No Tunisgrad

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Richard Anderson
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Re: No Tunisgrad

#106

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 May 2023, 08:55

Huszar666 wrote:
12 May 2023, 16:32
I don't think, there would be more (German) troops in Italy or, specifically Sizily, even if Africa was evacuated sometimes in Late 1942.
Possibly not.
There were actually only four German divisions there:
1, The 15th PzGrD, which was the renamed Division Sizilien, made up of troops destined for Tunisia, but still sitting in the "Italian traffic jam". No Tunisian campaign and evacuation in late 1942 means no "Italian Traffic Jam" and no Div.Sizilien and no 15th PzGr.
It was a bit more complicated than that. The 'Italienstau' had existed since the first movements of Sperrverband Rommel to Africa and was made up of all sorts. It also wasn't all in Italy. When the Tunisian capitulation was near only about 5,900 men of Division 999. had reached Tunisia, only 1,146 were in Sicily and another 9,213 were still in France and Germany. Thy were the primary source for Division Sizilien, along with six Marsch-Batallionen that had not gotten to Sicily and some convalescents and men on leave from 15. Panzer-Division.
2, PzDiv Hermann Göring: It was formed from the parts of Division Hermann Göring that stayed behind in the West when parts of the same division were rushed (and destroyed) in Tunisia. If Africa is lost already in 1942, and Husky is done five months earlier (February or March 1943), it is doubtful, if the division would have more troops, than what was sent to Tunisia OTL
Um, if the division did not send any troops to Tunisia, then it would have all the troops it had in July 1943 plus those it lost in Tunisia.
, 29th PzGrD, was only re-raised in June 1943, after it was destroyed in Stalingrad. We can disregard it against any landing, that would be done earlier, than OTL-Husky
Actually it was only renamed as 29. Panzergrenadier-Division on 23 June, it was already 29. Infanterie-Division (mot). That unit was reborn on 1 March 1943 by the renaming of 345. Infanterie-Division, which in turn had been organized 24 November 1942 and had already established a Panzergrenadier Brigade for employment in the east, although it was not deployed. So it was actually re-raised about seven months earlier than most figure.
4, 1st FJD. The constituent units were only collected from the Ostfront in May and June 1943, and was rushed to Sizily after the landing. We can disregard this division for any earlier landing too.
True, but it was 30 March when the division began moving west. Then there are whatever elements of Brigade Ramcke that can be evacuated and 5. FJR that likely wouldn't be sent.
Then, there are the divisions destroyed in Tunisia, namely
I, Ex-DAK-troops:
1, 15th PzD
2, 21st PzD
3, 90th leD
4, 164th leAfrikaDiv
5, Brigade Ramcke
All these together had around 5.000 men, 35 tanks, and a dozen or so field guns. Even if they could have been evacuated from Tripoli in December without further casualties - doubtful - this wreckage wouldn't be much of a reinforcement for Sizily.
Um, as of 1 December 1942 the ration strength of the German elements of the Deutsch-Italienische Panzerarmee numbered a bit more than around 5,000 men. It was actually 40,674. If the resources used to move 5. Panzerarmee to Tunisia were utilized to evacuate rather than to reinforce, then it is likely most of those would escape.
II, 5th PzArmy troops:
1, 10th PzD
2, Division Hermann Görig: see above
3, 999th AfrikaDiv
4, 334th InfDiv
From these, only the HG and the 999th were scheduled for Afrika even before Torch, so they may find their way to Sicily after the evacuation from Tripoli in December. The other two... without a new front in Tunisia to be built up in late November, it is quite likely, they would be sent to deal with the other trouble brewing in late November elsewhere. Please note, that the units, sitting in the "Italian Traffic Jam" from all four Divisions were used to magick up Division Sizilien (aka 15th PzGrD) and a Div HG was on Sicily OTL too.
I do not recall seeing anything indicating that Regiment/Brigade/Division Hermann Göring was ever scheduled for Africa prior to TORCH?

"999th AfrikaDiv" see above too. :D BTW, it was established 1 February 1943 as leichte-Afrika Division 999., so technically was not scheduled for Africa prior to TORCH, only its predecessor Brigade formation was. :D

However, everything I have seen says that 334. Infanterie-Division was established on 25 November 1942 with the intent of using it as an Africa reinforcement.

It really comes down to timing of the decision to evacuate Africa. If the fait accompli of TORCH and El Alamein are recognized, then quite a bit could be left on the table for use in Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy.
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Re: No Tunisgrad

#107

Post by Urmel » 15 May 2023, 10:03

15 Panzergrenadierdivision was the successor to 15 Panzerdivision. If 15. Panzerdivision is evacuated then it would never come into existence.

https://www.axishistory.com/books/150-g ... n-sizilien

Also, fully agree with Rich - the Italienstau was a permanent feature of the African campaign.
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Re: No Tunisgrad

#108

Post by Gooner1 » 15 May 2023, 17:18

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 May 2023, 00:54
I have two divergent strengths for the Desert Air Force in January. One is a strength of 240 aircraft. The other the date is less clear claims 480 of all types. Both sound way to low and may mean only front line strength in western Lybia.
Yes probably just those forward in Libya. On 27th October the strength of the Western Desert Air Force including USAAF squadrons under operational control, was about 750 out of a total of 1,628 aircraft (by U.E.) in RAF Middle East Command.

By the middle of April 43 the strength of the Allied Air Forces by unit establishment in theatre was 3,516, of which Northwest African Air Forces 2,286; Malta Air Command 218; Middle East Air Command 1,012.

The OH notes that "by mid-April 1943 there were over 3,000 non-operational aircraft as against the 3,400-3,500 which were operational."

This depends on what the Axis defense strength would be in Sicilly. As we can see from the several posts on the Axis strength in late 1942 early 43 there's a variety of possibilities & Hitlers unpredictability, with deception ops on top of all that... I think if I were to design a game for this situation the players would be drawing from several possible Axis defense OB cards, ranging from very weak to very strong.
Best way to do it I think. The Allied player wouldn't know if the victory condition was just to survive on the beachead or be in Messina 10.00 a.m. Tuesday until the card is turned/die is thrown.

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Re: No Tunisgrad

#109

Post by Sheldrake » 15 May 2023, 17:49

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
10 Oct 2011, 04:42
This one has been discussed tangentally in several other discussions.
phylo_roadking wrote: So the evacuation would start just at that point historically that the Allies "got into their groove" on interdicting air and sea traffic to and from Tunisia? 8O
Precisely

To make it practical the decision needs to come much earlier, not to support a Tunisian bridgehead. Either in November - withdraw the Axis forces from Tripoli; or as late as early January. At that date the Allies still lack the forward airbases to effectively interfere with Axis sea traffic. By March the Axis is screwed in this regard.

If the Axis has only a weak rearguard, or less, in Africa by Febuary the Allies can contemplate several other items on their 'to do list'. Operations Brimstone and Husky were both laid out at the Symbol Confrence at Casablanca in January. If it is seen the Axis will soon be gone from Tunisia preperations for husky & Brimstone can accelerate. It is likely the Allies will attempt invasions of Sicilly & Sardinia several months earlier, that may cause Musollini to be overthrown in May or June vs the historical date.
The bigger issue is that a decision not to divert resources to Tunisa in Nov 1942 means that there are more resources for the decisive battle in the East. THe transport aircraft lost in the Med might have made a big difference to 6th Arm,y's supply situation. The 450 tanks lost in Tunisia might have turned the tables in Army Group South for Mansteain before rather than after Stalingrad fell.

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Re: No Tunisgrad

#110

Post by Huszar666 » 15 May 2023, 18:37

The bigger issue is that a decision not to divert resources to Tunisa in Nov 1942 means that there are more resources for the decisive battle in the East. THe transport aircraft lost in the Med might have made a big difference to 6th Arm,y's supply situation. The 450 tanks lost in Tunisia might have turned the tables in Army Group South for Mansteain before rather than after Stalingrad fell.
This is what I meant by "other problems in November, elsewhere" above. If the 10th PzD could be sent to Tunisia, it could also be sent to Rostow, if there is no Tunisian bridgehead.
15 Panzergrenadierdivision was the successor to 15 Panzerdivision. If 15. Panzerdivision is evacuated then it would never come into existence.
In name only, very little personnel from the 15th PzD made it into 15th PzGrD. Most came from the Italienstau troops (i.e. Division Sizilien)
2, PzDiv Hermann Göring: It was formed from the parts of Division Hermann Göring that stayed behind in the West when parts of the same division were rushed (and destroyed) in Tunisia. If Africa is lost already in 1942, and Husky is done five months earlier (February or March 1943), it is doubtful, if the division would have more troops, than what was sent to Tunisia OTL
Um, if the division did not send any troops to Tunisia, then it would have all the troops it had in July 1943 plus those it lost in Tunisia.
The important points in my sentence is in bold and underlined. IF we are talking about July, you are right, the whole Div HG would be there (assuming, it wasn't diverted to somewhere else). If we are talking a few months earlier, only the units, that made it to Tunisia could be in Sicily - again assuming, they weren't diverted to... elsewhere.
Actually it was only renamed as 29. Panzergrenadier-Division on 23 June, it was already 29. Infanterie-Division (mot). That unit was reborn on 1 March 1943 by the renaming of 345. Infanterie-Division, which in turn had been organized 24 November 1942 and had already established a Panzergrenadier Brigade for employment in the east, although it was not deployed. So it was actually re-raised about seven months earlier than most figure.
Eh, I hate those renamings so much, you can't imagine.
Um, as of 1 December 1942 the ration strength of the German elements of the Deutsch-Italienische Panzerarmee numbered a bit more than around 5,000 men. It was actually 40,674. If the resources used to move 5. Panzerarmee to Tunisia were utilized to evacuate rather than to reinforce, then it is likely most of those would escape.
5000 is probably the fighting strength (I have the figure from wikipedia. Yes, I know). Divided that by 6 (15.Pz, 21.Pz, 90.le, 164.le, LW and army troops), we would have 6800 or so total per "division". 800 or so as "fighting strength" per "Division" is feasible.
Sure, you can use Italienstau troops to fill out those divisions, but either way, you can wave goodby to a Division Sizilien (aka 15.PzGrD) either way.
It really comes down to timing of the decision to evacuate Africa. If the fait accompli of TORCH and El Alamein are recognized, then quite a bit could be left on the table for use in Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy.
Yeah, everything comes down to when and from where the DAK and the Italians would be evacuated. Already in December from Tripoli, or January from Tunis.
However, if there isn't any inclination to sweep the Allies out of North Africa, or at least hold a bridgehead in Tunisia for a longer time, sending even one Landser to Tunisia in November doesn't make any sense. By the time the Allies would reach Tripoli, the wreckage of the Dt-It- PzArmee is already enjoying Sicilian hospitality.

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Re: No Tunisgrad

#111

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 May 2023, 19:31

Huszar666 wrote:
15 May 2023, 18:37
This is what I meant by "other problems in November, elsewhere" above. If the 10th PzD could be sent to Tunisia, it could also be sent to Rostow, if there is no Tunisian bridgehead.
:D
In name only, very little personnel from the 15th PzD made it into 15th PzGrD. Most came from the Italienstau troops (i.e. Division Sizilien)
Indeed, roughly 16,000 men originally from leichte-Afrika Division 999. and the six Marsch batallionen stranded by the collapse in Tunisia. It appears that most, if not all, the personnel that had served with 15. Panzerdivision were Urlauber and Genesene who were also part of the Italienstau or who returned to duty after the collapse in Tunisia. Those numbers have always been hard to nail down but likely were fewer than 1,000.
The important points in my sentence is in bold and underlined. IF we are talking about July, you are right, the whole Div HG would be there (assuming, it wasn't diverted to somewhere else). If we are talking a few months earlier, only the units, that made it to Tunisia could be in Sicily - again assuming, they weren't diverted to... elsewhere.
Certainly, they could be in Cognac or Mont-de-Marsan where they were formed, for example. However, the point is there would not be fewer of them, there would be more, wherever they were.
Eh, I hate those renamings so much, you can't imagine.
There there, it will be okay. :lol:
5000 is probably the fighting strength (I have the figure from wikipedia. Yes, I know). Divided that by 6 (15.Pz, 21.Pz, 90.le, 164.le, LW and army troops), we would have 6800 or so total per "division". 800 or so as "fighting strength" per "Division" is feasible.
Sure, you can use Italienstau troops to fill out those divisions, but either way, you can wave goodby to a Division Sizilien (aka 15.PzGrD) either way.
Well, sure, although quite a few of that 40,000 odd are Korück 556 and other D-I Panzerarmee rear area types - not that the Heer was afraid of shoving such personnel into the line when they saw fit.

And, yes, sure, No Division Sizilien, but instead the personnel of leichte-Afrika Division 999. and the six Marsch batallionen would likely be better used to fill up a strong 15. and 21. Panzer, 90. and 164. leichte-Afrika divisions instead, especially considering that depending on when the decision to abandon Africa is made, then the mass of additional Marsch batallionen committed there would be staged in Sicily as well. Add in those 24 to 25 battalions at 800-1,000 each and the four existing divisions would have over 9,000 replacements each to work with, easily bringing them up to full manpower strength.
Yeah, everything comes down to when and from where the DAK and the Italians would be evacuated. Already in December from Tripoli, or January from Tunis.
However, if there isn't any inclination to sweep the Allies out of North Africa, or at least hold a bridgehead in Tunisia for a longer time, sending even one Landser to Tunisia in November doesn't make any sense. By the time the Allies would reach Tripoli, the wreckage of the Dt-It- PzArmee is already enjoying Sicilian hospitality.
Yep.
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Re: No Tunisgrad

#112

Post by Huszar666 » 15 May 2023, 20:56

Certainly, they could be in Cognac or Mont-de-Marsan where they were formed, for example. However, the point is there would not be fewer of them, there would be more, wherever they were.
The question is, what amount of Div HG would be there in Sicily at any given time.
If it is pre-June, it would be less, if it is July, it would be more.
The other question would be, where the Div HG would be sent, if there was no Tunisian Bridgehead. So yeah, it like is drawing a card in wargame.
Well, sure, although quite a few of that 40,000 odd are Korück 556 and other D-I Panzerarmee rear area types - not that the Heer was afraid of shoving such personnel into the line when they saw fit.

And, yes, sure, No Division Sizilien, but instead the personnel of leichte-Afrika Division 999. and the six Marsch batallionen would likely be better used to fill up a strong 15. and 21. Panzer, 90. and 164. leichte-Afrika divisions instead, especially considering that depending on when the decision to abandon Africa is made, then the mass of additional Marsch batallionen committed there would be staged in Sicily as well. Add in those 24 to 25 battalions at 800-1,000 each and the four existing divisions would have over 9,000 replacements each to work with, easily bringing them up to full manpower strength.
I know, it is WI, but with all that marsch battalions, that where sent to Sicily because of the Tunisian Bridgehead, we are almost in sci-fi territory. Untangling all that italianstau, while keeping in mind, that quite a bit of that Italienstau was caused by the Tunisian Bridghead...
So yes, flipping cards.
Especially, if we couldn't pin down a date for an alternate-Husky.

So yes, my estimation is that the Germans have at best the same amount of troops, and probably less. But since it was complete chaos, one could say, the Germans would have twice the troops there at any given time.
Not, that it would have changed much.

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Re: No Tunisgrad

#113

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 May 2023, 21:51

Huszar666 wrote:
15 May 2023, 20:56
I know, it is WI, but with all that marsch battalions, that where sent to Sicily because of the Tunisian Bridgehead, we are almost in sci-fi territory.
Not really, because they were all Afrika-Marsch batallionen, so were all going that way with or without the Tunisian Bridgehead, since they were all scheduled for the D-I Panzerarmee originally.
Untangling all that italianstau, while keeping in mind, that quite a bit of that Italienstau was caused by the Tunisian Bridghead...
Again, and as Urmel also noted, the Italienstau was NOT caused by the Tunisia Bridgehead. It began developing in February 1941 and was never really cleared. The Tunisian Bridgehead may actually have relieved some of that strain, since IIRC some of the reinforcements staged out of Marseilles and Toulon, as well as the southern French airfields.
So yes, flipping cards.
Especially, if we couldn't pin down a date for an alternate-Husky.
They other problem, for the Allies, is the earlier HUSKY is, the fewer LST and LCT there are. That is also a major factor in a 1943 Cross-Channel attack.
So yes, my estimation is that the Germans have at best the same amount of troops, and probably less. But since it was complete chaos, one could say, the Germans would have twice the troops there at any given time.
Not, that it would have changed much.
I agree. Comme ci comme ça... :lol:
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Re: No Tunisgrad

#114

Post by History Learner » 18 Jun 2023, 09:28

Politician01 wrote:
09 Oct 2011, 16:03
Hitler is persuaded by Rommel that any further resistance in North Africa is futile and so nearly all German and Italian troops inluding their material are evacuated from Tunisia.

When the Allies capture Tunis in mid may 1943 they still make some 30 000 prisoners - albeit only some 10 000 Germans.

Over 100 000 Germans and over 100 000 Italians have been evacuated to Sicily - including most of their euipment.

What impact does this have on Husky?

In OTL there were some 40 000 Germans on the Island - now there would be perhaps 120 000 to defend it - three times as many. Including many tanks that were saved from NA.
Also possibly as much as two divisions worth of AA gear and hundreds of fighters. The bigger effects are strategic; losing North Africa was always going to be bad for Italy but an Axis Dunkirk that saves most of its army would reduce the worst of it and help keep Mussolini in a far more stable position. Being more assured of Italian resolve, Hitler probably lets Citadel go forward on June 10th. Probably too late to achieve their overall strategic goals but the Germans could probably destroy Soviet reserves on a favorable footing and thus burn up much of the Red Army's combat power needed for the late Summer campaigns. Historical Citadel just about achieved this and here 1st LSSAH wouldn't get pulled for Sicily and 1st Panzer (IIRC) would also be available.

So, stalemate in the East and a far more favorable Italian campaign. Question at that point becomes U.S. domestic politics in the face of higher casualties going into 1944 and whether or not Stalin decides to cut his losses and seek a deal with the Germans.

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Re: No Tunisgrad

#115

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Jun 2023, 19:18

History Learner wrote:
18 Jun 2023, 09:28
Also possibly as much as two divisions worth of AA gear and hundreds of fighters.
Divisions sounds like a lot, but between them 19. and 20. Flak-Division had about 11 mixed Flak-Abteilungen, which was a drop in the bucket. And more like a hundred fighters.
The bigger effects are strategic; losing North Africa was always going to be bad for Italy but an Axis Dunkirk that saves most of its army would reduce the worst of it and help keep Mussolini in a far more stable position.
True.
Being more assured of Italian resolve, Hitler probably lets Citadel go forward on June 10th.
It is doubtful if "Italian resolve" had anything to do with the delay of ZITADELLE>
Probably too late to achieve their overall strategic goals but the Germans could probably destroy Soviet reserves on a favorable footing and thus burn up much of the Red Army's combat power needed for the late Summer campaigns. Historical Citadel just about achieved this
It did not such thing.
and here 1st LSSAH wouldn't get pulled for Sicily and 1st Panzer (IIRC) would also be available.
LSSAH was not "pulled for Sicily". It was transferred west on 29 July to northern Italy, long after the issue in Sicily was not in doubt, to rebuild. It left all except its Befehlspanzer, Panzerbeobachtungswagen, and Panzer I behind in the east when it moved. Ditto 1. Panzerdivision, which was transferred to France on 25 December 1942, long before Sicily was an issue. It was strictly a personnel transport and by 22 February 1943 it had received all of 45 Panzer IV L43, about half the number to equip one of its two battalions. By 31 July 1943, it had increased that number to 64, along with 7 Flammpanzer III and 16 Befehlspanzer and Panzerbeobachtungswagen.
So, stalemate in the East and a far more favorable Italian campaign. Question at that point becomes U.S. domestic politics in the face of higher casualties going into 1944 and whether or not Stalin decides to cut his losses and seek a deal with the Germans.
Highly unlikely.
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Re: No Tunisgrad

#116

Post by T. A. Gardner » 18 Jun 2023, 20:02

"Never reinforce defeat..."

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Re: No Tunisgrad

#117

Post by Peter89 » 18 Jun 2023, 20:23

The force ratio between the Soviets and the Axis was problematic from the start, but it began to tell in 1943. Hitler's hesitation to pull back from the Kuban via Rostov made it close to impossible to plug the gap in the Axis line. In fact it was impossible to maintain such a front line in late 1942. The minor Axis nations provided little more than a piquet line and the many 100.000s of their soldiers will be sorely missed from the line in 1943. We tend to underscore the significance of this, but the Romanians, Italians and Hungarians sent some of their best manpower to fight ill-equipped. There was simply not enough men and equipment in the line to hold up the Soviets. These were either sacrificed in 1942 or happened to be at the wrong place.
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Re: No Tunisgrad

#118

Post by Peter89 » 18 Jun 2023, 20:24

As for Tunisia, it broke the back of the instructor crews and the recently established Transportgeschwaders for no apparent results. The only thing should have done was evacuation.
Last edited by Peter89 on 18 Jun 2023, 22:11, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: No Tunisgrad

#119

Post by History Learner » 18 Jun 2023, 20:57

Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Jun 2023, 19:18
Divisions sounds like a lot, but between them 19. and 20. Flak-Division had about 11 mixed Flak-Abteilungen, which was a drop in the bucket. And more like a hundred fighters.
So it was two divisions worth as I said and about as many flak battalions as III Flak Corps had in Normandy, that's hardly a drop in the bucket. As for fighter aircraft, I don't know how you're only getting 100 as they lost 484 between February-May in the MTO.
It is doubtful if "Italian resolve" had anything to do with the delay of ZITADELLE
Not according to the U.S. Army's official history:
The plan to occupy and defend all of Italy and the Balkans was the first plan adopted by Hitler. He charged Field Marshal Rommel with the activation of a skeleton army group headquarters in Munich to work out plans to occupy and defend Italy. [6] For Rommel's use, six good panzer (armored) or panzer grenadier divisions were to come from the East; two panzer grenadier and six infantry divisions (reconstituted units that had been virtually destroyed at Stalingrad) were to come from France. Furthermore, two parachute divisions were to be made available by the Luftwaffe. The secrecy surrounding these plans was such that not even the senior German general in Italy, Field Marshal Kesselring, was informed of the early discussions.

In June 1943, his fears concerning Italy temporarily eased, Hitler decided to carry out a limited offensive in Russia with the result that Rommel could no longer rely on the panzer divisions from the East for the execution of his task. Rommel thereupon informed Hitler that he could no longer undertake the defense of all of Italy with the troops expected to be available to him. [7] Hitler seemingly accepted Rommel's judgment, for subsequent plans envisaged the defense of Italy only in the Apennines north of Rome, and in July he stated unequivocally that "without the Italian Army we cannot hold the entire peninsula." [8]
It did not such thing.
It came very close to doing so, which was the point. See George Nipe's Decision in Ukraine and Ben Wheatley's new book The Panzers of Prokhorovka for further reading:
In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage. Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks. Those losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin. Subsequently, the depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and Rotmistrov ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry positions west of the town.
What else could've been achieved?
After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as reports of impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum, Hitler decided to cancel Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet tank armies. He had unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could have been used to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to break out from the Psel bridgehead or to cross the Psel east of Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south was committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the Soviet defenses. Manstein correctly realized that he had the opportunity to destroy the Soviet operational and strategic armor in the Prochorovka area.
Which leads us into our next point:
LSSAH was not "pulled for Sicily". It was transferred west on 29 July to northern Italy, long after the issue in Sicily was not in doubt, to rebuild. It left all except its Befehlspanzer, Panzerbeobachtungswagen, and Panzer I behind in the east when it moved. Ditto 1. Panzerdivision, which was transferred to France on 25 December 1942, long before Sicily was an issue. It was strictly a personnel transport and by 22 February 1943 it had received all of 45 Panzer IV L43, about half the number to equip one of its two battalions. By 31 July 1943, it had increased that number to 64, along with 7 Flammpanzer III and 16 Befehlspanzer and Panzerbeobachtungswagen.
Correct, LSSAH was not pulled for duty in Sicily but because of Sicily; I misspoke. I'm not sure where the idea of LSSAH needing to be rebuilt comes from, given its losses were minimal and the idea it was sent to Italy without its tanks is an odd one, to say the least, given we know from German field reports that was definitely not the case:
Hitler could not be persuaded to continue the attack, however. Instead, he dispersed the divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps to deal with the anticipated Soviet diversionary attacks south of the Belgorod­Kharkov sector. On the night of July 17-18, the corps withdrew from its positions around Prochorovka. Thus, the battle for Prochorovka ended, not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational tanks on July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the offensive. The SS panzer divisions were still full of fight; in fact, two of them continued to fight effectively in southern Russia for the rest of the summer.
This is actually probably an understatement, given Wheatley's newer research suggests German tank losses were even lower.
Highly unlikely.
Stalin was considering a deal throughout 1943 and 40% of Americans were open to a peace deal in April as casualties mounted. A shift of about ~2.6% is all it would take for FDR to lose the 1944 election, so it's definitely a realistic possibility if presented with the prospect of heavy casualties being needed to end the War.

Richard Anderson
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Re: No Tunisgrad

#120

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Jun 2023, 00:08

History Learner wrote:
18 Jun 2023, 20:57
So it was two divisions worth as I said and about as many flak battalions as III Flak Corps had in Normandy, that's hardly a drop in the bucket.
19. Flak-Division for most of its time in Africa, dating to the spring of 1941, had eight battalions under command. 20. Flak-Division when it came in to Tunis had another three or four and then the two divisions shared assets as the Axis position in Africa contracted. It all comes down to when this "Dunkirk-like" evacuation happens and, given it is "Dunkirk-like", presumably little or no equipment is evacuated?

Anyway, III Flak Korps was effectively a division, 13 battalions out of about 124 deployed in France and the Low Countries. So, yes, a drop in the bucket.
As for fighter aircraft, I don't know how you're only getting 100 as they lost 484 between February-May in the MTO.
That is losses over three months. The Jagdwaffe units committed as reinforcements to Tunis in December-January, were effectively around a Geschwader worth, so something between 50 and 100 aircraft, but I'd have to check for the exact numbers.
Not according to the U.S. Army's official history:
It doesn't strike you as odd that the only mention of such a reluctance exists as a single remark, on a single, untranslated page, by Walter Warlimont? It does not get a mention in any of the recorded Führer conferences appearing in Hitler and his Generals.
It came very close to doing so, which was the point. See George Nipe's Decision in Ukraine and Ben Wheatley's new book The Panzers of Prokhorovka for further reading:
In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic.
I've known they were catastrophic since at least 1995 when I spent five years working on the Kursk database from original Soviet records.
What else could've been achieved?
The defeat of the Soviet Union, which was the objective, rather than the destruction of Soviet tanks.
Correct, LSSAH was not pulled for duty in Sicily but because of Sicily; I misspoke. I'm not sure where the idea of LSSAH needing to be rebuilt comes from, given its losses were minimal and the idea it was sent to Italy without its tanks is an odd one, to say the least, given we know from German field reports that was definitely not the case:
As of 20 July 1943, the last report before it moved south from Stalino, LSSAH had a total of 97 Panzer operational and another 28 in repair. On hand were, 4 Panzer II, 2 Panzer III (k), 8 Pz III (l), 26 Panzer IV L43 and 48 L48), 17 Tiger, and 20 PzBefhl and BeobPz. It was at half strength. I./SS-Pz.Rgt. 1 was already re-equipping and training on Panthers and was scheduled to be united with the regiment and division so that division-level exercises could be done.

By 31 August it recorded a total of 153 Panzer operational and 26 in repair. Total on hand was 4 Pz II, 1 Pz III k, 58 Pz IV L48, 71 Panther, 27 Tiger, and 19 PzBefhl and BeobPz. The Panthers were not considered ready for combat until October.

In 15 days of combat at Kursk the division lost 3,271 personnel, 14.1 percent of its starting strength.
This is actually probably an understatement, given Wheatley's newer research suggests German tank losses were even lower.
Indeed, LSSAH only "lost" 1 Pz I, 1 Pz III k, 9 Pz IV l, and 1 Tiger. However, it started with 126 Panzer operational and ended with 91.
Stalin was considering a deal throughout 1943 and 40% of Americans were open to a peace deal in April as casualties mounted. A shift of about ~2.6% is all it would take for FDR to lose the 1944 election, so it's definitely a realistic possibility if presented with the prospect of heavy casualties being needed to end the War.
What American casualties were "mounting" in April 1943? How many times to Stalin offer "a deal" in 1943? During the war?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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