Finland better prepared for the Winter War

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Juha Tompuri
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Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Juha Tompuri » 23 Jan 2011 22:35

From here: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1551330
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
As Finnish army was about 340 000 men strong and the KIA rate in real Winter War between USSR and Finland was about 5.7 to 1 (or more), the two million army might or might not have been problematic for Finns in this scenario (Finns with more and better arms).
2 million - not a problem?!? Juha, I understand, that you are proud of armed forces of the country, but such words simply are not serious. If you at all do not count the Soviet infantry a problem, where you will put superiority RKKA in artillery, aircraft and tanks? All the same all this will shoot on the Finnish armies, only it will be much more, accordingly and losses in the Finnish army will be more.
The Red Army "would go through" also 600 thousand lost, and “would go through” Finnish, for example, 100-120 thousand killed and wounded?
The my statement is based on the "KIA exchange rate" which would be even more favourable for Finns if equipped better.
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
The purges and the a bit strange Soviet command system with included political elements in the decision making seemed to not to have encouraged the commanders in very initiative style of leading their units. If you understand what I mean.
I think what yes. The red army most of all suffered from a low level of preparation of command structure of an average and lowest link.
It was are direct investigation of the general low level of literacy of the population getting " in the inheritance " from Russian Empire. “Political elements” were much a smaller problem, than this.
A unit having two leaders, one military and one political was a strange and a clumsy system.

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon, I know you know that the " summer uniforms no less and at minus forty" is true and ""cuckooes" and built rubber bunkers" is less true.
Slon-76 wrote:I think, that you know, that I do not do groundless applications. "Summer uniforms no less and at minus forty" - It is a myth, same as ""cuckooes" and built rubber bunkers".
I actually ment Summer gear and -40, not them neccessary together. As I ment the cucooes and rubber bunkers not together too (cucooes shooting from rubber bunkers)
Slon-76 wrote:I already spoke, that such situations took place in December. But at the end of a month the instruction of the Stavka, strictly forbidden to send an army on front without warm regimentals has left. In December somewhere there were frosts -40C?
Possible at Salla-Saija-Märkjärvi area yes, at least at official measuring posts (which however were not at the front lines), this time at Sodankylä -34,3°C if it makes any difference for the individuals there.
Slon-76 wrote:By the way, " everyone know " that 44-n the division has arrived on front in the summer form.
I now work with documents of this division and I can approve, that it - lie. The only thing that was not at a division are “valenoks.” Them gave out already on a place.
What about 136th and 163th Divisions?
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote: During Winter war of Air Forces of Red Army lost one plane on 110-115 starts, the Air Forces of Finland - one on 89 starts.
Interesting.
Does the Soviet/Finnish figures also include trainers or just combat planes?
Combat sorties or all sorties?
These are losses of warplanes in fighting sorties.
Combat losses or all losses?
To what numbers you base your claim?

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Depending what the "win" is.
Soviet initial goal was to change the political system in Finland, and Finnish goal was to stay independent.
I think the outcome would have been the same.
Primary task was to remove border, attempt of change of political system - investigation of decision-making on the military decision of this question. Generalizing: Time we shall be at war, it is possible to put wider tasks.
If to start with an initial task the USSR has executed it. And that Stalin wanted in a reality we can guess only.
The Soviet goals at the war were far further (both military and political ones) than the eventually acchieved.

Regards, Juha

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Slon-76 » 26 Jan 2011 21:59

Juha Tompuri wrote: The my statement is based on the "KIA exchange rate" which would be even more favourable for Finns if equipped better.


The USSR will involve the big forces, hence losses of Finns too will be more. Besides by preparation of war by autumn of 1939 as a whole it was known about weak arms of the Finnish army. If there was an information that the Finnish army is equipped with very good and modern weapon - the plan could be another. The red Army would began to operate more cautiously, hence, with smaller losses. In general, in my opinion, long resistance of Finns result of successfully chosen tactics. I do not see how more modern arms somehow would essentially be reflected in losses of Red Army. Well can percent 10-15.
The end result all the same would not change, here that the main thing. In 30th years simply there was no the weapon capable so cardinally to help to Finns successfully to reflect an attack of the USSR.
Juha Tompuri wrote:
A unit having two leaders, one military and one political was a strange and a clumsy system.
Well the leader at unit nevertheless was one - its commander. The commissar directly to participate in fighting management should not. He should carry out the control and conduct educational work. Though, certainly, in practice it was frequently broken.
Nevertheless, while cases when the commissarаr very much prevented to work to the commander not frequently came across me. In small units helped more. Though as a whole the system was, certainly, vicious. Therefore it have refused. But in general I shall be repeated - the institute of commissars is not that main thing that prevented to be at war normally Red Army.
Juha Tompuri wrote:
I actually ment Summer gear and -40, not them neccessary together. As I ment the cucooes and rubber bunkers not together too (cucooes shooting from rubber bunkers)
I also speak about it. In Finland there were bunkers, and there was a rubber. But “rubber bunkers” was not. :)

Juha Tompuri wrote:
What about 136th and 163th Divisions?
About 163 division - the naked truth. Has really arrived in the summer form and overcoats (except for 81-st regiment). But in December of it have dressed in normal winter regimentals. About 136th do not know, but I think that there was not worse. It on an isthmus was, is closer to warehouses.

Juha Tompuri wrote:
Combat losses or all losses?
To what numbers you base your claim?


All losses. I took for calculation Finnish estimation of losses of the Soviet Air Forces maximum known to me - 900 planes (Mannerheim). The parity even worse for Finns is real. The Soviet Air Forces have executed 123 thousand fighting starts, having lost about 750 planes. Total 164 starts on one lost plane.
There are data as planes and about hours of flight on one loss (without the Air Forces of fleet:

DB-3 – 207 h
SB – 358 h
TB-3 – 92 h
R-5, R-Z, SSS – 207 h
Fighters – 301 h

The truth I think, that these data are a little bit overestimated. In particular on them fighting losses have made 249 planes whereas I have counted 309. Concerning noncombat losses to tell more difficultly as not always it is possible to track destiny of the plane. According to Management of the Air Forces of Red Army from 200 planes damaged in failures it has been written off only 65 + 71 broken in accidents. To this it is necessary to add 462 breakages, 235 emergency landings and 388 planes damaged in fight. During war was 1188 planes are repaired, including 1096 is direct in own units.


Juha Tompuri wrote:
The Soviet goals at the war were far further (both military and political ones) than the eventually acchieved.
You can prove it with documents in hands?

Regards

P.S. And I in general clearly write? The electronic translator translates, my English is even worse... :roll:

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Juha Tompuri » 26 Jan 2011 23:37

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: The my statement is based on the "KIA exchange rate" which would be even more favourable for Finns if equipped better.


The USSR will involve the big forces, hence losses of Finns too will be more. Besides by preparation of war by autumn of 1939 as a whole it was known about weak arms of the Finnish army. If there was an information that the Finnish army is equipped with very good and modern weapon - the plan could be another. The red Army would began to operate more cautiously, hence, with smaller losses. In general, in my opinion, long resistance of Finns result of successfully chosen tactics. I do not see how more modern arms somehow would essentially be reflected in losses of Red Army. Well can percent 10-15.
The end result all the same would not change, here that the main thing. In 30th years simply there was no the weapon capable so cardinally to help to Finns successfully to reflect an attack of the USSR.
As this is a "what if" section, my opinion still is is that better armed finnsh troops would have changed the course of the Winter War.
...But then ... if the finns had fought enough against the soviet troops, the spring thaw would have affected more to the Soviet side.
Then... on the other hand... if finns had resisted untill the April, the German attack against Norway would have weakened Finland, as it would in the end denied the possible western aid to Finland...
...seems to be that, as USSR needed at least some success before it was ready for the peace with Finland, thje peace came about the optimal time from the finnish point of view.
That is from my point of view.
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
A unit having two leaders, one military and one political was a strange and a clumsy system.
Well the leader at unit nevertheless was one - its commander. The commissar directly to participate in fighting management should not. He should carry out the control and conduct educational work. Though, certainly, in practice it was frequently broken.
Nevertheless, while cases when the commissarаr very much prevented to work to the commander not frequently came across me. In small units helped more. Though as a whole the system was, certainly, vicious. Therefore it have refused. But in general I shall be repeated - the institute of commissars is not that main thing that prevented to be at war normally Red Army.
Slon-76 wrote:Though as a whole the system was, certainly, vicious.
That is what I ment.
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
I actually ment Summer gear and -40, not them neccessary together. As I ment the cucooes and rubber bunkers not together too (cucooes shooting from rubber bunkers)
I also speak about it. In Finland there were bunkers, and there was a rubber. But “rubber bunkers” was not. :)
:)

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
What about 136th and 163th Divisions?
About 163 division - the naked truth. Has really arrived in the summer form and overcoats (except for 81-st regiment). But in December of it have dressed in normal winter regimentals. About 136th do not know, but I think that there was not worse. It on an isthmus was, is closer to warehouses.
A babelfish translation of the 136th Division commander reply to Stalin:
[CHERNYAK]. On December 13 I and commissioner reported to the military council of the 7th army, when they were unloaded at the station red. Many soldiers were barefooted
http://www.aroundspb.ru/finnish/comcom/comcom_2.php

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Combat losses or all losses?
To what numbers you base your claim?


All losses. I took for calculation Finnish estimation of losses of the Soviet Air Forces maximum known to me - 900 planes (Mannerheim). The parity even worse for Finns is real. The Soviet Air Forces have executed 123 thousand fighting starts, having lost about 750 planes. Total 164 starts on one lost plane.
There are data as planes and about hours of flight on one loss (without the Air Forces of fleet:

DB-3 – 207 h
SB – 358 h
TB-3 – 92 h
R-5, R-Z, SSS – 207 h
Fighters – 301 h

The truth I think, that these data are a little bit overestimated. In particular on them fighting losses have made 249 planes whereas I have counted 309. Concerning noncombat losses to tell more difficultly as not always it is possible to track destiny of the plane. According to Management of the Air Forces of Red Army from 200 planes damaged in failures it has been written off only 65 + 71 broken in accidents. To this it is necessary to add 462 breakages, 235 emergency landings and 388 planes damaged in fight. During war was 1188 planes are repaired, including 1096 is direct in own units.
As earlier said, interesting.
Or actually, very interesting, I will have to digest all this for a while.
Thank you for the details.


Slon-76 wrote:[
Juha Tompuri wrote:
The Soviet goals at the war were far further (both military and political ones) than the eventually acchieved.
You can prove it with documents in hands?
You can choose here the ones you like:
http://www.histdoc.net/history/velikie1939_e.html
Slon-76 wrote:P.S. And I in general clearly write? The electronic translator translates, my English is even worse... :roll:
Really no problem.
From the little I have learn't from you at this Forum, I really do believe you are an honest person and the possible translation problems do not change that my opinion.

Thank you very much for your posts,

Regards, Juha

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by CanKiwi2 » 27 Jan 2011 14:57

Hi Slon-76,

I have to second Juha's feedback here. Very interesting information and as I go forward with my What-if, I really look forward to discussing options and alternatives with you, offlline or online as appropriate. Perhaps we should use this thread for that, and I can incorporate pieces into my What-if as it moves ahead.

Cheers............Nige
ex Ngāti Tumatauenga ("Tribe of the Maori War God") aka the New Zealand Army

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Slon-76 » 28 Jan 2011 21:07

Juha Tompuri wrote:
As this is a "what if" section, my opinion still is is that better armed finnsh troops would have changed the course of the Winter War.
...But then ... if the finns had fought enough against the soviet troops, the spring thaw would have affected more to the Soviet side.
Then... on the other hand... if finns had resisted untill the April, the German attack against Norway would have weakened Finland, as it would in the end denied the possible western aid to Finland...
...seems to be that, as USSR needed at least some success before it was ready for the peace with Finland, thje peace came about the optimal time from the finnish point of view.
That is from my point of view.
I understand it. But in what a mistake as I think. You do the calculations proceeding from the point of view, that the Finnish army strongly to change, and the Red Army remain to the same. If to exaggerate, if at Finns would be twice more guns and machine guns, the Red Army would have twice the big losses.
In a reality Command of Red Army was rather quite good is informed about a condition of the Finnish army. It in many respects explains bad preparation for war, and heavy losses during the first period. Have decided, that can " throw caps ". Hence, if about the Finnish army there was an opinion, as about army well provided with the modern weapon to preparation for war would come more seriously. In particular, more attention it would be given to investigation on Karelian isthmus. About attraction of all means, from "tourists" up to aircraft. And most likely, it would become known about new construction on Mannerheim’s Line. Initially larger forces would be involved, and the Finnish defensive line would be exposed to more massed processing by artillery and aircraft. Losses strongly would jump up and at the Finnish party.
In air position too strongly would change. The Finnish aircraft did not count a serious problem, therefore to a question of protection of bombers seriously did not concern. It - one of the basic components success of the Finnish fighters in December. And if it was known, what the Finnish Air Forces have one hundred modern fighters? Even hundred Р-35 could not provide to Finns domination in air. Look at a real situation in February. At the Finnish Air Forces already it is a lot of fighters, but their successes are much more modest, than in December. Besides the Air Forces of Red Army practically free bomb the Finnish armies at the front and in near rear. Here about the same would be, if to the Finnish Air Forces are in earnest from the very beginning. Probably, it would be a little bit enough large air fights, it is possible even lost by the Soviet aircraft. But Finns would lose much more pilots, than in real December. I shall once again be repeated: the USSR presumed the big losses, Finland - is not present. Besides I strongly doubt, that the Finnish pilots of a sample of 1939 year were better than the Japanese pilots. But Japanese on the Halkhin-Hol have lost for air war, though all over again they were accompanied with success. At that the parity of forces was less favorable for the Air Forces of Red Army, than in Finland.
Juha Tompuri wrote: ...But then ... if the finns had fought enough against the soviet troops, the spring thaw would have affected more to the Soviet side.
Probably yes. And probably also is not present. A question in as far as war will be delayed.
There is such example. For March, 10 9 Army planned to begin approach to northern flank in area Kusamo - Markajarvi. In area Kusamo has concentrated "Artemyev's group" in structure of eight ski battalions. It should take Kusamo, and then attack the north, in flank to the Finnish grouping in area Markajarvi. The main shock grouping should consist of 122-nd and 88-th divisions strengthened 758-th rifle regiment and arriving 172-nd division. In that that these forces would crush the Swedish corps I do not doubt.
Approach has not taken place in connection with the ending of war and if war was not terminated - would take place. Than Finns would liquidate this approach? As though they with it were helped by new guns and planes? Even if to Finland would arrive 15 thousand promised Poles, strongly I doubt, that they would be at war better, than Red Army in December. All the same a battlefield very specific, and experience at them any...

Juha Tompuri wrote: A babelfish translation of the 136th Division commander reply to Stalin:
[CHERNYAK]. On December 13 I and commissioner reported to the military council of the 7th army, when they were unloaded at the station red. Many soldiers were barefooted
http://www.aroundspb.ru/finnish/comcom/comcom_2.php
It not absolutely in a theme, but I shall answer here.
As I have already told, the problem in December really took place.
The reason is very simple. It is not so quick system of rear maintenance of red Army.
Let's stop on same 163-rd and 136-th divisions.
163 D. It is generated in the beginning of September of 1939 in Tula and almost at once it has been sent in the Pskov area. As at this time it is warm - the division has gone without winter regimentals. At the end of October the division receives receives the order to be put forward in Kem'. In the same place it should receive warm regimentals from warehouses of the Leningrad military district. Kalinin military district, whence it leaves, in general is not interested to supply a decreasing division in any way. But in whom else not any warehouses, there only one regiment is deployed. In result the division comes on an empty place and then within a month "kneads a dirty" on 200-km to road from Kem’ up to border. In result to the beginning of war a division in summer regimentals and with very bad footwear.

136 D. History in general the same. It is generated in Nizhni Novgorod, at once has left for the Pskov area. To supply it there wants nobody, as a division "another's". And there is nothing. The footwear during a finding there is worn out, new promise to give already on a new place. In result the division has arrived in summer regimentals and "without footwear".
In general speaking while the division is in process of a transfer, anybody to be engaged in its supplies does not want.
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote:You can prove it with documents in hands?
You can choose here the ones you like:
http://www.histdoc.net/history/velikie1939_e.html
Also what it proves? I read all these documents, but they have not changed my opinion, as you see.
Where there the documents speaking that a question on border was not a starting point of the conflict and its main reason?


Regards,

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Juha Tompuri » 29 Jan 2011 23:27

Slon-76 wrote:I understand it. But in what a mistake as I think. You do the calculations proceeding from the point of view, that the Finnish army strongly to change, and the Red Army remain to the same.
At the exaple given, only the finnish side would have been more prepared.
Slon-76 wrote:If to exaggerate, if at Finns would be twice more guns and machine guns, the Red Army would have twice the big losses.
If Finnish side would have been better armed, perhaps the Soviet losses would have been higher.
Slon-76 wrote:In a reality Command of Red Army was rather quite good is informed about a condition of the Finnish army. It in many respects explains bad preparation for war, and heavy losses during the first period. Have decided, that can " throw caps ". Hence, if about the Finnish army there was an opinion, as about army well provided with the modern weapon to preparation for war would come more seriously. In particular, more attention it would be given to investigation on Karelian isthmus. About attraction of all means, from "tourists" up to aircraft. And most likely, it would become known about new construction on Mannerheim’s Line.
The Soviet intelligence worked pretty well, but seems to be that all their info didn't recach the ones that made the decions.
Slon-76 wrote:Besides I strongly doubt, that the Finnish pilots of a sample of 1939 year were better than the Japanese pilots. But Japanese on the Halkhin-Hol have lost for air war, though all over again they were accompanied with success. At that the parity of forces was less favorable for the Air Forces of Red Army, than in Finland.
Well... afaik compared to the japanese Finns had less fighters and acchieved better results? (please do corrrect me if I'm wrong)
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: ...But then ... if the finns had fought enough against the soviet troops, the spring thaw would have affected more to the Soviet side.
Probably yes. And probably also is not present. A question in as far as war will be delayed.
There is such example. For March, 10 9 Army planned to begin approach to northern flank in area Kusamo - Markajarvi. In area Kusamo has concentrated "Artemyev's group" in structure of eight ski battalions. It should take Kusamo, and then attack the north, in flank to the Finnish grouping in area Markajarvi. The main shock grouping should consist of 122-nd and 88-th divisions strengthened 758-th rifle regiment and arriving 172-nd division. In that that these forces would crush the Swedish corps I do not doubt.
Approach has not taken place in connection with the ending of war and if war was not terminated - would take place. Than Finns would liquidate this approach? As though they with it were helped by new guns and planes? Even if to Finland would arrive 15 thousand promised Poles, strongly I doubt, that they would be at war better, than Red Army in December. All the same a battlefield very specific, and experience at them any...
Your exaple is from the North (yes the thaw arrived there later), how about the Bay of Viborg?



Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote:You can prove it with documents in hands?
You can choose here the ones you like:
http://www.histdoc.net/history/velikie1939_e.html
Also what it proves? I read all these documents, but they have not changed my opinion, as you see.
Where there the documents speaking that a question on border was not a starting point of the conflict and its main reason?
Yes, the question of the border really was the Soviet issue.
How abot this one, that was not ratified for because of some minor political and military issues? http://heninen.net/sopimus/1939_e.htm

Regards, Juha

P.S. you mentioned:
The Soviet Air Forces have executed 123 thousand fighting starts
Ilmavoimat Talvisodassa (Keskinen and Stenman) mentions that
Soviet Army AF flew 84307 combat sorties
SE Front Army AF flew 47520 combat sorties
and Baltic Sea AF flew 15553 sorties during the Winter War.
How about the other "independent" units?

Suomen Ilmavoimien Historia 17 mentions the Soviet (total?) figure being 100970 combat flights
and Finnish one being 5693 combat flights during the Winter War.

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Slon-76 » 31 Jan 2011 19:19

Juha Tompuri wrote: At the exaple given, only the finnish side would have been more prepared.
OK. Probably, I have not truly expressed the idea. In the prospective alternative version of a history it turns out that:
1) Finland strenuously arms.
2) In Soviet Union it see.
3) Soviet Union behaves the same as in a real history.
I believe, that this too big assumption for the benefit of Finland. On mine if to consider alternative it is necessary to take into account counteractions of the opposite party.
In your version of the USSR does not react in any way. In my opinion, it not the correct approach.
Juha Tompuri wrote: If Finnish side would have been better armed, perhaps the Soviet losses would have been higher.
Yes, almost for certain. Question in as far as they will be higher and whether than loss of Finns will be higher as a result of the counter-measures undertaken by the Soviet union.
Juha Tompuri wrote: The Soviet intelligence worked pretty well, but seems to be that all their info didn't recach the ones that made the decions.
Frankly speaking, it is not ready to discuss this moment. Though if to judge under the plan of approach of 9-th army (26.11.39), for the given investigations, on the contrary, relied too strongly.
Juha Tompuri wrote: Well... afaik compared to the japanese Finns had less fighters and acchieved better results? (please do correct me if I'm wrong)
You are formally right. But! Japanese struggled for domination in air and the significant part of fights went above a front line. The Finnish fighters above a front line did not appear almost, allowing unpunishedly to bomb the Finnish armies on advanced. You, I believe, much better me know a history of rather tense attitudes between finnish Air Forces and army in a question of air covering armies. Taking into account a parity of forces, such behaviour is clear.
If the Finnish Air Forces would have 100 modern fighters, they had to cover armies and consequently intensity of air fights would grow very strongly. And it would be recurrence the Halkhin-Hol's script. Because Р-35 not strongly it is better I-16 type 18/27, and the Finnish fighters pilots as it seems to me, have not shown any overwhelming superiority over the Soviet fighters pilots.
Juha Tompuri wrote:Your example is from the North (yes the thaw arrived there later), how about the Bay of Viborg?
Well, for example, all the January long and February the Finnish defense is processed by artillery and aircraft which "mills" the Finnish armies on advanced. What the Finnish army, even with new arms can oppose this?
Juha Tompuri wrote:Yes, the question of the border really was the Soviet issue.
How abot this one, that was not ratified for because of some minor political and military issues? http://heninen.net/sopimus/1939_e.htm
I have initially told, that necessity to be at war has enabled to put wider purposes, including political. Easier speaking - "the people’s government" is a consequence of war, instead of its reason. Besides "on war all means are good". In Finland in fact too there were plans to create the alternative Russian government.
Juha Tompuri wrote: P.S. you mentioned:
The Soviet Air Forces have executed 123 thousand fighting starts
Ilmavoimat Talvisodassa (Keskinen and Stenman) mentions that
Soviet Army AF flew 84307 combat sorties
SE Front Army AF flew 47520 combat sorties
and Baltic Sea AF flew 15553 sorties during the Winter War.
Ups! Was mistaken. Has combined the general number of starts with starts of the Air Forces of fleet.
Air Forces of fleet - 16633.
Air Forces SE Front – 52798 (Including 23426 VVS 7A and 16122 VVS 13A)
Air Forces 8A – ? more than 17 thousand hours.
Air Forces 15A – 4963
Air Forces 9A – 10971
Air Forces 14A – 1881
OABr – 2739 (without March)

Total 106087

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Juha Tompuri » 02 Feb 2011 20:20

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: At the exaple given, only the finnish side would have been more prepared.
OK. Probably, I have not truly expressed the idea. In the prospective alternative version of a history it turns out that:
1) Finland strenuously arms.
2) In Soviet Union it see.
3) Soviet Union behaves the same as in a real history.
I believe, that this too big assumption for the benefit of Finland. On mine if to consider alternative it is necessary to take into account counteractions of the opposite party.
In your version of the USSR does not react in any way. In my opinion, it not the correct approach.
My version:
1) Finland strenuously arms.
2) In Soviet Union it see.
3) Soviet Union don't care - Finns won't resist - "throwing caps"
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: If Finnish side would have been better armed, perhaps the Soviet losses would have been higher.
Yes, almost for certain. Question in as far as they will be higher and whether than loss of Finns will be higher as a result of the counter-measures undertaken by the Soviet union.
After Finns having better and more weapons there would have been less Soviet soldiers and equipment for the counter measures (during the 105 days the war lasted)
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: Well... afaik compared to the japanese Finns had less fighters and acchieved better results? (please do correct me if I'm wrong)
You are formally right. But! Japanese struggled for domination in air and the significant part of fights went above a front line. The Finnish fighters above a front line did not appear almost, allowing unpunishedly to bomb the Finnish armies on advanced. You, I believe, much better me know a history of rather tense attitudes between finnish Air Forces and army in a question of air covering armies. Taking into account a parity of forces, such behaviour is clear.
If the Finnish Air Forces would have 100 modern fighters, they had to cover armies and consequently intensity of air fights would grow very strongly. And it would be recurrence the Halkhin-Hol's script.
It is possible, but I doubt that the finnish strategy would have changed with the introduction of the new and better planes.
Slon-76 wrote:Because Р-35 not strongly it is better I-16 type 18/27, and the Finnish fighters pilots as it seems to me, have not shown any overwhelming superiority over the Soviet fighters pilots.
More and better planes would have been an interesting factor - specially against the Soviet bombers, that would have been their main targets.
About the pilots it's very hard to say, as there were (as I believe also with Soviet AF) skilled and not so skilled Finnish fighter pilots.
However, different from Soviet pilots, no Finnish ones were veterans of wars. As was the case with some Soviet pilots.
Still, AFAIK Finnish fighter tactics in general were better than the Soviet ones, at least in the beginning of the war.
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:Your example is from the North (yes the thaw arrived there later), how about the Bay of Viborg?
Well, for example, all the January long and February the Finnish defense is processed by artillery and aircraft which "mills" the Finnish armies on advanced. What the Finnish army, even with new arms can oppose this?
Well, Soviet countermeasures against Finnish artillery ware not very impressing. So with more and better artillery Finnish counter artillery would have reduced the effects of the Soviet artillery.
With more ammo Finns could have used their artillery the same way as 1944 at for example at Ihantala.
More and better anti-arcraft artillery on their part could have done the same to the Soviet AF.
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:Yes, the question of the border really was the Soviet issue.
How abot this one, that was not ratified for because of some minor political and military issues? http://heninen.net/sopimus/1939_e.htm
I have initially told, that necessity to be at war has enabled to put wider purposes, including political. Easier speaking - "the people’s government" is a consequence of war, instead of its reason.
From my point of view the "people's government" was a tool of war, like a rifle or a bomber.
Mosins and Tupolevs worked better than Kuusinen.
Slon-76 wrote:Besides "on war all means are good".
...as in love, but there are some rules, at least in the war.
Slon-76 wrote:In Finland in fact too there were plans to create the alternative Russian government
AFAIK yes in Finland, but not by finns.
That is that during Winter War some "white russians" came to Finland and proposed raising an army from Soviet POW's attacking towards Moscow, and an idea of replacing Stalin with Trotsky.
Trotsky suffered a violent death ca. half a year after these thoughts.

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: P.S. you mentioned:
The Soviet Air Forces have executed 123 thousand fighting starts
Ilmavoimat Talvisodassa (Keskinen and Stenman) mentions that
Soviet Army AF flew 84307 combat sorties
SE Front Army AF flew 47520 combat sorties
and Baltic Sea AF flew 15553 sorties during the Winter War.
Ups! Was mistaken. Has combined the general number of starts with starts of the Air Forces of fleet.
Air Forces of fleet - 16633.
Air Forces SE Front – 52798 (Including 23426 VVS 7A and 16122 VVS 13A)
Air Forces 8A – ? more than 17 thousand hours.
Air Forces 15A – 4963
Air Forces 9A – 10971
Air Forces 14A – 1881
OABr – 2739 (without March)

Total 106087
Thanks.
Interesting.
Are the "separate"/"independent" units like Kravchenko's OAG also included?

One can also play with the numbers by a different, perhaps a more active way:
how many combat sorties it took to shoot down a enemy plane?

Soviet
+106087 Soviet combat sorties - 37-40(?) finnish planes shot down = 2800+ - 2600+ combat sorties/a shot down enemy plane

Finnish
5693 Finnish combat sorties - according to Soviet sources some 120 Soviet planes shot down = ca. 44 combat sorties/a shot down enemy plane.

Regards, Juha

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Slon-76 » 04 Feb 2011 16:35

Juha Tompuri wrote: My version:
1) Finland strenuously arms.
2) In Soviet Union it see.
3) Soviet Union don't care - Finns won't resist - "throwing caps"
Here therefore I also speak, that you "accompany" the Finnish party a little. I at all do not exclude such variant of events, but it not so suits "objective alternative". All this is equal what to take as an additional condition that the opponent (in this case a military management of the USSR) - the idiot. Why seeing perfectly armed Finnish army Voroshilov and Co will consider, what this army will not resist? In fact in a reality such opinion existed including because weakness of the Finnish army was obvious.
Juha Tompuri wrote: It is possible, but I doubt that the finnish strategy would have changed with the introduction of the new and better planes.
Then what needs reequipment? We allow (though I in it doubt), the Finnish fighters could stop day time strikes on the Finnish rear objects and cities. What is farther? It is absolutely insignificant part of fighting work of the Soviet aircraft. Maximum 10-15 % of starts. Would start to bomb at night. As far as I have understood, sense of strengthening fighter aviation just in having an opportunity to cover armies on a front line.

Juha Tompuri wrote:More and better planes would have been an interesting factor - specially against the Soviet bombers, that would have been their main targets.
As I have already told, a maximum the Finnish fighters in this case - the termination of day time strikes on the Finnish rear could achieve that. When I wrote work on actions of 16-th bombing brigade, very evidently saw, how efficiency of actions of the Finnish fighters falls as the brigade ceases to neglect elementary methods of maintenance of own safety. I.e. the big successes of the Finnish fighters in December - January is a direct consequence of effective using the Finnish pilots of serious lacks of the organization of fighting activity of the Soviet bombers. In process of elimination of these lacks starts to fall and efficiency of the Finnish fighters.

Juha Tompuri wrote:Still, AFAIK Finnish fighter tactics in general were better than the Soviet ones, at least in the beginning of the war.
It is very difficult to compare. Tactics was too different and had different final tasks.


Juha Tompuri wrote:
Well, Soviet countermeasures against Finnish artillery ware not very impressing. So with more and better artillery Finnish counter artillery would have reduced the effects of the Soviet artillery.
With it it is difficult to argue...
Juha Tompuri wrote:With more ammo Finns could have used their artillery the same way as 1944 at for example at Ihantala.
And here it is a little incorrect. I believe, that experience of the Finnish artillery in 1939 and 1944 years are two very different things. Without dependence from quantity and quality of arms.

Juha Tompuri wrote:
More and better anti-arcraft artillery on their part could have done the same to the Soviet AF.
If me have asked to create alternative favourable to Finland on struggle in air, I would bring to a focus of air defence of armies, instead of on expensive and ineffective reequipment actually the Air Forces. Eventually, command of the Air Forces NE front in antiaircraft artillery saw the main threat.
AFAIK, the additional one hundred in 40-mm "Bofors" would complicate a life of the Soviet aircraft much more seriously, than one hundred Р-35.
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote:Besides "on war all means are good".
...as in love, but there are some rules, at least in the war.
Show me who observed these rules... And in general, creation of a different sort of " the alternative governments " and " the governments in exile " - widespread enough practice during the Second World war

Juha Tompuri wrote:Interesting.
Are the "separate"/"independent" units like Kravchenko's OAG also included?
OAG = OABr before 7.03.40. Other "independent" units in the Air Forces was not, all of them submitted either the Air Forces of armies, or the Air Forces of front.
Juha Tompuri wrote: One can also play with the numbers by a different, perhaps a more active way:
how many combat sorties it took to shoot down a enemy plane?

Soviet
+106087 Soviet combat sorties - 37-40(?) finnish planes shot down = 2800+ - 2600+ combat sorties/a shot down enemy plane

Finnish
5693 Finnish combat sorties - according to Soviet sources some 120 Soviet planes shot down = ca. 44 combat sorties/a shot down enemy plane.
Yes, quite right. It is possible to pick up some more criteria for comparison. I name it "to play with figures".
Actually and this example has resulted to show, that simple comparison "Russian shot down/ Finns have shot down" is only one of variants of such game and to draw on its basis global conclusions on efficiency of one side and an inefficiency another is not true.
Always it is possible to find such parameters on which one will be much better than others. For example from your example it is possible to draw a conclusion, that the Finnish Air Forces at 60-64 are more effective than time Soviet! And if, for example, to compare number of fighting starts of the Air Forces of 9 armies and the Swedish volunteers becomes "obvious", that fighting efficiency of Swedes was somewhere in between a snowfall and fogs...
If to follow particularly your example the reason of such parity is abundantly clear, and it not the 60-fold superiority of Finns.
For the Finnish Air Forces the task to shot down the Soviet bombers was one of the major, and the Soviet aircraft was not hidden from Finnish. For the Soviet aircraft or if to be exact, fighters, struggle against the Finnish Air Forces was only one of numerous tasks. Thus the Finnish Air Forces had completely official orders to not get involved in fights with the Soviet fighters. I am confident, that if the Finnish Air Forces would operate the same as Soviet at Finns in 1-1,5 months planes simply would end.
Finns have chosen is unique correct tactics in the given conditions. But if to consider, that this tactics is most effective in general it turns out, as for Air Forces RККА it would be more effective than what was. But You for certain understand, that Finnish tactics simply is not comprehensible to the Soviet aviation.



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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Juha Tompuri » 04 Feb 2011 22:22

Slon-76 wrote: All this is equal what to take as an additional condition that the opponent (in this case a military management of the USSR) - the idiot.
I think it's is quite fair to say that the Soviet leadership underestimated the Finnish will to resist the Soviet attack.

Slon-76 wrote: Why seeing perfectly armed Finnish army Voroshilov and Co will consider, what this army will not resist? In fact in a reality such opinion existed including because weakness of the Finnish army was obvious.
AFAIK bad thing for Voroshilov & co was that they didn't listen Shaposhnikov.
Which of cource was good for finns.
Also the thing how united finns were to resist the attack seems to have been a sort of surprise to the Soviet side.
No matter what weapons a nation has if they are not willing to use them, even the odds would have been agaist them.

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: It is possible, but I doubt that the finnish strategy would have changed with the introduction of the new and better planes.
Then what needs reequipment? We allow (though I in it doubt), the Finnish fighters could stop day time strikes on the Finnish rear objects and cities. What is farther? It is absolutely insignificant part of fighting work of the Soviet aircraft.
From finnish point of view the harbours, bridges, railwaylines and -yards, factories etc were important.
Slon-76 wrote: Would start to bomb at night.
Here I would like to disagree.
1) the Soviet bombing accuracy even during day time was not very impressing
2) Seems that the same with the Soviet pilot orientation skills.


Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:More and better planes would have been an interesting factor - specially against the Soviet bombers, that would have been their main targets.
As I have already told, a maximum the Finnish fighters in this case - the termination of day time strikes on the Finnish rear could achieve that. When I wrote work on actions of 16-th bombing brigade, very evidently saw, how efficiency of actions of the Finnish fighters falls as the brigade ceases to neglect elementary methods of maintenance of own safety. I.e. the big successes of the Finnish fighters in December - January is a direct consequence of effective using the Finnish pilots of serious lacks of the organization of fighting activity of the Soviet bombers. In process of elimination of these lacks starts to fall and efficiency of the Finnish fighters.
That's were the "extra" fighters would have perhaps been a sollution to that problem.



Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:With more ammo Finns could have used their artillery the same way as 1944 at for example at Ihantala.
And here it is a little incorrect. I believe, that experience of the Finnish artillery in 1939 and 1944 years are two very different things. Without dependence from quantity and quality of arms.
Yes you are right.
The fire concentration methods had not yet been invented.
But if not exactly the same kind of effects as at Ihantala, something little less would have also suited to the finns.
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: AFAIK, the additional one hundred in 40-mm "Bofors" would complicate a life of the Soviet aircraft much more seriously, than one hundred Р-35.
Could we have had them both :)
The extra AAA would have been very useful at the "front line protection", but because of the "only regional" protection they would have offered, also extra fighters would have been needed.
Slon-76 wrote: in general, creation of a different sort of " the alternative governments " and " the governments in exile " - widespread enough practice during the Second World war
Yes, but using the Kuusinen government, Soviet side revealed their aims at the war clearly to all the finns.
From political left (counting off extremists) to right and everyone in between.
That was a big mistake.
For the Soviet side.

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:Interesting.
Are the "separate"/"independent" units like Kravchenko's OAG also included?
OAG = OABr before 7.03.40.
Aha!
Thank you.
Life is learning.
Slon-76 wrote:[Other "independent" units in the Air Forces was not, all of them submitted either the Air Forces of armies, or the Air Forces of front.
Like for example AG Tkachenko ?
Slon-76 wrote: For example from your example it is possible to draw a conclusion, that the Finnish Air Forces at 60-64 are more effective than time Soviet!
Well... that was an example also to point out the fact that even finnish pilots did not have any live combat experience when the war started - they started gaining the experiences at much higher rate than the Soviet pilots.
Practise makes the master.

Slon-76 wrote:For the Finnish Air Forces the task to shot down the Soviet bombers was one of the major, and the Soviet aircraft was not hidden from Finnish. For the Soviet aircraft or if to be exact, fighters, struggle against the Finnish Air Forces was only one of numerous tasks. Thus the Finnish Air Forces had completely official orders to not get involved in fights with the Soviet fighters. I am confident, that if the Finnish Air Forces would operate the same as Soviet at Finns in 1-1,5 months planes simply would end.
Finns have chosen is unique correct tactics in the given conditions. But if to consider, that this tactics is most effective in general it turns out, as for Air Forces RККА it would be more effective than what was.
Yes.
Slon-76 wrote:But You for certain understand, that Finnish tactics simply is not comprehensible to the Soviet aviation.
I have some doubts that there would have been any more drastical improvements in the Soviet AF's, if we talk about the 105 days the Winter War lasted.



Regards, Juha

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Slon-76 » 08 Feb 2011 15:21

Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote: All this is equal what to take as an additional condition that the opponent (in this case a military management of the USSR) - the idiot.
I think it's is quite fair to say that the Soviet leadership underestimated the Finnish will to resist the Soviet attack.
Actually - yes. But a question - why so has taken place.
Till the certain moment of the USSR in Finland especially was not interested. Finland, in itself, did not represent real danger, though attitudes with it were rather cold. When due to pact Molotov-Ribbentrop the opportunity to solve the problem with border by all means has appeared, including militarians, the government of the USSR very much hastened to make it. But as plans of war in private with Finland simply were absent, this plan should be made very quickly and without sufficient prospecting maintenance. All of us know result.

And now let's present, that the Finnish army on an extent 20-30years systematically and very well arms. Against whom it does - to guess easily. Precisely not against Sweden.
It is obvious, that in that case the Soviet investigation would give much more attention to that occurs in Finland. In particular, construction of new bunkers on Mannerheim’s Line would not remain unnoticed. Already it would allow to lower losses of Red Army in December, the Soviet command at least would know where new bunkers are located. Full revision of plans of approach aside increases in forces and more cautious promotion forward is not excluded also. And it would be bad for Finns.
Juha Tompuri wrote:AFAIK bad thing for Voroshilov & co was that they didn't listen Shaposhnikov.
That Shaposhnikov spoke unfortunately it is not known. "Shaposhnikov's Plan" till now is not found, and it is difficult to tell, whether it was in general.
Juha Tompuri wrote: From finnish point of view the harbours, bridges, railwaylines and -yards, factories etc were important.
It is clear. But in my opinion, Finns would achieve the big results if have covered the most important centers with a plenty of an antiaircraft artillery.

Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote: Would start to bomb at night.
Here I would like to disagree.
1) the Soviet bombing accuracy even during day time was not very impressing
2) Seems that the same with the Soviet pilot orientation skills.
Most likely there would be a refusal of distant spot-checks (for example Vaasa). For night impacts on Turku, Pori, Kouvola, Vyborg, Lappeenranta, Imatra, etc. competence of the Soviet pilots was quite enough. Besides there were very well prepared crews, capable to carry out a role of leaders and target’s indexes (85 special air regiment, etc.). Such experience did, if I am not mistaken, in January, and is quite successful.
Well and accuracy and was bad in the afternoon. Therefore what difference? :)

Juha Tompuri wrote: That's were the "extra" fighters would have perhaps been a sollution to that problem.
Paradox in that falling of efficiency occurred on a background of growth of quantity of the Finnish fighters. I think, be in hands of the Finnish command 100 P-35, it " would step on the same raker " as in a reality: "Would smear" the forces on huge front from Vartsila up to Turku. The desire "to be everywhere" - very seductive, but very dangerous.
Juha Tompuri wrote: in general, creation of a different sort of " the alternative governments " and " the governments in exile " - widespread enough practice during the Second World war
Yes, but using the Kuusinen government, Soviet side revealed their aims at the war clearly to all the finns.
From political left (counting off extremists) to right and everyone in between.
That was a big mistake.
For the Soviet side. [/quote]

As I already spoke, Kuusinen’s government is a consequence of the decision on war, instead of its reason. Time it is necessary to be at war why to not put wider purposes, than simply to remove border. Replacement of the Finnish government on government, completely subordinated to will of the USSR - cynical, but a logical step. Besides this step from the formal point of view could explain aggression somehow.
But in a reality, you are completely right, it appeared very big mistake.
Juha Tompuri wrote: Aha!
Thank you.
Life is learning.
Till 7.03.40 - OABr, the ambassador – OAG. So it is correct

Juha Tompuri wrote: Like for example AG Tkachenko ?
Was part of the Air Forces of 8-th army. "Kombrig Spirin’s Group of “blind flights”" - in structure of the Air Forces of 9-th army. OABr submitted directly to the commander of the Air Forces, only in the last some days - to the commander Northwest front.
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote: For example from your example it is possible to draw a conclusion, that the Finnish Air Forces at 60-64 are more effective than time Soviet!
Well... that was an example also to point out the fact that even finnish pilots did not have any live combat experience when the war started - they started gaining the experiences at much higher rate than the Soviet pilots.
Practise makes the master.
And bombs kill the soldier. And to him without a difference, the master has dumped it or "nestling".

Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote:For the Finnish Air Forces the task to shot down the Soviet bombers was one of the major, and the Soviet aircraft was not hidden from Finnish. For the Soviet aircraft or if to be exact, fighters, struggle against the Finnish Air Forces was only one of numerous tasks. Thus the Finnish Air Forces had completely official orders to not get involved in fights with the Soviet fighters. I am confident, that if the Finnish Air Forces would operate the same as Soviet at Finns in 1-1,5 months planes simply would end.
Finns have chosen is unique correct tactics in the given conditions. But if to consider, that this tactics is most effective in general it turns out, as for Air Forces RККА it would be more effective than what was.
Yes.

8O
You probably not so have understood me (probably, it is my fault). You consider, what the Soviet Air Forces for the greater efficiency should use Finnish tactics?
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote:But You for certain understand, that Finnish tactics simply is not comprehensible to the Soviet aviation.
I have some doubts that there would have been any more drastically improvements in the Soviet AF's, if we talk about the 105 days the Winter War lasted.
You are mistaken. During war tactics of the Soviet aircraft has changed rather strongly.


Regards,

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Juha Tompuri » 09 Feb 2011 20:19

Slon-76 wrote: And now let's present, that the Finnish army on an extent 20-30years systematically and very well arms. Against whom it does - to guess easily. Precisely not against Sweden.
Against every invaders.

Slon-76 wrote: It is obvious, that in that case the Soviet investigation would give much more attention to that occurs in Finland. In particular, construction of new bunkers on Mannerheim’s Line would not remain unnoticed. Already it would allow to lower losses of Red Army in December, the Soviet command at least would know where new bunkers are located. Full revision of plans of approach aside increases in forces and more cautious promotion forward is not excluded also. And it would be bad for Finns.
But wasn't it at Winter War, thatthe Soviet intelligence had located the Finnish bunkers and passed the information to the leaders, but somehow they did not pass the information the attacking troops.
Underestimation of the Finnish will to resist?
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:AFAIK bad thing for Voroshilov & co was that they didn't listen Shaposhnikov.
That Shaposhnikov spoke unfortunately it is not known. "Shaposhnikov's Plan" till now is not found, and it is difficult to tell, whether it was in general.
IIRC (can't now remember the source) Shaposhnikov would have used more troops.
Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: From finnish point of view the harbours, bridges, railwaylines and -yards, factories etc were important.
It is clear. But in my opinion, Finns would achieve the big results if have covered the most important centers with a plenty of an antiaircraft artillery.
Yes.

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote: Would start to bomb at night.
Here I would like to disagree.
1) the Soviet bombing accuracy even during day time was not very impressing
2) Seems that the same with the Soviet pilot orientation skills.
Most likely there would be a refusal of distant spot-checks (for example Vaasa). For night impacts on Turku, Pori, Kouvola, Vyborg, Lappeenranta, Imatra, etc. competence of the Soviet pilots was quite enough.
IIRC they were able to night bomb city-size "targets", not any important military targets.
Slon-76 wrote: Besides there were very well prepared crews, capable to carry out a role of leaders and target’s indexes (85 special air regiment, etc.).
AFAIK those were quite rare exeptions, and large Soviet night bombing attacks would have been more theory than reality.
Slon-76 wrote: Such experience did, if I am not mistaken, in January, and is quite successful.
Well and accuracy and was bad in the afternoon. Therefore what difference? :)
Which example you mean?

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: That's were the "extra" fighters would have perhaps been a sollution to that problem.
Paradox in that falling of efficiency occurred on a background of growth of quantity of the Finnish fighters. I think, be in hands of the Finnish command 100 P-35, it " would step on the same raker " as in a reality: "Would smear" the forces on huge front from Vartsila up to Turku. The desire "to be everywhere" - very seductive, but very dangerous.
Finnish fighter command did not use the "to be everywhere" tactics, but tried to concentrate the existing few planes to the most critical areas. As perhaps would have been the tactics even more and better planes would have been availlable.


Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote: in general, creation of a different sort of " the alternative governments " and " the governments in exile " - widespread enough practice during the Second World war
Yes, but using the Kuusinen government, Soviet side revealed their aims at the war clearly to all the finns.
From political left (counting off extremists) to right and everyone in between.
That was a big mistake.
For the Soviet side.
As I already spoke, Kuusinen’s government is a consequence of the decision on war, instead of its reason. Time it is necessary to be at war why to not put wider purposes, than simply to remove border. Replacement of the Finnish government on government, completely subordinated to will of the USSR - cynical, but a logical step. Besides this step from the formal point of view could explain aggression somehow.

Slon-76 wrote: But in a reality, you are completely right, it appeared very big mistake.
...for the Soviet side.
For the Finns it was lottery win.



Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote: For example from your example it is possible to draw a conclusion, that the Finnish Air Forces at 60-64 are more effective than time Soviet!
Well... that was an example also to point out the fact that even finnish pilots did not have any live combat experience when the war started - they started gaining the experiences at much higher rate than the Soviet pilots.
Practise makes the master.
And bombs kill the soldier. And to him without a difference, the master has dumped it or "nestling".
Actually I didn't mean the "bus driver" bomber pilots, but the "Formula 1 driver" fighter pilots.

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote:For the Finnish Air Forces the task to shot down the Soviet bombers was one of the major, and the Soviet aircraft was not hidden from Finnish. For the Soviet aircraft or if to be exact, fighters, struggle against the Finnish Air Forces was only one of numerous tasks. Thus the Finnish Air Forces had completely official orders to not get involved in fights with the Soviet fighters. I am confident, that if the Finnish Air Forces would operate the same as Soviet at Finns in 1-1,5 months planes simply would end.
Finns have chosen is unique correct tactics in the given conditions. But if to consider, that this tactics is most effective in general it turns out, as for Air Forces RККА it would be more effective than what was.
Yes.

8O
You probably not so have understood me (probably, it is my fault). You consider, what the Soviet Air Forces for the greater efficiency should use Finnish tactics?
In other words:
Slon-76 wrote:For the Finnish Air Forces the task to shot down the Soviet bombers was one of the major, and the Soviet aircraft was not hidden from Finnish.
Yes
Slon-76 wrote:For the Soviet aircraft or if to be exact, fighters, struggle against the Finnish Air Forces was only one of numerous tasks.
Yes.
Slon wrote:Thus the Finnish Air Forces had completely official orders to not get involved in fights with the Soviet fighters.
Yes.
Slon wrote:I am confident, that if the Finnish Air Forces would operate the same as Soviet at Finns in 1-1,5 months planes simply would end.
Yes.
Slon wrote:Finns have chosen is unique correct tactics in the given conditions.
Yes.
Slon wrote:But if to consider, that this tactics is most effective in general it turns out, as for Air Forces RККА it would be more effective than what was.
This one was not very clear, but what I ment, that the Soviet AF's would have performed even better, if they would have adopted some of the Finnish used tactics.

Slon-76 wrote:
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote:But You for certain understand, that Finnish tactics simply is not comprehensible to the Soviet aviation.
I have some doubts that there would have been any more drastically improvements in the Soviet AF's, if we talk about the 105 days the Winter War lasted.
Slon-76 wrote:You are mistaken. During war tactics of the Soviet aircraft has changed rather strongly.
True, but what I ment here was that I doubt that if the Finnish aicraft quality and quantity would have been better, the Soviet side would have been able to do any more changes in tactics during the 105 days than it in reality was able to make.

Regards, Juha

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by CanKiwi2 » 09 Feb 2011 22:04

Juha Tompuri wrote: True, but what I ment here was that I doubt that if the Finnish aicraft quality and quantity would have been better, the Soviet side would have been able to do any more changes in tactics during the 105 days than it in reality was able to make.

Regards, Juha
A fair assessment would probably be that the Soviet side won thr air war more be sheer weight of numbers than by any change or improvement in tactics. Witness Babarossa, where the Luftwaffe toasted the Soviet Air Force in fairly short order. The Soviet Air Force certainly didn't seem like they'd learned anything from the Winter War. Couple of good books that cover the subject listed below. Both give excellent coverage.

The Red Air for at War: Barbarossa and the Retreat to Moscow: Recollections of Soviet Fighter Pilots on the Eastern Front by Artem Drabkin, et al

Barbarossa: The Air Battle July-December 1941 by Christer Bergstrom
ex Ngāti Tumatauenga ("Tribe of the Maori War God") aka the New Zealand Army

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Juha Tompuri » 09 Feb 2011 22:42

CanKiwi2 wrote:A fair assessment would probably be that the Soviet side won thr air war more be sheer weight of numbers than by any change or improvement in tactics.
The mass really seems to have played bigger part than the tactics.
CanKiwi2 wrote:The Soviet Air Force certainly didn't seem like they'd learned anything from the Winter War.
The development of Il-2 might have had a boost from the Winter War as there the Soviet R-5 variants and fighter planes at ground attack role were not that impressing. Also the Soviet lack of bombers to acchieve results against pin-point targets might have speeded up the introduction of Ar-2 and Pe-2 type planes.

Regards, Juha

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Re: Finland better prepared for the Winter War

Post by Slon-76 » 10 Feb 2011 22:15

Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote: And now let's present, that the Finnish army on an extent 20-30years systematically and very well arms. Against whom it does - to guess easily. Precisely not against Sweden.
Against every invaders.
And you have doubts in the one whom saw in this role? I think in the USSR any strengthening of the Finnish army would be considered as the certificate act directed first of all against the USSR (well or for protection against the USSR).

Juha Tompuri wrote:But wasn't it at Winter War, that the Soviet intelligence had located the Finnish bunkers and passed the information to the leaders, but somehow they did not pass the information the attacking troops.
Underestimation of the Finnish will to resist?
The Soviet intelligence DID NOT KNOW about the Finnish bunkers constructed in 37-39 years. About their existence have learned already during war when have faced them.
Juha Tompuri wrote:
IIRC (can't now remember the source) Shaposhnikov would have used more troops.
There is no source. Some Soviet military leaders speak about this plan in the memoirs (Voronov, for example) only in general. Therefore it is not possible to know, плох the plan was whether or not (and whether it was in general).

Juha Tompuri wrote:
IIRC they were able to night bomb city-size "targets", not any important military targets.
To collect group at 30-40 the good crews, capable to work at night - problems were not. Other business, that in a reality in it needs did not see special.
Juha Tompuri wrote:
AFAIK those were quite rare exeptions, and large Soviet night bombing attacks would have been more theory than reality.
Look above. In it simply did not see necessity. Nevertheless, almost in each army there was a small group specially for actions at night and in bad weather.
Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote: Such experience did, if I am not mistaken, in January, and is quite successful.
Well and accuracy and was bad in the afternoon. Therefore what difference? :)
Which example you mean?
On January, 19 at 21.50 three SB from 12 oae attacked air station Utti. One plane has dumped lighting bombs, others two have struck on hangars. (Аccording to crews - have got, but I cannot know, as far as it corresponds to a reality).
This very day at 20.13 one DB-3 has struck same squadron stations Lappeenranta, and at 22.07 three more DB-3 have repeated impact, being guided on a fire from the previous impact.
The next night pair DB-3 bombed Kouvola station with use of lighting bombs. Fire.

Juha Tompuri wrote: Finnish fighter command did not use the "to be everywhere" tactics, but tried to concentrate the existing few planes to the most critical areas.
Probably. But from the side it looks absolutely on the contrary.

Juha Tompuri wrote:
CanKiwi2 wrote:A fair assessment would probably be that the Soviet side won thr air war more be sheer weight of numbers than by any change or improvement in tactics.
The mass really seems to have played bigger part than the tactics.
It I also want to explain to you all time. At us speak "against a breakage there is no reception". 40 fighters will be at Finns or 140 - the result of struggle in air remain the same - the USSR will knock down Finland number of planes.

Juha Tompuri wrote:
Slon-76 wrote: But in a reality, you are completely right, it appeared very big mistake.
...for the Soviet side.
For the Finns it was lottery win.
:D
Very exact remark!
Juha Tompuri wrote: This one was not very clear, but what I ment, that the Soviet AF's would have performed even better, if they would have adopted some of the Finnish used tactics.
What for example?

Juha Tompuri wrote: True, but what I ment here was that I doubt that if the Finnish aicraft quality and quantity would have been better, the Soviet side would have been able to do any more changes in tactics during the 105 days than it in reality was able to make.
I want to understand, what your way it will allow? Increase in the Soviet losses? The Soviet command could allow itself it. Struggle with the Soviet aircraft for domination in air Finland all the same could not.
CanKiwi2 wrote: Witness Babarossa, where the Luftwaffe toasted the Soviet Air Force in fairly short order.
You overlook, than all these Luftwaffe successes have ended - with a red flag above Berlin.


Regards

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