No Tunisgrad

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Locked
Peter89
Member
Posts: 2369
Joined: 28 Aug 2018, 06:52
Location: Europe

Re: No Tunisgrad

#91

Post by Peter89 » 12 May 2023, 14:42

Gooner1 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:29
An evacuation of Tunisia means an earlier invasion of Sicily, which entails an earlier invasion of Italy and downfall of Mussolini.

Assuming a tougher fight in Sicily but an earlier invasion of the mainland, say July, does Germany have the forces available to execute Operation Achse?

As it was most of the German divisions involved in the defence of Italy AIUI were 'Stalingrad' divisions and other divisions refitting after service on the Eastern Front.
Even if Operation Achse was executed as effectively, the Allies have probably an extra two months of good weather campaigning in Italy whilst being able to retain many of the divisions and landing craft needed for NWE longer also.

Doubtful the Allies could be held south of Rome for the winter IMO.
The earlier evacuation of Africa might draw the Wallies into a premature or ill-prepared invasion of mainland Europe. Also any Axis troops was much stronger fighting on the northern side of the Mediterranean sea.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Von Bock
Member
Posts: 170
Joined: 24 Oct 2022, 18:20
Location: South of Holland

Re: No Tunisgrad

#92

Post by Von Bock » 12 May 2023, 15:01

Peter89 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:08
Von Bock wrote:
12 May 2023, 11:15
Well, Hitler certainly allowed troops to evacuate on the Eastern Front regularly (Kuban bridgehead, for example) so it wouldn't be unique. The biggest problem might have been the victory at Ghazala and Tobruk in 1942. Even the Allies would have never evacuated their troops after such a victory and I don't think many of us would. So the OTL (with the pursuit to El Alamein) makes kind of sense, although it was the worst possible decision in hindsight.
Hitler never really allowed to evacuate because of rational reasons, he was always forced to do it; usually left it either to the last second or even later. To give up the Axis presence in Africa would be impossible for him.
Agreed.
The Allied evacuation after Gazala-Tobruk was impossible, because where woud they "evacuate"? They controlled almost all of Africa and the whole Middle East already. The Suez base provided some 5000 t/d supplies while the Axis had about 2000 t/d supplies. The Allies were winning the war.
I mean: If the Allies held the same positions as the Germans did in June 1942 (even with the shortage in supplies) I doubt if they would have evacuated their troops. Armies usually don't retreat when they win.


Von Bock
Member
Posts: 170
Joined: 24 Oct 2022, 18:20
Location: South of Holland

Re: No Tunisgrad

#93

Post by Von Bock » 12 May 2023, 15:10

Peter89 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:42
Gooner1 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:29
An evacuation of Tunisia means an earlier invasion of Sicily, which entails an earlier invasion of Italy and downfall of Mussolini.

Assuming a tougher fight in Sicily but an earlier invasion of the mainland, say July, does Germany have the forces available to execute Operation Achse?

As it was most of the German divisions involved in the defence of Italy AIUI were 'Stalingrad' divisions and other divisions refitting after service on the Eastern Front.
Even if Operation Achse was executed as effectively, the Allies have probably an extra two months of good weather campaigning in Italy whilst being able to retain many of the divisions and landing craft needed for NWE longer also.

Doubtful the Allies could be held south of Rome for the winter IMO.
The earlier evacuation of Africa might draw the Wallies into a premature or ill-prepared invasion of mainland Europe. Also any Axis troops was much stronger fighting on the northern side of the Mediterranean sea.
Let's not forget that the Normandy landings were quite late and 'safe'. I mean: The success rate was about 95 percent in June 1944. 'Ill-prepared' can still be prepared enough if you just succeed in dominating the sea and get enough men ashore.

Yes, German forces were strong in Italy but defeat was always inevitable once the Allies got a foothold. And don't mention Dieppe, 10000 troops is not the same as 150000 (Sicily) or more troops.

Gooner1
Member
Posts: 2776
Joined: 06 Jan 2006, 13:24
Location: London

Re: No Tunisgrad

#94

Post by Gooner1 » 12 May 2023, 15:30

Peter89 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:42
The earlier evacuation of Africa might draw the Wallies into a premature or ill-prepared invasion of mainland Europe. Also any Axis troops was much stronger fighting on the northern side of the Mediterranean sea.
A 1943 invasion of France may well be the ideal scenario. I don't think it would be either premature or ill-prepared. Montgomery was in favour of it.

The stumbling block was Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Von Bock
Member
Posts: 170
Joined: 24 Oct 2022, 18:20
Location: South of Holland

Re: No Tunisgrad

#95

Post by Von Bock » 12 May 2023, 15:40

Gooner1 wrote:
12 May 2023, 15:30
Peter89 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:42
The earlier evacuation of Africa might draw the Wallies into a premature or ill-prepared invasion of mainland Europe. Also any Axis troops was much stronger fighting on the northern side of the Mediterranean sea.
A 1943 invasion of France may well be the ideal scenario. I don't think it would be either premature or ill-prepared. Montgomery was in favour of it.

The stumbling block was Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
Agree about this one. D-day was definitely one year too late. 1944 had a 95 percent (or more) success rate, but I can't imagine a 1943 failure either. With almost no coastal defenses in France.

Huszar666
Member
Posts: 255
Joined: 18 Dec 2021, 15:02
Location: Budakeszi

Re: No Tunisgrad

#96

Post by Huszar666 » 12 May 2023, 16:32

Morning,

I don't think, there would be more (German) troops in Italy or, specifically Sizily, even if Africa was evacuated sometimes in Late 1942.
There were actually only four German divisions there:
1, The 15th PzGrD, which was the renamed Division Sizilien, made up of troops destined for Tunisia, but still sitting in the "Italian traffic jam". No Tunisian campaign and evacuation in late 1942 means no "Italian Traffic Jam" and no Div.Sizilien and no 15th PzGr.
2, PzDiv Hermann Göring: It was formed from the parts of Division Hermann Göring that stayed behind in the West when parts of the same division were rushed (and destroyed) in Tunisia. If Africa is lost already in 1942, and Husky is done five months earlier (February or March 1943), it is doubtful, if the division would have more troops, than what was sent to Tunisia OTL
3, 29th PzGrD, was only re-raised in June 1943, after it was destroyed in Stalingrad. We can disregard it against any landing, that would be done earlier, than OTL-Husky
4, 1st FJD. The constituent units were only collected from the Ostfront in May and June 1943, and was rushed to Sizily after the landing. We can disregard this division for any earlier landing too.

Then, there are the divisions destroyed in Tunisia, namely
I, Ex-DAK-troops:
1, 15th PzD
2, 21st PzD
3, 90th leD
4, 164th leAfrikaDiv
5, Brigade Ramcke
All these together had around 5.000 men, 35 tanks, and a dozen or so field guns. Even if they could have been evacuated from Tripoli in December without further casualties - doubtful - this wreckage wouldn't be much of a reinforcement for Sizily.
II, 5th PzArmy troops:
1, 10th PzD
2, Division Hermann Görig: see above
3, 999th AfrikaDiv
4, 334th InfDiv
From these, only the HG and the 999th were scheduled for Afrika even before Torch, so they may find their way to Sicily after the evacuation from Tripoli in December. The other two... without a new front in Tunisia to be built up in late November, it is quite likely, they would be sent to deal with the other trouble brewing in late November elsewhere. Please note, that the units, sitting in the "Italian Traffic Jam" from all four Divisions were used to magick up Division Sizilien (aka 15th PzGrD) and a Div HG was on Sicily OTL too.

So instead of having four quite good Divisions in July, Germany would have the wreckage of the DAK there (probably still less, than a full division combined), HG, and the 999th. So, one and a half divisions less.
The only extra troops would be Italians - the wreckage of Ariete, Littorio, Trieste, Trento, plus the Centauro, Pistoia, and some odd and ends. However, Livorno was deployed to Sicily with the understanding, it would join the Tunisian front, so...

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10058
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: No Tunisgrad

#97

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 May 2023, 17:02

Gooner1 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:29
An evacuation of Tunisia means an earlier invasion of Sicily, which entails an earlier invasion of Italy and downfall of Mussolini.

At the opening of the SYMBOL Conference in January 1943 the Combined Joint Chiefs entertained the idea of invading Sardnia in March 1943. This idea was floated before Eisenhower confirmed the Tunisian campaign would last to May or June. Brooke then blackballed the Sardinian operation as stratigicly pointless and argued for the Sicilian operation. He also insisted it be run after Tunisia was cleared. I see two key points there, one Brooke was insistent on securing Sicilly, even if there was no Italian campaign, & second the Joint Chiefs thought another amphibious invasion could be executed in as little as two months.

A earlier invasion of the Italian mainland is worth discussing. Churchill & the US Air Force leaders badly wanted to. Churchill wanted to capture Rome & march on into the Alps and other mountains of the Balkans ect.. Spaatz & hissers wanted the east complex of airfields (53 by one count( they had identified in Southern Italy, the Foggia region.

The third part is dependent on how fast the Facist Grand Council members and the King come to a conclusion. Its not clear to me if the consensus to remove Mussolini would have built up any faster. The loss of Scilly had its affect, but dodging the catastrophe of Tunisiagrad and perhaps a extended Sicilian campaign might have delayed the end of Mussolinis regime until September or August anyway.
Gooner1 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:29
Assuming a tougher fight in Sicily but an earlier invasion of the mainland, say July, does Germany have the forces available to execute Operation Achse?
Have to count the Italian soldiers as well. They were not present in the same numbers as in September.
Gooner1 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:29
As it was most of the German divisions involved in the defence of Italy AIUI were 'Stalingrad' divisions and other divisions refitting after service on the Eastern Front.
Even if Operation Achse was executed as effectively, the Allies have probably an extra two months of good weather campaigning in Italy whilst being able to retain many of the divisions and landing craft needed for NWE longer also.

The air battle is the key here. As of 1 January 1943 the Allies had all or 490 operating aircraft in the US 12th Air Force. The RAG had a wing and the Desert AirForce was just arriving in western Lybia and not operational. The Axis had a combined operational air strength of over 1,300. Plus others that could be transferred from the Balkans and Germany. After four months of battle the 12th Air Force had some 1,200 aircraft, the RAF another 800 in the NAAF control. Centerd in Egypt was a RAF heavy bomber force, the US 9th Airforce, and a hefty reserve of RAF fighters and light bombers to reinforce the NAAF. Conversely the Axis were har pressed to muster 800 useable aircraft in the Mediterranean and any further reinforcements from elsewhere were thin. It took the Allies about five months of concentrated effort to triple their air strength in Africa, and defeat the Axis air forces in the Tunisian campaign.

Starting from a position of numerical superiority & some other operational advantages it took another two months, from mid April to mid June to cripple the Axis air defense of Scilly. The Italians made the decision to withdraw all their remaining aircraft from Sicilly and the extreme south of Italy in Mid June. Shortly after the Germans withdrew their serving bombers and retained a small er number of fighters on dispersed & hidden airstrips.


Using that as a guide we can guess: 1. It will take about the same five months to triple the Allied airfares strength in the Mediterranean. 2. Initially the Axis air losses wont be as severe. March and April were the bad months for losses of the Tunisian campaign. 3. As the Allied air campaign ramps up over Sicilly/S Italy the Axis will have some advantages that may drag out the air campaign longer. Assuming the Allies decide Sicilly is next it may be late May or June anyway before the air campaign is won and its decided a invasion fleet can approach.


There is a chance a extended air campaign over Sicilly might cause the idea of the Sardinia operation be revived. The most immediate advantage there is the Italians judge Sardinia indefensible and planned only a delaying action there by a single understrength corps. In the longer run it places the entire Italian and S French littoral in range of the shorter range RAF & AAF bombers. The Blenheims, B26, & B25 twin engined models can supplement the big bombers. Brooke might oppose that, or a side trip to Crete as bad strategy, but I'm sure Churchill and others would be ethusiastic.

Gooner1 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:29
Doubtful the Allies could be held south of Rome for the winter IMO.
Aside from the battlefield outcome, there is that Hitler originally considered Italy indefensible & had plans in place to evacuate everything south of the mountains protecting the Po River Basin. Rommels Army Group B was set up to execute that plan. At the last minute Kesselring persuaded Hitler a defense could be made south of Rome. With so many other variable outcomes we can assume the German strategy will become defending southern Italy.

The downside will be Churchills ideas about soft underbelly will be encouraged.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10058
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: No Tunisgrad

#98

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 May 2023, 17:16

Von Bock wrote:
12 May 2023, 15:40

A 1943 invasion of France ... With almost no coastal defenses in France.

It would be interesting to make a detailed comparison of the beach defenses of Sicilly south coast & Normandy in 1943. I have some descriptions of France for late 1942, but less for Sicilly. Comparing the Category III formations in 1943 Normandy with the Italian militia on the Sicilian coast is another one.

Peter89
Member
Posts: 2369
Joined: 28 Aug 2018, 06:52
Location: Europe

Re: No Tunisgrad

#99

Post by Peter89 » 12 May 2023, 17:33

Gooner1 wrote:
12 May 2023, 15:30
Peter89 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:42
The earlier evacuation of Africa might draw the Wallies into a premature or ill-prepared invasion of mainland Europe. Also any Axis troops was much stronger fighting on the northern side of the Mediterranean sea.
A 1943 invasion of France may well be the ideal scenario. I don't think it would be either premature or ill-prepared. Montgomery was in favour of it.

The stumbling block was Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
In 1943 the prerequisites for a successful invasion of Northwest Europe were not met. It may ended up in a disaster on a strategic scale. See Douglas Porch's Path to Victory.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
Member
Posts: 2369
Joined: 28 Aug 2018, 06:52
Location: Europe

Re: No Tunisgrad

#100

Post by Peter89 » 12 May 2023, 17:40

Von Bock wrote:
12 May 2023, 15:10
Peter89 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:42
Gooner1 wrote:
12 May 2023, 14:29
An evacuation of Tunisia means an earlier invasion of Sicily, which entails an earlier invasion of Italy and downfall of Mussolini.

Assuming a tougher fight in Sicily but an earlier invasion of the mainland, say July, does Germany have the forces available to execute Operation Achse?

As it was most of the German divisions involved in the defence of Italy AIUI were 'Stalingrad' divisions and other divisions refitting after service on the Eastern Front.
Even if Operation Achse was executed as effectively, the Allies have probably an extra two months of good weather campaigning in Italy whilst being able to retain many of the divisions and landing craft needed for NWE longer also.

Doubtful the Allies could be held south of Rome for the winter IMO.
The earlier evacuation of Africa might draw the Wallies into a premature or ill-prepared invasion of mainland Europe. Also any Axis troops was much stronger fighting on the northern side of the Mediterranean sea.
Let's not forget that the Normandy landings were quite late and 'safe'. I mean: The success rate was about 95 percent in June 1944. 'Ill-prepared' can still be prepared enough if you just succeed in dominating the sea and get enough men ashore.

Yes, German forces were strong in Italy but defeat was always inevitable once the Allies got a foothold. And don't mention Dieppe, 10000 troops is not the same as 150000 (Sicily) or more troops.
Luftwaffe was not clearly defeated in 1943. Air supremacy wasn't a given.

The Heer was not broken in 1943 (especially without Italian campaign).
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Huszar666
Member
Posts: 255
Joined: 18 Dec 2021, 15:02
Location: Budakeszi

Re: No Tunisgrad

#101

Post by Huszar666 » 12 May 2023, 18:33

At the opening of the SYMBOL Conference in January 1943 the Combined Joint Chiefs entertained the idea of invading Sardnia in March 1943. This idea was floated before Eisenhower confirmed the Tunisian campaign would last to May or June. Brooke then blackballed the Sardinian operation as stratigicly pointless and argued for the Sicilian operation. He also insisted it be run after Tunisia was cleared. I see two key points there, one Brooke was insistent on securing Sicilly, even if there was no Italian campaign, & second the Joint Chiefs thought another amphibious invasion could be executed in as little as two months.
You have to keep in mind, that the OTL conference was done, while there was still quite heavy fighting in Tunisia. In this time line, there wouldn't be a single axis soldier anywhere in Africa at that time.
The air battle is the key here.
snip
Using that as a guide we can guess: 1. It will take about the same five months to triple the Allied airfares strength in the Mediterranean. 2. Initially the Axis air losses wont be as severe. March and April were the bad months for losses of the Tunisian campaign. 3. As the Allied air campaign ramps up over Sicilly/S Italy the Axis will have some advantages that may drag out the air campaign longer. Assuming the Allies decide Sicilly is next it may be late May or June anyway before the air campaign is won and its decided a invasion fleet can approach.
While the air battles are indeed key, what the Allies accomplished OTL was a case of severe overkill. They had more or less complete control (or absolute mastery) of the airspace. A landing could be made without less complete mastery. Also, how many of those 1300/800 axis were German, and how many the less capable Italians :wink:
So yes, it would take the same 5-7 months to cripple the axis air power in the central Med to the same degree, as it was crippled OTL, but sufficient air superiority could be achieved in far less time.
In my opinion, a landing could be made in the March-May time frame, without absolute dominance, but with normal supremacy.
As said before, without a Tunisian campaign, there would be most likely less axis troops on Sicily, so even with a stronger axis airforce, the Sicilian Campaign would probably end earlier.

The Duce would be deposed just as fast if Sicily fell, no matter the losses in Tunisia - the 8th Army was destroyed at the same time, and the colonies would be lost the same.

Gooner1
Member
Posts: 2776
Joined: 06 Jan 2006, 13:24
Location: London

Re: No Tunisgrad

#102

Post by Gooner1 » 13 May 2023, 13:07

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 May 2023, 17:02
The third part is dependent on how fast the Facist Grand Council members and the King come to a conclusion. Its not clear to me if the consensus to remove Mussolini would have built up any faster. The loss of Scilly had its affect, but dodging the catastrophe of Tunisiagrad and perhaps a extended Sicilian campaign might have delayed the end of Mussolinis regime until September or August anyway.
Deposing il Duce was on the cards after the fall of Africa and the disaster in Russia. The successful Allied landing in Siciliy pulled the trigger on it.
German abandonment of the Italians in Africa might actually lead to the situation of Mussolini leading Italy out of the war and their alliance with Germany!

OTOH It may well have helped Allied planning for the invasion of the mainland Italy if Mussolini had not been deposed already; it may have concentrated minds better, especially for Operation Shingle.

[he air battle is the key here. As of 1 January 1943 the Allies had all or 490 operating aircraft in the US 12th Air Force. The RAG had a wing and the Desert AirForce was just arriving in western Lybia and not operational. The Axis had a combined operational air strength of over 1,300. Plus others that could be transferred from the Balkans and Germany. After four months of battle the 12th Air Force had some 1,200 aircraft, the RAF another 800 in the NAAF control. Centerd in Egypt was a RAF heavy bomber force, the US 9th Airforce, and a hefty reserve of RAF fighters and light bombers to reinforce the NAAF. Conversely the Axis were har pressed to muster 800 useable aircraft in the Mediterranean and any further reinforcements from elsewhere were thin. It took the Allies about five months of concentrated effort to triple their air strength in Africa, and defeat the Axis air forces in the Tunisian campaign.
By October 42 the British had about 1200 aircraft (including 13 USAAF squadrons) in Egypt and Palestine with another 100+ aircraft in Malta. The issue of Allied air superiority would likely be less pressing for an earlier invasion of Sicily than the availability of sufficient landing ships and craft.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10058
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: No Tunisgrad

#103

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 14 May 2023, 04:15

Huszar666 wrote:
12 May 2023, 18:33
At the opening of the SYMBOL Conference in January 1943 the Combined Joint Chiefs entertained the idea of invading Sardnia in March 1943. This idea was floated before Eisenhower confirmed the Tunisian campaign would last to May or June. Brooke then blackballed the Sardinian operation as stratigicly pointless and argued for the Sicilian operation. He also insisted it be run after Tunisia was cleared. I see two key points there, one Brooke was insistent on securing Sicilly, even if there was no Italian campaign, & second the Joint Chiefs thought another amphibious invasion could be executed in as little as two months.
You have to keep in mind, that the OTL conference was done, while there was still quite heavy fighting in Tunisia. In this time line, there wouldn't be a single axis soldier anywhere in Africa at that time.
I was following the original TL, which proposed a Axis rear guard action that lasts past January.


The air battle is the key here.
snip
Using that as a guide we can guess: 1. It will take about the same five months to triple the Allied airfares strength in the Mediterranean. 2. Initially the Axis air losses wont be as severe. March and April were the bad months for losses of the Tunisian campaign. 3. As the Allied air campaign ramps up over Sicilly/S Italy the Axis will have some advantages that may drag out the air campaign longer. Assuming the Allies decide Sicilly is next it may be late May or June anyway before the air campaign is won and its decided a invasion fleet can approach.
Good question. The sources I was recalling there suggest between 15% & 25%. The count was for operational aircraft & the Italians had a lot more on had that weren't combat worthy or flyable without rebuilds. Same for the Germans. Pulling Ellis 'Brits Force' off the shelf & looking at Table 41 the Germans are credited with building 18,953 combat aircraft in 1942 the Italians with building all of 631. That suggests the proportion available. The several books here all agree the Italians withdrew the remnants of most of their air groups to northern Italy by the end of May, and withdrew the remainder from Sicilly in June. The kept some fighters in the Foggia region, but were trying to reorganize and rebuild the rest with that small production. If anyone reading here has a good accessible source for the Italian air strength in 1943 that would be welcome.

Huszar666 wrote:
12 May 2023, 18:33
While the air battles are indeed key, what the Allies accomplished OTL was a case of severe overkill. They had more or less complete control (or absolute mastery) of the airspace. A landing could be made without less complete mastery. Also, how many of those 1300/800 axis were German, and how many the less capable Italians :wink: [quote
So yes, it would take the same 5-7 months to cripple the axis air power in the central Med to the same degree, as it was crippled OTL, but sufficient air superiority could be achieved in far less time.
In my opinion, a landing could be made in the March-May time frame, without absolute dominance, but with normal supremacy.
As said before, without a Tunisian campaign, there would be most likely less axis troops on Sicily, so even with a stronger axis airforce, the Sicilian Campaign would probably end earlier.
What I find interesting in Dolittles autobiography and other sources for the attitudes of the Allied air leaders in early to mid 1943 is a mix of both over confidence and over estimation of Axis air capability. In March-April-May they did not see the battle as overkill, yet thought they were going to win the rest of the Medieranean campaigns on their own. Theres a sort of dissonance.

But the remark [quote} ..in the March-May time frame,without absolute dominance, but with normal supremacy.[/quote]. Does not track the actual situation for either side. In March the Allied airfares were only at parity over the Tunisian battlefield & that's not counting the Axis air strength in the Mediterranean but not yet committed to the Tunisian battle. Up through February the NAAF was out numbered and the RAF heavy bombers in Egypt or the US 9th Air Force in March did not provide 'normal supremacy'. Relocating the NAAF to Tunisia, bringing up the Desert Air Force, and adding in the strength of the heavy bomber groups in Egypt Does not look like a route to supremacy over Sicilly in March. The numbers look weak. May looks more like a logical point.
The Duce would be deposed just as fast if Sicily fell, no matter the losses in Tunisia - the 8th Army was destroyed at the same time, and the colonies would be lost the same.
The literature on the fall of Musslini I have suggests the opposition would not have coalesced until latter August. I dislike depending on one source for this, but other factors are described driving the removal beside the loss of Sicilly

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10058
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: No Tunisgrad

#104

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 May 2023, 00:54

Gooner1 wrote:
13 May 2023, 13:07

By October 42 the British had about 1200 aircraft (including 13 USAAF squadrons) in Egypt and Palestine with another 100+ aircraft in Malta. The issue of Allied air superiority would likely be less pressing for an earlier invasion of Sicily than the availability of sufficient landing ships and craft.
I have two divergent strengths for the Desert Air Force in January. One is a strength of 240 aircraft. The other the date is less clear claims 480 of all types. Both sound way to low and may mean only front line strength in western Lybia.
While the air battles are indeed key, what the Allies accomplished OTL was a case of severe overkill. They had more or less complete control (or absolute mastery) of the airspace. A landing could be made without less complete mastery. Also, how many of those 1300/800 axis were German, and how many the less capable Italians :wink:
A bit more information on the Italians. J Holland in his book 'Sicilly 43' places seven Gruppi of fighters on Sicilly late May & the 27 Gruppo Bombardmenti, he does not offer what the actual strength in operational aircraft might have been. Other Italian fighter groups were still based on the Foggia airbase cluster, and some bombers. On Sicilly Holland places three Gruppen of JG 53, totaling nine Staffel; the 2d Gruppe of JG 27; two Gruppen of JG 77 with a third on Sardinia. The only hint about actual strength is the number 40 is given for pilots in JG 77 at some point in late May. Later in the book Holland gives some information on the reinforcements in aircraft from Germany in June & July. Conversely the Italian replacement of aircraft was very thin.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10058
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: No Tunisgrad

#105

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 May 2023, 01:49

Gooner1 wrote:
13 May 2023, 13:07
... The issue of Allied air superiority would likely be less pressing for an earlier invasion of Sicily than the availability of sufficient landing ships and craft.

This depends on what the Axis defense strength would be in Sicilly. As we can see from the several posts on the Axis strength in late 1942 early 43 there's a variety of possibilities & Hitlers unpredictability, with deception ops on top of all that... I think if I were to design a game for this situation the players would be drawing from several possible Axis defense OB cards, ranging from very weak to very strong.

What we can count is the strength of the Torch operation. The Allies managed to land three Corps in the assault and its follow up 8th - 20 November. Using those naval forces as a low end estimate The 1st Army invading Sicilly with two strong corps is not unreasonable. If the Sardinian operation is revived it is possible to run it either first or second. There's pros and cos for either. Given the weak Italian defenses there a single Allied corps would be sufficient to seize the south shore and port. Given his insistence the Sicilly be secured first Brooke is likely to insist the same in this alternative reality. So, we might see a 2-3 Corps landing on Sicilly first, and a subsidiary invasion of Sardinia a month or two later. Of course the longer the Allies wait the larger the attack on Sicilly can be. By mid June you are in the zone for the historical strength in amphibious lift.

Locked

Return to “What if”