for example). The area occupied is 1250 by 750 meters. A convoy of twice as many ships would not be a bigger perimeter to defend (5 rows of 6 is 1250 by 1500 m), and would not need nearly as many escorts as another small convoy. If you extended that idea to really big convoys (50-100 ships) the escort could be rather large indeed.
RAF committing their bombers from their early and useless missions over germany, and taking part in hunting uboats would be a good start for them. Rather then even worrying about attacking submerged uboats, just dropping a delay action 500 lb bomb, with some sort of an impact fuse. Once the uboat dives, it is pretty tough to hit it from the air, so unless you get it right on the inital drop, you wouldn't worry about it too much.
Surface Fleet or Submarines
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Karwats
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There was a reason the convoy system took awhile to really kick in.If the British wanted to reduce losses initally, simply organzing large convoys at the earliest oppurtunity would be the most cost effective way. The difficulty in early sub warfare for the merchant ships to avoid detection. Even if a convoy has no escorts, it will not be detected if it doesn't randomnly run into a uboat. A convoy is just as likely to pass between the adjacent uboats patrol areas as a single ship.
Your average merchantship is notoriously bad at keeping formation, simply because this is not something regularly practiced by the merchant fleets it takes a fair amount of practice and exposure to get au fait with sailing in formations-especially large ones.
We would have the same problem today if we required merchabt ships to transit in convoys-the reasons are the same merchants tend to operate singly and navies operate in groups.
As for detection. Detection in the war was almost invariably visual and first contact was the smoke trail-most ships were still coal burners-that could be seen long before the vessel itself was above the horison. So a convoy twice the size would have double the smoke and by extension twice as much chance of being detected.
Hi Tim -nice job.
On the question of hunter killer groups,I agree this is the most effective way of hunting submarines.
However on the U-boat side,more boats = more tactical options. If Dönitz had sufficient boats he may have dedicated some of them to go after the escorts for a period of time.
There has been a trend post war in submarine doctrine to do exactly this, when engaging surface forces-first disable/destroy the escorting vessels and then go after the high value targets. I'm sure the Germans would have had a good look at this strategy if they had sufficient boats.
So it is better to have dead merchant ships then have them in convoys? If the problem is formation keeping, then increase the spacing between ships. It is pure stupidity to not have merchants moving in convoy. First, they will never learn to keep formation until they practice, so you are only putting off the inevitable. They may as well practice in the convoys themselves. If they get lost or fall out of formation, then they are no worse off then they where before, and if they try to stay in formation and succeed, then they are under a escort. Second, in WW1, most ships lost where traviling alone. Convoys cut losses to Uboats down to almost nothing, and at a time when there was almost no way to detect or attack a submerged uboat, or at night even on the surface.
What other altenative is there to convoys? Send packs of warships out and try and sink Uboats? It was something that was tried, as it appealed to the RN sense of being aggressive. It was clearly nonsense. U boatss are only an effective military weapon if they attack merchant ships. They are too slow and weak to go hunting for warships. By going out after Uboats, all you are doing is removing escorts, and sending them on wild goose chases. There is almost no chance of a hunter-killer group randomly encountering a uboat on the open ocean. Ironically, these groups later played a critiical role when they where used to reinforce convoys existing escort as they entered area with high concerntrations of uboats.
Why would you go out and attack escorts? While in principle, it makes sense to try and limit the # of escorts avalible, it is tough to kill a warship. They are relaivtively fast, have shallower drafts, and are much more manuverable then merchant ships. If you are on the surface, and atttack one, then the deck guns will quickly hit the Uboat, and then it can't submerge. If the Uboat is submerged, it is tough to get in range and fire a shot that will hit the escort. Torpedos are realtively slow, and only travel in a straight line. If the escorts are fired upon, they will change the course, and speed rapidly, ruin the fire solution, and the torpedos will miss. Until the acoustic homing torpedos come out in 1943, they are better off going for the very vulnerable merchant ships, who are carrying what you really want to prevent from getting supplies where you want them. Post war, I suspect that starts becoming a realistic option as uboat underwater performance improves, particuarly sonar. Wire guided torpedos in even electroboats is a much more realistic option then a type VII or type IX Uboat.
As far as the smoke issue, you are mistaken. Uboats patrol in long lines, many 10's of km apart, the rule of thumb on clear weather is 50 km for a smoke stack. If you send the ships through one at a time, they each have x percentage of being detected, so you will have 50 ships times of being detected (minus how ever many go way out of their way to avoid being detected). They will all be coming through at different speeds, so the uboats have a chance of picking them off one at a time. Now, if they are in convoy, you send all of them together, the smoke does not combine into one huge smoke plume. You have a whole bunch of little plumes. If the uboat is in range to see one plume, it will probably see many others too, but thye still know that there is one there. Furthermore, you cannot see the plume any further away. That is largely a function of the curvature of the earth. It is analougous to a single ship being a tiny dot in a huge ocean. A convoy extend the dot and makes a great big dot, but it is still insignificant when compared to the size of the ocean.
The one uboat will try to trail the convoy and report he positon. A lot of conovys where able to avoid the wolfpack style attacks, becase the max speed of a uboat is only 17 knots max, and cruising speed is much slower. A convoy at 5 to 8 knots may be able to travel far enough fast enough, that the uboats are not able to concentrate. There is a good chance that the 1 or only a few uboats will only be able to fire 4 torpedos before the convoy is out of range (remember that torpoedos take a long time to reload). There is also the chance that the escorts will drive off a single uboat. And again, larger convoys are still insignificant dots, but allow more and more escorts to be concentrated (although I am sure there is a practical limit in there somwhere).
What other altenative is there to convoys? Send packs of warships out and try and sink Uboats? It was something that was tried, as it appealed to the RN sense of being aggressive. It was clearly nonsense. U boatss are only an effective military weapon if they attack merchant ships. They are too slow and weak to go hunting for warships. By going out after Uboats, all you are doing is removing escorts, and sending them on wild goose chases. There is almost no chance of a hunter-killer group randomly encountering a uboat on the open ocean. Ironically, these groups later played a critiical role when they where used to reinforce convoys existing escort as they entered area with high concerntrations of uboats.
Why would you go out and attack escorts? While in principle, it makes sense to try and limit the # of escorts avalible, it is tough to kill a warship. They are relaivtively fast, have shallower drafts, and are much more manuverable then merchant ships. If you are on the surface, and atttack one, then the deck guns will quickly hit the Uboat, and then it can't submerge. If the Uboat is submerged, it is tough to get in range and fire a shot that will hit the escort. Torpedos are realtively slow, and only travel in a straight line. If the escorts are fired upon, they will change the course, and speed rapidly, ruin the fire solution, and the torpedos will miss. Until the acoustic homing torpedos come out in 1943, they are better off going for the very vulnerable merchant ships, who are carrying what you really want to prevent from getting supplies where you want them. Post war, I suspect that starts becoming a realistic option as uboat underwater performance improves, particuarly sonar. Wire guided torpedos in even electroboats is a much more realistic option then a type VII or type IX Uboat.
As far as the smoke issue, you are mistaken. Uboats patrol in long lines, many 10's of km apart, the rule of thumb on clear weather is 50 km for a smoke stack. If you send the ships through one at a time, they each have x percentage of being detected, so you will have 50 ships times of being detected (minus how ever many go way out of their way to avoid being detected). They will all be coming through at different speeds, so the uboats have a chance of picking them off one at a time. Now, if they are in convoy, you send all of them together, the smoke does not combine into one huge smoke plume. You have a whole bunch of little plumes. If the uboat is in range to see one plume, it will probably see many others too, but thye still know that there is one there. Furthermore, you cannot see the plume any further away. That is largely a function of the curvature of the earth. It is analougous to a single ship being a tiny dot in a huge ocean. A convoy extend the dot and makes a great big dot, but it is still insignificant when compared to the size of the ocean.
The one uboat will try to trail the convoy and report he positon. A lot of conovys where able to avoid the wolfpack style attacks, becase the max speed of a uboat is only 17 knots max, and cruising speed is much slower. A convoy at 5 to 8 knots may be able to travel far enough fast enough, that the uboats are not able to concentrate. There is a good chance that the 1 or only a few uboats will only be able to fire 4 torpedos before the convoy is out of range (remember that torpoedos take a long time to reload). There is also the chance that the escorts will drive off a single uboat. And again, larger convoys are still insignificant dots, but allow more and more escorts to be concentrated (although I am sure there is a practical limit in there somwhere).
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Karwats
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Whoa slow down. I'm not saying convoys are impractical-they are actually the only way to protect merchant ships under submarine threat.So it is better to have dead merchant ships then have them in convoys?
Point is, it is not as simple as an Admiralty order stating all ships will now travel in Convoy-there are practical considerations that will delay the effective implementation of the process.
You may want to have a look at the kill records for Capt RN "Johnny Walkers HK Group. used in conjunction with Air assets it is the most effective way of ASW.Send packs of warships out and try and sink Uboats? It was something that was tried, as it appealed to the RN sense of being aggressive. It was clearly nonsense. U boatss are only an effective military weapon if they attack merchant ships.
Precisely to limit the escorting capability of the opposing Navy and remove the protection fro further attacks.Why would you go out and attack escorts? While in principle, it makes sense to try and limit the # of escorts avalible, it is tough to kill a warship. They are relaivtively fast, have shallower drafts, and are much more manuverable then merchant ships. If you are on the surface, and atttack one, then the deck guns will quickly hit the Uboat, and then it can't submerge. If the Uboat is submerged, it is tough to get in range and fire a shot that will hit the escort. Torpedos are realtively slow, and only travel in a straight line. If the escorts are fired upon, they will change the course, and speed rapidly, ruin the fire solution, and the torpedos will miss.
Armoured ships BB,CA's and CL's were dificult to sink with contact torpedoes. Light forces ie. DD's FF, sloops and corvettes are not.
The attack profile for Escorts is different from that of merchants, it will invariably be submerged. Normally your solution will indicate the CPA and a fan or spread will be fired,assuming the escort is prosecuting you he will invariably close as rapidly and directly as possible without zigzagging, also as he is using active sonar you will constantly have bearing and range information simplyfying the firing solution greatly.Also detecting an incoming torpedo is incredibly difficult even today. I might add ARA Belgrano was sunk with straight running torpedoes.
Ja assuming a height of eye of +- 5 metres from the Fin of a U-boat the horison should be 22-24 NM. However you are looking for the smoke trail that is above the ship,I forget the equation but I think you gain 1-2 nm for every 1-2 meters above the water. So assuming your smoke makes a trail 15-20 metres above your funnel the visual detection range is greatly increased. Vessels in convoys travel in divisions/lines the smoke from these lines will tend to combine with normal standard distance of 2 cables,so you should have 6-10 smoke trials depending on how many lines are in the division obviously if the wind is beam on you will then have lots of different trails.the rule of thumb on clear weather is 50 km for a smoke stack.
Those are all difficulties best overcome by practice. The longer you wait the larger the butchers bill. They are certainly are practical concerns, but most of those early losses in ww2 are also due to uboats. If you spend the time and energy for detailed planning, those are not great concerns. Cosidering how close the Uboats where to removing the UK from WW1, I don't really think not implimenting it immediately is really an option. You can just put them in convoy, and if they fall out, they fall out and some will get sunk. Those that don't will probably survive.Whoa slow down. I'm not saying convoys are impractical-they are actually the only way to protect merchant ships under submarine threat.
Point is, it is not as simple as an Admiralty order stating all ships will now travel in Convoy-there are practical considerations that will delay the effective implementation of the process.
Agreed for ww2, but I was refering to air cover in ww1. In ww1, they frequently used airships & towed balloons to spot shallow or surfaced Uboats, but they had no way of actually conducting attacks. Air cover is still an important asset, but in ww1, it was only avalible to help direct the sruface assets.You may want to have a look at the kill records for Capt RN "Johnny Walkers HK Group. used in conjunction with Air assets it is the most effective way of ASW.
I'm not saying any of this cannot be done, but if the overall objective is to sink merchant ships, and as you mention, unless you sink them with a spread of torpedos, you are going to take an attack of depth charges at farily shallow depth, that is not a favorable prospect really. It is not like I would want to make a lot of those attacks, when I could just make a night approach and try and slip into the convoy and then have my way for a while without the dangers of dealing with the escorts to any great degree.Precisely to limit the escorting capability of the opposing Navy and remove the protection fro further attacks.
Armoured ships BB,CA's and CL's were dificult to sink with contact torpedoes. Light forces ie. DD's FF, sloops and corvettes are not.
The attack profile for Escorts is different from that of merchants, it will invariably be submerged. Normally your solution will indicate the CPA and a fan or spread will be fired,assuming the escort is prosecuting you he will invariably close as rapidly and directly as possible without zigzagging, also as he is using active sonar you will constantly have bearing and range information simplyfying the firing solution greatly.Also detecting an incoming torpedo is incredibly difficult even today. I might add ARA Belgrano was sunk with straight running torpedoes.
I understand everything that you are saying, but if you have seen 1 smoke trail, you have detected the convoy. the next Uboat is probably going to be too far away to see it. At best, another Uboat on the other side of the convoy might see the other side. So, it really doesn't matter. You only have 2 Uboats at most to make an immediate attack. Meanwhile you have a bunch of ships. Even if the Uboat each carries out a couple of sucessful attacks, they are only going to sink a few ships, and the rest of the convoy will continue through. If you spread those ships out, and put them on different courses the Uboat and his freinds are now in their element. They can sail along and attack the individual ships as they enter each boats patrol area. But if 20 ships sail through, he can engage all 20, 1 at a time (provided he has enough torpedos left), because he/they is/are taking them out 1 at a time. Some will clearly slip through without being detected at all, but if the line of Uboats is large, and sificiantly close together, or there are multiple lines, then the ships are just as likely to be found on average. Again, 1 ship is a single dot. A convoy is a bigger dot, but compared to the size of the ocean, it is easy to get lost and not detect them. According to Len Deightons book Blood tears and Folly, 9 out of 10 conoys escapes without being attacked.Posted: Thu Aug 12, 2004 6:10 pm Post subject:
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Quote:
So it is better to have dead merchant ships then have them in convoys?
Whoa slow down. I'm not saying convoys are impractical-they are actually the only way to protect merchant ships under submarine threat.
Point is, it is not as simple as an Admiralty order stating all ships will now travel in Convoy-there are practical considerations that will delay the effective implementation of the process.
Quote:
Send packs of warships out and try and sink Uboats? It was something that was tried, as it appealed to the RN sense of being aggressive. It was clearly nonsense. U boatss are only an effective military weapon if they attack merchant ships.
You may want to have a look at the kill records for Capt RN "Johnny Walkers HK Group. used in conjunction with Air assets it is the most effective way of ASW.
Quote:
Why would you go out and attack escorts? While in principle, it makes sense to try and limit the # of escorts avalible, it is tough to kill a warship. They are relaivtively fast, have shallower drafts, and are much more manuverable then merchant ships. If you are on the surface, and atttack one, then the deck guns will quickly hit the Uboat, and then it can't submerge. If the Uboat is submerged, it is tough to get in range and fire a shot that will hit the escort. Torpedos are realtively slow, and only travel in a straight line. If the escorts are fired upon, they will change the course, and speed rapidly, ruin the fire solution, and the torpedos will miss.
Precisely to limit the escorting capability of the opposing Navy and remove the protection fro further attacks.
Armoured ships BB,CA's and CL's were dificult to sink with contact torpedoes. Light forces ie. DD's FF, sloops and corvettes are not.
The attack profile for Escorts is different from that of merchants, it will invariably be submerged. Normally your solution will indicate the CPA and a fan or spread will be fired,assuming the escort is prosecuting you he will invariably close as rapidly and directly as possible without zigzagging, also as he is using active sonar you will constantly have bearing and range information simplyfying the firing solution greatly.Also detecting an incoming torpedo is incredibly difficult even today. I might add ARA Belgrano was sunk with straight running torpedoes.
Quote:
the rule of thumb on clear weather is 50 km for a smoke stack.
Ja assuming a height of eye of +- 5 metres from the Fin of a U-boat the horison should be 22-24 NM. However you are looking for the smoke trail that is above the ship,I forget the equation but I think you gain 1-2 nm for every 1-2 meters above the water. So assuming your smoke makes a trail 15-20 metres above your funnel the visual detection range is greatly increased. Vessels in convoys travel in divisions/lines the smoke from these lines will tend to combine with normal standard distance of 2 cables,so you should have 6-10 smoke trials depending on how many lines are in the division obviously if the wind is beam on you will then have lots of different trails.
1) Graf Zeppelin had a crew of 1700, Bismarck and Tirpitz had a crew of 2400 each, and the three Hipper class cruisers have a crew of 1600 each.Lkefct wrote: 1). Did Germany posses the facitilities to train that many more crews and officers quickly enough to man those boats? I don't know, but I suspect actually having the boats, and some extra time allows them to do so.
2). Germany had a huge problem with their torpedo's. This is a double edged sword. On the one hand, more boats in action means a wider variety of engagements, so that maybe they cannot actually sink as many ships. On the flip side, more engagements means they realize the extent of the problem sooner, switching to contact pins sooner, and getting the magnetic fuses put as a higher priority. Again a wash.
If those capital ships were not built, you'd have 11300 sailors freed up for the U-boat Service. That's enough to crew 200 Type VII U-boats, and have 1300 men left for command and shore duties.
2) I've given the historical figures for sinkings in my first post. The alternative figures only multiply this by the percentage of 'extra' boats available. So boat for boat, the 'extra' boats aren't sinking more ships on average than the original boats. So faulty torpedoes are accounted for - if 40% of German torpedoes were duds historically, 40% are duds in the alternative figures - but because extra boats means more torpedoes fired, it's 40% of a larger total number of torpedoes fired, which means more merchants sunk in more attacks.
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Kurt_Steiner
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Tim Smith wrote:
Best regards
Without the heavy cruisers Blucher, Prinz Eugen and Hipper the attack against Norway would have been quite different. Would the Kriegsmarine be able to support the attack without this three ships?Going purely on tonnage, if the Germans hadn't built Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin (which was 95% completed), and the heavy cruisers Blucher, Prinz Eugen and Hipper, that would come to about 150,000 tons.
Best regards
Nice work Tim 
I also think that if there had been greater emphasis on U-boats, the strategy would have been a lot more aggressive.
But I suppose this effect (on strategy), while it might have been the one with the greatest effect, is the one with the least amount of probability in certainity.
Lkefct = Lake Effect?
I klnow what you talking about pal. Nice user ID. Glad to know I'm not the only one from these frozen wastes By the way, there's a diner by that name on Route 5 (Main St.) in Buffalo.
I also think that if there had been greater emphasis on U-boats, the strategy would have been a lot more aggressive.
But I suppose this effect (on strategy), while it might have been the one with the greatest effect, is the one with the least amount of probability in certainity.
Lkefct = Lake Effect?
I klnow what you talking about pal. Nice user ID. Glad to know I'm not the only one from these frozen wastes By the way, there's a diner by that name on Route 5 (Main St.) in Buffalo. Prinz Eugen wasn't used in Norway - she wasn't commissioned until 1 Aug 1940.
The Germans would have had to use their two old coastal battleships, Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein, in Norway if Hipper and Blucher had not been available. They were slow but had 4 x 11" guns, so that's good enough for coastal bombardment duties. Also they would have transported troops.
Historically Blucher was sunk by Norwegian coastal gun and torpedo batteries and Hipper damaged after colliding with the British destroyer Glowworm. If the same had happened to Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein, it would not have been a critical loss to the Germans, since these ships were hardly ever used again.
Incidently, the Germans also had 6 light cruisers in WWII. Two were sunk in the Norwegian operation.
The Germans would have had to use their two old coastal battleships, Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein, in Norway if Hipper and Blucher had not been available. They were slow but had 4 x 11" guns, so that's good enough for coastal bombardment duties. Also they would have transported troops.
Historically Blucher was sunk by Norwegian coastal gun and torpedo batteries and Hipper damaged after colliding with the British destroyer Glowworm. If the same had happened to Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein, it would not have been a critical loss to the Germans, since these ships were hardly ever used again.
Incidently, the Germans also had 6 light cruisers in WWII. Two were sunk in the Norwegian operation.
Kurt_Steiner wrote: Without the heavy cruisers Blucher, Prinz Eugen and Hipper the attack against Norway would have been quite different. Would the Kriegsmarine be able to support the attack without this three ships?
Best regards
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PrinceLiberty
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increased losses
I agree that those extra loses were realistic and would haveTim Smith wrote:Going purely on tonnage, if the Germans hadn't built Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin (which was 95% completed), and the heavy cruisers Blucher, Prinz Eugen and Hipper, that would come to about 150,000 tons.
That steel could have been used to build 150 more type VII U-boats, which could all have been available by September 1940.
Here is a statistical analysis based on actual figures of U-boat victories and losses in the North Altantic. The 'Historical' figures are real, the 'Alternative' figures assume that 150 extra U-boats were deployed in September 1940 (having been in training for 2 years previously), and figures for both Allied losses and U-boat losses have been increased proportionally from October 1940.
Note: Under the 'Alternative' heading, ONLY the figures for the North Atlantic have been increased. Allied losses elsewhere remain identical. So this is therefore a conservative estimate of the effect of an increased U-boat force, as the possibility of increased U-boat kills outside the North Atlantic has not been considered, although total U-boat losses has been. This balances the fact that not all Allied losses in the North Atlantic were caused by U-boats.
Analysis:
1a) 1939 Historical:
Average Operational U-boats: 50
Allied Losses, N. Atlantic: 249,195 GRT
Allied Losses, World: 755,237 GRT
Total U-boat Losses: 9
1b) 1939 Alternative: As above.
2a) 1940 Historical:
Average Operational U-boats: 60
Allied Losses, N. Atlantic: 1,805,494 GRT
Allied Losses, World: 3,991,641 GRT
Total U-boat Losses: 23
2b) 1940 Alternative:
Average Operational U-boats: 180 (historical Jan-Sep, x2.5 Oct-Dec)
Allied Losses, N. Atlantic: 3,572,896 GRT (historical Jan-Sep, x2.5 Oct-Dec)
Allied Losses, World: 5,759,043 GRT (N. Atlantic historical Jan-Sep, x2.5 Oct-Dec, rest historical)
Total U-boat Losses: 31 (historical Jan-Sep, x2.5 Oct-Dec) (extra U-boats remaining 142)
3a) 1941 Historical:
Average Operational U-boats: 75
Allied Losses, N. Atlantic: 2,421,700 GRT
Allied Losses, World: 4,328,558 GRT
Total U-boat Losses: 35
3b) 1941 Alternative:
Average Operational U-boats: 215 (x2.85 historical)
Allied Losses, N. Atlantic: 6,901,845 (x2.85 historical)
Allied Losses, World: 8,808,703 GRT (N. Atlantic x2.85, rest historical)
Total U-boat Losses: 100 (x2.85 historical) (extra U-boats remaining 77)
4a) 1942 Historical:
Average Operational U-boats: 125
Allied Losses, N. Atlantic: 5,471,222 GRT
Allied Losses, World: 7,790,697 GRT
Total U-boat Losses: 86
4b) 1942 Alternative:
Average Operational U-boats: 200 (x1.6 historical)
Allied Losses, N. Atlantic: 8,753,955 (x1.6 historical)
Allied Losses, World: 11,073,430 (N. Atlantic x1.6, rest historical)
Total U-boat Losses: 138 (x1.6 historical) (extra U-boats remaining 25)
(From 1943 onward the effect of the remaining 25 extra boats is virtually nil.)
Historical Total Allied Losses, 1939-42: 16,866,133 GRT
Alternative Total Allied Losses, 1939-42: 26,396,413 GRT
Difference - Total sunk by extra 150 U-boats: 9,530,280 GRT
So you can see that Allied shipping losses between 1939 and 1942 would have increased by half from the deployment of an extra 150 U-boats at the beginning of the war.
This would probably not be 'quite' enough to win the war for Germany, but the British would be in an extremely serious position. It is clear that an extra 300 U-boats in 1940, twice the amount assumed here, certainly would have won the war for Germany.
Under this alternative scheme, the German surface fleet would still have the three pocket battleships Deutschland, Scheer and Graf Spee, and also Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The last two should have been equipped with 6x15" guns instead of 9x11" guns from the start. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau with 6x15" guns would make them almost as effective as Bismarck and Tirpitz (less heavily armed and armoured, but faster.)
strechted Britian but not forced them to surrender due
to the way American would have pitched with extra contruction.
It is impossible to say but it could have effect the campaigns
resources would have been diverted form the production
of tanks planes to build more merchant ships also
the supply of the North Africia Army may have been effected
and the supply of aid to Russia in 1941 almost surely would
been far less and that could have changed how the North
Africia campaigns go and how things go in Russia in 1942.
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PrinceLiberty
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losses
Rommell was only stopped in Egypt because the British builtSam H. wrote:That's almost 10,000,000 extra tonnage lost. Gotta figure that would have delayed Operation Torch by a few months. Subsequent invasions would also be delayed (Sicily, Italy, Normandy), or perhaps cancelled.
How do you figure the Axis would have done with the extra time?
This would also decrease the Lend-lease supplies to Russia. Gotta figure on that hurting the Soviets in some minor way.
up a huge edge in equipement, supply, men etc..
with all these extra losses that edge would to some extent
been less and Rommell several times almost broke the
British but each time his inferiority in supply and equipment
(more than in men) was way too much to completely overcome
and have him throw the final knockout punch.
The British having less might have made the difference
and Operation Torch might have not just not been
delayed but never happened because Rommell takes
Egypt and the Middle East and then the Axis
follow up by protecting the French Colonies,
forcing Spain in the war and take Gibraltar.
Which of course if that happens makes thing worse in Submarines
can base in the Middle East Gibraltar and so forth
then after 1942 the Submarines will still be kicking butt
and will not suffer nearly as heavy losses as they did in 1942.
Tim wrote:
Also the flip side to this would be the possible increase in RN personnel released from capital ships now that these German ships cease to exist, for use within RN escorts etc.
Andy H
That's an ideal scenario. A certain % would be unfit for submarine duties given there age, attitude & naval skills etc.1) Graf Zeppelin had a crew of 1700, Bismarck and Tirpitz had a crew of 2400 each, and the three Hipper class cruisers have a crew of 1600 each.
If those capital ships were not built, you'd have 11300 sailors freed up for the U-boat Service. That's enough to crew 200 Type VII U-boats, and have 1300 men left for command and shore duties.
Also the flip side to this would be the possible increase in RN personnel released from capital ships now that these German ships cease to exist, for use within RN escorts etc.
Andy H
Andy H wrote:That's an ideal scenario. A certain % would be unfit for submarine duties given there age, attitude & naval skills etc.
Also the flip side to this would be the possible increase in RN personnel released from capital ships now that these German ships cease to exist, for use within RN escorts etc.
Andy H
Sorry, Andy, but you are nitpicking.
Most German sailors in WWII were young. And the Kreigsmarine managed to field 300+ U-boats later in the war. They found the men to do that even though hundreds of thousands were dying on the Russian front. Suggesting that they somehow couldn't do the same pre-war is silly.
If the Germans had built submarines instead of large capital ships, the U-boat training schools would have been greatly expanded as far back as 1937, in preparation. And the training for surface sailors would be reduced.
As for the Royal Navy, as I've stated previously the RN had to commit to a capital ship building program in 1936. At that time the Admiralty had to prepare for the worst-case scenario - Britain and France vs Germany, Italy and Japan. With the US remaining neutral. Back in 1936 the USA was very isolationist indeed - China hadn't even been invaded yet - so at that time Britain couldn't afford to assume that the US would definitely help, not even against Japan.
So Britain could not have afforded to scale back her capital ship program and build escorts instead pre-war.
She would still need five new King George V class battleships to replace the obselete Revenge class dreadnaughts, and six new Illustrious/Implacable class carriers to counter the Japanese carrier building program. Also several of the RN's early experimental carriers were poorly designed and getting old (Furious, Vindictive, Argus, Hermes, Eagle) so needed replacing anyway.
The German surface fleet would still be a potent threat to Britain even without Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and the Hipper class cruisers. She'd still have the three Deutschland class pocket battleships. And also Scharnhorst and Gneisenau - which, if Bismarck and Tirpitz were cancelled, would have been equipped with 6 x 15" guns instead of 9 x 11" guns. (That's because they'd be Germany's only battleships.) With 6 x 15" guns, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would be nearly as dangerous as Bismarck and Tirpitz - admittedly with slightly less armour and one less turret, but faster.
Also the Italian and Japanese fleets were building many powerful new battleships and cruisers, which the Royal Navy had to counter.
I think the only thing Britain would do differently pre-war is cancel the four Lion class battleships four months earlier. Historically, the first two of these were laid down in June 1939 - and they were cancelled in October 1939 anyway so the shipyards could build escorts. So Britain gets a four-month head start on escort building in June 1939.