Operation Barbarossa Launched In May 1942

[ljadw]

Britain did not give up after France was defeated. Why would Churchill give up after Russia's (a neutral country) defeat? It doesn't make sense. The whole "USSR is the last hope of Britain in continental Europe" thing, was nothing more than an excuse. Hitler only used 50% of his Air Force during the battle of Britain. The other 50% was stationed in Poland facing (neutral) Russia. Why? Because Hitler wanted to invade any way.

Soviet union was not be neutral country.

Again you was write mostest strange tosh.

Soviet union was be on bilateral alliance with Nazi Germany since august 1939 for to invade and for to occupy and for to oppress many countrys in east europe.

This is nonsense : there was NO bilateral alliance between the USSR and Germany .

[ljadw]

Britain did not give up after France was defeated. Why would Churchill give up after Russia's (a neutral country) defeat? It doesn't make sense. The whole "USSR is the last hope of Britain in continental Europe" thing, was nothing more than an excuse. Hitler only used 50% of his Air Force during the battle of Britain. The other 50% was stationed in Poland facing (neutral) Russia. Why? Because Hitler wanted to invade any way.

This is nonsense : the whole operational part of the LW was committed in the Battle of Britain and the Blitz .
''The USSR is the last hope of Britain in continental Europe '' was no excuse, but the reason why Hitler attacked the USSR .

[Zoomer]

''The USSR is the last hope of Britain in continental Europe '' was no excuse, but the reason why Hitler attacked the USSR .

Was Stalin going to form an alliance with Churchill against Hitler? No. He wanted to remain neutral or even make an agreement with Hitler. So why did Hitler decide to attack the USSR? Because he was insane and not because it was a measure against Britain.

[ljadw]

There was nothing else Hitler could do .
He could not defeat Britain .
He could do nothing against the USA : after the GOP convention from June 1940 war with the USA was inevitable .
Remained the USSR .The elimination of the USSR before the USA were ready would,hoped Hitler, weaken the war party in Britain and strengthen the opponents of Churchill .It would also strengthen the position of those in Japan who wanted a confrontation with the USA.
The alternative was to do nothing,while his opponents were taking the initiative.
Churchill could hope on the USA/USSR . Hitler had NO allies .

[Ружичасти Слон]

Evidences. Not comment. Not opinion. Not imagination storys.

Erklärung der Deutschen Reichsregierung und der Regierung der UdSSR

Nachdem die Deutsche Reichsregierung und die Regierung der UdSSR durch den heute unterzeichneten Vertrag die sich aus dem Zerfall des polnischen Staates ergebenden Fragen endgültig geregelt und damit ein sicheres Fundament für einen dauerhaften Frieden in Osteuropa geschaffen haben, geben sie übereinstimmend der Auffassung Ausdruck, daß es dem wahren Interesse aller Völker entsprechen würde, dem gegenwärtig zwischen Deutschland einerseits und England und Frankreich andererseits bestehenden Kriegszustand ein Ende zu machen. Die beiden Regierungen werden deshalb ihre gemeinsamen Bemühungen, gegebenenfalls im Einvernehmen mit anderen befreundeten Mächten, darauf richten, dieses Ziel sobald als möglich zu erreichen.

Sollten jedoch die Bemühungen der beiden Regierungen erfolglos bleiben, so würde damit die Tatsache festgestellt sein, daß England und Frankreich für die Fort-setzung des Krieges verantwortlich sind, wobei im Falle einer Fortdauer des Krieges die Regierungen Deutschlands und der UdSSR sich gegenseitig über die erforderlichen Maßnahmen konsultieren werden.

[Zoomer]

There was nothing else Hitler could do .
He could not defeat Britain .
He could do nothing against the USA : after the GOP convention from June 1940 war with the USA was inevitable .
Remained the USSR .The elimination of the USSR before the USA were ready would,hoped Hitler, weaken the war party in Britain and strengthen the opponents of Churchill .It would also strengthen the position of those in Japan who wanted a confrontation with the USA.
The alternative was to do nothing,while his opponents were taking the initiative.
Churchill could hope on the USA/USSR . Hitler had NO allies .

1. "Germany could not defeat Britain."
Britain could not defeat Germany either.

2. "Churchill could hope..." "Hitler hoped..."
We are not phycologists here. We are discussing facts, not feelings.
In mid 1940: USA was neutral. USSR was neutral.
In November 1940: USA was leaning towards Britain (FDR's reelection). USSR was leaning towards Germany (Molotov's visit).
Hitler decided to attack USSR (a neutral country and a potential ally) for literally no reason. Barbarossa was not a part of the plan for defeating Britain. How could it be?

[ljadw]

1 Germany had to defeat Britain in the very short run: once the US intervened,Germany could no longer win .
2 Germany expected war with the US BEFORE 1942 .
In August 1940 the US marines were already on Iceland .6 months later,Lend Lease started and in the summer of 1941 US Navy was chasing the U Boats .

[Zoomer]

1 Germany had to defeat Britain in the very short run: once the US intervened,Germany could no longer win .
2 Germany expected war with the US BEFORE 1942 .
In August 1940 the US marines were already on Iceland .6 months later,Lend Lease started and in the summer of 1941 US Navy was chasing the U Boats .

Britain + USA could NOT defeat Germany. Defeating Germany was only possible with the help of the USSR (which was neutral, if not pro-German). Germany could NOT lose the war (but could not win either). Unless ofc, Hitler decides to attack the USSR for no reason. Hint: He did.

The allies could not land in continental Europe with 200 german divisions guarding the beaches. It would have been a bombing war and a race for the A bomb.

[ljadw]

There was only one running in the race : USA
There were no 200 German divisions guarding the beaches
A landing in continental Europe was not needed to defeat Germany .

[Peter89]

There was only one running in the race : USA
There were no 200 German divisions guarding the beaches
A landing in continental Europe was not needed to defeat Germany .

The situation was even worse for the Germans / Axis. The US voted the Two-Ocean Navy Act on July 19, 1940, and even though the capital ships began to arrive in numbers in early 1943, the game was already over. Total naval supremacy was granted for the Wallies.

[Peter89]

1 Germany had to defeat Britain in the very short run: once the US intervened,Germany could no longer win .
2 Germany expected war with the US BEFORE 1942 .
In August 1940 the US marines were already on Iceland .6 months later,Lend Lease started and in the summer of 1941 US Navy was chasing the U Boats .

Britain + USA could NOT defeat Germany. Defeating Germany was only possible with the help of the USSR (which was neutral, if not pro-German). Germany could NOT lose the war (but could not win either). Unless ofc, Hitler decides to attack the USSR for no reason. Hint: He did.

The allies could not land in continental Europe with 200 german divisions guarding the beaches. It would have been a bombing war and a race for the A bomb.

Germany had a serious problem: the exploitation of the quick victories and captured goods from 1938-1941 will not last forever. So the time window we are actually talking about was quite narrow, so by mid-1942 they either finished off Britain or lost the war.

By the way... finishing off Britain does not automatically mean the control of the BE's resources. With overwhelming US naval superiority the best they could have done was to secure the Mediterraneum and the colonies around. But their economical worth was questionable, especially with very limited merchant fleet and the lack of transport system around the Med sea.

A lot of people who are interested in history like to think that the German Army in 1940 was a highly trained, very professional, very skilled, motorized force with superb communication between the various branches. In fact the German Army had some experience, but even the most experienced formations didn't see more than a few months of combat and the key branches (KM & LW) had a terrible cooperation on the seas (see Operation Wikinger or the Weserübung).

The loss rates of skilled pilots also pointed out the significance of the training programs, something that Germany will never be able to best the Wallies.

Truth to be told, there was only bad and worse choices for the Germans in 1941, they chose a bad one (maybe the worst), but even if they do something else, they would have lost the war by the end of 1945.

[Zoomer]

There was only one running in the race : USA
There were no 200 German divisions guarding the beaches
A landing in continental Europe was not needed to defeat Germany .

False.
A landing in continental Europe was needed. Bombing german cities from Britain would not have won the war for the allies. Remember what happened to german planes over Britain? Same thing would have happened to allied planes over Germany. Instead of letting the allies suffer a similar defeat, Hitler decided to attack the USSR (a neutral country and a potential ally) for no reason. Only the A bomb would end the war.

[Avalancheon]

Bessarabia was in the pact. Bukovina wasn't, but that's irrelevant, it's a small useless territory. Hungary and Bulgaria also took parts of Romania so Bukovina was not a big deal.

The difference is, Bulgaria and Romania didn't grab these territorys on their own. They were awarded them through German mediation. Bulgaria got Dobrudja in the Treaty of Craiova. Romania got Transylvania in the Second Vienna Award.

The Soviets didn't consult the Germans when they annexed Bukovina. They made a demand to King Carol, and then sent the Red Army in. This was an act of naked aggression that alarmed both the Romanians and Germans.

Finland was also in the pact but Hitler refused to give the country to Stalin as agreed in the pact. Stalin was planning a bigger attack on Finland but the allies landed in Norway, so he stopped.

What are you talking about? The Moscow treaty was signed on March 12, 1940. The Norwegian campaign started on April 9, when Germany launched operation Weserubung. The Soviets were already at peace with Finland by the time the Allies got involved in Norway.

Then the Germans defeated the allies in Norway and Stalin could proceed in Finland. But then, a problem occurred. Hitler stationed troops in Finland meaning that Stalin was no longer able to attack.

Uh huh. So you expect us to believe that Stalin was going to invade Finland a couple months after he had made peace with them? Where is your evidence for that?

That was against the pact since Finland was in the Soviet sphere of influence. Hitler broke the pact, so Stalin could not ally with him. Molotov and Ribbentrop (and other Nazis officials like Goring, Schulenburg etc) tried many times to get a deal but Hitler wanted to proceed with the invasion. The order for the preparations of the invasion was given BEFORE the Molotov visit. Get your facts straight

Here are the relevant facts: The Soviet invasion of Finland was a costly blunder that hurt their prestige, forcing them to fall back on the Moscow treaty. Their attempt to subjugate the country had failed long before the Germans showed up in Norway. Hitlers decision to move troops into Finland merely solidified the geopolitical stalemate.

The Nazi-Soviet conference in November 1940 is a complicated affair. Its failure can be attributed to misunderstandings on the part of both the German and Russian sides. They could not come to an agreement due to the intransigence of Hitler and Stalin.

[Avalancheon]

Absent a deep computer model simulating thousands of engagements where Germany has more shells than OTL, it's hard to say what the tactical/casualty effects would have been. It's even harder to see how better tactical performance all across the front cashes out in operational/strategic terms.

I would guess that doubling German shell supply in Barbarossa would mean 20-30% more RKKA bloody casualties. That's just a guess based on (1) artillery caused most casualties and (2) diminishing returns to the marginal shell.

Do you have any figures on German shell consumption in 1941? Or Soviet shell consumption in the same period? That would help us gain some context on the artillery parity between the two sides. There is some information on both the quantity and tonnage of shells fired by the two sides in 1942, 1943, and 1944. https://forums.spacebattles.com/threads ... w2.308559/

USSR / Germany: Shell quantity
1942 - 37.983.800 / 45.261.822
1943 - 82.125.480 / 69.928.496
1944 - 98.664.568 / 113.663.900

USSR / Germany: Shell tonnage
1942 - 446.133 / 709.557
1943 - 828.193 / 1.121.545
1944 - 1.000.962 / 1.540.933

According to these figures, the tonnage of shells fired by Germany in 1942 exceed that of the Soviets by 59%.
The tonnage they fired in 1943 was 35% greater than the Soviets.
The tonnage they fired in 1944 was 54% greater than the Soviets.

Agreed.

My only reservation is the extent to which the different decision-makers held these presumptions. Your point about trained reserves vs. manpower is well-taken. Nonetheless, I wonder to what extent Hitler, Halder, Bock, Wagner, etc. had any uniform picture of the case. The different power centers had different views all the way up the strategic level. Halder's views may have been formed explicitly on the reservist assumptions while Hitler may not have been fed such information - IMJ Halder hid from Hitler much important staff work such as logistics, wargames, and planning analysis.

Thats very true. You are aware of the fact that there were actually two separate drafts for operation Barbarossa. The first was made by Erich Marcks, and involved a two pronged assault. The second was made by Bernhard von Lossberg, and involved a three pronged assault.

But did you know that Marcks also made an update to his original study, where he reappraised some of his initial assumptions? Among other things, he stated that the war might not end even if the Wehrmacht managed to advance all the way up to the Archangelsk-Astrakahn line. It was conceivable that the Red Army could still manage to fight large scale guerilla actions. He called this 'Situation Red.' Apparently, Franz Halder never shared this study with Hitler.

Honestly I'm not certain about this. Surprising as it may be 80 years later, more research is needed IMO.

Glantz's view is that Stavka/Stalin ordered holding fast; others have pointed out retreats on local initiative.

Blau I was a double envelopment in which one of the mobile arms (assigned to 6th Army) had only one panzer corps. It's hardly surprising that most encircled RKKA units penetrated such a weak screen, probably assisted by escape orders issued locally earlier than occurred in '41. Per Glantz (Stalingrad Volume I), the units briefly encircled in June/July were completely disorganized by their frantic escapes. That could partially explain the resurgence in November once the men were reorganized.

I would guess that Blau's relative PoW failure owed to both the weakness of German mobile units and earlier local withdrawals by Soviet forces.

You have a point. The failure to create large pockets during Case Blue probably was the result of numerous factors. Morale in the Red Army hit a low point after the catastrophe at the second battle of Kharkov. That is probably why the withdrawls ordered by local commanders turned into full scale retreats. The Red Army may have lost alot of ground, but many of their troops escaped from encirclement.

Another factor was, as you mentioned, the shortage of panzer and panzergrenadier divisions in the Wehrmacht. This hampered their ability to carry out double envelopments. They were only able to create two small pockets, one at Stary Oskol and one at Millerovo. The Germans had only captured 88,000 prisoners by July 13. The liquidation of the Millerovo pocket a few days later would have brought the number up significantly. But that was still well below what they needed for a knock out blow against the Soviets.

It's far better than OTL but not clearly sufficient to hold off the Wallies indefinitely. I don't see why the Eastern Front would be "inactive" even conceding successful German defense of the Volga line with weaker forces. SU can still draw copious LL aid and can still field a large army. Germany still needs at least 2mil men on the Eastern Front. In that scenario, probably D-Day is pushed into '45 and America's "91-division gamble" is undone, but the war still ends with a dead Hitler IMO, even setting aside the A-bomb.

More to the point for me is why stop at the Volga? It's ~1,000 miles from Poland to Kuibyshev and 500 miles from Kuibyshev to Magnitogorsk. The extra 500 miles pushes the SU into strategic irrelevance once, in its weakened state, it can no longer keep Vladivostok open against Japan (who either blockades or conquers it with '42's 1.2mil-man Kwantung Army). With Germans in Kazakhstan, the Central Asian Muslim populations behave as did the Caucasians and revolt. Game over for the SU (more rational for both sides is to agree a peace and leave an asiatic SU, as Hitler said he would do if Stalin retreated to the Urals).

What we are talking about here is a scenario where the Germans have fulfilled the ultimate objective of operation Barbarossa: By crushing the Red Army in battle, and driving the Soviets all the way back to the Volga river. In other words, they have successfully completed the advance to the Archangelsk-Astrakahn line. This would be an astonishing achievement without precedent in military history. The USSR would have lost most of its population, industry, and resources by the end of this campaign. They would be neutralised as far as being a military threat to Germany (now transformed into Greater Germany, by all the territory they have conquered).

In this scenario, it isn't clear how long the Soviets will continue to fight They would have effectively been reduced to a rump state by this point (albeit very large in terms of landmass), and would suffer a loss of prestige with both Leningrad and Moscow in Nazi hands. Britain and America will have written them off as an ally worthy of their confidence. Japan would be re-evaluating its peace agreement with the Soviets, and considering an invasion into Siberia. And amidst all that, the staggering human losses would have exceeded what even the Russians could tolerate.

All of these factors would weigh against continuing the war. The USSR was one of the most ruthless dictatorships in history, but there comes a point where even they must draw a line in the sand. They must surely try to make peace with the Germans.

It's far better than OTL but not clearly sufficient to hold off the Wallies indefinitely. I don't see why the Eastern Front would be "inactive" even conceding successful German defense of the Volga line with weaker forces. SU can still draw copious LL aid and can still field a large army. Germany still needs at least 2mil men on the Eastern Front. In that scenario, probably D-Day is pushed into '45 and America's "91-division gamble" is undone, but the war still ends with a dead Hitler IMO, even setting aside the A-bomb.

Again, this scenario is the ultimate fantasy of the Germans, in that they have successfully reached the Archangel-Astrakahn line. This basically puts the Eastern front into an entirely different context than what it historically was. The Red Army will have basically been gutted by this point, and will only be capable of large scale guerilla actions. This is what General Marcks was considering when he wrote his draft on 'Situation Red.' But again, thats assuming they decide to continue prosecuting the war (which isn't exactly a given).



What makes you think that the Soviets can continue drawing on a 'copious' volume of Lend Lease? By this point, they will have lost control of Murmansk, Archangelsk, and the Caucasus. Thus, the only other place they can receive shipments of war material is at Vladivostok, and even that won't be secure in the long term (given the possibility of Japanese intervention). If they want to get supplys up to Saratov or Samara, then they have to be sent down the Trans-Siberian railway on a trip that stretchs over 6000 km.

What makes you certain that the British and Americans could pull off an even larger amphibious invasion than they historically did, even with an extra year of preparation? Isn't it possible that they might consider this operation too ambitious and too expensive to pull off? Or that it would require the sacrifice of so many lives that their people would no longer support the war? Remember, they are democracys that must take public opinion into account.

[ljadw]

There was only one running in the race : USA
There were no 200 German divisions guarding the beaches
A landing in continental Europe was not needed to defeat Germany .

False.
A landing in continental Europe was needed. Bombing german cities from Britain would not have won the war for the allies. Remember what happened to german planes over Britain? Same thing would have happened to allied planes over Germany. Instead of letting the allies suffer a similar defeat, Hitler decided to attack the USSR (a neutral country and a potential ally) for no reason. Only the A bomb would end the war.

Germany had not 200 divisions to guard the beaches: Germany had in June 1941 some 210 divisions,of which more than 40 were not fit for combat .
Of the 170 that were operational, at least 70 would be needed to guard the border with the USSR ( a neutral country is potential an enemy ).
100 divisions remained to guard the beaches from Narvik to the Pyrenees, to occupy Yugoslavia and Greece and to fight in NA/the Mediterranean .
About the air attacks on Germany : the German cities were already wrecks in 1944 .The Allies could land in Norway, Italy, the Balkans ;Normandy was not needed .The Allies could chose where they would land,while the Germans were obliged to defend everything .
If Germany remained defensive,it would lose the initiative,and thus the war .
In WWI,Germany lost the initiative after he Marne ( with two exceptions ) and thus lost the war .It was the same in WWII.