Admiral Phillips finest hour

[Fatboy Coxy]

Thank you guys, so good so far, excellent post Mescal, and your info on sunset is pretty good. Incidentally the South China Sea, off the coast of Kota Bharu is enjoying typical seasonal weather, heavy rain, as we discuss (29.12.2012)
I do need to provide more information here, apologies for those of you who posted in ignorance.

Historically Phillips knew the Japanese were making landings at Kota Bharu and Singora. He planned to catch them at Singora, at dawn, 10th December, so at some stage his course would have taken a sharp turn west. British intelligence told him that the transports were being covered by at least one Kongo class battleship, three heavy and two light cruisers, and twenty destroyers. He had little information of the strength, disposition or efficiency of the Japanese air forces.

HMS Prince of Wales was equipped with Type 281 Radar, air warning set, with a secondary surface search and gunnery capability of up to 25,000 yards. Unfortunately the radar was inoperative, and they hadn’t been able to fix it at Singapore.

HMS Repulse was equipped with Type 284 Radar, which was used for surface gunnery. At later mod 284P was used by DoY to sink Scharnhorst blind. This was working fine!

The Japanese Type 93 Torpedo, ‘Long Lance’ was a secret weapon. Thanks to it using compressed oxygen as opposed to compressed air, it had a maximum range of 40 kilometers at 38 knots with a 1,000 pound high explosive warhead. It was installed on destroyers and cruisers, including the Mogami class. Normally the Japanese launched at a distance of 20 kilometers, while everyone else launch theirs at 10 kilometers, and more importantly expected everyone else to! But posters are right to point out the further away you are the less accurate you will be.

The Mogami class Cruisers had been built with 6 inch triple turrets on larger turret rings to circumvent the Washington Treaty, having them replaced with 8 inch twin mounts later. This and other design features made them top heavy which created stability problems in poor weather!

The Japanese convoys had an escort of three destroyer divs, I’d guess 12 destroyers. 7th Cruiser Sqn was the covering force, about 150 miles off Kota Bharu, while Admiral Kondo was southeast of Indochina near Poulo Condore Island, 60 miles south of Saigon. Kondo can’t get to Singora before Phillips!

Information taken from ‘The War Against Japan – Woodburn Kirby, The Imperial Japanese Navy Page (Web Site), and numerous Wikipedia pages
Steve

[Terry Duncan]

Quite interesting. Would this also affect the Japanese AA armament? Of all people they should know how dangerous planes could be against ships. Would this result in more US losses, possibly even a Japanese win at Midway?

Possibly. The Japanese ended up with anything up to about 162 x 25mm AA guns on Yamato without adding much to her real defences. The Japanese 25mm is a good gun, with a adequate RoF, can shoot at high angles, has a good shell, and comes in many mounting sizes - 1-3 mounts, armoured and unarmoured versions etc - but has one real major problem. Its range is almost entirely useless. All guns were struggling with dive bombers, but the 25mm struggles with torpedo planes in so much as it is only in its effective range after they have dropped their weapons. Therefore it does nothing to prevent attack, as it only gets planes as they pull away from their attack runs.

The follow up ships to Yamato would have had better guns, swapping the mixed batteries for 20 x 3.9" guns which were really quite good if somewhat late appearing in numbers. Its unlikely the Japanese could fix anything by the wars end, yet alone Midway, their industry was simply not up to the job it had been set.

[Markus Becker]

If Force Z had not been sunk by the Japanese aircraft, how would that have affected the war? Apparently, after this incident, all navies saw the need to protect their ships from planes and upgraded their AA armament substantially, suddenly realising the threat these planes posed.

The RN and USN had realized this long before. Upgunning was done but the demand for more triple-A was much bigger than the supply, especially in case of the RN. In terms of their AA-defences Repusle and the four DD were way below what other british warships had.

[Baltasar]

The follow up ships to Yamato would have had better guns, swapping the mixed batteries for 20 x 3.9" guns which were really quite good if somewhat late appearing in numbers. Its unlikely the Japanese could fix anything by the wars end, yet alone Midway, their industry was simply not up to the job it had been set.

The question is whether or not the Japanese would be able to inflict more losses on the USN at Midway, especially their carrieres. With Hornet or/and Enterprise sunk too, the USN would find this battle less decisive and would require more time to start her counteroffensive across the Pacific, thus giving the Japanese more time for their own plans, whatever plans they had after losing four carriers.

[LWD]

.... The Japanese 25mm is a good gun, with a adequate RoF, can shoot at high angles, has a good shell, and comes in many mounting sizes - 1-3 mounts, armoured and unarmoured versions etc - but has one real major problem. ....

They don't seem to agree with you over at:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/25_60.htm

It was also a very mediocre weapon, being hampered by slow training and elevating speeds (even in power-operated triple mounts), excessive vibration and muzzle flash, and the fact that the ammunition feed was via a 15-round fixed magazine which necessitated ceasing fire every time the ammo had to be changed.

[Juha Tompuri]

Phillips perhaps could have acchieved his goal (or avoided the destruction) if he had used the fighter cover availlable to Force Z.

Regards, Juha

[Fatboy Coxy]

OK Guys lets get back to the thread, its a what if...

So no more talk of 25mm guns and Midway, and please Juha, no Buffalos, Finish or not, cos the weather is too bad (in my what if). Now I’ll qualify the post with, the weather forecast is bad until the 12th Dec....

So onto the first contact, and lets get the old salty dogs thinking

Force Z are deployed thus, HMS Prince of Wales, followed by HMS Repulse about 5,000 yards astern, preceded by the destroyers in an arc, left to right, HMAS Vampire, HMS Electra, Express, and Tenedos, each 5,000 yards apart. The screen is primary there for submarines, the mission is to get to Singora undetected. They’re sailing at 15 knots, partly to conserve fuel for the destroyers, and partly because of the rough sea.

The Japanese have a screen, line abreast, Ayanami , Isonami, light cruiser Sedai, Shikinami and Uranami 10,000 yards apart. 10,000 yards behind Isonami comes Rear Adm Kurita & Kumano, with Mikuma 5,000 yards astern. Mogami and Suzuya are in an identical order behind Shikinami. The two columns of heavy cruisers is to provide more tactical options. (I know people are gonna shoot me down for this, but its a bit more aggressive)

5.12pm Electra sails out of a rain squall, and sights smoke to the North East, signals to PoW, three plus unidentified ships on bearing .....

5.14pm Uranami signals to Mogami, warship sighted south west, bearing...

What happens next!

Steve

[Tim Smith]

What's the range at 5.12 pm please?

[LWD]

Why so far part? That's significantly further than I would expect battleships to be if they are expecting a gun engagement.

[Juha Tompuri]

and please Juha, no Buffalos, Finish or not, cos the weather is too bad (in my what if).

OK, but they could also have been Blenheims

Regards, Juha

[Fatboy Coxy]

I think I've bitten off more than I can chew here, so gonna need some help. Basically I want to create an encounter that gives both sides some limited time to act. Historically the weather had been bad, and I've extended that period of bad weather, so air power is very limited. I want to explore how successful Admiral Phillips might have been in poor weather.

and please Juha, no Buffalos, Finish or not, cos the weather is too bad (in my what if).

OK, but they could also have been Blenheims

Regards, Juha

Sorry Juha, no Blenheims, Hudsons, Nells or Bettys. However we do have to allow the use of the ship bourne aircraft. PoW carried 4 Supermarine Walrus and Repulse, 4 Fairey III amphibious biplanes, launched by catapult. The Mogami class heavy cruisers carried 3 Aichi E13A "Jake" seaplanes each, catapult launched. However once launched, due to rough seas and the enemy in close proximity they will unlikely be recovered.

Why so far part? That's significantly further than I would expect battleships to be if they are expecting a gun engagement.

Pardon my ignorance here LWD, I had difficulty deciding on distances between ships. Force Z is trying to sail undetected, the Destroyer screen mostly for submarines, while the Japanese are searching, but want to retain the ability to react quickly. Please alter these distances if you think they are off the mark.

What's the range at 5.12 pm please?

OK, very good point Tim. I guess a Destroyer's bridge is about 45 feet above sea level, so the horizen is about 8.2 miles, 14,400 yards, less than the gun range of both the Japanese and British destroyers. Given the low cloud cover, and poor light, and having just come out of a rain squall, I'll say 7 miles, 12,400 yards. On present courses they will pass each other on the portside, with the distance slightly increasing with time.

OK how does that look?.... Action stations everybody

Steve

[Takao]

You forgot to mention the IJN Chokai in all this, don't forget she was with Sentai 7 too. That would give the Japanese 16 floatplanes for recon work, 15(5*3) aboard the heavy cruisers and 1 aboard Sendai.

Also, the range at 1712 hours is way too far for a surface engagement. Sometime around 1845-1900 hours is much better, maybe even later, depending on the source of information. Since the British spotted the flare that an IJN search plane dropped on Chokai around 1830(or later, depending on the source). Rather than turning away from the area, as he did historically, Phillips turns towards the flare to investigate...

Still, that would nix the bad weather interfering with flight ops, except for the occasional squalls passing through the area. Also, the British forces may or may not be short the destroyer Tenedos, which was detached around the same time to refuel at Singapore.

One could also wonder what would happen if Phillips had turned to investigate the flare over Chokai, with 50+ bombers still in the immediate area...

Continuing...
The British radar was a fire control radar, and of very limited use as a search radar. This is evidenced by the fact that Chokai was not picked up by the Repulse's Type 284 set(if it was even in operation) even though she was well within range. So essentially both forces are steaming "blind". It may also call into question the effectiveness of the set in bad atmospherics, so the radar advantage of the british may, in fact, have been non-existant.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Just for detail, which model radar did the Brits have? Can we assume it was the same as used to search for the Bismarck earlier, or were there other models used then?

[Fatboy Coxy]

Just for detail, which model radar did the Brits have? Can we assume it was the same as used to search for the Bismarck earlier, or were there other models used then?

Thought this was an easy answer, but just need to check before I committed. Was going to say Type 284M, but while searching I found this link, and wow it looks like there was a lot of Radar, abet all of a limited nature.

Prince of Wales - see link below
http://navalhistory.flixco.info/H/12220 ... 330/a0.htm

Also suggestion that Repulse had both 284M (August 1941) and 286P (November 1941)
http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono ... epulse.htm

You forgot to mention the IJN Chokai in all this, don't forget she was with Sentai 7 too. That would give the Japanese 16 floatplanes for recon work, 15(5*3) aboard the heavy cruisers and 1 aboard Sendai.

Chokai was one of the four Takao class heavy cruisers. Takao and Atago were with Admiral Kondo and the battleships, Maya was escorting a invasion convoy to the Phillipines, and I thought Chokai was doing the same with a Malayan convoy. I was aware of the incident with the flare that night but didn't know she was with the 7th Cruiser Div. If she was, I believe Vice Adm Ozawa was on board and would make him commander of this formation, over Rear Adm Kurita. This significantly changes things for me, as it cam be argued that Ozawa was Japans best tactical Admiral, more than a match for Phillips!

If we add Chokai, where do we place her, 1 column of three, and 1 of two, cruisers, or a single column of five. Are their distances ok?

Also, the range at 1712 hours is way too far for a surface engagement.

I bow to your better knowledge on this, your just what is needed, a salty dog (no offense intended)

Also, the British forces may or may not be short the destroyer Tenedos, which was detached around the same time to refuel at Singapore.

I believe Phillips could have refueled Tenedos by trailing a fuel pipe astern, but this would have been an extremely high risk option, so at some stage he will have to let Tenedos go. I guess this would have to be sometime this night, unless Tenedos stays and then has to sail direct to Singapore, along the coastline, becoming vunerable to mines, aircraft and any submarine picket lines.

Continuing...
The British radar was a fire control radar, and of very limited use as a search radar. This is evidenced by the fact that Chokai was not picked up by the Repulse's Type 284 set(if it was even in operation) even though she was well within range. So essentially both forces are steaming "blind". It may also call into question the effectiveness of the set in bad atmospherics, so the radar advantage of the british may, in fact, have been non-existant.

I'd guess that other than fire control, their radar or radars are almost useless, and you have to ask about the fire control element as well. But in 1943, in a snowstorm Royal Navy ships sank Scharnhorst using Radar to direct their guns. That would have been Type 284P, did the radar improve, is a ice cold storm different for radar than a tropical storm?

This is begining to look a bit bleak for Tom Thumb (Phillips) to me. Anyone got any British cheer?

Steve

[Carl Schwamberger]

Just for detail, which model radar did the Brits have? Can we assume it was the same as used to search for the Bismarck earlier, or were there other models used then?

Thought this was an easy answer, but just need to check before I committed. Was going to say Type 284M, but while searching I found this link, and wow it looks like there was a lot of Radar, abet all of a limited nature.

Prince of Wales - see link below
http://navalhistory.flixco.info/H/12220 ... 330/a0.htm

Also suggestion that Repulse had both 284M (August 1941) and 286P (November 1941)
http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono ... epulse.htm

Continuing...
The British radar was a fire control radar, and of very limited use as a search radar. This is evidenced by the fact that Chokai was not picked up by the Repulse's Type 284 set(if it was even in operation) even though she was well within range. So essentially both forces are steaming "blind". It may also call into question the effectiveness of the set in bad atmospherics, so the radar advantage of the british may, in fact, have been non-existant.

I'd guess that other than fire control, their radar or radars are almost useless, and you have to ask about the fire control element as well. But in 1943, in a snowstorm Royal Navy ships sank Scharnhorst using Radar to direct their guns. That would have been Type 284P, did the radar improve, is a ice cold storm different for radar than a tropical storm?

This is begining to look a bit bleak for Tom Thumb (Phillips) to me. Anyone got any British cheer?

Steve

Thanks very much. Maybe once before I've gotten a coherent answer to that question, & I cant recall where the other might have been. The several radar systems must have something to do with that. The multiplicites confusing people as it were. From reading elsewhere I have been told the weather differences between to cold North Atlantic and warm tropics will require a very different interpretation of the return signals. Perhaps the operators had not adjusted completely to operating conditions?