Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the start

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ljadw
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by ljadw » 24 Apr 2012 15:25

Some time ago,I have posted on this forum (but I can't find them back) some figures about the mechanisation and the surface of the German farms,but,I remember that the average German farm was much smaller than the average British one and the same for the mechanisation .
From Wiki (Agrarwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik im Deutschen Reich)
1937:29 % of the active population was working in the agriculture
:there were more than 3 million farms for a total area of 19.5 million ha (average surface was 6 ha,in 2007:48)
:25 % of the 19.5 million ha belonged to 0.2 % of the farms(6000 farms with 5 million ha and 3 million with 14 million ha)
:Landflucht :between 1933/1939,400000 were leaving for the cities
:the mechanisation :
1933 :sowing-machines:667.692
:mowing-machines:949.805
:machines for the lifting of potatos:343.720
1939:sowing-machines:806.452
:mowing-machines:1.363.396
:for potatos:458.559
In 1936 was 50 % of the household income going to food :mostly potatos
In 1938,had Gemany to import 10 % of its food consumption

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by pugsville » 24 Apr 2012 16:09

I got some different statistics (US Civil Affairs Handbook section 7 :Agriculture - Combined Arms research library )

"Germany's total area in 1937 boundaries the "Old Reich" or"Altreich" -amounted to 470,545 square kilometers or 181,677 square miles.The country is densely populated, with a 1939 population of 69,316,465 or38 per square mile (147 per square kilometer), as against 375 per squaremile in Italy (1939), 197 in France (1936), and 225 in Denmark (1938), InEurope only Great Britain with 520 per square mile (1939), Belgium with 710(1937), and the Netherlands with 640 (1937) are more densely populated thanGermany. The United States in 1940 had only 44 persons per square mile,Of Germany's total area of 47 million hectares (116 million acres)in 1938 fully 61 percent or 28.5 million hectares (70.4 million acres) werein agricultural use. Forests and woodland amounted to 28 percent of thetotal area of 13 million hectares (32.1 million acres), unproductive andwaste-land to somewhat under 4 percent or 1.? million hectares (4.2 millionacres). The remaining 3.8 million hectares (9.4 million acres) or 8 percentof the total area were used for buildings, roads, recreational grounds, mili-tary installations, etc., or were covered by water.Germany is an industrial country with more than 90 percent of itsnational income derived from non-agricultural activities. Agriculture'sshare in the total social income thus amounted to less than 10 percent orabout the same percentage as in the United States, The total number ofpeople whose livelihood depended on agriculture, including those employedand temporarily unemployed as well as dependents, was 13,300,000 in 1933"

"Yields per acre are high in Germany,"which is especially re-markable if the quality of the soil is considered. Great thoroughnessof land preparation and large applications of manure and commercialfertilizers have been instrumental in achieving such yields."

"As shown in an account for a very large estate in the provinceof Brandenburg, during 1928-1929, not less than 60 horse hours and 35man hours' were used, on the average, per acre of winter wheat up to,but not including, the harvest 2/. To these figures must be added thesubstantial amounts of power and labor used in handling manure, whichcannot be charged to the livestock account alofe. In contrast, accordingto a survey in central Indiana, only 2,6 horse hours, 0.6 tractor hours,mand 2.0 man hours were used per acre to produce, but not to harvest,winter wheat on farms of a size much smaller than that of the Germanestate. /Only in Belgium and the Netherlands, and partly Japan, thecountries with the most intensive agriculture in the world, was morecommercial fertilizer used per acre of farmland than in Germany. Bel-gium and the Netherlands grow a considerably larger proportion of rootcrops and potatoes which require especially large quantities of fertil-izer."

"FarmsAccording to the 1939 census returns there were 3,200,000farm holdings over 1* acres in size within the boundaries of the OldReich. The total area in farms, including woodland and garden land,was 42,700,000 hectares (107,000,000 acres). Most of the farms inLabor

Germany are owner-operated. Only the very 11 holdings and the largeestates (including state-owned latifundia) had substantial proportionsof tenant-operated units. Of all holdings uder 5 acres about one-fourth,and of all farms and estates over 250 aeres one-fifth were tenant-operated.(Farms over 250 acres under German conditions t be considered large-size.) In all other size-groups, between 5 and 250 acres, the number oftenant-operated farms is less than 5 percent of their total. There are,however, considerable numbers of farms in al size-groups which operate,together with their own land, moderate proportions of rented fields. Yetof the total area in farms all over Germany only 10 percent is eithertenant-operated or rented. Fully 89 percent is owner-operated; and only1 percent is share-cropped, worker-operated, or in communal ownership.As shown in figure 7, Germany may be grouped into three broadsections according to the prevalent size of farm, The small holdingsup to 25 acres prevail in the southwest, especially in the valleys andslopes of the middle and upper Rhine and its tributarses The largefarms and estates are predominant in the northeast, especially in Mecklen-burg, Pomerania, Lower Silesia, and to some extent Bast Prussia. Therest of the area, all the way up from Bavaria through central Germanyand Westphalia to the tip of Schleswig-H oltein, is checterized bythe prevalence of medium and medium-large farms s from 25 to 250 acres.For Germany as a whole the distribution of the land in agri-cultural use may be gauged, in a different grouping, by the followingproportions in farms of various size-groups: In 1933 slightly over3 percent of the agricultural land was in dwarf-holdings up to 5 acres -whose operators for the most part supplemented their income from non-agricultural pursuits; this size-group includes vineyard holdings. Smallfarms from 5 to 12i acres comprised 9 percent of the agricultural area,medium farms from 12% to 50 acres 35 percent. A little over 33 percentof the agricultural land is in medium-large farms from 50 to 250 acres,and 20 percent in large farms and estates over 250 acres. Accordingly,almost three-fourths of the agricultural land in Germany is operated bya broad middle-class of independent peasants who make their living ex-clusively in agriculture; about one-fifth is in large estates. (Seetable 4.)"

"According to the census of 1939 the total number of farm-hands,agricultural laborers, and employees in Germany was estimated at 2,032,000compared to 2,497,000 in 1933. Both in 1939 and in 1933 the number offarm operators and working members of his family was about 6,720,000.The total of all people working in agriculture and gardening thus de-clined from 9,200,000 in 1933 to 8,750,000 in 1939 -Old Reich basis."

"Farm ,Machinery1Numbers.- Small machines are the most numerous of the sizesin German agriculture since they can best be utilized on small farms.On the three million farms of the Old Reich in 1939 there were about1,650,000 electro-motors of which over 80 percent had less than 6 H.P.There were about 1.7 million mowers for grass and grain including over300,000 binders, Threshing machines too, despite their high orice, wererather numerous (960,000). 'ully 87 percent of all threshing machinesare driven by mechanical power while 13 percent are based upon animaldraft power.Sowing machines numbered about 720,000 in 1939, which meansthat only about one-fourth of all German farms on the average owned asowing machine. However, the proportion of farms which used drills(including borrowed machines) was about one-third., Even on this basisit apears that more than two-thirds of the farmers who grow grain werestill sowing by hand. Such a calculation, however, applies only to thenumber of farms, not to a comparable proportion of the grain acreagessince the grain acreage in farms without sowing machines is small.Of other farm machinery which can be used to good advantageon smaller, farms as well, such as tedders and potato diggers, therewere about 400,000 each, Manure and fertilizer spreaders in 1939 num-bered about 225,000. The fewer numbers of the larger and more expensive machinerywere mostly to be found on the larger farms. The Old Reich in 1939had about 10,000 steam engines including steam plow locomotives, about 66,000 tractors including small tractors and motor mowers; 37,000 ofthe tractors had more than 22 belt horse-power. 'or total numbers andregional distribution'of machinery see table 9.Farms using machinery. -The German census not only ,enumeratesthe farm machinery owned by the farmers, but also the number of farmswhich have used agricultural machinery of various types no matter whetherit was owned, rented, borrowed, or used cooperatively. As a result, inthe case of a number of machines, the numbers of farms which used themare larger than the numbers of the existing machines. Most frequentappears to have been the utilization of rented or borrowed threshingmachines. About 1,400,000 farms used. threshing machines with mechanicalpower, while there were only 840,000 such machines available. Each 100of these machines was therefore used by about 170 farms. The number ofowned tractors is also considerably smaller than the number of farmsusing tractors, The utilization of sowing machines, manure spreaders,and. potato diggers on a renting, borrowing, or cooperative basis alsowas considerable. On the other hand, particularly in the case of thesmaller types of machinery, the numbers owned were greater than thenumbers of the farms using such machinery. This means that many farmshad more than one such machine. Electro-motors and mowers are casesin point."

"IIA. THE CROPSGrain /With a total grain acreage of about 11.7 million hectares in1932-37, Germany produced 7.8 million metric tons of rye, 5.7 milliontons of oats, almost 5 million tons of wheat' (including a small quan-tity of spelt), 3.4 million tons of barley, 850,000 tons of mixed grainor maslin (wheat and rye, or more frequently barley and oats), and50,000 tons of corn. The total grain crop, therefore, was about 23million metric tons. In the bumper crop year 1938 this total rose to26.4 million tons, from a slightly smaller acreage, because of recordyields.The total grain acreage from 1931 to 1937 showed a decline byabout 600,000 hectares or 5 percent, with decreases in rye, spelt, wheat(especially spring wheat), spring barley, and oats, but an expansion inwinter barley and maslin. Yields in general bad an 'upward trend."

"Row cropsIn 1932-37 Germany's potato acreage amounted to about 2.8million hectares -roughly equal to that for oats. Acreage in thelater t30's was somewhat increased in a general shift toward higher-yielding crops. Total production in 1932-37 was 45.6 million metrictons, at a yield of 16,400 kgs. per hectare. By 1938 production hadreached almost 51 million tons at a yield of 17,600 kgs. per hectare,following the record harvest of 55 million tons in 1937."

"An average of, 360,000 hectares-planted to sugar beets in 1932-37gave yield of 30,000 kgs. per hectare and a total production of 11 mil-lion metric tons. The expansion of sugar beet growing was particularlymarked in 1937 and 1938 when the acreage reached 450,000 and 500,000hectares, respectively. Production in both years was around 15 mil-lion tons, at a record yield of 34,500 kgs. per hectare in 1937 and31,000 in 1938."

"B. LIVZSTOCK .According to the census of December 4, 1939, Germany at theoutbreak of war had a total of almost 20 million cattle (of which about10 million dairy cows), 25 million hogs, almost 5 million sheep, 2.3million-goats, almost 90 million chickens (of which 83.8 million layinghens), 4.7 million geese, and 2.6 million ducks. The number of horseswas 3= million of which 2.8 million were over three years old.Cattle. numbers in December 1939 were larger than in any previousyear except for 1936 and 1937. Hog, numbers were the largest in any yearexcepting 1936. Sheep were also higher than at any time after World WarI ane had shown a rising trend ever since 1934 when expansion under activegovernment promotion began.Compared to 1913 livestock,numbers in 1939 within the territoryof the Old Reich (193? boundaries) were considerably higher, Int the caseof cattle there was an increase of about 7.5 percent; because of some shififrom beef cattle to dairy cattle the number of cows two years and olderhad even increased by 12,9 percent. Hog numbers in 1939 were 11.4 percenthigher than in 1913. On the other hand, the number of sheep was 3 percentbelow 1913, the number of goats 28.6 percent below. The number of chickensin 1939 was 39.4 percent over 1913, that of ducks 22.9 percent higher, whilegeese showed a decline by 19,1 percent- In the inter-war period Germanyhad considerably increased its feed supplies from purely domestic resourcesso that, despite the increase in livestock numbers, the country's dependenceon imported fedituffs in 1939 was very much less than at the outbreak ofthe ?irst World War.U4"

"HorsesThe horse is Germany's most important source of farm draft power.The relative density of horses in the various agricultural areas fluctuatesa great deal. On an average, there were about 12 horses per 100 hectaresof land in agricultural use or about five horses per 100 of the population.fastern and northwestern Germany, where horse breeding is considerable,have the greatest density, namely over 14 horses per 100 hectares of egri-cultural land. Elast Prussia, Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, Weser-Elms,Mecklenburg, and the Rhine country are the most important horse-breedingand surplus producing regions. These areas have good pastures which areessential for a healthy growth of the young animals."

"C. FOOD SUPPLIES AND CONSUMTIONTotal -roduction and degrees of food and feed self-sufficiencyGermany's food economy at the outbreak of war had a high degreeof self-sufficiency. From 80 to 85 percent of total food consu4mption inrecent pre-war years, calculated on a calorie basis, was covered bydomestic production, the main deficit being in fats and oils.Total agricultural production from the soil from the middle'20's to the middle 130's increased considerably, as shown in table 25.According to estimates of.the German Institute for Business Research,this increase amounted to about one-fourth. The effective increase interms of ultimate energy for food in that period, however, was only aboutb5 percent since the gain in production was relatively larger in feed-stuffs than in foodstuffs of vegetable origin for direct human consumption.With such a distribution of the increase in output, the loss in energysustained in the conversion of feed into livestock products weighs downthe total rate of gain if calculated in terms of ultimate food caloriesfor human consumption.Of a total agricultural production from the soil in the late'30's of 220 trillion calories about 20 trillion were used in the feedingof draft animals, while 30 trillion went into seed, loss, and waste aswell as industrial uses, leaving a net production for food and feed ofabout l?0 trillion calories. Hereof 41 trillion were used for directhuman consumption as foodstuffs of vegetable origin, while the remain-ing 129 trillion -at a loss of six-sevenths of the original energy -were converted into about 19 trillion calories of foodstuffs of animal origin. Imports, in term of ultimate food calories, amounted to roughly7 trillion of vegetable origin and to about 5 trillion of animal origin(3 direct, 2 converted from imported feed). Total food consumption thuswas roughly 72 trillion calories, of which 12 trillion ultimate foodcalories or about 17 percent were, imported as food or feed, while fully83 percent were produced from purely domestic resources.In recent pre-war years Germany produced more bread grain thanwas required for human consumption, leaving a surplus for feeding tolivestock or for accumulation of reserves. Production of sugar amplycovered human requirements, and only about one-fourth of the largequantities of potatoes produced was needed to meet substantial food uses,the rest -after deduction of waste and seed -going mainly into feeding.Feeding of imported grain amounted to little more than 8 percent of thetotal quantity of grains and potatoes, in terms of grain, used for feed.On the other hand, Germany depended to a considerable extent on importsfrom overseas for feed concentrates. Yet it should be remembered that,while these concentrates were very important in certain sectors of thedairy industry, Germany's cattle herds subsisted mainly on hay, pastures,feed roots, and other domestically produced feeds.In regard to meats Germany was almost self-sufficient. Althoughpart of these meat supplies were produced with imported feeds, such depend-ence was little over 10 percent of total production. The substantial de-ficit in fats was the chief weakness in the German food economy. Domestieproduction of food fats before the war amounted to less than one-half ofrelatively high consumption."

". CURSORY REVIEW OF THE WAR-TIME FOOD SIT'UATIONGermany's war-time food situation must be interpreted againstthe background of pre-war conditions, as they were described in PartII. As compared with 1914-1918, the country's considerably strongerposition in this war is due to substantially larger su-oplies fromher own agricultural production, from substantial stocks accumulatedbefore the outbreak of war (grain, fats, sugar) as well as fromappreciably larger and more diversified takings from other contin-ental countries most of which this time are under Germany's ^control.Germany was able to ipoort or requisition about three-fourths ofwhat it used to import before the war, and this amount contributedbetween 10 and 15 percent of its total war-time requirements. Onlyin regard to fats, eggs, and feed concentrates were Germa y's war-time imports considerably smaller than those of pre-war years. Allother major foodstuffs and feedstuffs, meats, fish, vegetables, andpossibly fruits, as well as grains were imported and requisitionedin quantities equal to or exceeding the pre-war average,In the first two years of war, food conditions remainedrelatively favorable although the reduction in civilian consumptionof individual foods compared to pre-war was substantial. The ration-ing system clearly favors large-size families and, above all, thoseconsumer groups who most directly sustain the military, industrial,and agricultural war effort. The total calorie value of food consumption by the civilian population from the outbreak of warto the end of 1941 may be estimated to have averaged well above90 percent of the pre-war level. For important consumer groupsit differed little from theiT pre-war standard; for the commoncity-dweller in non-manual work, the "normal" consumer, the re-striation was considerable. The supply of carbohydrates has beenfairly ample, As a result of the. imposed shifts in the diet, how-ever, the proportions of fats and animal proteins, and of foodvitamins and mineral salts, were generally reduced..As the season 1941-42 opened, German food prospects appearedless favorable than in the first 24 months of war. Central Euro-pean crops in 1941 again had turned out below average. Possibil-ities for imports and requisitions, after a year of reserve de-pletion in the countries under German domination, on the wholehad been reduced below actual takings in 1940-41. Reserve stocksof fats and to some extent grains had also been reduced in Germanyproper. At the same time, requirements for the greatly expandedarmed forces and foreign workers in Germany had risen considerablysince the early part of 1941, and it appeared probable that Germanywould be called upon in 1941-42 to ship bread grains, potatoes,sugar, and in some cases even fats to several other Europeancountries. Last, but not least, the huge requirements for the warin RussiAa had generally added to the problem of transport and dis-tribution in Germany and other continental countries.and an extremely long and cold winter greatly increased the diffi-culties of transport and storage. The potato supply to the urbanpopulation over most of the winter 1941-42 appears to have beenconsiderably diminished from that of 1940-41, a year in which con-sumption had increased greatly over previous years. By April 1942'informal rationing of potatoes in the cities was largely replacedby a more uniform system of allocation under which only 2 to 21egs. (44 to 51 pounds) were distributed per person per week. Thehighr figure is about equivalent to pro-war consumption in Germanworker families, but the reduction compared to 1940-41, in view ofthe scarcity of other foods, was keenly felt by. the population.Jollowing a curtailment in meat rations from June 2, 1941,the German government decided upon a more inclusive cut in foodallowances as from April 6, 1942. On that day adult meat and fatrations were reduced by from 20 to 25 percent and bread rations bysomewhat under 10 percent. The milling extraction for bread flourwas raised to near 100 percent in two suc'cessive steps. 1/ Thesequantitative' and qualitative reductions in the food allowances wereimportant, but reflected long-range planning rather than an immed-iate emergency. The rations were brought down to a level at whichthey probably could have been maintained for an extended periodeven if crops had tnned Qut as poor as the German authorities ex-pected in the spring of 1942.1"

"Yields.- The average yield of grain in 1932-1937 was about19-4 metric quintals per hectare. Assuming an increase in the trendin yields by 2 percent annually up to 1939, the theoretical trendvalue of grain yields in that year would appear to have been 21m. quintals; the actual yield was about 21.4 quintals. As perestimates given in table 40 grain yields in 1940 to 1942 werereduced to about 18* Quintals per hectare or 12 percent belowthe trend value attained at the outbreak of war. In 1943 grainyields may have been up to slightly over 20 quintals or only about4 percent below the 1939 productivity level"

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Gorque
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by Gorque » 27 Apr 2012 01:08

ljadw wrote:From the WOD:
Arable ha per farmer (one ha being 2.5 acre)
US:12.8
Denmark:4.7
Britain :3.8
SU:3.1
France:2.8
Germany :2.1
The same,but using the index 100 for Germany
US:617.4
Denmark:229.4
Britain:182.3
SU:150.9
France:134.1
and
Carl Schwamberger wrote:We dont see the output per acre. Perhaps the German techniques were super efficient? It is also possible that represents a lot of products which did not need large tracts?
From WOD, Table A5, p 686

Grain harvest in million of tons

1932-3, 22.8
1933-4, 24.3
1934-5, 20.3
1935-6, 21.0
1936-7, 20.9
1937-8, 21.1
1938-9, 24.9
1938-9, 29.6 (Somethings wrong with the table! The years are repeated, yet the nos. are different.)
1939-40, 27.5
1940-1, 24.0
1941-2, 23.6
1942-3, 22.7
1943-4, 23.9

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by pugsville » 27 Apr 2012 04:31

German Agriculture was relatively High yielding, but it used large amount of fertilizer and Labour. It was relatively productive in land terms, but not so much if you are looking at labour.

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 27 Apr 2012 17:06

My great grandfather Charles Schwamberger emmigrated from Swabia circa 1872. Many decades earlier from the era we are discussing, but it causes me to ponder the changes in farming technique he saw when he adapted to the prairie style farms where he settled in Indiana.

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by BDV » 30 Apr 2012 22:13

pugsville wrote:German Agriculture was relatively High yielding, but it used large amount of fertilizer and Labour. It was relatively productive in land terms, but not so much if you are looking at labour.
That was true of the agriculture in the entire Central and Eastern Europe, and much (most, IMO) of the manufacturing. Labor was the limiting factor. Anything that diverts labor to a less efficient uses is bound to create huge disruptions.

It really can seem trivial, but take a barber for example. Assume that he can be projected to spare his customers twice the time that he uses to shave them. If his customers are workmen from the nearby manufacturing shops, his business being forced to close is the equivalent of losing two trained men from their jobs.

Repeat the above with tailors, shoemakers, cobblers, watch/device repairmen, down to the ragged "salesman" trading my grandma pots and matches and wicks and lampoil in exchange for a chicken or a measure of shlivovitz or whatnot, etc, etc, etc.

Until one acounts for the micro level, where most of the jewish minority worked and produced, one cannot understand why the 3rd Reich's antisemitic policies were such a kick in the nuts to the economy.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by Politician01 » 03 Feb 2013 21:46

To review this old thread - I read an interesting article which supports my claim.

All major combatants manages to reach maximum production within 2-3 years after their entry into the war - while Germany needed 4-5 years.

Considered their production increase from 42-44 - despite Allied bombing it is reosonable that they could have done what they did in 42-44 in 40-42

All numbers quoted from memory:

Aircraft production 39/40/41/42/43/44:

Britain: 8000/15 000/20 000/23000/ 26 000/26 000
USSR: 10 500/10 500/15 500/ 25 000/ 35 000/ 40 000
USA: 8000/12 000/ 26 000/ 45 000/ 86 000/ 95 000
Japan: 5 000/5500/5500/8800/16 500/ 28000
Germany: 8000 /10 800/ 11 700/ 15 500/ 25 000/ 40 000

If we take the maximum ever produced as 100 then

Britain increased her production from 30% in 1939 to 90% in 1942 - 60% increase in 2 years
The USSR increased from 39% in 1941 to 90% in 1943 - 50% increase in 2 years
The USA increased from 27% in 1941 to 90% in 1944 - 60% increse in 2 years
Japan increased from 20% in 1941 to 60% in 1943 - 40 % increase in 2 years
Germany increased from 20% in 1939 to just 40% in 1942 - 20% increase in 2 years

The numbers for tanks and spgs are similar - Germany was simply slacking in 1940/41

Had they gone to total war allready in 1939 they could have pushed their production levels forward by 2 years thus reaching 1944 production allready in 1942.

They managed to do this in 1942-1944 despite allied bombing and defeat on many fronts - so they would have been perfectly able to do so in 1940-42.

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 03 Feb 2013 22:07

To review this old thread - I read an interesting article which supports my claim.
OP, I'd hate to think you'd already forgotten how it works around here.

Can we have a link to or reference for that article?
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by Politician01 » 03 Feb 2013 22:22

phylo_roadking wrote:
To review this old thread - I read an interesting article which supports my claim.
OP, I'd hate to think you'd already forgotten how it works around here.

Can we have a link to or reference for that article?
A link does not exist because the article is in a book

But the book is called :
Axis Power: Could Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan have won World War II? by Dr. William Roger Townshend

The authors points are the following:

- Germany managed to increase its production massively from 1942-1944 despite allies bombing and despite beeing pushed back on all fronts so it would easily have been possible in 1940/41.

- All major combatants reached around 90% of maximum production in the third year of their entry into the war - while Germany increased only very little in the first three years - because Germany was slacking.

- The extra production in the years 1940-1942 could easily have meant a victory in the Battle of britain - a conquered meditarenean and a Russian defeat in 1941/42

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 03 Feb 2013 22:33

- Germany managed to increase its production massively from 1942-1944 despite allies bombing and despite beeing pushed back on all fronts so it would easily have been possible in 1940/41.
Okay....there's a HUGE number of threads on AHF discussing this aspect; to precis VERY briefly - "Germany managed to increase its production massively BETWEEN 1942-1944"....but production dipped in 1943 due to the bombing; come 1944, production rose to greater than 1942 levels, because vital production had been moved underground.
- The extra production in the years 1940-1942 could easily have meant a victory in the Battle of britain -
The numbers for tanks and spgs are similar - Germany was simply slacking in 1940/41

Had they gone to total war allready in 1939 they could have pushed their production levels forward by 2 years...
Tanks and guns don't win the BoB...aircraft and aircrews do. And the Luftwaffe was quite large enough to do the job, see the numbers...

Also - German aircraft rpoduction was slower than British NOT because of overall production, but because items like the DB 601 etc. had taken longer to cxome into production than planned, etc. Sheer numbers can't cause changes in the development chronology ;)

Also - take a look at something like E.R. Hooton for ALL the constraints that stopped teh german aero industry moving forward any faster than it did in reality. basically - for the Germans to be producing MORE aircraft in 1940, they'd have had to be doing it long before 1940. Aircraft development trends are years...sometimes decades...long.
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 03 Feb 2013 22:49, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by Politician01 » 03 Feb 2013 22:41

phylo_roadking wrote:
for the Germans to be producing MORE aircraft in 1940, they'd have had to be doing it long before 1940. Aircraft development trends are years...sometimes decades...long.
Britain managed to increase production from 8000 in 1939 to 15 000 in 1940 despite the Blitz
The USSR managed to increase production from 15 000 in 1941 to 25 000 in 1942 despite loosing 40% of its capacity

So Germany could very well have produced 15 500 aircraft in 1940 instead of 10 800 and 25 000 in 1941 instead 12 000
The resources were there - it was the effort that was not invested

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by stg 44 » 03 Feb 2013 22:53

phylo_roadking wrote: Also - take a look at something like E.R. Hooton for ALL the constraints that stopped teh german aero industry moving forward any faster than it did in reality. basically - for the Germans to be producing MORE aircraft in 1940, they'd have had to be doing it long before 1940. Aircraft development trends are years...sometimes decades...long.
I suggest you read Edward Homze's "Arming the Luftwaffe" (which E.R. Hooton quotes over and over), Daniel Uziel's "Arming the Luftwaffe", and Richard Overy's doctoral thesis about Luftwaffe production in 1939-1941. Germany could very well have produced much more in aircraft from 1939-1941. Udet killed himself for a reason, which Hooton himself mentions the effects of.
Also Richard Overy's very recent "Göring: Hitler's Iron Knight" also delves into the problems in aircraft production that stemmed from Udet and Göring's mismanagement of aircraft production and the economy respectively.
The Bundeswehr's military history research office series on Germany at war also deals with how badly Göring handled the economy.
Beyond that there are some interesting things Lutz Budraß has to say about Luftwaffe production:
http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de ... en/id=4115


The overall conclusions of all of this is that Udet's rise and Milch's sidelining guaranteed that German aviation production would stagnate for years until Udet's suicide in late 1941 and Milch's return to control immediately resulted in major improvements in production.

Overy's "Air war in WW2" also has interesting numbers about the resources that Germany and Britain respectively committed to aircraft production between 1939-1941, which shows how Germany had more workers, raw materials, and factory floor space in their aviation industry in those early years of the war, yet produced less than the British, who with fewer resources leapfrogged German production. Of course then in 1942 on Germany with the same manpower and raw materials staged their massive aircraft production increases. Part of this of course was from switching to fighter aircraft, which is why the British were able to outproduce Germany in 1940-2, as they were focused on fighters primarily in that period. Of course one should recognize that both Britain and Germany included damaged aircraft returned to duty after major repairs as part of new production, which helped boost German production numbers in 1943-44, while the British were able to repair the same fighters over and over again in 1940-1, while Germany lost aircraft shot down over Britain, so couldn't repair them and send them back into combat.

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phylo_roadking
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 03 Feb 2013 22:59

Britain managed to increase production from 8000 in 1939 to 15 000 in 1940 despite the Blitz
...and it was the culmination of a trend begun in 1933; See John James "The Paladins" about the regrowth of the RAf and British aero industry. Plus Poston's "British War Economy"...

...Britain also put greater than "normal" resources into the aero industry and aircraft development for the six months after Dunkirk - the so-called "Emergency Production Period" - thus spiking production rates for 1940.
So Germany could very well have produced 15 500 aircraft in 1940 instead of 10 800 and 25 000 in 1941 instead 12 000
The resources were there - it was the effort that was not invested
I'm sure it could - aircraft without engines or crews! :roll:

Seriously - unless you start paralleling a single "posit" book with more general history regarding what the book is talking about...like in this case some decent history on the said aero industries...you're going to continue along at the mercy of REAL history.
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 03 Feb 2013 23:03, edited 1 time in total.
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phylo_roadking
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 03 Feb 2013 23:02

I suggest you read Edward Homze's "Arming the Luftwaffe" (which E.R. Hooton quotes over and over), Daniel Uziel's "Arming the Luftwaffe", and Richard Overy's doctoral thesis about Luftwaffe production in 1939-1941. Germany could very well have produced much more in aircraft from 1939-1941. Udet killed himself for a reason, which Hooton himself mentions the effects of.
Also Richard Overy's very recent "Göring: Hitler's Iron Knight" also delves into the problems in aircraft production that stemmed from Udet and Göring's mismanagement of aircraft production and the economy respectively.
The Bundeswehr's military history research office series on Germany at war also deals with how badly Göring handled the economy.
Beyond that there are some interesting things Lutz Budraß has to say about Luftwaffe production:
http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de ... en/id=4115


The overall conclusions of all of this is that Udet's rise and Milch's sidelining guaranteed that German aviation production would stagnate for years until Udet's suicide in late 1941 and Milch's return to control immediately resulted in major improvements in production.

Overy's "Air war in WW2" also has interesting numbers about the resources that Germany and Britain respectively committed to aircraft production between 1939-1941, which shows how Germany had more workers, raw materials, and factory floor space in their aviation industry in those early years of the war, yet produced less than the British, who with fewer resources leapfrogged German production. Of course then in 1942 on Germany with the same manpower and raw materials staged their massive aircraft production increases. Part of this of course was from switching to fighter aircraft, which is why the British were able to outproduce Germany in 1940-2, as they were focused on fighters primarily in that period. Of course one should recognize that both Britain and Germany included damaged aircraft returned to duty after major repairs as part of new production, which helped boost German production numbers in 1943-44, while the British were able to repair the same fighters over and over again in 1940-1, while Germany lost aircraft shot down over Britain, so couldn't repair them and send them back into combat.
That's my point; Germany COULD be producing more in 1940...

But It needs to have addressed/changed a whole series of previous and decades-long PODs/litany of problems to do so...including people dying/not dying - even the Versailles Treaty and its restrictions on the German aero industry not existing for more than a decade :P :lol: :lol:

Townshend...isn't he the ACW historian???...can't just "magic" extra production into existence - he has to also take on board WHY it was "low" and sort ALL those trends.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by stg 44 » 03 Feb 2013 23:25

phylo_roadking wrote: That's my point; Germany COULD be producing more in 1940...

But It needs to have addressed/changed a whole series of previous and decades-long PODs/litany of problems to do so...including people dying/not dying - even the Versailles Treaty and its restrictions on the German aero industry not existing for more than a decade :P :lol: :lol:
You're missing the point: the aero-engine industry had problems because it was not managed by the RLM and instead had to fend for itself; it also didn't get the investments that the airframe industry did because of Udet. Yes, Wever would have to live for the changes to be made, but it was a problem of the right people not being in place as they should have been had one abnormal event not happened. Frankly without that one accident and death then production would have been higher in everything aircraft related, even the engine portion AND there would have been more pilots trained. So the problem wasn't that the capacity didn't exist, but rather that Germany was badly mismanaged in the aero-industry, along with several others. Göring and Udet are chiefly to blame.

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