No Tunisgrad

[Carl Schwamberger]

Carl -

For the last quarter of 1942 Ellis (drawing from 'The Italian navy in WWII' Brandigan) identifies a little over 250,000 tons of Axis military cargo embarked for Africa & 210,000 tons arriving.

At what ports? In this ATL, none of that goes to Tunisia...I mean, what sort of tonnage could the Libyan ports only shift out in the other direction during an evacuation?

Looking at the previous calendar quarters Tripoli took in over 150,000 tons each. In some cases over 250,000 tons were dispatched to Lybia, where Tripoli was the only port of consequence.

Looking at the Allied build up of air forces into NW Africa during Nov-Dec 1942 any interdiction of a Tripoli evacuation is going to be fairly weak. Certainly some squadrons can be quickly rushed forward to the Tunisian airfields, but the mass of aircraft & support echelon that made the spring 1943 interdiction possible could not occur instantly.

Carl, this was by no means the only reason why an effective Allied air interdiction of the supply bridge was historically delayed;

A/ OTL, February 1943 saw three weeks of very bad weather which delayed ops greatly.

B/ There was also a steep learning curve - in that the USAAF flew against Tunis and Bizerte for some time first, attempting to attack merchantmen in port...and took heavy loses from the heavy massed AA there; I mentioned this previously - what amount of AA did the Germans and Italians have remaining in Libya by November-December 1942?

C/ OTL, there were problems with mission profiles I.E. how they bombed merchantmen; if there's no Tunis/Bizerte level of AA around Tripoli, then the USAAF isn't forced away from the more highly accurate skipbombing they tried first OTL.

D/ the USAAF historically attempted to bomb ships in port with B-17s; this tactic had to first fail then B-26s employed...but I would venture that with the DAK and the remains of the Italians clustered around major evacuation ports in Libya, shipping isn't the most effective target anyway...

Several good reasons there why Allied airpower would have a weak interdiction ability during a early Nov-Dec 1942 evacuation. Still the simple lack of aircraft and ground support in NW Africa and Tunis would be the largest problem in the first weeks. The ability of the Axis air forces to attack the Allied airfields & ports could have its effect as well.

[Carl Schwamberger]

In april and may,the Germans evacuated 25000 men .Why not more ?
My guess :not only the allied air and naval forces were hindering the evacuation,but,also,the front was collapsing .

By that time the Allied air forces were effective. The losses to Italian ships were the largest of the war thus far. At the start of the 2d quarter 1943 Ellis shows a avg of 290,000 tons dispatched & 210,000 tons arriving in Tunis. During april & May the quantity arrived vs embarked plunges to under 50%. That does not reflect losses on the docks before & after embarck/disembarkation. Ellis hints at that, showing that embarkation of material drops below 150,000 tons for the 2d quarter.

There is a remaining widow for evacuation January - Febuary, but the losses then are likely to be larger than a early Tripoli evacuation in 1942. Also, a Febuary evacuation implies some sort of build up of Axis forces in Tunisia & expendenture or combat losses. A early evacuation avoids that loss. The trade off is a early evacuation from Tripoli allows the Allies to advance their operations elsewhere in the Med.

A alternate course is if the Axis conducts a only a delaying action in Tunisia. That is a holding force is established to deny the Allies the Bizerte/Tunis ports and the all weather airfields there as long as practical. That costs far less in manpower & material, the Axis forces in Lybia can still be evacuated in part in 1942, and the Allies advance their operations by only a month or two.

[Kingfish]

Can you imagine what the state of things would be if the USAAF levelled out a Namsos-level of destruction upon Tripoli???

The question is *can* the USAAF carry out a Namsos type level of destruction upon Tripoli in the months Nov/Dec?
Bear in mind the Germans were flying from airbases far more advanced than what the allies had in Tunisia.

[mescal]

The problem with an evacuation of the Italian-German Panzerarmee from Tripoli in late December/early January has IMHO less to do with Allied air power than with Allied naval power.

The Mediterranean Fleet at Alexandria was feeble by that time, but by December, after operations Stoneage and Portcullis, the old Force K had been reconstituted at Malta.
It consisted in 3 light cruisers (Dido, Euralyus, Cleopatra) and 4 destroyers (Nubian, Jervis, JAvelin, Kelvin). In January they were joined by Orion, Pakenham and Paladin.
Such a force would pose a tremendous threat to any evacuation convoy from Tripoli.

To counter the threat, the Regia Marina would have to provide very heavy escorts. But if the ships were available, the bunker oil was probably not - at least for a sustained effort. After the summer of 1942, the Italian main fleet was confined in harbor for want of oil, keeping in reserve only a one-time strike capacity.
Would Supermarina use this strategic reserve for a still very risky evacuation from Tripolitania ?
I don't think so.

[Kingfish]

Would Supermarina use this strategic reserve for a still very risky evacuation from Tripolitania ?
I don't think so.

Consider the military and political ramifications of abandoning the army in NA to their fate.

[mescal]

Yes, there is a lot at stake.

But given that
1) even a maximum effort will not be enough to save all the Panzerarmee (as it is not sustainable)
2) with depleted Axis air force in Tripolitania, the Italian battle fleet risk very serious losses
3) the fleet can theoretically be cut off from their bases in Italy if the Royal Navy chooses to transfer Nelson & Rodney to Malta (possible if no or very small Axis forces in Tunisia - at least Supermarina has to assume this). [Actually, the more general point is that the Allies had strong forces in the Western Med, which could not be easily committed in the Central Basin as long as the minefield could not be swept - which was prevented by the occupation of Tunisia. This may change if it's technically easier to sweep the minefields and if there is a large payoff in Central Med - like evacuation convoys].

the risk of loosing the fleet without saving the army is very high. And loosing the Navy also has far reaching political, strategic and symbolic ramifications

[Kingfish]

1) even a maximum effort will not be enough to save all the Panzerarmee (as it is not sustainable)

That is certainly a possibility.
However, *if* the decision is made early enough substantial forces could be pulled out before the Allies get their act together. It's a some-or-nothing proposition.

the risk of loosing the fleet without saving the army is very high. And loosing the Navy also has far reaching political, strategic and symbolic ramifications

A rock and a hard place to be sure, but in my mind I think the Axis would attempt it. The window to pull this off is small, but then again it is also small for possible RN intervention.

[phylo_roadking]

A/ OTL, February 1943 saw three weeks of very bad weather which delayed ops greatly.

B/ There was also a steep learning curve - in that the USAAF flew against Tunis and Bizerte for some time first, attempting to attack merchantmen in port...and took heavy loses from the heavy massed AA there; I mentioned this previously - what amount of AA did the Germans and Italians have remaining in Libya by November-December 1942?

C/ OTL, there were problems with mission profiles I.E. how they bombed merchantmen; if there's no Tunis/Bizerte level of AA around Tripoli, then the USAAF isn't forced away from the more highly accurate skipbombing they tried first OTL.

D/ the USAAF historically attempted to bomb ships in port with B-17s; this tactic had to first fail then B-26s employed...but I would venture that with the DAK and the remains of the Italians clustered around major evacuation ports in Libya, shipping isn't the most effective target anyway...

Several good reasons there why Allied airpower would have a weak interdiction ability during a early Nov-Dec 1942 evacuation.

Carl, I think you mistook my meaning...

In relation to A/....the weather November to January didn't hinder the Allies.

In relation to B/....there is in this ATL no need to spend time attacking Tunis or Bizerte.

In relation to C/ ....ONLY if ATL there's a heavy AA presence around Tripoli in the same scale as Tunis/Bizerte OTL will there be a need to change away temporarily from the more effective skip bombing.

In relation to D/....the problem with B17s flying from Western Tunisia and Algeria was the turnround/reaction time; flying from Tunis/Bizerte however....

In other words - being able to step forward to Tunis/Bizerte greatly reduces a lot of the historical factors preventing an early effectiveness of interdiction.

[Kingfish]

In relation to C/ ....ONLY if ATL there's a heavy AA presence around Tripoli in the same scale as Tunis/Bizerte OTL will there be a need to change away temporarily from the more effective skip bombing.

Would there be any reason to think Tripoli would not have as extensive an AAA defense as Tunis/Bizerta?
It was, after all, the primary logistical hub for the entire NA campaign pre-11/42.

In relation to D/....the problem with B17s flying from Western Tunisia and Algeria was the turnround/reaction time; flying from Tunis/Bizerte however....

...Is even further away if you are using the Algerian/Tunisian border as a reference. What is the distance from Western Tunisia to the port of Tunis? Now compare that to Tunis-Tripoli.

[phylo_roadking]

Would there be any reason to think Tripoli would not have as extensive an AAA defense as Tunis/Bizerta?
It was, after all, the primary logistical hub for the entire NA campaign pre-11/42

Maybe the fact that the Germans poured AA into Tunis/Bizerte from November 1942-on to protect their "bridgehead"?

Somebody somewhere should have some inkling of German AA assets at both locations...?

...Is even further away if you are using the Algerian/Tunisian border as a reference. What is the distance from Western Tunisia to the port of Tunis? Now compare that to Tunis-Tripoli.

Yes it's further - but from Tunis/Bizerte the USAAF can also effectively interdict both the port(s) of departure (Tripoli) AND arrival in Sicily....

And...from a standing start in mid-November 1942 - how long does it take the Allies to develop new fields elsewhere in Tunisia? Further down the map, between Sfax and Gabes, for instance...

[Kingfish]

Maybe the fact that the Germans poured AA into Tunis/Bizerte from November 1942-on to protect their "bridgehead"?

Somebody somewhere should have some inkling of German AA assets at both locations...?

Larry D...calling Larry D...please come to the 'No Tunisgrad' thread in the What If department

Yes it's further - but from Tunis/Bizerte the USAAF can also effectively interdict both the port(s) of departure (Tripoli) AND arrival in Sicily....

...And be counter-interdicted from Axis airfields in Sicily and Sardinia. The sword has two edges.

And...from a standing start in mid-November 1942 - how long does it take the Allies to develop new fields elsewhere in Tunisia? Further down the map, between Sfax and Gabes, for instance...

For P40s, I would guess a couple of weeks.
For B17s...

A related question - from the moment the Axis defenses in Alamein is broken and the decision to quit NA is made, how long do you (or anyone) think the evacuation can be completed? Assume not all of the DAK can make it out, but a sacrificial rearguard is left to keep the ground forces at bay.
1-2 weeks?
1 month?

[Carl Schwamberger]

....

In other words - being able to step forward to Tunis/Bizerte greatly reduces a lot of the historical factors preventing an early effectiveness of interdiction.

You are not recognizing the lack of the aircraft, and the support echelon in November - December. The Allies did not & could not instantly place their air forces in NW Africa, or Lybia. The Axis started this period with a marked superiority of aircraft in the region, and establsihed bases on Sicilly & Sardinia. Effective Allied air interdiction of a November-Dec evacuation from Tripoli is a nonstarter.

[Carl Schwamberger]

And...from a standing start in mid-November 1942 - how long does it take the Allies to develop new fields elsewhere in Tunisia? Further down the map, between Sfax and Gabes, for instance...

For P40s, I would guess a couple of weeks.
For B17s...

For a few hundred aircraft a few weeks. The interdiction campaign of spring 1943 was accomplished with some 2,000 operational Allied aircraft arrayed from Algeria through Lybia. It took between 3-4 months to establish that strength and the bombs, fuel, spare parts, ground crew, communications, what not. It also took several months to attrition the Axis airforces down to where it could not effectively protect the sea lanes. In this scenario the Allies have to collect a large enough AF in Tunisia in the face of a initial Axis air superiority. The ground support & material must be brought in either overland by a marginal road system, or through the ports of Bizerte & Tunis, which are in easy interdiction range of the Axis AF. This is not a trivial conisderation. Historically the Torch planners rejected amphibious operations against Tunis precisely because of Axis air superiority over those waters. The example of the Pedestal convoy was taken seriously.

Note that the B17 had the range to bomb Italy from Algeria. The first substantial raids by the heavyweights started in mid to late December. In his biography Dolittle remarked about the problems establishing the logistics base fin Algeria for the heavy bomber wings through January.

[Kingfish]

....

In other words - being able to step forward to Tunis/Bizerte greatly reduces a lot of the historical factors preventing an early effectiveness of interdiction.

You are not recognizing the lack of the aircraft, and the support echelon in November - December. The Allies did not & could not instantly place their air forces in NW Africa, or Lybia. The Axis started this period with a marked superiority of aircraft in the region, and establsihed bases on Sicilly & Sardinia. Effective Allied air interdiction of a November-Dec evacuation from Tripoli is a nonstarter.

Carl,

How much of a factor were these limitations to the air force supporting 8th army?

IIRC, they began the Alamein offensive with a significant superiority in numbers, and while not all could shift West, they (and their supporting echelons) were at least starting out in the theater.

Wouldn't operating from the Benghazi area reduce the Axis air threat from Sardinia/Sicily (of course there still is Crete/Greece)?

[BDV]

Establishing Tunisia from the ground up at a moment when the enemy is massing against two of the exposed Axis fronts (Egypt and Don-bend), I don't think that is optimal.

Of course Tunisia cannot be abandoned without a fight, however, a small diversionary force, to buy time for a "Scortched Earth" supplemented by AngloAmerican bomber activity is probably the optimum that the German-Italian forces should try. The optimal "last stand" place is most likely Benghazi-Beda area. The Tiger Abteilungs most certainly belong to the Rostov area, and the air bridge assets (and a more defense minded commander) to the Egypt front...