it's really doubtful if that one death (or not) could have improved that side of aircraft production THAT much; remember, just like the aircraft themselves, the aero engine industry had been held back for 12-14 years. Wever might have managed the remaining few years of the decade better - but it's not going to actually telescope a decade's missing development into those few years.
It seems like you are conflating engine development with production potential. Yes, there were issues with higher horsepower engine research, but by 1939-1940 there existed 1000hp engines and up, which were sufficient for needs at that moment. The changes to upgrade were relatively minor within the Db 601 series from 1939-41, so didn't disrupt production too much to 'change over'. The issue you have brought up is whether they can produce enough engines for the bombers, which is a separate issue from engine power. They could produce enough engines if the RLM intervened in the aero-engine industry's production and invested in expansion to match air frame production. This wasn't done by the time Udet replaced Milch, so it wasn't done sufficiently until the end of Udet's life and then was majorly upgraded under Milch. So if Milch had kept his job through 1936 and through the war, then he would have been forced to upgrade the engine production capacity to keep up with airframe production before the war. So by the time the war starts engine production would have kept pace and been sympathically expanded in 1939-41 as output of airframes rose.
Look how much time we've spent discussing various bomber options? Now....look at the aircraft that were designed and built and brought into service
...look at the major disadvantages some of them enjoyed, sometimes simple issues because the Germans missed out so
much development and tried to telescope so
much into a few years. And those are the aircraft they DID make "work"!
Again, that's a separate issue to production. The Jumo 211 and Db601 were production quality in 1939 AND in serial production. Its just a question of making sure production capacity was expanded pre-war, something Udet failed to do to a sufficient degree.
Put it this way - even if Wever lives and is given full control of engine development too...what exactly DOES that mean???
Wever wouldn't have anything to do with engine development; rather his development branch would, which would mean Wilhelm Wimmer (and his subordinate Wolfram von Richthofen, who had an engineering degree) would have control over it in conjunction with Erhard Milch. Udet historically took this over in 1936 when it was still part of the RLM, but was soon given total control over production and planning, which was Milch and Wimmer's jobs pre-war. He bungled the job very badly in so many ways, which would not have been the case if Milch and Wimmer (and Richthofen) were still around. All of the above that were replaced had serious experience in technical and production matters (I think Loeb would still have remained in production planning too instead of being shifted to the 4-year plan, where his extensive talents were lost to the Luftwaffe), more so than anyone else in the Luftwaffe or really Germany at that time, which would have avoided all the problems during Udet's tenure as head of development and production. Again, even overlooking development and just focusing on production Milch, Loeb, Wimmer, et al would have avoided the massive production issues that destroyed the Luftwaffe's ability to increase produce in 1939-1941. The biggest single example was the Me210 debacle, which its estimated cost the Luftwaffe over 2,000 aircraft between 1939-1942 from production time lost tooling up, wasted production, and time lost tooling up for different models when the Me210 failed to appear.
Think of the time and budgetary constraints he (and the Luftwaffe) worked under to get what they even did
. To have an even bigger aircraft industry....and an even bigger aero engine industry...where does he get the EXTRA money from for ALL of it?
Considering that the Luftwaffe invested too much in the airframe industry, they didn't need to spend everything they did there and could have spent it on aero engine production capacity. Rather than utilizing existing space to the utmost, they instead built more factories so that they could run one shift each, if even that in some cases. Production planning was very poorly carried out in factories, so that there was much wasted effort. Utilizing the limited space more efficiently, which they did from 1942 on, they could have saved on investments in new factories and machine tools, which were being badly backlogged because of so much demand, and instead ran multiple shifts on existing factories and make the existing space as efficient as possible by installing conveyor belts and using modern production methods with fewer, but more efficient specialize machine tools. They could have let industry train workers to do 3-4 tasked in 2-3 months instead of having the military train workers as fully certified machinists in 2 years. If Milch were allowed to start de-skilling immediately in 1939 and integrate PoWs and German married women in factories there would have been no labor shortage issues, raw materials shortages, and it would have increased output as he historically did from 1942-44.
The problem wasn't getting a bigger airframe industry, rather the total opposite; Germany needed less frame capacity and to use what they had much more efficiently. Aero-engine production needed increased capacity, but also increased efficiency, both of which Milch provided and enforced respectively once he returned to power in 1942. Udet overspent on capital projects, like more and bigger factories when Germany couldn't even run one full shift in all of the factories they possessed in 1940. They needed to run multiple shifts in less factory space and save money for other projects, something Milch understood. When Udet was gone, several factory projects were abandon as wastes of time because the existing capacity was already there, just under utilized, while the manhours and raw materials that went into those incomplete projects was wasted, as was the money. These were pre-war projects too and they continued throughout the war until Milch's tenure resumed and they were dropped. So without Milch stopping his tenure as aircraft production plenipotentiary, these investments would have been made, that funding not misused, and the manhours and raw material not wasted. Also the unnecessary machine tool orders not made, meaning Daimler-Benz could get the tools it historically ordered in a more timely manner!
It's not just a matter of time, and management by one individual - it's also a matter of funding. ALL that has to be paid for
But in fact it is a matter of time and timing, as well as management by the team that was in place historically in 1936, but were broken up by Walter Wever's death and Udet's rise. Had that not happened, Wever could have done his job, Milch, Wimmer, Loeb, von Richthofen, etc. all of theirs. Funding was there, but badly misspent under Udet, who focused on unnecessary capital investments (under prompting by industrialists, who manipulated Udet very easily, throughout the war so that they would have the most stocks in Europe post-war) that Milch and his team avoided/wouldn't have made. The period from 1936-39 was very critical for the Luftwaffe and that time and funding was badly misspent by Udet under the influence of the industrialists he was supposed to manage. He did not understand the first thing about production, so relied on them to tell him what they needed; instead they told him what they wanted and it resulted in lots of unnecessary and profitable spending by the RLM. Milch was hated by these industrialists because he knew what was necessary and what the end goal was, because of his experience managing Lufthansa before the war, so wouldn't have made those funding mistakes and been taken advantage of. That would mean production would remain balanced and output would constantly increased as it was under Milch's terms in 1933-1936 AND in 1942-45.