Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the start

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stg 44
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by stg 44 » 04 Feb 2013 17:40

phylo_roadking wrote:
Not sure what fighter fuel consumption was (probably less than half of a bomber due to having a single engine and much less fuel storage)
Fuel loads smaller, yes...but consumption rate possibly higher - and at times FAR higher I.E. when on full war power ;)

The reason I keep referring you to pilots' notes and their charts is that the ones I've seen for bombers etc. usually give consumption rate charts etc. for loaded and unloaded aircraft I.E. when homeward bound sans ordnance! Fuel comsumption also depends on windage; an aircrat flying into high headwinds one day will have a higher fuel comsumption due to higher throttle settings than the on-paper "best economy" settings/rates.

Here's something I would suggest you spend a minute on and check...
I think trainers would use less fuel than armored and loaded bombers, so maybe 500L tanks for multi-engine trainers? Most pilots were getting trained to about 250 hours pre-war, which dropped to 150-200 in the early years of the war, not sure what usage would be.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Wo ... y#Trainers
...how many of that list ARE multi-engined??? Remember, they used Ju 52s as multi-engined bomber crew trainers :wink: That's just a list of the specifically-built-for-the-job ab initio/intermediate/advanced trainers.
Some of the trainers listed are multi-engine. I haven't found any manuals online for the Ju88 and He111 that list fuel consumption rates.

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Mobilize WHAT German Industry?

Post by BDV » 04 Feb 2013 18:35

Well, if the Romanian order of GnomeRhone 14Ns or for Puteaux AT guns does not get filled properly (let's say) Gnome-Rhone does not get paid and its workers cannot feed their families. Same (say) for the italian order of SOMUAs or the hungarian order of D520s. Same for the german order of Canon de 194 mle GPFs or of Panhard 178s.

Can it be as easy as that?
Last edited by BDV on 04 Feb 2013 18:48, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Feb 2013 18:48

As far as the aviation industry went, keeping foreign lines going was a massive waste of resources, because of sabotage and low rates of production when tried. Germany did not have enough raw materials to supply both occupied factories and her own. So it made much more sense to keep domestic lines going and use whatever they could from foreign industry.
This is a "cart and horse" problem ;) The Germans won't know any of that UNTIL its done as per OTL...and it certainly couldn't and didn't factor into any RLM/LW expansion for 1939-40!
Some of the trainers listed are multi-engine.
No....they have various possible engine fitments.

Only ONE is a twin-engine aircraft, the Fw58.

See Hooton P.158 - "...the Ju52 became the backbone of the C2 syllabus although supplemented by obsolete bombers" - with the Fw 58 being used along with a range of other older aircraft in the B2 and C1 courses. It was a "light medium" two-engined aircraft in the Avro Anson/Airspeed Oxford class, and was already obsolete with manufacturing halting in 1942.
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Re: Full Mobilisation of What German Industry?

Post by BDV » 04 Feb 2013 19:06

stg 44 wrote:As far as the aviation industry went, keeping foreign lines going was a massive waste of resources, because of sabotage and low rates of production when tried.
That was not the issue in Czechia AFAIK. So it's an issue of the local Reichskommissar's competence? Also problems of sabotage would not be a factor if Germany is helping Axis partners+underlings expand and streamline their own production facilities. E.g. Hungary, instead of producing multiple AFVs, could focus producing Nimrods in large numbers. The heavy howitzer production could have around the italian Obice 210/22. And so on and so forth, on a Axis-wide basis, as opposed to everyone trying to do everything.

Daniel Uziel covers this very well in "Arming the Luftwaffe". His conclusion is that Germany was better off by not utilizing captured foreign industry, because the raw materials were not there for both Germany and France, so it made much more sense to just focus production in Germany and use French workers and machines in German factories where they could be better controlled. German labor early on in the aviation was largely women (1939-41), who worked very well, with constantly increasing numbers of PoWs and slave labor as time went on.
This may very well hold true for 1943-1944, but the war was for all intents and purposes lost in 1941-42, and integration of industry would have been the ooptimal path for the short war option.

Part of the problem with organizing labor for industrial work was that the armed forced, mainly via the army, insisted that they train workers in a fully range of skills that corresponded to apprenticeship for machining, which took two years. Industry wanted to train new workers in 2-3 months to do 3-4 tasks quickly, which they eventually got clearance to do starting in 1942.
Meanwhile, perfectly fine skilled french workers sit on their idled hands, hungry, while commie aggitation fills their ears.
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Re: Full Mobilisation of What German Industry?

Post by stg 44 » 04 Feb 2013 21:18

BDV wrote:
stg 44 wrote:As far as the aviation industry went, keeping foreign lines going was a massive waste of resources, because of sabotage and low rates of production when tried.
BDV wrote: That was not the issue in Czechia AFAIK. So it's an issue of the local Reichskommissar's competence? Also problems of sabotage would not be a factor if Germany is helping Axis partners+underlings expand and streamline their own production facilities. E.g. Hungary, instead of producing multiple AFVs, could focus producing Nimrods in large numbers. The heavy howitzer production could have around the italian Obice 210/22. And so on and so forth, on a Axis-wide basis, as opposed to everyone trying to do everything.
Czechia is a very different issue from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and even Austria. The "Germany and the Second World War" series covers why this one area was different than all of the others. There were major problems integrating Austria into the German economy, but they had the benefit of being able to work things out pre-war. Same with Bohemian industry. Lessons learned in Austria were applied in Bohemia, which made the process work much smoother. And the lessons learned in Austria and Bohemia taught the Germans that France was too much to integrate so long as Germany had limited resources; remember France had to import virtually everything, including oil and coal. They needed German or British coal pre-war, which wasn't an option during the war, as the Germans used up their production domestically, in Austria, and in Bohemia. Britain wasn't giving Germany coal and the blockade they had running prevented imports from anywhere else but the Soviets, and the Soviets were demanding payment up front until 1941 and were charging an arm and a leg for their exports (primarily food, as Germany couldn't feed herself and there were famine conditions in 1940-1 in Europe but for Soviet grains...so the money and goods in trade had to go toward food production). French industry therefore had no coal to run her factories; not only that, but she lacked oil for her motor transports, so the country ground to a halt and was reduced to adopting the horse and buggy again.

As to Hungary and Italy, both were just as bad as France: they lacked sufficient domestic supplies of necessary raw materials to run their factories, so were dependent on Germany to provide them. They were therefore a drain on resources and could only be equipped at the expense of German units, who already were under equipped. More German production through better investments and organization pre- and early war would have allowed the Axis minor allies to be equipped and Germany to be paid for those goods. Alternatively Hungarian and Italian workers and resources could have been used in the primary European Axis workshops in Germany, whose output, depressed as it was historically, was far higher than her allies. Using those workers only as needed in their home countries and as much as possible in Germany would have yielded much better production output.

Part of the European Axis' production problem was that they didn't coordinate economically, which would have meant industry shutting down in the less productive periphery states and the resources utilized in the concentrated, much more productive 'metropol' of Germany, who could then leverage those extra resources to help supply the Axis minors more effectively than they could themselves. This did happen to a degree, especially later (1943 and on) as Italy was invaded and Germany took direct control over her Allies (Hungary) or vassals (France), but not on the scale possible or indeed preferable. The Central Powers had similar issues in WW1 when they didn't coordinate militarily or economically. Sometimes transnational economic planning works, which the Allies demonstrated without question in the way they helped one another during the Lend-Lease period. But the difference in their case was they were the 'haves'. They had the materials that the Axis was fighting a war to acquire, so the Allies disposed of the necessary materials to maximize output in all of the Allied industries, while Germany lacked sufficient material for her own economy, let alone all of her dependent 'allies'. Still there is no excuse in that case for lack of coordination and planning, in fact its doubly required in the case of the Axis!
BDV wrote:
Daniel Uziel covers this very well in "Arming the Luftwaffe". His conclusion is that Germany was better off by not utilizing captured foreign industry, because the raw materials were not there for both Germany and France, so it made much more sense to just focus production in Germany and use French workers and machines in German factories where they could be better controlled. German labor early on in the aviation was largely women (1939-41), who worked very well, with constantly increasing numbers of PoWs and slave labor as time went on.
This may very well hold true for 1943-1944, but the war was for all intents and purposes lost in 1941-42, and integration of industry would have been the ooptimal path for the short war option.
If you have the resources. Germany did not have the materials to run both the French, Dutch, Belgian, and German factories at the same time. As it was there was plenty of latent capacity in Germany and no shortage of labor until 1942-3, which ultimately was filled by slaves. The problem was Germany did not use its capacity to the utmost in 1939 on. Seriously check out Uziel, he covers why this was not a viable option; also there is Tooze, who I have issues with, but he is spot on about the problems integrating foreign industries captured in wartime.
BDV wrote:
Part of the problem with organizing labor for industrial work was that the armed forced, mainly via the army, insisted that they train workers in a fully range of skills that corresponded to apprenticeship for machining, which took two years. Industry wanted to train new workers in 2-3 months to do 3-4 tasks quickly, which they eventually got clearance to do starting in 1942.
Meanwhile, perfectly fine skilled french workers sit on their idled hands, hungry, while commie aggitation fills their ears.
Most did sit around during WW2 without an issue; the others were conscripted and taken to Germany to work in German factories. Not an issue for Germany really until 1944.

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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Feb 2013 21:45

Can we please not loose sight of the the fact that no matter how Germany does or does not reorganise the labour and manufacturing potential of Belgium, Holland and France - none of them will make any difference to the number of KM ships at sea or LW aircraft in the sky or Wehrmacht boots on the ground by the summer of 1940? Until Germany actually conquers the West - all this is moot.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by stg 44 » 04 Feb 2013 21:47

phylo_roadking wrote:Can we please not loose sight of the the fact that no matter how Germany does or does not reorganise the labour and manufacturing potential of Belgium, Holland and France - none of them will make any difference to the number of KM ships at sea or LW aircraft in the sky or Wehrmacht boots on the ground by the sumer of 1940?
Absolutely. I'd argue they'd never make a difference, but by 1940 and even 1941 they were not going to make a bit of difference.

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Re: Full Mobilisation of What German Industry?

Post by BDV » 05 Feb 2013 21:17

stg 44 wrote:Czechia is a very different issue from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and even Austria ... And the lessons learned in Austria and Bohemia taught the Germans that France was too much to integrate so long as Germany had limited resources;
But Poland, was under the absolute control of Germany. Boosting the Polish industrial base with selected french machinery and sustaining the productivity through an Heydrich-like carrot and stick approach would have been useful. Historically Frank was more interested in hanging Poles and even more in boasting about it (contrast Unternehmen Tannenberg to the corresponding highly efficient and discreet -and to this day anonymous - Soviet operation) rather than running the COP efficiently.

one example of mismanagement

remember France had to import virtually everything, including oil and coal.
What assignment are we to give the Lothringen and Walloon coal?

French industry therefore had no coal to run her factories; not only that, but she lacked oil for her motor transports, so the country ground to a halt and was reduced to adopting the horse and buggy again. As to Hungary and Italy, both were just as bad as France: they lacked sufficient domestic supplies of necessary raw materials to run their factories, so were dependent on Germany to provide them.
No it is a question whether boosting established production capacities in Italy, Hungary, Romania, and running very specific French companies/production lines would be a more efficient use of resources than for Germany to set up everything anew, including production facilities, tools, and slaves.

Part of the European Axis' production problem was that they didn't coordinate economically, which would have meant industry shutting down in the less productive periphery states and the resources utilized in the concentrated, much more productive 'metropol' of Germany, who could then leverage those extra resources to help supply the Axis minors more effectively than they could themselves. This did happen to a degree, especially later (1943 and on) as Italy was invaded and Germany took direct control over her Allies (Hungary) or vassals (France), but not on the scale possible or indeed preferable. The Central Powers had similar issues in WW1 when they didn't coordinate militarily or economically. Sometimes transnational economic planning works, which the Allies demonstrated without question in the way they helped one another during the Lend-Lease period. But the difference in their case was they were the 'haves'. They had the materials that the Axis was fighting a war to acquire, so the Allies disposed of the necessary materials to maximize output in all of the Allied industries, while Germany lacked sufficient material for her own economy, let alone all of her dependent 'allies'. Still there is no excuse in that case for lack of coordination and planning, in fact its doubly required in the case of the Axis!
I agree wholeheartedly!

Germany did not have the materials to run both the French, Dutch, Belgian, and German factories at the same time.
But with good planning, labour intensive jobs can be shunted to labor rich areas. For example, upgrading the trophy french guns to german standards (e.g., the story of the 75/38), upgrading the hordes of trophy French tanks to the 1939 standards (the H35s and R35s), these were much more labour intensive rather than resource intesive, and would have made a tremendous impact on the Axis war effort in 1941-42. And the upgrading can be done in otherwise idle French and Benelux armories and tank factories.

Also, some specific products, the French standard of 1940 was just simply acceptable, especially for auxilliary duties. One does not have to run the ENTIRE french economy, just those selected components churning out the handful of useful products, the truck lines, the SOMUAs line, the Pa178s, the D520s, the 47 mm APX and a small stream of self-propelled GPF 194s.

As it was there was plenty of latent capacity in Germany and no shortage of labor until 1942-3, which ultimately was filled by slaves.
So there was shortage of labor. Latent capacity means not enough labor.

Part of the problem with organizing labor for industrial work was that the armed forced, mainly via the army, insisted that they train workers in a fully range of skills that corresponded to apprenticeship for machining, which took two years. Industry wanted to train new workers in 2-3 months to do 3-4 tasks quickly, which they eventually got clearance to do starting in 1942.

Meanwhile, perfectly fine skilled french workers sit on their idled hands, hungry, while commie aggitation fills their ears.

Most did sit around during WW2 without an issue; the others were conscripted and taken to Germany to work in German factories. Not an issue for Germany really until 1944.
So you agree that there was a labor shartage in some regions and waste of labor in others! All the while there's a shortage of weapons at the frontline!

As to the commie aggitation quip, it was prompted by the german complaints of sabotage.

"For Satan finds some mischief still
For idle hands to do"


I agree that in some respect, in '41, '42, '43 things were as good as they could be for Germany (General-gouvernement mismanagement and jewish banishment aside). But in starting in June 1940 it was no longer Gothia vs Albion, it was Axis vs Allies. And what was bad for the Axis, was bad for Germany.
Last edited by BDV on 05 Feb 2013 21:27, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 05 Feb 2013 21:24

But Poland, was under the absolute control of Germany.
Well....technically not until the summer of 1941 ;) Might be worth checking what percentage of Poland's former heavy industry ended up in the Soviet zone of control in September 1939...
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by BDV » 05 Feb 2013 21:29

Sure, but the main military factories, most of COP, and Silesia were in Adolf's grasp from October '39 on.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 05 Feb 2013 21:47

...and the trained workforce? I.E. Poland's military reservists?
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by BDV » 05 Feb 2013 21:53

Yes, by and large. Didn't germans do most of the fighting (and capturing?)

Germans recovered the old Habsburg lands (historically developed) and captured the COP (the big industrial development project of 2nd Polish Republic). The Soviets got the (relatively) underdeveloped East, and Lithuanians (AFAIK) got Vilnius (for a while).
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the sta

Post by phylo_roadking » 05 Feb 2013 23:07

...and the trained workforce? I.E. Poland's military reservists?
Yes, by and large. Didn't germans do most of the fighting (and capturing?)
My point was that they're POWs ;) You might put them in their own factories...but if you're worried about sabotage and slow working in France...how bad do you think Polish POWs forced to work in Polish factories are going to be? :P
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Re: Full mobilisation of German-controlled economy

Post by BDV » 06 Feb 2013 04:41

They were not POWs for long. AFAIK given the dissolution of the Polish state, those POW were released fairly quickly.

Except those that were murdered, of course.

P.S.

Whaddaya know, there was a lively discussion on the topic in the Polish subforum.
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Re: Full mobilisation of the German war economy from the start

Post by Guaporense » 24 Aug 2016 00:21

Politician01 wrote:I recall reading that until Stalingrad German factories were running only at 16 hours a day and that on weekends they were shut down.
During the whole war the degree of utilization of metal working industrial capacity in Germany was 40-45% of the UK's, even in 1944. In occupied Europe the utilization of industrial capacity was even lower.
And Speer wrote in his Erinnerungen that had they started to organize the German war economy from the start of the war they could have reached 1944 production levels allready in 1942.
Well, they could but they choose to do not do so because it would be a waste of resources. What the Wehrmacht do with more equipment? Historically the Wehrmacht was fighting really well in 1939-1941, which means they did not suffer from shortage of basic equipment and ammunition. Maybe if their ammunition production was higher they would have more firepower (that's a good point), but overall the failure to finish the USSR off in 1941 was mostly due to geography and manpower and not scarcity of equipment.

Overall, during the war the Wehrmacht did not particularly suffer from lack of equipment, it's supply of equipment and ammunition was regarded as good in quantity and quality by the Heer officers.

Also I should point out that sales of ammunition and military equipment were only about 22 billion RM in 1943 compared to 123 billion RM in total military outlays, most of which was spent on maintaining the army.
So what happens if Germany starts to fully mobilize its war production from late 1939/early 1940 onwards?
A massive waste of resources and they would end up with tens of thousands of aircraft and tanks sitting in parking lots. Although having a couple million tons of ammunition to spare would help a lot in the Eastern front.
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