Operation Barbarossa Launched In May 1942

[Ружичасти Слон]

There was only one running in the race : USA
There were no 200 German divisions guarding the beaches
A landing in continental Europe was not needed to defeat Germany .

False.
A landing in continental Europe was needed. Bombing german cities from Britain would not have won the war for the allies. Remember what happened to german planes over Britain? Same thing would have happened to allied planes over Germany. Instead of letting the allies suffer a similar defeat, Hitler decided to attack the USSR (a neutral country and a potential ally) for no reason. Only the A bomb would end the war.

It seems to me you are not interest for serious discuss about history.

Like ljadw opinions from ljadw imagination storys you like to make zoomer opinions from zoomer imagination storys.

How sombody can to give answers to your questions when story be only imagination story in your head ? Person what make imagination story must to make answer.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Do you have any figures on German shell consumption in 1941?

Not really at the moment. DRZW v.4 has the following table for stocks at the beginning of Barbarossa:



So about 300k tons at the outset.

DRZW vols 4 and 5 contain extensive discussion of how ammunition production peaked in mid-'40 then declined, peaked again in mid-'41, then declined again until '42. I recall seeing monthly stats somewhere, if I find them I'll post them (can anybody help?).

But did you know that Marcks also made an update to his original study, where he reappraised some of his initial assumptions?

I know he updated it but I'm not clear on the timeline or content. I am translating this version from German Docs in Russian: https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/4

It's not an impressive document, IMO.

the Germans have fulfilled the ultimate objective of operation Barbarossa: By crushing the Red Army in battle, and driving the Soviets all the way back to the Volga river.

This raises once more the meta-question of how to determine the "ultimate objective." OKH planners may have viewed the Volga as such but Hitler stated that he'd chase Stalin to the Urals if he had to (and would give him a peace treaty if he retreated there). Hitler's conception of the Russians as "Asiatic" interlopers in Europe is consonant with the latter strategic vision. For an operation so poorly and diffusely planned there are arguments many ways for "ultimate objective." But ultimately Hitler's preference would have won out.

All of these factors would weigh against continuing the war. The USSR was one of the most ruthless dictatorships in history, but there comes a point where even they must draw a line in the sand. They must surely try to make peace with the Germans.

I basically agree with that logic and find it likely that SU would have thrown in the towel if Germany reaches A-A line. Crucially they will lack the productive farmland to support much population.

But as a partially rhetorical (or epistemic) matter, I've decided to hold myself to a standard higher than "likely" for the purposes of WW2 ATL's. That is, if continued Soviet resistance is feasible even if not likely, then I want a narrative in which Germany deals with that resistance. The Urals line seems apt, as even if Stalin doesn't surrender at that point Germany needs only small forces to contain the SU. And in the Urals case Japan almost certainly takes the Far East because Kwantung Army will have >2:1 numerical superiority. In the Volga case it's less clear - even if likely - that Japan takes the plunge.

Lend Lease? By this point, they will have lost control of Murmansk, Archangelsk, and the Caucasus. Thus, the only other place they can receive shipments of war material is at Vladivostok

Not all of the Persian Corridor LL went via the Caucasus. Allies could have beefed up infrastructure in Western Iran instead of Eastern Iran as in OTL. It takes a little longer and is still lower-capacity but it's feasible. The Persian Corridor would have remained the preferred route for high value/ton products like machine tools and finished weapons.

If Japan takes/blockades Vladivostok that's still enormously serious for SU - likely deadly. Persian Corridor is too expensive (shipping distance and infrastructure) to take all of LL.

We shouldn't underestimate FDR's commitment to the SU though. He understood - practically alone at first among the top brass - the paramount strategic value of the Red Army. I find it difficult to posit an ATL in which he gives up on the SU while it still controls the Urals etc.

What makes you certain that the British and Americans could pull off an even larger amphibious invasion than they historically did, even with an extra year of preparation? Isn't it possible that they might consider this operation too ambitious and too expensive to pull off?

It's possible that they'd consider it too expensive but IMO there's epistemic certainty they could have made a stronger landing:

• US landed two divisions in the Marianas in the same month as D-Day and that ship-shore landing was more materially intensive than D-Day
• D-Day and Marianas landings occurred after a ~9-month surge in landing craft production, which had declined prior to that surge (See the appendices in Global Logistics and Strategy pdf for detail).

If the Wallies build landing craft for another year and postpone a landing in Japan (good strategic sense anyway), by 1945 they probably could have made 3 D-Day's at once.

Of course if there are 200 German divisions in France, even 10 D-Day's is probably insufficient regardless of what happens on the beaches.

But if there's still a strong SU in Hitler's rear it's harder to see a massive German army in France...

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On the whole I hope it's clear that I agree with most of your analysis, I'm just applying a different standard.

Since starting my Eastern Front ATL's, I've reflected more on the sweep and import of the historical revisionism I propose. That's lead me to believe that a Nazi victory/survival ATL (phrase still makes my stomach turn) must articulate outcomes with greater probability than "likely" because, given the extraordinary nature of Nazi evil, it's hard to rebut arguments that likely events would have been overturned by extraordinary resistance and heroism (as actually happened on the Eastern Front, I'd argue).

[TheMarcksPlan]

@Avalancheon I also consider it feasible - probably not likely - that the SU collapses in '41 if the Germans do slightly better. As discussed in another thread, Red Army's tactical surrender rate around Moscow was ~20% during November. viewtopic.php?f=55&t=249359. If Ostheer takes Leningrad, Moscow, and advances to the Don, that surrender rate would only get worse.

It may develop into WW1-style refusal to fight - NKVD can't shoot the entire army. Some soldiers also had the option of simply walking home and many did (NKVD found nearly a million of these in re-conquered territory). Under greater food pressure, the peasants may hide/withhold food as they did in WW1 - the threat of denunciation works less when the alternative to non-compliance is starvation. Contrary to impressions of an all-powerful Soviet state, the Germans discovered that Ukrainian peasants had hid enough food for the '42 planting season despite orders to the contrary. So an element of patriotic solidarity was always essential to the SU's survival in WW2; there were always means (mostly passive) of resistance to Stalin.

IMO the scope of feasible outcomes on the Eastern Front is far greater than commonly imagined. Nonetheless I'm trying to restrict myself to something like a worst-case scenario for the Germans for rhetorical/epistemic reasons.

[History Learner]

The USSR may have been better prepared materially but, they still would have been deficient tactically and operationally. it might have benefited the Wehrmacht if the USSR was able to position more of their troops and reserves closer to the front. In OTL many USSR units were not at the front due to logistic problems. The Wehrmacht planned on encircling the Red Army at the front and after destroying them the war would be won. Waiting a year might let this happen.

This has become my thinking as of late, in addition to looking at other factors. For example, when discussing a later Barbarossa, the materially better position of the Red Army and VVS comes up but that leaves out quite a bit of what makes a successful military. Case in point is the situation with the VVS in 1941, as described by Glantz in When Titans Clashed:

Despite such limitations, some newer aircraft—such as the swift MiG-1 and MiG-3 fighters and the excellent Il-2 Sturmovik ground attack airplane—were equal or superior to their German counterparts. These aircraft were just entering service in 1941, and many units had a mixture of old and new equipment. A massive increase in the size of the air force combined with the purges to dilute the number of trained leaders, pilots, administrators, and mechanics, so that 25 percent of VVS regiments existed only on paper. In an atmosphere where a plane crash would result in the commander’s arrest for sabotage, VVS leaders were very cautious about allowing their pilots to train on the new aircraft or fly at night. Pilots in the Baltic Special Military District averaged only 15.5 flight hours in the first three months of 1941; their counterparts in Kiev averaged 4 hours. Only 932 of 2,800 pilots had completed transition training to their new aircraft by 22 June.49 Many soldiers and airmen were so unfamiliar with the new designs that they fired on their own aircraft when the war began.

Even presuming the organizational issues are sorted out by 1942, the VVS is still going to be exceptionally poorly trained while the Luftwaffe isn't, and has the benefit of combat occurring closer to its own bases so it can achieve a higher sortie rate; even in 1945, this allowed the LW to temporarily achieve air superiority over Poland during the Vistula-Oder offensive. You can also add in logistics overall, in that the Germans would be fighting closer to their own base of supply while the Soviets are farther forward from their own. Add in the German operational finesse still on display historically in 1942-1943, and it wouldn't surprise me if the Soviet movement to the front would have devastating consequences.

[Tim-76]

Hi guys, I'm new to this forum and I'm also interested in history. Let me express my opinion in your interesting discussion.
1 Barbarossa is one continuous adventure that moved Hitler because of the belief that the USSR was a colossus on clay feet and due to the European successes of the Wehrmacht, to this we can also add the unsuccessful Finnish war in which the red army suffered significant losses, which gave Hitler and his generals confidence in a quick victory.

2 Hitler attacked an industrially developed state.despite all the shortcomings and constant shortages for citizens, the USSR defense industry was well developed.

3 Lend-lease was 4% of Soviet production (according to Soviet data) modern historians slightly increase this percentage, but it was not decisive.Of course, we are very grateful to the Allies for their help with vehicles, food and weapons.And without lend-lease, the USSR would have fought for a year or a year and a half more, while losing hundreds of thousands more people..But I want to give one example of what it looked like.the fact is that the USSR in 1941 was the second country in the world after the United States in terms of the number of trucks ( thanks to Stalin and the American engineers who helped build automobile plants ) And all the trucks that ran out of life by the year 43 were replaced by the famous American Studebakers and Fords.Therefore, the Red army entered Europe in American cars.This is logical if the allies make supplies, then everything was accumulated in the reserve of the supreme command headquarters.Supplies freed up very necessary workers.It's the same story with steam locomotives and rails, food and gunpowder.Lend-lease has indeed saved thousands of lives and freed up workers.But I would not consider it a decisive factor in the victory of the USSR over Germany.

[Tim-76]

I'm writing through a translator, so I'm sorry that I have to share posts. I believe that if Germany had attacked the USSR in 1942, its fate would still have been sealed.To do this, we need to return to the origins of the blitzkrieg strategy, which allowed for rapid military operations, the USSR could wage a war of attrition indefinitely, but Germany could not. In addition, the USSR has huge territories and troops have a place to retreat in such open spaces. The USSR could have been defeated if Japan had joined the war, then the USSR could well have been defeated.But thanks to pre-war diplomacy and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, this did not happen.Because Tokyo considered itself deceived after signing this document.