Luftwaffe only has to fight the VVS

[KDF33]

A limited Case Blue is more likely. The Donets Basin and the Don river line were fine objectives and would inflict serious losses to the Soviets in the process. If Germany has access to world oil markets, they don't need to invade the Caucasus, but they would like all that high quality coal and expensive metals in the Donets basin while also taking a strong defensive line on the Don river. It also opens up the Black Sea to sea supply for Axis forces via the Italian merchant marine. Frankly South is the best option for the Axis in 1942, but only a limited objective as the goal, with a follow up on Leningrad after the Soviet's attention is dragged south. Plus using the west bank of the Don river as a platform to reach Soviet oil production for Luftwaffe and RA bombers would be a nice little bonus.

I respectfully disagree. A limited Case Blue would probably not inflict much more damages than Voronezh - Voroshilovgrad did historically, which is probably about 500,000+ irrecoverable, if one includes the DoW and permanently disabled. Although it would restrict the Soviet supply of coal, it would also substantially increase the length of the German frontline and further dilute the striking power of the Wehrmacht. Assuming the Germans stop on the Don line, I also fail to see how it opens up the Black Sea, since the Soviet ports are much farther south. With regards to an assault on Leningrad, a limited Blue forces the Germans to shift troops North, wasting time and multiplying the axises of attack for no good reason. Lastly, I don't think any German bombers can reach Baku from the Donets, with the exception of the odd He 177, and in any case they wouldn't be able to get fighter cover. Of course all this is conditional on whether we are talking about the war IOTL or on a limited German - Soviet war - it was my understanding that the last couple of posts were discussing the former.

how are they planing to win than ?

Through the destruction of Soviet troop and equipment concentrations.

[stg 44]

A limited Case Blue is more likely. The Donets Basin and the Don river line were fine objectives and would inflict serious losses to the Soviets in the process. If Germany has access to world oil markets, they don't need to invade the Caucasus, but they would like all that high quality coal and expensive metals in the Donets basin while also taking a strong defensive line on the Don river. It also opens up the Black Sea to sea supply for Axis forces via the Italian merchant marine. Frankly South is the best option for the Axis in 1942, but only a limited objective as the goal, with a follow up on Leningrad after the Soviet's attention is dragged south. Plus using the west bank of the Don river as a platform to reach Soviet oil production for Luftwaffe and RA bombers would be a nice little bonus.

I respectfully disagree. A limited Case Blue would probably not inflict much more damages than Voronezh - Voroshilovgrad did historically, which is probably about 500,000+ irrecoverable, if one includes the DoW and permanently disabled. Although it would restrict the Soviet supply of coal, it would also substantially increase the length of the German frontline and further dilute the striking power of the Wehrmacht. Assuming the Germans stop on the Don line, I also fail to see how it opens up the Black Sea, since the Soviet ports are much farther south. With regards to an assault on Leningrad, a limited Blue forces the Germans to shift troops North, wasting time and multiplying the axises of attack for no good reason. Lastly, I don't think any German bombers can reach Baku from the Donets, with the exception of the odd He 177, and in any case they wouldn't be able to get fighter cover. Of course all this is conditional on whether we are talking about the war IOTL or on a limited German - Soviet war - it was my understanding that the last couple of posts were discussing the former.

The Ju88 could and did reach Soviet oil centers in 1942. There was a limited bombing campaign of these centers historically, but this was after the offensive had already failed. Author Joel Hayward discusses this in his book on Stalingrad and in his article "Too Little Too Late" as a major missed opportunity for Germany.

The ports I'm thinking of are Mariupol and in the Crimea.

[1st Cavalry]

1st Cavalry,
The Germans are under no obligation to attack in the Caucasus direction.

how are they planing to win than ?

Capture the Donets and bomb Soviet oil production

that basically means no fighter cover over the target.

[1st Cavalry]

how are they planing to win than ?

Through the destruction of Soviet troop and equipment concentrations.

than the best thing they can hope for is draw , not a victory.

[KDF33]

than the best thing they can hope for is draw , not a victory.

Why not? By the autumn of 1942 the Soviets hardly had any manpower slack left. If the Germans could keep attriting the Red Army at a fast rate during 1942 and avoid catastrophe during the winter, IMO they would be in a good position to resume major offensives by the next spring.

[1st Cavalry]

This lull in fighting at Stalingrad coincided with the Fuehrer's eventual realization that his forces in the Caucasus would not reach the main oilfields before winter weather forced them to take up winter positions. On 7 October, therefore, he ordered Richthofen, whose units had temporarily suspended attacks on Stalingrad's ruined suburbs, to attack oilfields at Grozny and other central Caucasian centres as strongly as possible. If he could not have the oilfields--at present, anyway--he should at least deny Stalin's agriculture, industry and armed forces their vast output.[48]

Richthofen realised that this would be no easy task, especially as Hitler had not ordered Greim's units in the Moscow sector to participate (apparently because Soviet pressure in that sector was also mounting and Hitler wanted Greim's forces kept there to prevent any Soviet attacks). Richthofen therefore ordered the transfer of almost every available bomber and dive-bomber unit in the Stalingrad sector to airfields around the northern Caucasian towns of Krasnodar, Maikop and Armavir, where they were made ready for their first "strategic" bombing mission in months. Some units, including the 3rd Group of the Fifty-fifth Bomber Wing (III./K.G. 55), had to operate from airfields at Saki in the distant Crimea.[49] Even reaching Grozny from Saki would prove difficult for them. Reaching Baku was impossible. Aircraft could no longer operate from Fliegerkorps IV's forward airfields around Voroshilovsk and in the region between the Kuma and Terek Rivers; they had proven too vulnerable to VVS attacks and had mostly been abandoned during September in favour of airfields further north.

On 10 October, Richthofen hurled almost every operational bomber his air fleet possessed against the Grozny refineries.[50] Bomber units, like those of the other aircraft types, was now in poor shape. Richthofen had started Operation Blau with an impressive force of 480 bombers, of which 323 (a reasonable 67 per cent) were serviceable.[51] Now he had only 232 bombers, of which a mere 129 (55 per cent) were serviceable. They could still deliver reasonable blows to single targets, however. The damage they and dive-bombers inflicted on Grozny reminded Richthofen of attacks on Sevastopol during June 1942; huge flames leapt from shattered fuel tanks and burst pipes, and dense clouds of smoke rose high into the air.[52] He was delighted, joyfully noting in his diary the following evening that smoke clouds were still 5,500 meters high. He repeated the attacks two nights later[53], with equally pleasing results.

These raids on Grozny's oil refineries, though, marked the sum total of Luftflotte 4's "strategic" attacks on Soviet industry in the Caucasus.[54] Richthofen simply could not spare aircraft from the Stalingrad sector to carry out further such raids. He certainly had no chance of conducting the "massive attacks" on Baku's oilfields, for instance, that Hitler ridiculously ordered on 22 October.

The distance between Armavir and Grozny was around 400 km .
from krasnodar to to Baku = 1000 km .
maikop or Armavir to baku = 900 km .

[1st Cavalry]

than the best thing they can hope for is draw , not a victory.

Why not? By the autumn of 1942 the Soviets hardly had any manpower slack left. If the Germans could keep attriting the Red Army at a fast rate during 1942 and avoid catastrophe during the winter, IMO they would be in a good position to resume major offensives by the next spring.

by 1943 they lost 6 million out of 34 million mobilised , there was plenty of slack left.

[Kingfish]

Kingfish,

I actually agree with most of what you wrote, except this: "Now all they could attempt was a limited offensive aimed at the Caucasus". Like I replied to 1st Cav, why do you feel the Germans were under the obligation to strike South?

I'm not suggesting that they were, but would point out that if the Germans were desperate to deliver a knock out blow (and they were) then it would make more sense to strike towards the Caucasus than either Moscow or Leningrad. Capturing the former, or even just denying the access to it, would have had a greater impact on the Russian's war effort than losing either city.

[KDF33]

by 1943 they lost 6 million out of 34 million mobilised , there was plenty of slack left.

The Soviets did mobilise 34.5 million men and women for the armed forces, the formations coming under other departments (like the NKVD) and industry, of which 4.8 million, presumably those with specialist skills as well as those with limited fitness, were sent disproportionately to the latter two categories (Krivosheev p91). That leaves, rounded up, 30 million that could be easily sent to the front against Germany.

By the launch of Operation Uranus, the Soviets had suffered slightly under 6.2 million (p104) dead and captured (including DoW). They had also suffered a large number of permanently disabled, 11.5% of the sick and wounded, according to Krivosheev (p91). That's slightly under 0.6 million by 18.11.42. Lastly, during the retreat of 1941, the Soviets lost 0.5 million reservists called up but captured by the Germans before they could be taken on strength by the Red Army. In sum, the Soviets had lost about 7.2 million men by Uranus.

By then, they also had about 10.6 million men on active duty and somewhat more than 0.8 million in hospitals, for a total of about 11.5 million men in the armed forces (Soviet fronts strengths: Overview). This would indicate of total consumption of about 18.7 million men on a total of about 30, thus leaving roughly 11.3 million more men for the rest of the war, right?

Wrong. According to this post by Art, the Soviets had also lost access to over 5.6 million men up to the class of 1924 (mobilisable in 1942) in the conquered territories by the time Fall Blau stalled in September. Arguably some of those were killed by the Germans and others were sent to work in Germany, but then again the classes of 1925, 1926 and 1927, all mobilisable before the end of the war, are not counted in the 5.6 million. So let's say the Soviets could gain from reconquered territories during the war 4 - 5 million men. Our pool of "used resources" now totals about 23 million men. That leaves roughly 7 million for the continuation of the war, of which (according to Tschadenko) about 0.9 million were fully fit and immediately mobilisable, 0.7 million (class of 1925) were mobilisable in 1943, a significant number were in the classes of 1926 - 27 and couldn't be immediately mobilised and the rest, perhaps 3 million men, would have to be combed out from men overaged or with limited fitness, the industry, the penitentiary system or the security organs. That would give, on average, about 2.5 million new recruits each year for 1943 - 45, a number which squares quite well with the about 2 million men mobilised during the autumn of 1942 (decree 2100) and winter of 1943 (decree 2640) - but a number also largely insufficient to cover irrecoverable losses at the rate the Soviets had experienced them until then.

[KDF33]

I'm not suggesting that they were, but would point out that if the Germans were desperate to deliver a knock out blow (and they were) then it would make more sense to strike towards the Caucasus than either Moscow or Leningrad. Capturing the former, or even just denying the access to it, would have had a greater impact on the Russian's war effort than losing either city.

The knock-out blow would come from destroying Soviet formations, and thus manpower, not through the taking of the cities. It seems obvious to me that the best way to achieve maximum attrition on the Soviets during 1942 was to strike North (I would favor it over Moscow), first by cutting off the Kalinin Front in the Demyansk - Rzhev salient, then by rolling up the front towards the Finns, and lastly by eliminating the Leningrad Front - there would never be more than one axis of attack and each component of the general offensive would free up men to reinforce the next attack. it's not like the Germans didn't know the Soviets were starting to run out of manpower either - Blau basically rested on the assumption that once the South-West and Southern Fronts had been smashed, the Soviets wouldn't be able to reconstitute them, so in all probability the Germans actually overestimated the rate at which the Soviets were nearing the bottom of the barrel manpower-wise. This thus begs the question: if the Germans thought they were in the process of bleeding the Soviets to death, why didn't they plan their 1942 summer offensive on that basis?

[stg 44]

I'm not suggesting that they were, but would point out that if the Germans were desperate to deliver a knock out blow (and they were) then it would make more sense to strike towards the Caucasus than either Moscow or Leningrad. Capturing the former, or even just denying the access to it, would have had a greater impact on the Russian's war effort than losing either city.

The knock-out blow would come from destroying Soviet formations, and thus manpower, not through the taking of the cities. It seems obvious to me that the best way to achieve maximum attrition on the Soviets during 1942 was to strike North (I would favor it over Moscow), first by cutting off the Kalinin Front in the Demyansk - Rzhev salient, then by rolling up the front towards the Finns, and lastly by eliminating the Leningrad Front - there would never be more than one axis of attack and each component of the general offensive would free up men to reinforce the next attack. it's not like the Germans didn't know the Soviets were starting to run out of manpower either - Blau basically rested on the assumption that once the South-West and Southern Fronts had been smashed, the Soviets wouldn't be able to reconstitute them, so in all probability the Germans actually overestimated the rate at which the Soviets were nearing the bottom of the barrel manpower-wise. This thus begs the question: if the Germans thought they were in the process of bleeding the Soviets to death, why didn't they plan their 1942 summer offensive on that basis?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany_an ... _World_War
Volume VI has all the answers you're looking for...and more. They didn't think they were bleeding the Soviets to death, but rather they could encircle formations and basically eliminate cadres, so that the Soviets would be so reduced in organization and quality that the glorified militias that they would then field wouldn't stand up to German regulars. That's a horrible simplification, so check out that book and there are something like 100 pages explanation, maps, and charts about planning for Blau. The Germans thought they were bleeding to death, so it was best to eliminate as many Soviet formations as possible on the way to grab Soviet oil.

[Marcelo Jenisch]

In other topic I posted:

I already *heard* that the British and Americans held some 5 million German POW's by the wars end, in comparison to three million Soviet POWs. Unfornately, the people who told me this didn't provided a source. It was also said that if we add the POWs in consideration, the share for neutralization of German troops was almost 50/50 between the Western Allies and Soviets.

Someone can confirm this? That being the case, obviously it would made a considerable difference in this scenario, not to mention the German troops in France, Norway, Italy and the Balkans employed against the Soviets, as well as the Italian troops. Perhaphs the European Axis could not have conquered the USSR, but with this number of Axis troops it seems pretty realistic that a Soviet advance towards Germany could have been stopped as well.

Then LWD answered:

Jenisch wrote:
I *heard* that the British and Americans held some 5 million German POW's by the wars end, in comparison to three million Soviet POWs. Unfornately, the people who told me this didn't provided a source....

It's wiki but it is footnoted pretty well.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disarmed_Enemy_Forces
Approximately 35 million POWs were taken in World War II, 11 million of them Germans.[9][18] ... the U.S. Army had to cope with most of the surrendered German army.[19] While the Allies had anticipated 3 million surrendering Germans, the actual total was as many as 5 million in American hands by June 1945 out of 7.6 million in northwestern Europe alone, not counting the 1.4 million in Allied hands in Italy.[19]
...
The number of Germans surrendering to U.S. forces shot up from 313,000 by the end of the first quarter of 1945, to 2.6 million by April 1945 and more than 5 million in May.[20][21][22]

So if there was a total of 11 million German POW's and the US and British held 9 million + ...

This page tends to confirm the above in rough numbers if not exactly:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_cas ... rld_War_II

Some people there commented that most of such POWS from the West would be useless against Russia. Different view here?

[KDF33]

Well, part of these POWs would be administrative and medical personel. Others would come from the Kriegsmarine or the Luftwaffe, in particular from the large Flak units. So not all of them could of been used against Russia. A lot would come from combat forces, however. In any case, the Germans held the advantage in manpower when adjusted for attrition, so it doesn't really matter in the end where the allied POWs came from.

[KDF33]

Volume VI has all the answers you're looking for...and more. They didn't think they were bleeding the Soviets to death, but rather they could encircle formations and basically eliminate cadres, so that the Soviets would be so reduced in organization and quality that the glorified militias that they would then field wouldn't stand up to German regulars. That's a horrible simplification, so check out that book and there are something like 100 pages explanation, maps, and charts about planning for Blau. The Germans thought they were bleeding to death, so it was best to eliminate as many Soviet formations as possible on the way to grab Soviet oil.

Do you have a link to an accessible web version of Vol. VI?

[stg 44]

Volume VI has all the answers you're looking for...and more. They didn't think they were bleeding the Soviets to death, but rather they could encircle formations and basically eliminate cadres, so that the Soviets would be so reduced in organization and quality that the glorified militias that they would then field wouldn't stand up to German regulars. That's a horrible simplification, so check out that book and there are something like 100 pages explanation, maps, and charts about planning for Blau. The Germans thought they were bleeding to death, so it was best to eliminate as many Soviet formations as possible on the way to grab Soviet oil.

Do you have a link to an accessible web version of Vol. VI?

Sorry. I managed to get a copy via interlibrary loan about a year ago, so I don't have a copy (they are about $600 each)