1941: What if Germany refuses troops for North Africa

[butgen]

Italy would have lost north africa much more quickly and the alliance would have been seriously strained.
Southern europe would have been under threat from allied invasion much earlier.
The only thing that was done wrong by Germany is to give not enough support to the italians in view of the strategic importance of the Meditteranian.

[stg 44]

Posting on request from OP:
if Germany doesn't engage in Libya at all and just focuses on the Balkans/Greece, then Malta murders Italian supply lines and the area falls to the Brits some time over the Summer in 1941, which puts them on the border of Tunisia and potentially creates a major friction point for Vichy neutrality and perhaps might get North Africa to flip to the Free French, same with Syria-Lebanon about the same time. It makes Germany look super weak, potentially opens Italy to invasion, at very least reopens the Mediterranean to British shipping and saves them millions of tons per year that no longer has to go around South Africa, plus keeps the Aegean open to a potential counterattack from the Brits. It would be a terrible geo-political move and give the Brits all the breathing room they need to get aggressive in the Mediterranean in 1941-42. Once the US shows up they can invade Italy directly after securing North Africa, depending what happens with Vichy Neutrality. Perhaps the Brits invade Tunisia and Algeria to lock it down and force Germany to invade Vichy like historically in 1942...just a year early or more.

North African intervention was actually the better option for the German compared to letting Italy fail, that is until Operation Torch. Then the Germans should have cut bait and defended Sicily and Sardinia rather than trying to drag out the campaign in 1943.

[kfbr392]

Posting on request from OP:
if Germany doesn't engage in Libya at all and just focuses on the Balkans/Greece, then Malta murders Italian supply lines and the area falls to the Brits some time over the Summer in 1941, which puts them on the border of Tunisia and potentially creates a major friction point for Vichy neutrality and perhaps might get North Africa to flip to the Free French, same with Syria-Lebanon about the same time. It makes Germany look super weak, potentially opens Italy to invasion,

yes. and only a matter of time. here it happens earlier than in OTL.

at very least reopens the Mediterranean to British shipping and saves them millions of tons per year that no longer has to go around South Africa,

no. in this scenario there would be great numbers of LW anti-shipping aircraft stationed on Crete, Sicily, and Sardinia; and some KM assets in Italy and Greece (S-Boats, sub hunters, possibly Type VII U-Boats). They would locate and pound any Allied shipping and Malta convoys. No smooth sailing.

plus keeps the Aegean open to a potential counterattack from the Brits.

so? they would find a German occupied Aegean of 1941-1942 even more hostile than the Aegean of the fall of 1943 in OTL.

North African intervention was actually the better option for the German compared to letting Italy fail, that is until Operation Torch. Then the Germans should have cut bait and defended Sicily and Sardinia rather than trying to drag out the campaign in 1943.

I say lets cut bait and defend Europe in Europe.
Sure, the Italians will not be amused by the loss of Lybia ... There will be awkward moments between the Duce and the Führer.
Send some air defence assets (flak, radar, fighters, destroyers, night fighters) to defend Italian airspace.
Station some German motorized and armored units on Sicily and Sardinia from the end of 1941 (units rebuilding from losses in Russia).
Let the Wallies come, counterattack ... and all the while nibble at THEIR sea supply lanes...


Again, in OTL:
- the fighting in North Africa did much to teach the British and Americans about modern warfare. How well would they have fared in their invasion of Europe with their last fighting encounters with the Germans having been Dunkirk 1940 and Greece 1941 for the UK, and ZERO for the Americans... The British could have concluded after taking Tripolis in mid-1941 in this ATL that their equipment and leadership were in great shape; and become complacent...
- the thousands of Axis tanks, guns, and vehicles and soldiers tied down and lost there were wasted.

Those two factors proved catastrophic and should have been avoided...

[stg 44]

Posting on request from OP:
if Germany doesn't engage in Libya at all and just focuses on the Balkans/Greece, then Malta murders Italian supply lines and the area falls to the Brits some time over the Summer in 1941, which puts them on the border of Tunisia and potentially creates a major friction point for Vichy neutrality and perhaps might get North Africa to flip to the Free French, same with Syria-Lebanon about the same time. It makes Germany look super weak, potentially opens Italy to invasion,

yes. and only a matter of time. here it happens earlier than in OTL.

I don't think it was inevitable. The Mediterranean Front was winnable with a different strategy than IOTL. A critical mistake was not starving Malta into submission before shifting X. Fliegerkorps to Greece in May-June. They let up just at the moment the Brits had given up on it, but hadn't decided to surrender yet, which let them recover and turn it into the major output in the Mediterranean. Had they kept up Luftwaffe efforts through June it would have surrendered in June or July, which was before X. Fliegerkorps did anything of value in the Aegean. With Malta out in June/July then Rommel's logistics aren't taken out in July-December and he would be able to storm Torbuk in August and then invade Egypt in September long before the Operation Crusader reinforcements had arrive, before the Brits really had learned to fight, when the numerical strengths of both sides were roughly equal, and when British equipment wasn't as good as it would become in 1942.

at very least reopens the Mediterranean to British shipping and saves them millions of tons per year that no longer has to go around South Africa,

no. in this scenario there would be great numbers of LW anti-shipping aircraft stationed on Crete, Sicily, and Sardinia; and some KM assets in Italy and Greece (S-Boats, sub hunters, possibly Type VII U-Boats). They would locate and pound any Allied shipping and Malta convoys. No smooth sailing.

Where are these a-historical extra anti-shipping forces coming from? The Germans couldn't spare them from Norway both to defend and attack Allied shipping, same with Atlantic anti-shipping forces. Plus the Brits could station more of their own offensive aircraft in the Mediterranean and chew up Luftwaffe bombers attacking their ships. With North Africa in their hands Allied shipping could hug the shoreline and receive fighter protection the entire route through the Mediterranean, plus have normal convoy defenses. "Bomb Alleys' historically around Crete and Malta only worked the way they did because the Axis had control around the shores, Allied shipping could move out of range of Axis bombers and in range of land based fighters to cover them. Going after such convoys is not going to be feasible without far more resources allocated to the job than the Axis had to spare and a much higher tolerance for losses than the Axis could afford. By making North Africa an area not worth German troops they aren't going to send huge numbers of specialist air units instead, because that is even more expensive than sending men to control the North African coast with Italian ground troops and a much less effective way at shutting down Allied convoys moving through the area. Historically after North Africa fell in May 1943 the Allies ran convoys through the Mediterranean without loss from then on despite massive Axis commitments to the theater.

plus keeps the Aegean open to a potential counterattack from the Brits.

so? they would find a German occupied Aegean of 1941-1942 even more hostile than the Aegean of the fall of 1943 in OTL.

Not to commando raids and aerial harassment. Plus the Axis would have to commit huge resources there; as it was by 1943 the Germans were already committing 70,000 men just to defend Crete, including the excellent 22nd Airlanding division, which was utterly wasted on occupation duty. But the threat of invasion was such that they had to do that to deter British invasion. Net gain for the Allies.

North African intervention was actually the better option for the German compared to letting Italy fail, that is until Operation Torch. Then the Germans should have cut bait and defended Sicily and Sardinia rather than trying to drag out the campaign in 1943.

I say lets cut bait and defend Europe in Europe.
Sure, the Italians will not be amused by the loss of Lybia ... There will be awkward moments between the Duce and the Führer.
Send some air defence assets (flak, radar, fighters, destroyers, night fighters) to defend Italian airspace.
Station some German motorized and armored units on Sicily and Sardinia from the end of 1941 (units rebuilding from losses in Russia).
Let the Wallies come, counterattack ... and all the while nibble at THEIR sea supply lanes...

Defending Europe from Europe is the less effective option, going on the offensive in the Mediterranean is the best defense of Europe. I said cut bait in late 1942 because that was the least bad option once the US shows up with it's crushing air power and resources. It is still a bad option, just the least bad one left. In 1941 committing a small German corps to North Africa and potentially disemboweling the British empire with the capture of Egypt was the BEST option for Germany in 1941, FAR better to focus on than Barbarossa, which was a fool's errand. If you are already talking about stationing German troops in Italy to defend it from invasion, you're already fucked without lubricant, because it will require far more to defend than attack. Attacking the Brits in their colonies is the only way to WIN the damn war. Attacking Russia does not accomplish that and actually gives Japan the cover to attack the US...which means more likely than not bringing them into the war in Europe eventually even if Hitler doesn't declare war first. By not attacking the Soviets in 1941 and going full tilt in the Mediterranean the Germans can actually destroy the British empire at it's core and force them from the war. After that the blockade ends and Stalin isn't going to attack Hitler ever.

The problem with the historical campaign was the fuck up around Malta. Not taking it in 1941 via the aerial interdiction that was just about to get a surrender was the fatal mistake that prevented Rommel from winning when winning was still possible in 1941. He didn't need any forces that weren't already there historically, just for Malta not to be an issue, because he'd have enough supplies to storm and take Tobruk in August, then invade and conquer Egypt in September before the Brits could bring in the Crusader reinforcements. Barbarossa wouldn't have made one bit of difference then, Egypt could have been taken with historical forces used better. Then the option for a Middle East campaign and inciting Muslim uprisings and ripping out the guts of the British empire was on the table come December 1941; at that point even with US entry Operation Torch isn't workable, because then the Brits and US would have to ship forces to the Middle East to hold the area and ensure the Persian Lend-Lease route isn't lost, Turkey stays neutral, and the British empire doesn't collapse. That is if Churchill doesn't lose a vote of no-confidence in 1941 and Britain exits the war because they lose Egypt and the Middle East is being invaded with Arab uprisings everywhere. That's not even getting into the naval potential of taking the Suez and running Uboats and Italian naval units in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf!

Again, in OTL:
- the fighting in North Africa did much to teach the British and Americans about modern warfare. How well would they have fared in their invasion of Europe with their last fighting encounters with the Germans having been Dunkirk 1940 and Greece 1941 for the UK, and ZERO for the Americans... The British could have concluded after taking Tripolis in mid-1941 in this ATL that their equipment and leadership were in great shape; and become complacent...
- the thousands of Axis tanks, guns, and vehicles and soldiers tied down and lost there were wasted.

Those two factors proved catastrophic and should have been avoided...

That's why you fight better so the campaign is won before the Americans show up and the Brits learn how to fight. That all hinges on Malta not falling historically. That was the original sin of the Axis and why they ended up dragging out the campaign and losing eventually. It might be the reason that Britain was able not to lose the war in 1941. The problem is you seem to think without experience in North Africa the Allies would never have been able to win the war; that is just tactical thinking and why Germany lost, they needed to win strategically and time and material were on the side of the Allies. Playing defensively means the Allies have all the time in the world to build up their resources to crushing proportions and overwhelm the Germans strategically and operationally. Even if avoiding the Mediterranean in 1941 let's the Germans somehow defeat the USSR in 1941 the US and UK would be able to build up and defeat Germany eventually and they had the will and firepower to do so, it would just be a longer, bloodier war, especially for Germany, because then nukes at least become and option and gas and anthrax might be too.

[georgica]

If so , Let's say that did not happen.. than Germans did not have to slow down fighting over Stalingrad and maybe won the battle. But when was no supply of fuel , no replacement parts and fresh troops the inevitable took place : defense and retreat.
Romanian oil fields were strategic crucial in supply fuel and parts for tanks and other warming equipment needed in that harsh winter Russian land.
Does anyone know Who's the American Commander that ordered these Raids on Romanian region Ploiesti Oil Fields ?

[T. A. Gardner]

If so , Let's say that did not happen.. than Germans did not have to slow down fighting over Stalingrad and maybe won the battle. But when was no supply of fuel , no replacement parts and fresh troops the inevitable took place : defense and retreat.
Romanian oil fields were strategic crucial in supply fuel and parts for tanks and other warming equipment needed in that harsh winter Russian land.
Does anyone know Who's the American Commander that ordered these Raids on Romanian region Ploiesti Oil Fields ?

The German problem at Stalingrad, and with ACG South towards the end of 1942 wasn't so much oil as it simply was a shortage of everything, and an inability of the rail and supply system in general to support their troops that far forward. The Luftwaffe was flying as many transport missions, or more, than combat missions to support Stalingrad the supply situation was that bad.

Romanian oil wasn't going to change anything one iota in this respect.

As for this thread:

What the Germans needed in the Med wasn't more air power necessarily, but a navy and merchant shipping, two things they didn't have and weren't going to get. Without at least a minimal fleet of warships and a sufficient number of merchant hulls, they were hit trying to do most anything in N. Africa.

The British don't have to send their fleet or merchants through the Med except to resupply Malta. Otherwise they can make the trip around Africa in relative safety. The Germans have to be able to move supplies across the Med and that means the merchants need lots of escorts to stop air and submarine attacks on them.
As it was, they relied virtually completely on the Italians to do this, paying a hefty price tag to do it too.

[kfbr392]

I don't think it was inevitable. The Mediterranean Front was winnable with a different strategy than IOTL [...]

Sir, I thank you for this most compelling and well-founded post.
This definately and definitivly answers my original post.
Bottom line: it was appropriate to send German forces to NA in late 1940/ early 1941.

(I ask forum users to continue any discussion on which Axis strategy should have been employed in the Med, the question of supplying Axis troops in the Eastern Med by sea, etc in other "what if" threads. There are already plenty in existence:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=de-US&s ... uche&gbv=1
Thank you.)

[Urmel]

With Malta out in June/July then Rommel's logistics aren't taken out in July-December and he would be able to storm Torbuk in August and then invade Egypt in September long before the Operation Crusader reinforcements had arrive, before the Brits really had learned to fight, when the numerical strengths of both sides were roughly equal, and when British equipment wasn't as good as it would become in 1942.

The real hit to the logistics only came in September onwards, the stuff lost until then was pretty inconsequential. So taking Malta out in May wouldn't make a war-winning difference before autumn (i.e. CRUSADER timeframe). On the other hand, a lot of the materiel used by the Allied command in November was present in September. Most notably absent were 22 Armoured Brigade at that stage.

The tank delivery numbers by month are here:

https://rommelsriposte.com/2014/02/23/b ... uary-1942/

By the end of August you have additional 114 I-tanks, 109 US M3 Stuarts, and 103 UK Cruisers, for a total of 326 mediums. These need to be added to the about 100 tanks that were in Tobruk once 4 R.T.R. arrived there in September (prior to that 4 R.T.R. was in Egypt, and 28 older cruisers as well as 17 I-tanks were in Tobruk), and at least 100 older cruisers with 6 and 7 R.T.R. So in tanks the Allies were already superior by the end of September, probably over 500 against about 300 Axis mediums ignoring Tobruk.

In terms of divisions, they had 1 and 2 South African. 2 New Zealand. 4 Indian. 6 (later 70) British Infantry Division, 9 Australian (in Tobruk), 6 Australian in Palestine. These were all at full strength apart from 1 South African which had only two brigades. The Germans on the other hand are looking at not having much of the infantry that made up Division z.b.V. (the Afrika Regiment only got in in October/November), and the Italians would be without Trieste, which only got in in September, which means they have all the divisions severely weakened in Spring and their weak immobile infantry divisions. Plus Ariete, which maybe at full strength (although I think one tank battalion only got into theatre in August?)

Without adding substantial forces to the delivery schedule in May-July, the Axis does emphatically not have the strength to take Egypt in September, let alone earlier than that.

[stg 44]

With Malta out in June/July then Rommel's logistics aren't taken out in July-December and he would be able to storm Torbuk in August and then invade Egypt in September long before the Operation Crusader reinforcements had arrive, before the Brits really had learned to fight, when the numerical strengths of both sides were roughly equal, and when British equipment wasn't as good as it would become in 1942.

The real hit to the logistics only came in September onwards, the stuff lost until then was pretty inconsequential. So taking Malta out in May wouldn't make a war-winning difference before autumn (i.e. CRUSADER timeframe). On the other hand, a lot of the materiel used by the Allied command in November was present in September. Most notably absent were 22 Armoured Brigade at that stage.

The tank delivery numbers by month are here:

https://rommelsriposte.com/2014/02/23/b ... uary-1942/

By the end of August you have additional 114 I-tanks, 109 US M3 Stuarts, and 103 UK Cruisers, for a total of 326 mediums. These need to be added to the about 100 tanks that were in Tobruk once 4 R.T.R. arrived there in September (prior to that 4 R.T.R. was in Egypt, and 28 older cruisers as well as 17 I-tanks were in Tobruk), and at least 100 older cruisers with 6 and 7 R.T.R. So in tanks the Allies were already superior by the end of September, probably over 500 against about 300 Axis mediums ignoring Tobruk.

In terms of divisions, they had 1 and 2 South African. 2 New Zealand. 4 Indian. 6 (later 70) British Infantry Division, 9 Australian (in Tobruk), 6 Australian in Palestine. These were all at full strength apart from 1 South African which had only two brigades. The Germans on the other hand are looking at not having much of the infantry that made up Division z.b.V. (the Afrika Regiment only got in in October/November), and the Italians would be without Trieste, which only got in in September, which means they have all the divisions severely weakened in Spring and their weak immobile infantry divisions. Plus Ariete, which maybe at full strength (although I think one tank battalion only got into theatre in August?)

Without adding substantial forces to the delivery schedule in May-July, the Axis does emphatically not have the strength to take Egypt in September, let alone earlier than that.

The hit to Axis supply lines started in July, intake was almost half of June due to increasingly aggressive British forces out of Malta and things went down hill from there. Taking Malta by June would prevent the July and on downtick. Already in July intake of supplies was below requirements. Plus once Malta is gone the Luftwaffe can shift to full Afrika Korps support, rather than splitting it's attention. With Tobruk being stormed and artillery doing a lot of the heavy work that is more than one full division lost to the Brits in August, plus a bunch of equipment and supplies. 9th Aussie was pulled out in mid-August, right around the time that Rommel was supposed to attack without his supplies getting disrupted from July on. That would catch them at their weakest and if the Brits inserted the historical replacements to shore them up, they'd get lost too, especially with the full X. Fliegerkorps free to support the attack without Malta.

Then the Axis ground troops spend time recovering, Trieste shows up in September, and the attack goes forward. 6th Aussie is not going to be any help, because it is needed to hold Palestine unless something comes in to replace them. The British demonstrated they sucked at armored warfare in the Desert during this period and their number of tanks was worth quite a bit less than the more limited Axis divisions, so it's more likely than not they lose, especially given 9th Aussie is removed from the picture and 6th Aussie is not a factor. The Brits might have full strength divisions, but that generally did not help them when they were faced with maneuver warfare and given that their armor numbers are quite a bit lower than they were in November, that would be the margin Rommel needed to win, especially without Tobruk and the Aussies at his back and all his forces concentrated on the Wire. Add in that the Luftwaffe can dedicate their full attention to supporting him, Rommel is in a good position to roll the British at the border like he did in Gazala and race for Alexandria.

[Urmel]

I think the only thing that you demonstrated is that you don't know what you are talking about.

[stg 44]

I think the only thing that you demonstrated is that you don't know what you are talking about.

Which you've proven with this incisive response?

[David Thompson]

Urmel -- You wrote (at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 2#p2055402):

I think the only thing that you demonstrated is that you don't know what you are talking about.

From our rules:

There has been a lot of stimulating information exchanged on this forum, and some excellent discussions of controversial points. With few exceptions, the participants are thoughtful, serious people. If you find an argument is flawed, point out the flaws and the evidence to the contrary, and leave it at that. There is no need to resort to insults which do not prove your point. If you disagree with a contributor, please use your energy to show why his argument is mistaken. This will improve both the tone and quality of our discussions.

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[Urmel]

Urmel -- You wrote (at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 2#p2055402):

I think the only thing that you demonstrated is that you don't know what you are talking about.

From our rules:

There has been a lot of stimulating information exchanged on this forum, and some excellent discussions of controversial points. With few exceptions, the participants are thoughtful, serious people. If you find an argument is flawed, point out the flaws and the evidence to the contrary, and leave it at that. There is no need to resort to insults which do not prove your point. If you disagree with a contributor, please use your energy to show why his argument is mistaken. This will improve both the tone and quality of our discussions.

http://forum.axishistory.com/app.php/rules

David

I provided a well-argued post with data. The other poster completely ignored it to continue to claim things that aren't correct, without bringing forth ANY data to substantiate his argument.

When are you going to remind him of the rules?

Many thanks.

[Urmel]

I think the only thing that you demonstrated is that you don't know what you are talking about.

Which you've proven with this incisive response?

I provided data and verifiable information. You ignore it in order to claim things that are verifiably untrue in pursuit if an argument that makes no sense and flies in the face of reality. When you engage with the data and bring anything worth that description of your own, rather than making up things, you'll get a reasoned response. At present the above is all your post deserves.

[Gooner1]

I don't think it was inevitable. The Mediterranean Front was winnable with a different strategy than IOTL. A critical mistake was not starving Malta into submission before shifting X. Fliegerkorps to Greece in May-June. They let up just at the moment the Brits had given up on it, but hadn't decided to surrender yet, which let them recover and turn it into the major output in the Mediterranean. Had they kept up Luftwaffe efforts through June it would have surrendered in June or July

Your evidence for this is? This strikes me as wishful thinking especially since convoys and naval ships did make successful supply runs to Malta February-May '41.

http://www.naval-history.net/xAH-MaltaSupply03.htm