What if Germany had better long range sea-air recon?

[LWD]

navigation over open water wasn't exactly trivial back then. Even a fairly light cross wind can make a huge difference. How accurate would the subs reports be by the way? I doubt they would be on the surface during the day anywhere near a convoy either.

[phylo_roadking]

Many Ju88 D models were assigned to ocean recon in the OTL.

They couldn't divebomb, and they carried minimal defensive armament.

Many Ju88 D models were assigned to ocean recon in the OTL

...as opposed to HOW many were used for longrange photorecce in BARBAROSSA???

Just make them extended range Ju 88s.

You DO realise the very major structural changes that the H-4 required over a standard A-4??? Months of testing and rebuilding to create a force of "ER" Ju88s...

...while every A-4 NOT built is missed in Russia, North Africa....

What other fronts? Time Frame! Time Frame! Fall 1940 to summer 1941 is when the convoys are at their most vulnerable.

Exactly - TIME FRAME! - the uboat fleet was recalled after the Armistice with France for major recommissioning, it had been operational since the outbreak of war. It's not available again for shipping work until after SEALION is postponed...and THAT is thus the first time a combined operation could identify the requirement for an extended range Ju88 at the earliest I.E. work only begins THEN if its to be a Condor alternative...

...and it's at that point that you have to factor in the months of lead time required for development and testing, and the RLM/Luftwaffe runs slap into BARBAROSSA again.

[Old_Fossil]

phylo_ roadking wrote:

Exactly - TIME FRAME! - the uboat fleet was recalled after the Armistice with France for major recommissioning, it had been operational since the outbreak of war. It's not available again for shipping work until after SEALION is postponed.

Sorry, wrong! Check out Uboat.net for ship losses for the relevant time frame.

Time Ships Sunk
Aug 1940 66
Sept 1940 64
Oct 1940 72
Nov 1940 36
Dec 1940 50
Jan 1941 15
Feb 1941 27
Mar 1941 50
April 1941 48
May 1941 66

I think you may be confused by the pull back after invasion of Norway. Sealion or the BoB were not issues.

[phylo_roadking]

Aug 1940 66
Sept 1940 64
Oct 1940 72
Nov 1940 36
Dec 1940 50
Jan 1941 15
Feb 1941 27
Mar 1941 50
April 1941 48
May 1941 66

And where on uboat.net do these figures come from?

Because strangely enough, when I go HERE - http://www.uboat.net/allies/merchants/losses_year.html and click on, for instance, August 1940 http://www.uboat.net/allies/merchants/l ... ugust+1940 ....it doesn't say 66, it ACTUALLY says -

57 ships sunk (287,311 tons) and 9 ships damaged (69,982 tons).

Might be best if you checked and re-edited your last post figures.

To quote Peter Fleming, p.160

The number of uboats operating during these months was small, yet the average number of kills per uboat was proabably higher than any other time during the war.

[Old_Fossil]

http://www.uboat.net/allies/merchants/losses_year.html Ship LOSSES by month. Sorry if I believed them.

Besides, losses are not the best metric. That would be convoy sighting reports. More convoys were sighted than were successfully attacked.

[phylo_roadking]

More convoys were sighted than were successfully attacked.

What's your source on this?

Aug 1940 66 57
Sept 1940 64 57
Oct 1940 72 60
Nov 1940 36 33
Dec 1940 50 41
Jan 1941 15 15
Feb 1941 47 44
Mar 1941 50 40
April 1941 48 44
May 1941 66 63

Quite different when corrected...

[stg 44]

it seems that there is value to having convoy recce available with an aircraft using non-strategic fuel very efficiently and doesn't take up airfield space. Again, I'm not getting where the little cost of having 100 or so Do26s spotting for Uboats is a bad thing.

I'm not really that sure that THIS - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_26 - is an aircraft I'd care to to be sitting in as it tries to traverse standing RAF/USAAF patrol areas in the Western Approaches and Eastern Atlantic...with a Mosquito or Beaufighter, or a P-38...or even a Hudson!...bearing down on me...

Agreed, which is why you replace them in 1942 when those aircraft show up. From 1939-41 the Do26 is perfect and meaningful; after that point its useless, as is the Battle of the Atlantic. Of course by then the Ju290 should be available, so use that instead. Or an upgraded FW200 that had proper defensive machine guns like the later version...or have the FW300 project running.
Frankly there should be a replacement for something better in the pipeline by the time the Do26 enters service because it will eventually be obsolete.
But as has already been said: the 1940-41 period is what matters and during that period the Do26 is perfect for the role envisioned.

[phylo_roadking]

From 1939-41 the Do26 is perfect and meaningful; after that point its useless

Hardly; the RAF was using Hudsons as patrol aircraft in 1939; IIRC, the first aircraft shot down by an RAF aircraft operating from the UK was by a Hudson! Which has a 45mph advantage on the Do 26...AND a 1,900-mile range!

Even Skuas could shoot down Do 26s!

All the RAF has to do is fly Hudson patrols out ofer the Western Approaches and into Biscay, and the Do 26s have to run their gauntlet flying to and from their bases...

[stg 44]

To quote Peter Fleming, p.160

The number of uboats operating during these months was small, yet the average number of kills per uboat was proabably higher than any other time during the war.

And it would have been higher with proper 'eyes' supplementing naval intelligence. The Do26 could drop flares and smoke pots as needed for long range sighting by Uboats at a distance. Some suggested the Uboats wouldn't surface during the day: they ran on the surface most of the time, especially in 1939-42. They could close pretty close to a convoy, especially in 1940 when there was often only a single escort, and attack on the surface. Doctrine was a surface attack at night though, so during the day they would position themselves in the path of the convoy and attack as it rolled over them, which they could effectively do much easier with aerial recce reports and them marking convoys with short ranged radio homing signals or dropping flares periodically as Uboats closed in, to give them a heads up.

[phylo_roadking]

The Do26 could drop flares and smoke pots as needed for long range sighting by Uboats at a distance.

...and they'd need to sink EVERY ship in a convoy with a radio to prevent word of THAT tactic reaching the UK! The advantage of something like the Condor was it could "orbit" right up/out at virtually the limit of vision on the surface and report movements...

Nothing would trigger the British coming up with a countermeasure quite like a "non-passive" action like that...

And it would have been higher with proper 'eyes' supplementing naval intelligence.

You can't assume that UNLESS you check every single convoy spotted and engaged during that period and determining IF any opportunities were missed.

[stg 44]

From 1939-41 the Do26 is perfect and meaningful; after that point its useless

Hardly; the RAF was using Hudsons as patrol aircraft in 1939; IIRC, the first aircraft shot down by an RAF aircraft operating from the UK was by a Hudson! Which has a 45mph advantage on the Do 26...AND a 1,900-mile range!

Even Skuas could shoot down Do 26s!

All the RAF has to do is fly Hudson patrols out ofer the Western Approaches and into Biscay, and the Do 26s have to run their gauntlet flying to and from their bases...

The defensive armament could make that a harder task. How many Hudsons were out there patrolling in 1940-41? It sounds like it couldn't reach as deep as the Do26 and didn't have much Atlantic patrolling as a result, but then wikipedia is a bit vague.

The Skua was fine for anti-Do26 work provided there were carrier escorts to convoys, which IIRC weren't in place until later in 1941 when H-K patrols were toned down in favor of escort work.

[stg 44]

The Do26 could drop flares and smoke pots as needed for long range sighting by Uboats at a distance.

...and they'd need to sink EVERY ship in a convoy with a radio to prevent word of THAT tactic reaching the UK! The advantage of something like the Condor was it could "orbit" right up/out at virtually the limit of vision on the surface and report movements...

Nothing would trigger the British coming up with a countermeasure quite like a "non-passive" action like that...

So fine then, the Do26 could do the same thing, 'orbit' from a distance and report. I figure the Do26 would operate just as the Condor did in the recce role, which I assumed had similar 'active' help to Uboat guidance. If not, then I would assume Do26s would avoid attracting attention and radio reports in with 'passive' actions.

[phylo_roadking]

How many Hudsons were out there patrolling in 1940-41?

78 at the outbreak of war, you COULD also check squadron by squadron...https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Hudson#Operators

It sounds like it couldn't reach as deep as the Do26 and didn't have much Atlantic patrolling as a result,

So fine then, the Do26 could do the same thing, 'orbit' from a distance and report

Range of Do 26 - 4,412 miles, range of Hudson - 1,960 miles. Just under half...but the Hudson doesn't NEED to patrol the Atlantic...it JUST has to patrol the airspace BETWEEN Spanish/Portuguese airpspace and UK Fighter Command-controlled airspace that the Do 26 has to pass through going out on patrol and returning from patrol! It's a wide corridor - but ALL of it's "width" is within the Hudson's range

The defensive armament could make that a harder task

It's not that useful if something like the Hudson has the speed in hand to outfly it. Its whole ventral surface is undefended, for instance...with lots of fuel tankage in there...

There's ANOTHER action the British could always take... ; The navy could repeat what the Suffolk did! Sail in just before dawn and bombard seaplane anchorages on the French coast - after all, they did it a couple of times during the invasion scare period to destroy barges That's the problem with flyingboat/seaplane anchorages - they're vulnerable.

[stg 44]

They would probably operate out of Bordeaux, which is going to be a deep target for the British to try and hit. Beyond that until 1942 they were in no command of the West Coast of France, especially as deep as Bordeaux; that required the Mosquito AND the majority of German aircraft to be fighting in the East or Mediterranean. So until 1942 the Bay of Biscay is not threatened by British air power, as the only aircraft with that range would be shot down by German fighters in the area. Also aircraft are much harder to find, so if the British are going to use their 78 Hudsons to patrol the West Coast of France for the occasional Do26? Wouldn't they be better used hunting Uboats?

[Carl Schwamberger]

From 1939-41 the Do26 is perfect and meaningful; after that point its useless

Hardly; the RAF was using Hudsons as patrol aircraft in 1939; IIRC, the first aircraft shot down by an RAF aircraft operating from the UK was by a Hudson! Which has a 45mph advantage on the Do 26...AND a 1,900-mile range!

Even Skuas could shoot down Do 26s!

All the RAF has to do is fly Hudson patrols out ofer the Western Approaches and into Biscay, and the Do 26s have to run their gauntlet flying to and from their bases...

Why does this bring visions of Me110 & Hudsons searching out dogfights over the Atlantic.