Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the start

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 03 Feb 2013 23:55

You're missing the point: the aero-engine industry had problems because it was not managed by the RLM and instead had to fend for itself; it also didn't get the investments that the airframe industry did because of Udet. Yes, Wever would have to live for the changes to be made, but it was a problem of the right people not being in place as they should have been had one abnormal event not happened. Frankly without that one accident and death then production would have been higher in everything aircraft related, even the engine portion AND there would have been more pilots trained. So the problem wasn't that the capacity didn't exist, but rather that Germany was badly mismanaged in the aero-industry, along with several others. Göring and Udet are chiefly to blame.
it's really doubtful if that one death (or not) could have improved that side of aircraft production THAT much; remember, just like the aircraft themselves, the aero engine industry had been held back for 12-14 years. Wever might have managed the remaining few years of the decade better - but it's not going to actually telescope a decade's missing development into those few years.

Look how much time we've spent discussing various bomber options? Now....look at the aircraft that were designed and built and brought into service...look at the major disadvantages some of them enjoyed, sometimes simple issues because the Germans missed out so much development and tried to telescope so much into a few years. And those are the aircraft they DID make "work"! :P

Put it this way - even if Wever lives and is given full control of engine development too...what exactly DOES that mean??? Think of the time and budgetary constraints he (and the Luftwaffe) worked under to get what they even did. To have an even bigger aircraft industry....and an even bigger aero engine industry...where does he get the EXTRA money from for ALL of it? :wink:

It's not just a matter of time, and management by one individual - it's also a matter of funding. ALL that has to be paid for. This was a peacetime economy in the late 1930s, running on the Austrian and Czech exchequers and the last of the Von Papen loans...and it's running done! Hitler NEEDED to take Poland....and all that production of the war years was ALSO funded by him taking control of most of the rest of Europe soon afterwards!

So, Germany has a bigger airforce by 1940...achieved out of a peacetime budget it'll mean a smaller Wehrmacht/a smaller Kriegsmarine.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by stg 44 » 04 Feb 2013 00:27

phylo_roadking wrote: it's really doubtful if that one death (or not) could have improved that side of aircraft production THAT much; remember, just like the aircraft themselves, the aero engine industry had been held back for 12-14 years. Wever might have managed the remaining few years of the decade better - but it's not going to actually telescope a decade's missing development into those few years.
It seems like you are conflating engine development with production potential. Yes, there were issues with higher horsepower engine research, but by 1939-1940 there existed 1000hp engines and up, which were sufficient for needs at that moment. The changes to upgrade were relatively minor within the Db 601 series from 1939-41, so didn't disrupt production too much to 'change over'. The issue you have brought up is whether they can produce enough engines for the bombers, which is a separate issue from engine power. They could produce enough engines if the RLM intervened in the aero-engine industry's production and invested in expansion to match air frame production. This wasn't done by the time Udet replaced Milch, so it wasn't done sufficiently until the end of Udet's life and then was majorly upgraded under Milch. So if Milch had kept his job through 1936 and through the war, then he would have been forced to upgrade the engine production capacity to keep up with airframe production before the war. So by the time the war starts engine production would have kept pace and been sympathically expanded in 1939-41 as output of airframes rose.

phylo_roadking wrote: Look how much time we've spent discussing various bomber options? Now....look at the aircraft that were designed and built and brought into service...look at the major disadvantages some of them enjoyed, sometimes simple issues because the Germans missed out so much development and tried to telescope so much into a few years. And those are the aircraft they DID make "work"! :P
Again, that's a separate issue to production. The Jumo 211 and Db601 were production quality in 1939 AND in serial production. Its just a question of making sure production capacity was expanded pre-war, something Udet failed to do to a sufficient degree.

phylo_roadking wrote: Put it this way - even if Wever lives and is given full control of engine development too...what exactly DOES that mean???
Wever wouldn't have anything to do with engine development; rather his development branch would, which would mean Wilhelm Wimmer (and his subordinate Wolfram von Richthofen, who had an engineering degree) would have control over it in conjunction with Erhard Milch. Udet historically took this over in 1936 when it was still part of the RLM, but was soon given total control over production and planning, which was Milch and Wimmer's jobs pre-war. He bungled the job very badly in so many ways, which would not have been the case if Milch and Wimmer (and Richthofen) were still around. All of the above that were replaced had serious experience in technical and production matters (I think Loeb would still have remained in production planning too instead of being shifted to the 4-year plan, where his extensive talents were lost to the Luftwaffe), more so than anyone else in the Luftwaffe or really Germany at that time, which would have avoided all the problems during Udet's tenure as head of development and production. Again, even overlooking development and just focusing on production Milch, Loeb, Wimmer, et al would have avoided the massive production issues that destroyed the Luftwaffe's ability to increase produce in 1939-1941. The biggest single example was the Me210 debacle, which its estimated cost the Luftwaffe over 2,000 aircraft between 1939-1942 from production time lost tooling up, wasted production, and time lost tooling up for different models when the Me210 failed to appear.
phylo_roadking wrote: Think of the time and budgetary constraints he (and the Luftwaffe) worked under to get what they even did. To have an even bigger aircraft industry....and an even bigger aero engine industry...where does he get the EXTRA money from for ALL of it? :wink:
Considering that the Luftwaffe invested too much in the airframe industry, they didn't need to spend everything they did there and could have spent it on aero engine production capacity. Rather than utilizing existing space to the utmost, they instead built more factories so that they could run one shift each, if even that in some cases. Production planning was very poorly carried out in factories, so that there was much wasted effort. Utilizing the limited space more efficiently, which they did from 1942 on, they could have saved on investments in new factories and machine tools, which were being badly backlogged because of so much demand, and instead ran multiple shifts on existing factories and make the existing space as efficient as possible by installing conveyor belts and using modern production methods with fewer, but more efficient specialize machine tools. They could have let industry train workers to do 3-4 tasked in 2-3 months instead of having the military train workers as fully certified machinists in 2 years. If Milch were allowed to start de-skilling immediately in 1939 and integrate PoWs and German married women in factories there would have been no labor shortage issues, raw materials shortages, and it would have increased output as he historically did from 1942-44.

The problem wasn't getting a bigger airframe industry, rather the total opposite; Germany needed less frame capacity and to use what they had much more efficiently. Aero-engine production needed increased capacity, but also increased efficiency, both of which Milch provided and enforced respectively once he returned to power in 1942. Udet overspent on capital projects, like more and bigger factories when Germany couldn't even run one full shift in all of the factories they possessed in 1940. They needed to run multiple shifts in less factory space and save money for other projects, something Milch understood. When Udet was gone, several factory projects were abandon as wastes of time because the existing capacity was already there, just under utilized, while the manhours and raw materials that went into those incomplete projects was wasted, as was the money. These were pre-war projects too and they continued throughout the war until Milch's tenure resumed and they were dropped. So without Milch stopping his tenure as aircraft production plenipotentiary, these investments would have been made, that funding not misused, and the manhours and raw material not wasted. Also the unnecessary machine tool orders not made, meaning Daimler-Benz could get the tools it historically ordered in a more timely manner!
phylo_roadking wrote: It's not just a matter of time, and management by one individual - it's also a matter of funding. ALL that has to be paid for
But in fact it is a matter of time and timing, as well as management by the team that was in place historically in 1936, but were broken up by Walter Wever's death and Udet's rise. Had that not happened, Wever could have done his job, Milch, Wimmer, Loeb, von Richthofen, etc. all of theirs. Funding was there, but badly misspent under Udet, who focused on unnecessary capital investments (under prompting by industrialists, who manipulated Udet very easily, throughout the war so that they would have the most stocks in Europe post-war) that Milch and his team avoided/wouldn't have made. The period from 1936-39 was very critical for the Luftwaffe and that time and funding was badly misspent by Udet under the influence of the industrialists he was supposed to manage. He did not understand the first thing about production, so relied on them to tell him what they needed; instead they told him what they wanted and it resulted in lots of unnecessary and profitable spending by the RLM. Milch was hated by these industrialists because he knew what was necessary and what the end goal was, because of his experience managing Lufthansa before the war, so wouldn't have made those funding mistakes and been taken advantage of. That would mean production would remain balanced and output would constantly increased as it was under Milch's terms in 1933-1936 AND in 1942-45.

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Feb 2013 00:56

Again, that's a separate issue to production. The Jumo 211 and Db601 were production quality in 1939 AND in serial production. Its just a question of making sure production capacity was expanded pre-war, something Udet failed to do to a sufficient degree.
That should read "the Jumo 211 and Db601 were production quality by 1939"....and development of the latter was so protracted that it's entirely possible it would have been leapfrogged as Daimler Benz moved on to the next promising development if the war had been held off as planned.
Wever wouldn't have anything to do with engine development; rather his development branch would
Wever's at the helm; it wasn't going to be Wimmer walking into a meeting at the Chancellery to wrangle money.
He bungled the job very badly in so many ways, which would not have been the case if Milch and Wimmer (and Richthofen) were still around.
Again, even overlooking development and just focusing on production
That's the point - you can't overlook it. And having Wimmer at the helm of the branch at the RLM isn't going to speed up the protracted development of the 601 at Daimler Benz.
But in fact it is a matter of time and timing, as well as management by the team that was in place historically in 1936, but were broken up by Walter Wever's death and Udet's rise. Had that not happened, Wever could have done his job, Milch, Wimmer, Loeb, von Richthofen, etc. all of theirs.
Yes....but that's only half the time issue. The other "half" is the industry and its development of product. All the managers in the word at the RLM aren't going to sort development issue on the bench at BMW or Daimler Benz.
It seems like you are conflating engine development with production potential. Yes, there were issues with higher horsepower engine research, but by 1939-1940 there existed 1000hp engines and up, which were sufficient for needs at that moment. The changes to upgrade were relatively minor within the Db 601 series from 1939-41, so didn't disrupt production too much to 'change over'. The issue you have brought up is whether they can produce enough engines for the bombers, which is a separate issue from engine power.
But they weren't sufficient, that's the point. The frontline LW aircraft of September 1939 weren't "sufficient" for September 1940. Look back at the other threads we've discussed - engine power limited bombload, fuel load, defensive armament..."sufficient" would have had He 111Ps over London, not Hs.

Which brings me back to money again; yes, a lot of waste might have been eliminated compared to OTL....but really, enough to cover all the engine production investment that wasn't made?

And while you've discussed the situation about overspending on airframe facilities...what about the threat of doing the same for engine production??? Look at what we've discussed previously regarding engine types that experienced longer-than average gestation periods, often SO long that they were sidestepped entirely. Through 1938 and early 1939 there's exactly the same threat for engine production - having too much factory space built and sitting idle with nothing to produce.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by stg 44 » 04 Feb 2013 02:11

According to Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_601
Serial production begun in November 1937, and ended in 1943, after 19,000 examples of all types were produced.[1]

[1]Mankau, Heinz and Peter Petrick. Messerschmitt Bf 110, Me 210, Me 410. Raumfahrt, Germany: Aviatic Verlag, 2001.
And German wikipedia:
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_601
Nach den ersten erfolgreichen Probeläufen im Jahre 1935 begann die Fertigung des DB 601 im November 1937.
My translation: "after the first successful test run in 1935 production of the DB601 began began in November 1937."
Sources:
Daimler-Benz Flugmotor DB 601. in: Luftfahrtlexikon (1978) S. 1033ff. Verlag E.S Mittler & Sohn
Kyrill von Gersdorff, Kurt Grasmann: Flugmotoren und Strahltriebwerke. Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1981.

So I'm not sure where you are getting the information that it was only ready in 1939 or that there was problems getting it ready and Daimler that was getting ready to leapfrog the design.

Jumo certainly had problems. Had Udet or Milch, if he had not been replaced, invested in Daimler instead and had Jumo produce DB designs under license, they would have had far less problem and benefited significantly from economies of scale.

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Feb 2013 02:52

According to Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_601
Serial production begun in November 1937, and ended in 1943, after 19,000 examples of all types were produced.[1]

[1]Mankau, Heinz and Peter Petrick. Messerschmitt Bf 110, Me 210, Me 410. Raumfahrt, Germany: Aviatic Verlag, 2001.

And German wikipedia:
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_601
Nach den ersten erfolgreichen Probeläufen im Jahre 1935 begann die Fertigung des DB 601 im November 1937.
My translation: "after the first successful test run in 1935 production of the DB601 began began in November 1937."
Sources:
Daimler-Benz Flugmotor DB 601. in: Luftfahrtlexikon (1978) S. 1033ff. Verlag E.S Mittler & Sohn
Kyrill von Gersdorff, Kurt Grasmann: Flugmotoren und Strahltriebwerke. Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1981.

So I'm not sure where you are getting the information that it was only ready in 1939 or that there was problems getting it ready...
Not all 601s were created equal ;) The 601A entered serial production in November 1937....but the substantially-redesigned 601N that powered the Bf 109E-4/N, E-7/N and Bf 110C didn't enter production until the end of 1939 ;) (See AHF member Kurfurst's Bf109 site)

It had recurring problems during its bench and service life with crankshafts due to Messerschmitt's use of roller bearings; they changed back and forth from ball to roller bearings for the life of the 601 design and all its variants...but went fully to even worse plain bearings for the 605. See Takashi Suzuki's "The Romance of Engines".

What were they working on to leapfrog the 601? The 605 enlarged version of course! But the factory had also gone on with work on the similarly enlarged DB603 during the late 1930s ;) The 1,750hp DB 603A was developed in 1937 and the 1,800hp DB 603E in 1939.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by stg 44 » 04 Feb 2013 03:35

phylo_roadking wrote: Not all 601s were created equal ;) The 601A entered serial production in November 1937....but the substantially-redesigned 601N that powered the Bf 109E-4/N, E-7/N and Bf 110C didn't enter production until the end of 1939 ;) (See AHF member Kurfurst's Bf109 site)
Yes, the initial DB601A and slightly later Aa were in the 1100-1175hp range. They were the predominate engines that were available in mass production in 1939 for the Db601. The Db601N, which offered slightly better performance at altitude with C3 fuel, as opposed to the B4 of the Db601, did not appear until 1940. I don't see what the problem was then with the Db601Aa or A other than it had slightly less performance at altitude than the N model.
The Db601A or Aa is perfectly sufficient in 1939-40. Then by 1941 the Db601E shows up and is a major improvement over the N and Aa. So there wasn't a problem with the Db601 series for mass production in late 1937-1939 (or 1940 for that matter). It was a matter of the RLM under Udet choosing to go for both the Db601 and Jumo211 at the same time instead of standardizing on one type of inline liquid cooled engine.
phylo_roadking wrote: It had recurring problems during its bench and service life with crankshafts due to Messerschmitt's use of roller bearings; they changed back and forth from ball to roller bearings for the life of the 601 design and all its variants...but went fully to even worse plain bearings for the 605. See Takashi Suzuki's "The Romance of Engines".
So that was Messerschmidt's fault not anything with the engine itself? Did the later bearing trouble have anything to do with US bombing of ball bearing production?
Still the engine seems to have offered excellent service in 1937-1941 before the switchover the larger Db605. At that point I don't recall reading anything about major problems with the 605 series.
phylo_roadking wrote: What were they working on to leapfrog the 601? The 605 enlarged version of course! But the factory had also gone on with work on the similarly enlarged DB603 during the late 1930s ;) The 1,750hp DB 603A was developed in 1937 and the 1,800hp DB 603E in 1939.
But the 605 wasn't in service until 1942. It was just the extension of DB601 development. Same as the Db603, but the 603 was cancelled in 1937. Sure Daimler was encouraged to use its own money to develop the engine, not really fixing the issues with it then until late 1943 because of the lack of development or money from 1937-1940 when it was once again funded by the RLM. I've read that the DB603 wasn't in the 1750hp version until 1942, which was the result of years of development and experience with the Db601 and 605. It wasn't at 1800hp with the 603E until 1943. Even then it had overheating issues and required major overhauls after 40 hours of service. Frankly without the war the Db603 wouldn't have been brought back into development. Remember too when it was proposed in 1936 it was predicted to offer 1400-1500hp and through years of development and experience with the smaller Db601 finally managed to reach 1750 in 1942. I don't think it was much higher than 1600hp in 1941.
The Db605 even without the war wouldn't have appeared until about 1942 anyway, because it required the fully development of the Db603. So as far as I can tell Daimler was not about to switch over to anything before 1942 at the earliest, meaning the Db601 was going to be in production in peace time for several more years.

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Feb 2013 04:02

Yes, the initial DB601A and slightly later Aa were in the 1100-1175hp range. They were the predominate engines that were available in mass production in 1939 for the Db601. The Db601N, which offered slightly better performance at altitude with C3 fuel, as opposed to the B4 of the Db601, did not appear until 1940. I don't see what the problem was then with the Db601Aa or A other than it had slightly less performance at altitude than the N model.
1/ performance at altitude at full war power I.E. actual fighting, and

2/ reliability; thus...
The Db601A or Aa is perfectly sufficient in 1939-40
...for 1939 it may be - but not for the sumer of 1940. You need to look at Bishop and his day-by-day approach to really grasp what an advantage that altitude performance gave the LW for some time.
So there wasn't a problem with the Db601 series for mass production in late 1937-1939 (or 1940 for that matter).
Only if you want to take a combat at altitude capability away from the Luftwaffe for the Bob, and saddle them with greater unreliability...
So that was Messerschmidt's fault not anything with the engine itself?
No; it was a problem with the engine. Messerschmitt tried to deal with the issue in various ways, but didn't eradicate the problem - and it came back with a vengence on the enlarged motors.
Did the later bearing trouble have anything to do with US bombing of ball bearing production?
No; the change had been made on the bench long before Schweinfurt. The problems being experienced were partly to do with the increased injection pressures of successive 601 variants, and a lack of experience as yet with manifold injection...and also that Benz had problems producing the required numbers of light alloy bearing cages in-house (Suzuki)

It should be noted that this latter problem wasn't anticipated; it wasn't just a case of throwing capacity at the issue, but also the availability of alloying metals for the bearing cages.
Still the engine seems to have offered excellent service in 1937-1941 before the switchover the larger Db605.
...apart from stripping cranks :P

Regarding the 605's reliability...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschm ... ts#Bf_109G
The DB 605 suffered from reliability problems during the first year of operation, and this output was initially banned by VT-Anw.Nr.2206, forcing Luftwaffe units to limit maximum power output to 1,310 PS (1,292 hp, 964 kW) at 2,600 rpm and 1.3 atm manifold pressure. The full output was not reinstated until 8 June 1943 when Daimler-Benz issued a technical directive
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by KDF33 » 04 Feb 2013 06:56

Although this discussion about the deficiencies of the German aircraft industry is interesting, I believe it fails to mention the elephant in the room: even with a greater engine / airframe production early in the war, the Luftwaffe would still be unable to effectively expand because of the shortage of aviation fuel.

Using this site as a reference, here are the highlights of the German avgas supply:

At the end of 1939, Germany had 511,000 tons of avgas in stock. During 1940, it produced and imported 721,000 tons and consumed 966,000 tons. What prevented Germany's reserves from falling substantially was the capture of 275,000 tons from French stocks, which allowed the Reich to end the year with an increase in stocks, at 613,000 tons. In 1941, with Barbarossa heavily taxing the fuel supply, Germany produced and imported 910,000 tons and consumed 1,274,000 tons, thus reducing stocks to 254,000 tons at the end of the year, or slightly over 40% of their level of 1.1.1941. In fact, without the captured French stocks, Germany would have run out of avgas before the end of the year!

1942 was the first year when non-captured supply exceeded consumption, and barely at that (1,472,000 vs 1,426,000 tons). So talk of a greatly expanded Luftwaffe during the early war years has no basis in reality, even if you allow for perfect German planning and organisation in the aircraft industry. In fact, I'd even go on a limb here and posit that the low German production in the early years of the war probably had something to do with the RLM planners knowing that it was useless to expand aircraft production before the supply of avgas had catched-up, especially since building a massive reserve of engines and aircraft that would become obsolete by the time enough fuel arrived for them would have been a gigantic waste.

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by Mostlyharmless » 04 Feb 2013 12:28

It was not as simple as some posters suggest for the RLM to have decided that the DB 600 series was better than the Jumo 211 series. The DB 601 had better superchargers and worse lubrication. The lubrication problems are mentioned in various discussions such as http://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-353495.html, http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviati ... 534-2.html, http://www.enginehistory.org/phpbb/view ... 582a23e9a9. Also as mentioned, the sparking plugs of the DB 601 A were badly positioned and cost significant power until they were moved in the DB 601E. The Jumo 211 initially lacked pressurized coolant. I am not sure when the DB 600 series coolant became pressurized but I think that it was earlier than the Jumo 211.

The RLM wanted a single engine with everything and thought that the Jumo 213 would do the job. However, the Jumo 213 didn't work until the end of 1943 when the firing order was changed. Meanwhile, the British developed the Merlin to give more power on less volume and weight http://www.missbardahl.com/engine/hist/ ... in_dev.pdf.

In retrospect, the RLM should have persuaded Daimler Benz to sort out the lubrication problems by making a significant redesign analogous to the introduction of end feed lubrication in the Merlin 100 series at the same time as introducing the DB 605. The resources to do that might come from cancelling the DB 604 and DB 610.

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by stg 44 » 04 Feb 2013 16:16

KDF33 wrote:Although this discussion about the deficiencies of the German aircraft industry is interesting, I believe it fails to mention the elephant in the room: even with a greater engine / airframe production early in the war, the Luftwaffe would still be unable to effectively expand because of the shortage of aviation fuel.

Using this site as a reference, here are the highlights of the German avgas supply:

At the end of 1939, Germany had 511,000 tons of avgas in stock. During 1940, it produced and imported 721,000 tons and consumed 966,000 tons. What prevented Germany's reserves from falling substantially was the capture of 275,000 tons from French stocks, which allowed the Reich to end the year with an increase in stocks, at 613,000 tons. In 1941, with Barbarossa heavily taxing the fuel supply, Germany produced and imported 910,000 tons and consumed 1,274,000 tons, thus reducing stocks to 254,000 tons at the end of the year, or slightly over 40% of their level of 1.1.1941. In fact, without the captured French stocks, Germany would have run out of avgas before the end of the year!

1942 was the first year when non-captured supply exceeded consumption, and barely at that (1,472,000 vs 1,426,000 tons). So talk of a greatly expanded Luftwaffe during the early war years has no basis in reality, even if you allow for perfect German planning and organisation in the aircraft industry. In fact, I'd even go on a limb here and posit that the low German production in the early years of the war probably had something to do with the RLM planners knowing that it was useless to expand aircraft production before the supply of avgas had catched-up, especially since building a massive reserve of engines and aircraft that would become obsolete by the time enough fuel arrived for them would have been a gigantic waste.
Any idea what the individual aircrafts' fuel consumption was?

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Feb 2013 17:00

Any idea what the individual aircrafts' fuel consumption was?
That's one for the pilots' notes :(

Rremember - it'll affect training too ;) Both in the fuel aspect...and of course an expansion of the Luftwaffe beyond OTL means an equivalent expansion in the numbers of training aircraft etc.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by stg 44 » 04 Feb 2013 17:09

phylo_roadking wrote:
Any idea what the individual aircrafts' fuel consumption was?
That's one for the pilots' notes :(
http://www.thecalculatorsite.com/conver ... c-tons.php
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju ... sche_Daten
Near as I can tell if bomber used about 3500 liters per mission, which was around the maximum fuel load for a He111 and Ju88 within +/- 200 liters with external bomb loads at maximum range, which would be less for shorter ranged missions of course, consumed about 2.5 tons of fuel. German Avgas was usually 87 octane in 1939-1940, so I calculated weights based on modern gasoline in the US, which is at a minimum 87 octane.
So 275,000 tons of avgas captured equals just over 200,000 long range bomber sortees. Not sure what fighter fuel consumption was (probably less than half of a bomber due to having a single engine and much less fuel storage) or what external fuel tanks would add to consumption rates.

Edit:
PRK you are right, training and transport would also eat into this too.

http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviati ... 20Ju52.htm
Normal load was about 2500L, with auxiliary tanks it could approach He111 levels of fuel.

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt07/me-109g.html
The Me109 had 106 gallons in their tank, not sure what that is in liters.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_87
According to this they had 480L total.

I think trainers would use less fuel than armored and loaded bombers, so maybe 500L tanks for multi-engine trainers? Most pilots were getting trained to about 250 hours pre-war, which dropped to 150-200 in the early years of the war, not sure what usage would be.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Wo ... y#Trainers

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Feb 2013 17:21

Not sure what fighter fuel consumption was (probably less than half of a bomber due to having a single engine and much less fuel storage)
Fuel loads smaller, yes...but consumption rate possibly higher - and at times FAR higher I.E. when on full war power ;)

The reason I keep referring you to pilots' notes and their charts is that the ones I've seen for bombers etc. usually give consumption rate charts etc. for loaded and unloaded aircraft I.E. when homeward bound sans ordnance! Fuel comsumption also depends on windage; an aircrat flying into high headwinds one day will have a higher fuel comsumption due to higher throttle settings than the on-paper "best economy" settings/rates.

Here's something I would suggest you spend a minute on and check...
I think trainers would use less fuel than armored and loaded bombers, so maybe 500L tanks for multi-engine trainers? Most pilots were getting trained to about 250 hours pre-war, which dropped to 150-200 in the early years of the war, not sure what usage would be.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Wo ... y#Trainers
...how many of that list ARE multi-engined??? Remember, they used Ju 52s as multi-engined bomber crew trainers :wink: That's just a list of the specifically-built-for-the-job ab initio/intermediate/advanced trainers.
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 04 Feb 2013 17:32, edited 4 times in total.
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BDV
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Full Mobilisation of What German Industry?

Post by BDV » 04 Feb 2013 17:22

People with detailed knowledge will surely correct me,

BUT

It would be quite difficult for the german economy to mobilize from the beginning, when a large fraction of the expansion was due to equipment booty from the conquered lands, with the factory infrastructure needig construction, with the german workforce being conscripted, and new workforce having to be to be conscripted from the conquered populations. This type of arrangement takes time.

It would have been IMO, a much more productive endeavour to keep specific production lines in the occupied lands going, with attention to feeding the required raw materials/resources into those systems/lines.

Axis-Europe wide integration of armaments production, rather than an even faster engorgement of German military-industrial base (unsustanable and disruptive as it was) would have been the optimal path.
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Re: Full Mobilisation of What German Industry?

Post by stg 44 » 04 Feb 2013 17:39

BDV wrote:People with detailed knowledge will surely correct me,

BUT

It would be quite difficult for the german economy to mobilize from the beginning, when a large fraction of the expansion was due to equipment booty from the conquered lands, with the factory infrastructure needig construction, with the german workforce being conscripted, and new workforce having to be to be conscripted from the conquered populations. This type of arrangement takes time.

It would have been IMO, a much more productive endeavour to keep specific production lines in the occupied lands going, with attention to feeding the required raw materials/resources into those systems/lines.

Axis-Europe wide integration of armaments production, rather than an even faster engorgement of German military-industrial base (unsustanable and disruptive as it was) would have been the optimal path.
As far as the aviation industry went, keeping foreign lines going was a massive waste of resources, because of sabotage and low rates of production when tried. Germany did not have enough raw materials to supply both occupied factories and her own. So it made much more sense to keep domestic lines going and use whatever they could from foreign industry. But German machine tool stocks were actually just about as high as the US before they pillaged France for hers, which ended up sitting in warehouses, gathering dust because Germany didn't need them, or being melted down for other purposes.
German control domestic industry performed much better when integrating foreign workers and slave labor than foreign lines producing orders for the German military, with higher production rates, better quality, and less sabotage.

Daniel Uziel covers this very well in "Arming the Luftwaffe". His conclusion is that Germany was better off by not utilizing captured foreign industry, because the raw materials were not there for both Germany and France, so it made much more sense to just focus production in Germany and use French workers and machines in German factories where they could be better controlled. German labor early on in the aviation was largely women (1939-41), who worked very well, with constantly increasing numbers of PoWs and slave labor as time went on. Part of the problem with organizing labor for industrial work was that the armed forced, mainly via the army, insisted that they train workers in a fully range of skills that corresponded to apprenticeship for machining, which took two years. Industry wanted to train new workers in 2-3 months to do 3-4 tasks quickly, which they eventually got clearance to do starting in 1942.

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