300 Ju 89's during the Blitz

[stg 44]

Let's take up that topic then:
what if those 300 Ju 89s were instead used in naval support operations? ....

What effect does this have on the war/Blitz?

I guess part of the answer is how well prepared for these operations they would be. I know in OTL the martitme capabilites were not well developed & they were learning the techniques on the fly. Another part would be how cooperationsbetween the Air Force & the Navy came about. Maritime ops of this scope imply a lot more cooperation than in OTL.

I imagine even having the Ju89 available would mean a massive change in perspective of the Luftwaffe general staff. Based on our earlier discussion this is very unlikely as an option under any leadership, but the only one that gives us a minor chance is having Wever live and maintaining his 1936 status quo in terms of personnel. Wever was all for cooperation with the other services, so I'd imagine that there is far more cooperation with the navy than IOTL. Göring and his toady Jeschonnek were very much players in the rivalry with the navy, which I could see Wever pushing back against, especially as IOTL the LW operations and intelligence services were pushing for a campaign against the British ports and trade. All it takes is someone that can put it into action and stand up to Göring.

[Carl Schwamberger]

.... All it takes is someone that can put it into action and stand up to Göring.

Or a better politician

[phylo_roadking]

Mention was made of the B-17 earlier in this thread as a way of beefing up the RAF's bombing capacity...and I noted that it was regarded as a failure in RAF service...

Usually, there's not much more to be found with regard to this - but today I came across some more detail in Chris Ward & Steve Smith's operational history of 3 Group, Bomber Command; No. 90 Sqn RAF was selected to trial the early B-17C, which arrived in British service known as the "Fortress I". 90 Sqn., an old WWI squadron number, was reformed on the 5th of May 1941, with its first crews arriving at RAF Bottesford from RAF Marham. The first aircraft had arrived in the UK on the 5th of March, flying into Watton...and was shipped out for modification on the 7th!

In the end, the Fortress proved to be endlessly beset with technical problems and was totally unsuited to the role assigned to it in the RAF. The serviceability rate was "abysmal", and there was a long spate of unanticipated losses that decimated the 20 test aircraft; the operational trial therefore only lasted until September! 90 Sqn flew on with the Fortress - in training! - for another five months, but it already clear to the Air Ministry that ops in Winter were not feasible with the type...and as early as October 1941 the Fortresses were being sent to the warmer climes of the Middle East to serve with 220 Sqn.!

[stg 44]

Mention was made of the B-17 earlier in this thread as a way of beefing up the RAF's bombing capacity...and I noted that it was regarded as a failure in RAF service...

Usually, there's not much more to be found with regard to this - but today I came across some more detail in Chris Ward & Steve Smith's operational history of 3 Group, Bomber Command; No. 90 Sqn RAF was selected to trial the early B-17C, which arrived in British service known as the "Fortress I". 90 Sqn., an old WWI squadron number, was reformed on the 5th of May 1941, with its first crews arriving at RAF Bottesford from RAF Marham. The first aircraft had arrived in the UK on the 5th of March, flying into Watton...and was shipped out for modification on the 7th!

In the end, the Fortress proved to be endlessly beset with technical problems and was totally unsuited to the role assigned to it in the RAF. The serviceability rate was "abysmal", and there was a long spate of unanticipated losses that decimated the 20 test aircraft; the operational trial therefore only lasted until September! 90 Sqn flew on with the Fortress - in training! - for another five months, but it already clear to the Air Ministry that ops in Winter were not feasible with the type...and as early as October 1941 the Fortresses were being sent to the warmer climes of the Middle East to serve with 220 Sqn.!

Its well known that the B17 before the E and F series were so beset with problems that they were barely produced, so having B17Cs have a terrible rating is not surprising. Plus IIRC didn't the British contemporary strategic bombers have no problem operating during winter in Europe?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_Stir ... al_history
The Stirling, designed only slightly later than the Ju89, first flew a combat mission in February 1941, a month that saw bad flying for the LW, which reduced their sortee generation by half.

[phylo_roadking]

Plus IIRC didn't the British contemporary strategic bombers have no problem operating during winter in Europe?

No, not in the way they did with the Fortress. ALL aircraft had icing problems before the advent of really reliable de-icing systems and fluids, nights lost due to bad weather in winter etc., but there seems to have been something more extreme in the degree of mechanical issues the B-17C experienced.

In regards to this from the Wiki article...

Another consequence of the thick wing was a low ceiling and many missions were flown as low as 12,000 ft (4,000 m). This was a disadvantage on many raids, notably if crews were attacking Italy and had to fly through (rather than "over") the Alps. When Stirlings were on combined operations with other RAF bombers which could fly higher, the Luftwaffe concentrated on the low-flying Stirlings. Within five months of being introduced, 67 out of the 84 aircraft delivered had been lost to enemy action or written off after crashes.

...I'm actually in the process of finding out from Ward& Smith that the Stirling had a REALLY terrible problem with its undercarriage - it broke on landing, it broke on take off, it stuck down or stuck up...every problem that it could have with an aircraft's undercarriage it had. One Stirling went all the way to its target and back on BC's first Thousand Bomber Raid with its undercarriage down! There was even one incident in 1942 when one aircraft stationary on the ground decided to collapse on its undercarriage, crushing the ground crew working on it It also generated a much larger number of mechanical "returns to base" than other types until the Manchester; its crews liked the plane in flight - they didn't necessarily love it at any other time!

Its well known that the B17 before the E and F series were so beset with problems that they were barely produced

...but by the time that decent versions were being produced - the British aviation industry was producing enough aircraft of its own. Nor, with all the the Empire training schools and schemes etc., was there any real shortage of crews for them. We didn't need and wouldn't have ATL needed the B-17.

[Simon Gunson]

The heavy bombers could only use paved runways.

https://flic.kr/p/PQUot4

A lifetime ago working for an airline flying the ATL.98 we operated at 73,000lb MTOW from grass runways

[T. A. Gardner]

They wouldn't last long. Okay, they start with 300. Let's say production is at a rate of 1 per 2 days, or 15 per month. If operational losses are 1% per day and we assume they are 50% operational, that means every time they fly a mission you end up with less bombers by 1 or 2 than you started with. Replacements can't keep up with even these low rates of loss.
Once it picks up to 5 or 6% per mission flown, this bomber force goes down hill quickly. At most you could fly 250 missions total a month with the aircraft and production would replace losses at that rate. Essentially, Junkers can't make enough. The Luftwaffe can't fly them much. The program is self-defeating.
The Luftwaffe has far bigger problems than what airplane they have in service or don't. The Ju 89 would end up being a white elephant in service.

[Simon Gunson]

They wouldn't last long. Okay, they start with 300. Let's say production is at a rate of 1 per 2 days, or 15 per month. If operational losses are 1% per day and we assume they are 50% operational, that means every time they fly a mission you end up with less bombers by 1 or 2 than you started with. Replacements can't keep up with even these low rates of loss.
Once it picks up to 5 or 6% per mission flown, this bomber force goes down hill quickly. At most you could fly 250 missions total a month with the aircraft and production would replace losses at that rate. Essentially, Junkers can't make enough. The Luftwaffe can't fly them much. The program is self-defeating.
The Luftwaffe has far bigger problems than what airplane they have in service or don't. The Ju 89 would end up being a white elephant in service.

Flying at night during the Blitz how effective were British defences?

The Home Chain radar was a perimeter radar system. It could not detect aircraft once they had crossed inland from the coast. Yes the Defiant was potentially useful but Mosquito or Beaufighter with radar homing were still years ahead. 6 months of pounding at night by heavy bombers against very primitive night fighter defences would have been very one sided in favour of the Ju89

What it would have done is forced dispersal of populations and manufacturing and perhaps led to the collapse of British defence before America came into the war.

[T. A. Gardner]

They wouldn't last long. Okay, they start with 300. Let's say production is at a rate of 1 per 2 days, or 15 per month. If operational losses are 1% per day and we assume they are 50% operational, that means every time they fly a mission you end up with less bombers by 1 or 2 than you started with. Replacements can't keep up with even these low rates of loss.
Once it picks up to 5 or 6% per mission flown, this bomber force goes down hill quickly. At most you could fly 250 missions total a month with the aircraft and production would replace losses at that rate. Essentially, Junkers can't make enough. The Luftwaffe can't fly them much. The program is self-defeating.
The Luftwaffe has far bigger problems than what airplane they have in service or don't. The Ju 89 would end up being a white elephant in service.

Flying at night during the Blitz how effective were British defences?

The Home Chain radar was a perimeter radar system. It could not detect aircraft once they had crossed inland from the coast. Yes the Defiant was potentially useful but Mosquito or Beaufighter with radar homing were still years ahead. 6 months of pounding at night by heavy bombers against very primitive night fighter defences would have been very one sided in favour of the Ju89

What it would have done is forced dispersal of populations and manufacturing and perhaps led to the collapse of British defence before America came into the war.

They had GL Mk II gun laying radar available for their 3.7" AA guns. They also have searchlights. So, they've had effective flak defenses. Those alone would cause several percent losses, particularly given the lack of any countermeasures by the Luftwaffe. Nightfighters would have gotten some aircraft too. The British, like the Germans were in the infancy of that field. The British in addition to the Defiant also flew Blenheim IF's in this period as well as the Douglass DB-7 / P-70 nightfighter. The Blenheim Mk IF got its first night kill on 6/18/40 when they shot down a combined total of 5 Luftwaffe bombers on a night raid.
Also, without the precision navigation aids like X-Gerät and such their bombers weren't likely to get much of their load on target, just as the RAF was unable to early in the war.

I doubt that raids by maybe a couple hundred bombers at most, and probably less than 100 most of the time, would have had much effect on British industry. German intelligence wasn't even that good at pinpointing what to hit. The British also didn't go for huge public shelters like the Germans did. Instead, they preferred improvised ones like the London subway, or even ones in family's backyards, like the Anderson shelter...



For night bombing to really be effective it took the RAF about two years of effort and training to get proficient. By then they also had the means of production in place to mount a "Thousand plane raid" on a German city.
Besides, even if the Luftwaffe somehow pulled off a miracle in production, the British have the option to just move their production overseas and completely out of range of the Luftwaffe. Canada produced a large number of aircraft for example. The Luftwaffe wasn't going to bomb a factory there. The same goes for aircrew training. The RAF had choices about where to do it with better weather than Germany had. They simply moved most of the basic training of pilots and aircrew out of Britain and out of reach of any interference by the Germans. Germany doesn't have that luxury.

[LWD]

The British also had numerous spotters and sonic detection measures from what I recall. They were from previous discussions important day or night in tracking the German raids.

[Terry Duncan]

Necromancy.