What if Germany had better long range sea-air recon?

[stg 44]

From 1939-41 the Do26 is perfect and meaningful; after that point its useless

Hardly; the RAF was using Hudsons as patrol aircraft in 1939; IIRC, the first aircraft shot down by an RAF aircraft operating from the UK was by a Hudson! Which has a 45mph advantage on the Do 26...AND a 1,900-mile range!

Even Skuas could shoot down Do 26s!

All the RAF has to do is fly Hudson patrols out ofer the Western Approaches and into Biscay, and the Do 26s have to run their gauntlet flying to and from their bases...

Why does this bring visions of Me110 & Hudsons searching out dogfights over the Atlantic.

Because its an awesome visual and pretty similar in the later concept of the Ju88 vs. Mosquito battles:
http://www.usaaf.net/ww2/uboats/uboatspg4.htm
http://www.amazon.com/Bloody-Biscay-Ove ... 0947554874

I want phylo_roadking to realize that historically the British didn't start doing what he is suggesting until July 1942 after the Luftwaffe was locked in to the fighting in Russia, in the Mediterranean, and the USAAC was fighting over Europe. The British are going to do something, but starting the Battle of Biscay early is just not one of them, because they didn't have the resources yet. The were too worried about a possible German invasion until 1941 to give coastal command the necessary resources.

As the professional contrarian on these boards Phylo should realize that this was a zero sum game: if the British start using resources to patrol Biscay and start hunting Do26s there, what gets left open as a result? Where are the resources going to come from and what are the British going to give up? What are their chances of success at a time when they had little offensive radar ability too? And of course they are going to have to deal with Me110 escorts as Carl mentioned, which would slaughter the limited number of Hudsons, while giving the Me110 something better to do than die in the BoB.

[LWD]

... The Do26 could drop flares and smoke pots as needed for long range sighting by Uboats at a distance. Some suggested the Uboats wouldn't surface during the day: they ran on the surface most of the time, especially in 1939-42. They could close pretty close to a convoy, especially in 1940 when there was often only a single escort, and attack on the surface. Doctrine was a surface attack at night though, so during the day they would position themselves in the path of the convoy and attack as it rolled over them, which they could effectively do much easier with aerial recce reports and them marking convoys with short ranged radio homing signals or dropping flares periodically as Uboats closed in, to give them a heads up.

I'm not sure the coordination would be as easy as you seem to suggest. Nor are radio signals reliably "short ranged".

[stg 44]

... The Do26 could drop flares and smoke pots as needed for long range sighting by Uboats at a distance. Some suggested the Uboats wouldn't surface during the day: they ran on the surface most of the time, especially in 1939-42. They could close pretty close to a convoy, especially in 1940 when there was often only a single escort, and attack on the surface. Doctrine was a surface attack at night though, so during the day they would position themselves in the path of the convoy and attack as it rolled over them, which they could effectively do much easier with aerial recce reports and them marking convoys with short ranged radio homing signals or dropping flares periodically as Uboats closed in, to give them a heads up.

I'm not sure the coordination would be as easy as you seem to suggest. Nor are radio signals reliably "short ranged".

Who said easy? I'm just saying it would be an improvement over the historical setup.

[LWD]

Would it? By the time the bugs were worked out would it matter?

[stg 44]

Would it? By the time the bugs were worked out would it matter?

Well, considering that Germany had naval recon in 1939, I'd think that by August 1940 much of the 'working out' had already been done, especially after the Norwegian Campaign. Fighting in the Atlantic would be different for sure, but the ground work had been laid. My understanding of the recce issue in the Atlantic was that despite complications with positioning and navigation, the main issue was lack of sufficient aircraft with sufficient range. So I don't see how it would hurt to have more aircraft with greater range, using less fuel, less necessary fuel, and much greater reliability for recce operations

The question is how effective it would have been and that's what we haven't discussed yet really.
It would certainly be more effective than the historical non-effort was, especially if seriously started in 1940. However, given the navigation issues, how well is recce going to function given the limitation of the technology at that time and the need for spotters to remain passive? The Hohentwiel system wasn't available until later in 1941 AFAIK, so won't be a big help in the important July 1940-1941 period.
What do we think, does having 50 aircraft operational in Atlantic-based units in August 1940 increase losses by 100k tons per month?

[LWD]

Coordinating subs and planes is a whole different kettle of fish compared to what they did in the Norwegian campaign. It's going to take some time to get that working properly and there's a real question of how well it will work at all. Once the effort starts one would expect losses to climb the question would be how high and how fast. Then they would tend to fall as the British work out counters and perhaps rise again. Whether or not it is worthwhile is an open question. For one thing you are talking about a pretty significant consumption of avgas are you not? Even without British opposition there will also be significant losses among the scout planes.

[stg 44]

Coordinating subs and planes is a whole different kettle of fish compared to what they did in the Norwegian campaign. It's going to take some time to get that working properly and there's a real question of how well it will work at all. Once the effort starts one would expect losses to climb the question would be how high and how fast. Then they would tend to fall as the British work out counters and perhaps rise again. Whether or not it is worthwhile is an open question. For one thing you are talking about a pretty significant consumption of avgas are you not? Even without British opposition there will also be significant losses among the scout planes.

The Do26 didn't use avgas, it ran on diesel, which was in larger supply than avgas.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Jumo_205

As far as losses go, historically as long as the Condor didn't launch low level attacks, which the Do26 woud not do here, it suffered minimal combat losses until later in 1941. Most of the attrition was via accidents until then or just plain maintenance issues. The question is whether the British would consider it that much of a threat if it hung back and just spotted. I think by late 1941 or whenever the escort carriers really got going then the Do26 would see its days numbered. I'm not convinced CAM ships would be used if there wasn't the risk of attack deep in the Atlantic from the air.

[LWD]

The Do26 didn't use avgas, it ran on diesel, which was in larger supply than avgas.

Interesting. Thanks for the information.

As far as losses go, historically as long as the Condor didn't launch low level attacks, which the Do26 woud not do here, it suffered minimal combat losses until later in 1941. Most of the attrition was via accidents until then or just plain maintenance issues.

Indeed especially early on I would expect the losses to be mostly from accidents or navigational problems. A good portion of the combat losses during this period would have navigation as an underlying cause. I.e. they accidenty got to close to Britain.

The question is whether the British would consider it that much of a threat if it hung back and just spotted. I think by late 1941 or whenever the escort carriers really got going then the Do26 would see its days numbered. I'm not convinced CAM ships would be used if there wasn't the risk of attack deep in the Atlantic from the air.

That would likely depend on how obvious it was that they were spotting for U-boats and how losses correlated with their sightings.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Would it? By the time the bugs were worked out would it matter?

Well, considering that Germany had naval recon in 1939, I'd think that by August 1940 much of the 'working out' had already been done, especially after the Norwegian Campaign. Fighting in the Atlantic would be different for sure, but the ground work had been laid.

As far as command coordination I tried to find a quick answer & failed. The Navy had a system for coordinating and using messages from air recon over the North Sea and Baltic. How well it worked and how easily adapted to the Atlantic battle I failed to determine. Goerings poor cooperation is attributed to being a problem, but I failed to find the details.

My understanding of the recce issue in the Atlantic was that despite complications with positioning and navigation, the main issue was lack of sufficient aircraft with sufficient range. So I don't see how it would hurt to have more aircraft with greater range, using less fuel, less necessary fuel, and much greater reliability for recce operations

The command coordination aspect cant be underestimated here. Much more experienced navies like the USN or IJN had some major problems making use of air recon for naval operations, and much of that was from the top. That is the procedures or methods in 7 between the HQ failed more than one would expect.

The question is how effective it would have been and that's what we haven't discussed yet really.
It would certainly be more effective than the historical non-effort was, especially if seriously started in 1940. However, given the navigation issues, how well is recce going to function given the limitation of the technology at that time and the need for spotters to remain passive? The Hohentwiel system wasn't available until later in 1941 AFAIK, so won't be a big help in the important July 1940-1941 period.
What do we think, does having 50 aircraft operational in Atlantic-based units in August 1940 increase losses by 100k tons per month?

I think just tossing more aircraft out over the Atlantic wont have a very large effect in itself. Some sort of previous effort to better develop C3, navigation training, reconnisance planning or doctrine of use, ect.. would be necessary for a significant gain to be seen.

[stg 44]

As far as command coordination I tried to find a quick answer & failed. The Navy had a system for coordinating and using messages from air recon over the North Sea and Baltic. How well it worked and how easily adapted to the Atlantic battle I failed to determine. Goerings poor cooperation is attributed to being a problem, but I failed to find the details.

I think just tossing more aircraft out over the Atlantic wont have a very large effect in itself. Some sort of previous effort to better develop C3, navigation training, reconnisance planning or doctrine of use, ect.. would be necessary for a significant gain to be seen.

I had the same problem; if you find the answer, let me know. I think half the battle is getting the necessary aircraft out there for the problems to be identified and worked out.

[LWD]

The decision to make a serious effort in that direction and getting all onboard is going to be the biggest hurdle IMO. Once that is decided planning and experiance will dominate but I'm not sure which will.

[phylo_roadking]

They would probably operate out of Bordeaux, which is going to be a deep target for the British to try and hit.
Beyond that until 1942 they were in no command of the West Coast of France, especially as deep as Bordeaux; that required the Mosquito AND the majority of German aircraft to be fighting in the East or Mediterranean.

....which happened from 1941, not 1942!

So until 1942 the Bay of Biscay is not threatened by British air power, as the only aircraft with that range would be shot down by German fighters in the area.

And of course they are going to have to deal with Me110 escorts as Carl mentioned, which would slaughter the limited number of Hudsons, while giving the Me110 something better to do than die in the BoB.

Only if the British patrols orbit in range of shore-based fighters. Flying from south-west Englnad - Cornwall and Devon...they can establish a well-offshore cordon.

...Also aircraft are much harder to find,

Harder to find yes...if it wasn't for the major advantage of Bletchley Park and Air Intelligence Branch

so if the British are going to use their 78 Hudsons to patrol the West Coast of France for the occasional Do26? Wouldn't they be better used hunting Uboats

Why??? They'll need the Hudsons for longrange combat patrolling...but they have other ASW aircraft for uboats!

I want phylo_roadking to realize that historically the British didn't start doing what he is suggesting until July 1942 after the Luftwaffe was locked in to the fighting in Russia, in the Mediterranean, and the USAAC was fighting over Europe.

Actually - the RAF was patrolling down into Biscay from late 1940 on, using OTHER aircraft - Sunderlands etc. trying to catch uboats on the surface. What happened in 1942-43 was that the USAAF could start operating from Morocco etc. AFTER TORCH... because the uboats had moved further south along the Portuguese and Spanish coasts for richer pickings Why KG 40 started taking SUCH major losses is that the whole area was being patrolled from BOTH the north and the south - with them operating in the middle!

The were too worried about a possible German invasion until 1941 to give coastal command the necessary resources.

Actually - Coastal had a LOT of resources...what the problem was that they didn't have enough dedicated ASW aircraft; they had a mishmash of other types - older marks of Wellingtons, Whitleys as replaced in Bomber Command, etc.

if the British start using resources to patrol Biscay and start hunting Do26s there, what gets left open as a result? Where are the resources going to come from and what are the British going to give up?

Nothing - because they were patrolling off French Atlantic ports anyway looking for uboats!

What are their chances of success at a time when they had little offensive radar ability too?

Radar in the form of surface-scanning radar greatly improved the hunting of uboats...but see ALL the remarks made above about SIGINT etc. to Old Fossil!

[Orwell1984]

This paper from the Air Command and Staff College may be of some interest as it does touch on Luftwaffe/Kriegsmarine relations.
From the abstract:

Also included will be an examination of the fierce rivalry between the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine senior leadership and how this interfered with the conduct of countersea operations.

LUFTWAFFE MARITIME OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II:
THOUGHT, ORGANIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA476401

[Carl Schwamberger]

The C & S paper was a interesting read. Once again illustrates the managment school observation 'The fish rots from the head first.'