Battle of Britain

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
ljadw
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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by ljadw » 29 Dec 2020 19:09

Marita (attack on Greece ) was already decided in the period when Barbarossa was decided .
The weather issues for Barbarossa were not the heavy spring rains, but the continuing winter weather resulting in a late thaw.
For Barbarossa : you argue as if there were no Soviets,and that the German defeat was caused by the weather. German mistakes or failures in the West .And this was not so .
If AGS had to take Kiew,that meant that Barbarossa had failed .The same for Moscow or Leningrad .The only possibility for a German victory was that the Red Army would be defeated WEST of the Dniepr ( not decimated ) which would cause /and would be caused by the collapse of the Soviet regime and all the rest would be a piece of a cake .Kiew,Moscow, Leningrad would not be taken, they would voluntarily surrender to the Ostheer,and the first German units would not remain in these cities,but would go as far and fast as possible to the East .These cities had no military importance.
And if the Soviets did not collapse in 1941 they would not collapse in 1942,but in 19454 the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
The fall of the USSR had to happen in the Summer, but 12 days more of Summer weather would not help the Ostheer : they had almost 3 months of Summer weather and failed. 12 days more would not make a difference .
About Britain and the superiority of the LW in the South : Liverpool was not in the South and Liverpool was more important than London .Coventry is not in the South but in the West Midlands north of London .Manchester is also north of London .
The range of the German fighters was limited to the coast,thus the bombers could not go much farther,unless they attacked at night and when they did it,it resulted in a very low efficiency .
The Bf 101 had only 10 minutes of flying time when he arrived at the British coast,this means that the LW could never have air superiority and could not eliminate Briton's manufacturing industry in the South .

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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by History Learner » 30 Dec 2020 08:12

ljadw wrote:
29 Dec 2020 19:09
Marita (attack on Greece ) was already decided in the period when Barbarossa was decided .
The weather issues for Barbarossa were not the heavy spring rains, but the continuing winter weather resulting in a late thaw.
For Barbarossa : you argue as if there were no Soviets,and that the German defeat was caused by the weather. German mistakes or failures in the West .And this was not so .
If AGS had to take Kiew,that meant that Barbarossa had failed .The same for Moscow or Leningrad .The only possibility for a German victory was that the Red Army would be defeated WEST of the Dniepr ( not decimated ) which would cause /and would be caused by the collapse of the Soviet regime and all the rest would be a piece of a cake .Kiew,Moscow, Leningrad would not be taken, they would voluntarily surrender to the Ostheer,and the first German units would not remain in these cities,but would go as far and fast as possible to the East .These cities had no military importance.
And if the Soviets did not collapse in 1941 they would not collapse in 1942,but in 19454 the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
The fall of the USSR had to happen in the Summer, but 12 days more of Summer weather would not help the Ostheer : they had almost 3 months of Summer weather and failed. 12 days more would not make a difference .
About Britain and the superiority of the LW in the South : Liverpool was not in the South and Liverpool was more important than London .Coventry is not in the South but in the West Midlands north of London .Manchester is also north of London .
The range of the German fighters was limited to the coast,thus the bombers could not go much farther,unless they attacked at night and when they did it,it resulted in a very low efficiency .
The Bf 101 had only 10 minutes of flying time when he arrived at the British coast,this means that the LW could never have air superiority and could not eliminate Briton's manufacturing industry in the South .
Operation Marita was launched precisely because of British aid, which here would not be available. Hitler's decision to commit to the operation came four days after the British landed on Crete, as Hitler was highly concerned this would result in an air campaign against Romanian oil. If the Royal Navy is depleted in the Mediterranean and/or the British Army has its resources too thin, this would not happen and thus no Marita. By early 1940, the Greeks had exhausted their ammunition supplies and were on the verge of defeat anyway by the Italians, so no British means no need by Berlin to intervene. Likewise, Yugoslavia will be keeping an eye on said developments and those will lend themselves nicely to the Pro-Axis viewpoint.

Now, moving onto Barbarossa, said late thaw led to the flooding season being later, as I said. This made the May start date unfeasible and then equipment shortages from the Balkans campaign resulted in the June 21nd date. Said flooding, however, was over by June 10th and if there is no Balkans Campaign, said equipment issues are likewise avoided. Moving onto your other points, I must say they are divorced from reality entirely. For example, you state "Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad would not be taken"......when we know for a historical fact Kiev was. Not sure what's going on there or the claim that Moscow, Leningrad, etc had no value because that's blatantly untrue:
In addition to the symbolism of the city’s name, by 1939 Leningrad was also an important Soviet industrial center, responsible for 11 percent of the USSR’s industrial production. Thus, Leningrad became German Army Group North’s major objective from the start of the massive surprise Nazi sneak attack on June 22, 1941. In fact, Leningrad’s fall was the key to all of Nazidom’s vast, projected Northern Theater of Operations’ goals during August 1941-January 1944.​
If you wish for that to be explained in terms of military production:
Some researchers of the Siege of Leningrad consider that in the besieged city new military equipment wasn’t issued, and only its repair was carried out. Official reports don’t confirm this point of view. During the second half of the year 1941, (November – December of this year were one of the most difficult months), Leningrad gave to the front 713 tanks, near 3000 cannons, more than 10300 mortars, 480 armoured cars, 58 armoured trains. In July – December, 1941 Red Army received more than 3 million shells and mines, 40000 rockets, big quantity of other military equipment. It is a lot of or a little? The following comparative data are in this regard indicative: in the second half of the year 1941 in Leningrad was released 10,1 % from all cannons made in the country, 23,5 % of mortars and 14,8% of tanks. About 52% of mines and 68 % of the shells spent by the front during this period was made in Leningrad.​

Produced cannons, mortars and ammunition went not only to the Leningrad front, but also under Moscow. In the hardest period of the Moscow battle over 400 cannons, about 1 thousand mortars of various calibers and nearly 40 thousand armor-piercing shells were sent from the besieged Leningrad . On November 28, 1941 the commander of the Western front G. K. Zhukov sent the telegram to Leningrad: “Thanks to Leningrad people for the help to Moscow in fight against blood-thirsty Hitlerites”​
Without industrial output or the manpower contained in cities, the Red Army cannot sustain itself and will be defeated; I get the German planning was to destroy it within the first 400 km but that was not the only path to victory. I also find it extremely odd you take their planning at face value but then reject their outlooks elsewhere; to be honest, it's a pretty obvious double standard.

Finally, with regards to the UK, yes those cities are beyond escort range. Problem is, combined, they have about the same % of output as Southern England (Including London) do. Again, the comparison to the Ruhr Campaign in 1943 is obvious and open, and I'm not really seeing a strong counter-argument being made here. As for the assertion the Luftwaffe could never have air superiority, the paper I presented says otherwise based on their mathematical analysis of the situation; Dr MacKay is the Department Head of the University of York's Math department, so he's no slouch. If, for some reason you still don't accept their work, how about we ask for the contemporary opinion of the British military and political leadership?

Here it is:
The attacks continued relentlessly. On average, the Luftwaffe sent 1,000 airplanes a day, and seldom fewer than 600. On Aug. 30 to 31, more than 1,600 came. The worst day for Fighter Command was Aug. 31 when it lost 39 aircraft and 14 pilots. Most days the Luftwaffe’s losses were even heavier than the RAF’s, but the production of Hurricanes and Spitfires was no longer keeping up with losses, and there were not enough replacements for the experienced pilots who had been killed.​

Some pilots scrambled six times a day. Civilian teams from Hawker and Supermarine joined RAF ground crews, working to get damaged Hurricanes and Spitfires ready to fly again. The British people look back on this part of the battle as “the desperate days.” Looking back later, Churchill said, “In the fighting between Aug. 24 and Sept. 6, the scales had tilted against Fighter Command.”​

ljadw
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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by ljadw » 30 Dec 2020 11:04

I said that if the SU collapsed in July/August 1941, Moscow, Kiew,Leningrad would not be taken ,they would fall without fighting ,as a ripe apple from the tree .
The military production of Leningrad in the second half of 1941 did not benefit to the USSR,because during that period,Leningrad was encircled . And, one should be very suspicious of Soviet official figures .
About the Battle of Britain : Dr MacKay should not use a mathematical analysis ,because that will lead inevitably to a totally wrong conclusion :
one can not compare LW and FC losses ,for several reasons
1 LW losses include bombers and fighters( bombers were more important ) , FC losses were fighters only .
2 ALL LW losses over England were total losses : aircraft and crew, while a lot of the RAF losses were recuperated : aircraft and crew .
3 If needed , FC could withdraw to the north ,where it was safe .
4 FC had a defensive mission : to prevent the LW from establishing an air superiority at the British coast,while the mission of the LW was offensive : to establish air superiority at the British coast
5 And this is essential : as long as FC had the opportunity to withdraw to the north,it could still intervene in the south and prevent a German air superiority .
Air superiority would NOT make Sealion possible, but no air superiority would make Sealion impossible .
Churchill was wrong : between August 24 and September 6 ,the scales had tilted against the LW. They did it since the start of the BoB.
FC losses between August 26 and September 8 :279.
FC sorties between August 26 and September 8 : 9916
LW losses for the same period :
Fighters : 241 Sorties :8750
Bombers :
Losses 123
Sorties :2100
Source : Eagle in Flames : P 15.
10850 sorties from the LW in 13 days is NOT 1000 per day .
Besides, this is irrelevant ,as even with air superiority,a successful landing was excluded .
As is irrelevant that some ( how many ? ) pilots scrambled six times a day . This is not a bad,but a very good thing : FC pilots COULD scramble 6 times a day, LW pilots could not do this .
15 September is traditionally celebrated as the BoB day . This is wrong : 15 September was not the decisive day : the weather alone would make Sealion impossible on September 15, even if the LW had gained air superiority on that day .
The fact that 8750 fighter sorties were unable to protect 2100 bomber sorties proves that Galland failed, whatever he was saying after the war .The fighters lost less than 3 %, the bombers 6 % .
Fighter Command losses were at the same level of the LW fighter losses .
The whole ''Battle of Britain '' has /and is still presented as a decisive battles between German and British fighters . This is totally wrong .Air superiority as such was totally meaningless : it would not make a successful passage and landing possible .
The LW had to escort the invasion fleet, to help the landing forces, to make the build-up possible : it could never be done .
About the Ruhr Campaign : it was not decisive : German war production continued to increase .

ljadw
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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by ljadw » 30 Dec 2020 11:51

History Learner wrote:
30 Dec 2020 08:12
ljadw wrote:
29 Dec 2020 19:09
Marita (attack on Greece ) was already decided in the period when Barbarossa was decided .
The weather issues for Barbarossa were not the heavy spring rains, but the continuing winter weather resulting in a late thaw.
For Barbarossa : you argue as if there were no Soviets,and that the German defeat was caused by the weather. German mistakes or failures in the West .And this was not so .
If AGS had to take Kiew,that meant that Barbarossa had failed .The same for Moscow or Leningrad .The only possibility for a German victory was that the Red Army would be defeated WEST of the Dniepr ( not decimated ) which would cause /and would be caused by the collapse of the Soviet regime and all the rest would be a piece of a cake .Kiew,Moscow, Leningrad would not be taken, they would voluntarily surrender to the Ostheer,and the first German units would not remain in these cities,but would go as far and fast as possible to the East .These cities had no military importance.
And if the Soviets did not collapse in 1941 they would not collapse in 1942,but in 19454 the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
The fall of the USSR had to happen in the Summer, but 12 days more of Summer weather would not help the Ostheer : they had almost 3 months of Summer weather and failed. 12 days more would not make a difference .
About Britain and the superiority of the LW in the South : Liverpool was not in the South and Liverpool was more important than London .Coventry is not in the South but in the West Midlands north of London .Manchester is also north of London .
The range of the German fighters was limited to the coast,thus the bombers could not go much farther,unless they attacked at night and when they did it,it resulted in a very low efficiency .
The Bf 101 had only 10 minutes of flying time when he arrived at the British coast,this means that the LW could never have air superiority and could not eliminate Briton's manufacturing industry in the South .
Operation Marita was launched precisely because of British aid, which here would not be available. Hitler's decision to commit to the operation came four days after the British landed on Crete, as Hitler was highly concerned this would result in an air campaign against Romanian oil. If the Royal Navy is depleted in the Mediterranean and/or the British Army has its resources too thin, this would not happen and thus no Marita. By early 1940, the Greeks had exhausted their ammunition supplies and were on the verge of defeat anyway by the Italians, so no British means no need by Berlin to intervene. Likewise, Yugoslavia will be keeping an eye on said developments and those will lend themselves nicely to the Pro-Axis viewpoint.

Now, moving onto Barbarossa, said late thaw led to the flooding season being later, as I said. This made the May start date unfeasible and then equipment shortages from the Balkans campaign resulted in the June 21nd date. Said flooding, however, was over by June 10th and if there is no Balkans Campaign, said equipment issues are likewise avoided. Moving onto your other points, I must say they are divorced from reality entirely. For example, you state "Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad would not be taken"......when we know for a historical fact Kiev was. Not sure what's going on there or the claim that Moscow, Leningrad, etc had no value because that's blatantly untrue:
In addition to the symbolism of the city’s name, by 1939 Leningrad was also an important Soviet industrial center, responsible for 11 percent of the USSR’s industrial production. Thus, Leningrad became German Army Group North’s major objective from the start of the massive surprise Nazi sneak attack on June 22, 1941. In fact, Leningrad’s fall was the key to all of Nazidom’s vast, projected Northern Theater of Operations’ goals during August 1941-January 1944.​
If you wish for that to be explained in terms of military production:
Some researchers of the Siege of Leningrad consider that in the besieged city new military equipment wasn’t issued, and only its repair was carried out. Official reports don’t confirm this point of view. During the second half of the year 1941, (November – December of this year were one of the most difficult months), Leningrad gave to the front 713 tanks, near 3000 cannons, more than 10300 mortars, 480 armoured cars, 58 armoured trains. In July – December, 1941 Red Army received more than 3 million shells and mines, 40000 rockets, big quantity of other military equipment. It is a lot of or a little? The following comparative data are in this regard indicative: in the second half of the year 1941 in Leningrad was released 10,1 % from all cannons made in the country, 23,5 % of mortars and 14,8% of tanks. About 52% of mines and 68 % of the shells spent by the front during this period was made in Leningrad.​

Produced cannons, mortars and ammunition went not only to the Leningrad front, but also under Moscow. In the hardest period of the Moscow battle over 400 cannons, about 1 thousand mortars of various calibers and nearly 40 thousand armor-piercing shells were sent from the besieged Leningrad . On November 28, 1941 the commander of the Western front G. K. Zhukov sent the telegram to Leningrad: “Thanks to Leningrad people for the help to Moscow in fight against blood-thirsty Hitlerites”​
Without industrial output or the manpower contained in cities, the Red Army cannot sustain itself and will be defeated; I get the German planning was to destroy it within the first 400 km but that was not the only path to victory. I also find it extremely odd you take their planning at face value but then reject their outlooks elsewhere; to be honest, it's a pretty obvious double standard.

The German plan to destroy the Red Army west of the DD line ,with the hope that this would result in a civil war in the Kremlin,was the ONLY way to destroy the USSR. All the rest is Cold War propaganda from the defeated German generals ( Manstein, Halder, Guderian ) to embellish their blazon .
And it failed almost immediately .See the diary of Halder where he first claimed that the war was won,to be obliged a few weeks later too admit that they had underestimated the Soviets ( which was an indirect way to blame FHO );this was wrong :the failure of Barbarossa in the Summer was not caused by German ( = Hitler ) mistakes,as the German generals lied after the war ,but by the fact that notwithstanding the initial setbacks, the Soviet regime remained master of the situation .
Militarily the USSR was indefensible, but its Achilles tendon was its political regime. If that collapsed, it was over,if it did not collapse,it was also over: for the Germans .
The Germans hoped that the regime would collapse in the Red Army was defeated before the regime could mobilize its superior manpower and industrial resources .
The Germans failed in the Summer, close to their depots and with a numerical superiority .
The loss of Kiew,the encirclement of Leningrad did not help the Germans .The fact that the Germans had still to fight in the late Autumn for Kiew, Moscow and Leningrad was a proof that not only the Soviets were not defeated, but that they became stronger every day ( from June 22 on ).

ljadw
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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by ljadw » 30 Dec 2020 12:55

About Barbarossa starting on June 10 instead of June 22 : this is not a serious argument as it would benefit more the Soviets than the Germans : the Soviet mobilization would start 10 days earlier .

History Learner
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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by History Learner » 30 Dec 2020 12:58

ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2020 12:55
About Barbarossa starting on June 10 instead of June 22 : this is not a serious argument as it would benefit more the Soviets than the Germans : the Soviet mobilization would start 10 days earlier .
Soviet mobilization had started in April; how exactly did that work out for them? Likewise, it grants an additional two weeks of good weather for combat. Move up Operation Typhoon by two weeks and you grant it almost a month of fighting before the Fall rains/snows start with all of its logistical impact.

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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by History Learner » 30 Dec 2020 13:04

ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2020 11:51
History Learner wrote:
30 Dec 2020 08:12
ljadw wrote:
29 Dec 2020 19:09
Marita (attack on Greece ) was already decided in the period when Barbarossa was decided .
The weather issues for Barbarossa were not the heavy spring rains, but the continuing winter weather resulting in a late thaw.
For Barbarossa : you argue as if there were no Soviets,and that the German defeat was caused by the weather. German mistakes or failures in the West .And this was not so .
If AGS had to take Kiew,that meant that Barbarossa had failed .The same for Moscow or Leningrad .The only possibility for a German victory was that the Red Army would be defeated WEST of the Dniepr ( not decimated ) which would cause /and would be caused by the collapse of the Soviet regime and all the rest would be a piece of a cake .Kiew,Moscow, Leningrad would not be taken, they would voluntarily surrender to the Ostheer,and the first German units would not remain in these cities,but would go as far and fast as possible to the East .These cities had no military importance.
And if the Soviets did not collapse in 1941 they would not collapse in 1942,but in 19454 the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
The fall of the USSR had to happen in the Summer, but 12 days more of Summer weather would not help the Ostheer : they had almost 3 months of Summer weather and failed. 12 days more would not make a difference .
About Britain and the superiority of the LW in the South : Liverpool was not in the South and Liverpool was more important than London .Coventry is not in the South but in the West Midlands north of London .Manchester is also north of London .
The range of the German fighters was limited to the coast,thus the bombers could not go much farther,unless they attacked at night and when they did it,it resulted in a very low efficiency .
The Bf 101 had only 10 minutes of flying time when he arrived at the British coast,this means that the LW could never have air superiority and could not eliminate Briton's manufacturing industry in the South .
Operation Marita was launched precisely because of British aid, which here would not be available. Hitler's decision to commit to the operation came four days after the British landed on Crete, as Hitler was highly concerned this would result in an air campaign against Romanian oil. If the Royal Navy is depleted in the Mediterranean and/or the British Army has its resources too thin, this would not happen and thus no Marita. By early 1940, the Greeks had exhausted their ammunition supplies and were on the verge of defeat anyway by the Italians, so no British means no need by Berlin to intervene. Likewise, Yugoslavia will be keeping an eye on said developments and those will lend themselves nicely to the Pro-Axis viewpoint.

Now, moving onto Barbarossa, said late thaw led to the flooding season being later, as I said. This made the May start date unfeasible and then equipment shortages from the Balkans campaign resulted in the June 21nd date. Said flooding, however, was over by June 10th and if there is no Balkans Campaign, said equipment issues are likewise avoided. Moving onto your other points, I must say they are divorced from reality entirely. For example, you state "Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad would not be taken"......when we know for a historical fact Kiev was. Not sure what's going on there or the claim that Moscow, Leningrad, etc had no value because that's blatantly untrue:
In addition to the symbolism of the city’s name, by 1939 Leningrad was also an important Soviet industrial center, responsible for 11 percent of the USSR’s industrial production. Thus, Leningrad became German Army Group North’s major objective from the start of the massive surprise Nazi sneak attack on June 22, 1941. In fact, Leningrad’s fall was the key to all of Nazidom’s vast, projected Northern Theater of Operations’ goals during August 1941-January 1944.​
If you wish for that to be explained in terms of military production:
Some researchers of the Siege of Leningrad consider that in the besieged city new military equipment wasn’t issued, and only its repair was carried out. Official reports don’t confirm this point of view. During the second half of the year 1941, (November – December of this year were one of the most difficult months), Leningrad gave to the front 713 tanks, near 3000 cannons, more than 10300 mortars, 480 armoured cars, 58 armoured trains. In July – December, 1941 Red Army received more than 3 million shells and mines, 40000 rockets, big quantity of other military equipment. It is a lot of or a little? The following comparative data are in this regard indicative: in the second half of the year 1941 in Leningrad was released 10,1 % from all cannons made in the country, 23,5 % of mortars and 14,8% of tanks. About 52% of mines and 68 % of the shells spent by the front during this period was made in Leningrad.​

Produced cannons, mortars and ammunition went not only to the Leningrad front, but also under Moscow. In the hardest period of the Moscow battle over 400 cannons, about 1 thousand mortars of various calibers and nearly 40 thousand armor-piercing shells were sent from the besieged Leningrad . On November 28, 1941 the commander of the Western front G. K. Zhukov sent the telegram to Leningrad: “Thanks to Leningrad people for the help to Moscow in fight against blood-thirsty Hitlerites”​
Without industrial output or the manpower contained in cities, the Red Army cannot sustain itself and will be defeated; I get the German planning was to destroy it within the first 400 km but that was not the only path to victory. I also find it extremely odd you take their planning at face value but then reject their outlooks elsewhere; to be honest, it's a pretty obvious double standard.

The German plan to destroy the Red Army west of the DD line ,with the hope that this would result in a civil war in the Kremlin,was the ONLY way to destroy the USSR. All the rest is Cold War propaganda from the defeated German generals ( Manstein, Halder, Guderian ) to embellish their blazon .
And it failed almost immediately .See the diary of Halder where he first claimed that the war was won,to be obliged a few weeks later too admit that they had underestimated the Soviets ( which was an indirect way to blame FHO );this was wrong :the failure of Barbarossa in the Summer was not caused by German ( = Hitler ) mistakes,as the German generals lied after the war ,but by the fact that notwithstanding the initial setbacks, the Soviet regime remained master of the situation .
Militarily the USSR was indefensible, but its Achilles tendon was its political regime. If that collapsed, it was over,if it did not collapse,it was also over: for the Germans .
The Germans hoped that the regime would collapse in the Red Army was defeated before the regime could mobilize its superior manpower and industrial resources .
The Germans failed in the Summer, close to their depots and with a numerical superiority .
The loss of Kiew,the encirclement of Leningrad did not help the Germans .The fact that the Germans had still to fight in the late Autumn for Kiew, Moscow and Leningrad was a proof that not only the Soviets were not defeated, but that they became stronger every day ( from June 22 on ).
I know that the German plan was to defeat the Red Army in the first 400 km or so; I'm saying that's not the only way and all evidence points in my direction. Case in point is your claim that the Red Army grew stronger after June 22, but it did not:
The Red Army is often portrayed as overwhelmingly powerful in 1942; for quantitative reasons as much as anything else. In reality it was numerically far weaker than it had been in June of 1941. For instance, in spite of concentrating production on key weapons systems like tanks, aircraft and artillery and mortars the Red Army's stocks hadn't come anywhere close to pre-war levels. In June of 1941 the Red Army had 22,600 tanks on its books. In May of 1942 this total had fallen to 9,325 such machines. Aircraft had dropped from 20,000 to 14,967. Artillery and mortar stocks were down from 112,800 to 107,795 on the eve of the 1942 German summer campaign. Moreover, the increased focus on tank, artillery, and aircraft production that had even enabled the Red Army to maintain such those numbers came at the expense of other very important items - not least of which being truck production.
Can you explain how this situation would be any better with the loss of the manpower and industrial output of cities such as Leningrad or Moscow? This isn't the 18th Century; Armies need vast amounts of supplies and ready access to manpower sources. Even if the Red Army survives the initial German blows, it doesn't matter if they don't have the fuel, food, munitions, equipment or men to sustain itself.

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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by History Learner » 30 Dec 2020 13:27

ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2020 11:04
I said that if the SU collapsed in July/August 1941, Moscow, Kiew,Leningrad would not be taken ,they would fall without fighting ,as a ripe apple from the tree .
The military production of Leningrad in the second half of 1941 did not benefit to the USSR,because during that period,Leningrad was encircled . And, one should be very suspicious of Soviet official figures .
About the Battle of Britain : Dr MacKay should not use a mathematical analysis ,because that will lead inevitably to a totally wrong conclusion :
one can not compare LW and FC losses ,for several reasons
1 LW losses include bombers and fighters( bombers were more important ) , FC losses were fighters only .
2 ALL LW losses over England were total losses : aircraft and crew, while a lot of the RAF losses were recuperated : aircraft and crew .
3 If needed , FC could withdraw to the north ,where it was safe .
4 FC had a defensive mission : to prevent the LW from establishing an air superiority at the British coast,while the mission of the LW was offensive : to establish air superiority at the British coast
5 And this is essential : as long as FC had the opportunity to withdraw to the north,it could still intervene in the south and prevent a German air superiority .
Air superiority would NOT make Sealion possible, but no air superiority would make Sealion impossible .
Churchill was wrong : between August 24 and September 6 ,the scales had tilted against the LW. They did it since the start of the BoB.
FC losses between August 26 and September 8 :279.
FC sorties between August 26 and September 8 : 9916
LW losses for the same period :
Fighters : 241 Sorties :8750
Bombers :
Losses 123
Sorties :2100
Source : Eagle in Flames : P 15.
10850 sorties from the LW in 13 days is NOT 1000 per day .
Besides, this is irrelevant ,as even with air superiority,a successful landing was excluded .
As is irrelevant that some ( how many ? ) pilots scrambled six times a day . This is not a bad,but a very good thing : FC pilots COULD scramble 6 times a day, LW pilots could not do this .
15 September is traditionally celebrated as the BoB day . This is wrong : 15 September was not the decisive day : the weather alone would make Sealion impossible on September 15, even if the LW had gained air superiority on that day .
The fact that 8750 fighter sorties were unable to protect 2100 bomber sorties proves that Galland failed, whatever he was saying after the war .The fighters lost less than 3 %, the bombers 6 % .
Fighter Command losses were at the same level of the LW fighter losses .
The whole ''Battle of Britain '' has /and is still presented as a decisive battles between German and British fighters . This is totally wrong .Air superiority as such was totally meaningless : it would not make a successful passage and landing possible .
The LW had to escort the invasion fleet, to help the landing forces, to make the build-up possible : it could never be done .
About the Ruhr Campaign : it was not decisive : German war production continued to increase .
Where to begin?

First, I'm not sure why you made the false claim production in Leningrad had no impact on Moscow because I've already cited Soviet records to show otherwise:
Some researchers of the Siege of Leningrad consider that in the besieged city new military equipment wasn’t issued, and only its repair was carried out. Official reports don’t confirm this point of view. During the second half of the year 1941, (November – December of this year were one of the most difficult months), Leningrad gave to the front 713 tanks, near 3000 cannons, more than 10300 mortars, 480 armoured cars, 58 armoured trains. In July – December, 1941 Red Army received more than 3 million shells and mines, 40000 rockets, big quantity of other military equipment. It is a lot of or a little? The following comparative data are in this regard indicative: in the second half of the year 1941 in Leningrad was released 10,1 % from all cannons made in the country, 23,5 % of mortars and 14,8% of tanks. About 52% of mines and 68 % of the shells spent by the front during this period was made in Leningrad.​

Produced cannons, mortars and ammunition went not only to the Leningrad front, but also under Moscow. In the hardest period of the Moscow battle over 400 cannons, about 1 thousand mortars of various calibers and nearly 40 thousand armor-piercing shells were sent from the besieged Leningrad . On November 28, 1941 the commander of the Western front G. K. Zhukov sent the telegram to Leningrad: “Thanks to Leningrad people for the help to Moscow in fight against blood-thirsty Hitlerites”
Official Soviet records and statements by contemporary Soviet leadership show vast amounts of equipment was provided by Leningrad to the defense of Moscow. If you feel otherwise, the onerous is now on you to provide a differing citation because stating such is wrong is not an actual counter-argument.

Next, let's look at the Ruhr Campaign, and we shall do so by citing The Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze, starting on Page 596:
In the spring of 1943, however, the German war economy itself was sucked directly into the fighting. As we have seen, the threat of Anglo-American bombing had bulked large in German strategic thinking at least since 1940. But until early 1943 it proved remarkably easy to counter. The Royal Air Force simply did not have enough heavy bombers to do sustained damage to the German home front, nor did it have the technology necessary to guide them to their targets. The heavy air raids on Luebeck (28/29 March 1942), Rostock (23/24 April 1942) and the 'thousand-bomber raids' on Cologne (30/31 May 1942) and Essen (1 June 1942) gave some indication of what was in store, but they did not develop into a sustained campaign of aerial destruction.26 It was not until March 1943 that RAF Bomber Command had the planes with which to mount a prolonged attack on the heart of German heavy industry, or the technology with which to guide them to their targets.​

The 'Battle of the Ruhr' began on 5 March with an attack on the industrial city of Essen, the home of Krupp.27 Between 8.58 p.m. and 9.36 p.m., following the invisible beam of the OBOE electronic guidance system, 362 bombers hit the main target with a combination of incendiaries and high explosives leaving a trail of blazing destruction.28 This time the RAF not only attacked in force but returned repeatedly over a period of five months, dropping a total of 34,000 tons of bombs. The sequence of heavy attacks was relentless and interspersed by daily harassing raids by small forces of light Mosquito bombers. Heavy attacks were delivered against every major node of the Ruhr conurbation: Essen (5 March, 12/13 March, 3/4 April, 30 April, 27 May, 25 July), Duisburg (26/27 March, 8/9 April, 26/27 April, 12/13 May), Bochum (13/14 May, 12 June), Krefeld (21 June), Duesseldorf (25 May, 11 June) and Dortmund (4 May, 23 May), Barmen-Wuppertal (29 May), Muelheim (22 June), Elberfeld-Wuppertal (24 June), Gelsenkirchen (25 June, 9 July), Cologne (16 June, 28 June, 3 July, 8 July). To increase the misery, on 16 May specially adapted bombs destroyed the dams on the Moehne and Eder rivers, inundating the surrounding countryside and cutting off the water supply. The bombers killed thousands of people and did heavy damage to the urban fabric. Above all, however, they struck against the most vital node in the German industrial economy, precisely at the moment that Hitler, Speer and the RVE were hoping to energize armaments production with a fresh surge in steel production.​

Reading contemporary sources, there can be no doubt that the Battle of the Ruhr marked a turning point in the history of the German war economy, which has been grossly underestimated by post-war accounts.29 As Speer himself acknowledged, the RAF was hitting the right target.30 The Ruhr was not only Europe's most important producer of coking coal and steel, it was also a crucial source of intermediate components of all kinds. Disrupting production in the Ruhr had the capacity to halt assembly lines across Germany. When the first of the heavy raids struck Krupp in Essen, Speer immediately travelled to the Ruhr with a view to learning general lessons in disaster management.51 He was forced to return in May, June and July to energize the emergency response and to rally the workforce with well-advertised displays of personal bravery.32 The Ruhr was raised from the status of the home front to that of a war zone. Speer established a special emergency staff with absolute authority over the local economy and made plans for the total evacuation of the non-essential population. The remaining workforce was to be organized along para-military lines, uniformed and housed in camp accommodation so that they could be redeployed at a moment's notice to whichever plants were still operational.33​

But all Speer could do was to limit the damage. He could not stop the bombers or prevent them from seriously disrupting the German war effort. Following the onset of heavy air raids in the first quarter of 1943, steel production fell by 200,000 tons. Having anticipated an increase in total steel production to more than 2.8 million tons per month and allocated steel accordingly, the Zentrale Planung now faced a shortfall of almost 400,000 tons. All the painstaking effort that had gone into reorganizing the rationing system was negated by the ability of the British to disrupt production more or less at will. In light of the steel shortage, Hitler and Speer had no option but to implement an immediate cut to the ammunition programme.34 After more than doubling in 1942, ammunition production in 1943 increased by only 20 per cent.35 And it was not just ammunition that was hit.​

In the summer of 1943, the disruption in the Ruhr manifested itself across the German economy in a so-called 'Zulieferungskrise' (sub-components crisis). All manner of parts, castings and forgings were suddenly in short supply.56 And this affected not only heavy industry directly, but the entire armaments complex. Most significantly, the shortage of key components brought the rapid increase in Luftwaffe production to an abrupt halt. Between July 1943 and March 1944 there was no further increase in the monthly output of aircraft. For the armaments effort as a whole, the period of stagnation lasted throughout the second half of 1943. As Speer himself acknowledged, Allied bombing had negated all plans for a further increase in production.37 Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks.​
Again, the onerous is on you to explain why all the documentation, along with contemporary and post war analysis by Historians like Adam Tooze is wrong.

Last, we turn to the matters of the Battle of Britain itself. Quite frankly, Dr. McKay is vastly more qualified than either you or me on the matter of running mathematic analysis; he was an undergraduate in Cambridge and then a PhD student in Durham. He is currently the Department Head of the University of York's Mathematics Department as whole, but is also the Chair of Correspondents for the Isaac Newton Institute and International Centre for Mathematical Sciences. His qualifications and positions mark him as a recognized and distinguished expert in his field of study, and therefore I don't see any validity in your assertion he doesn't know what's he doing. Even if you take said extreme position, he's not the only author of the paper; the rest are all Doctors too, so you'd really have to be hitting the lottery in terms of crackpots.

Beyond that, there really isn't any validity into your specific criticisms. You bring up the issue of airframes, but that is quite literally addressed in the study itself:

Image

Total air frames to air frames are being accounted for. Likewise, citing the sortie rate does nothing; the thrust of their paper is that German tactics were resulting in a casualty rate among British pilots that was simply unsustainable. Their analysis used three different benchmarks to run their simulation:

1) The Battle of Britain was a 50/50 contest, and either side was just as likely to win/lose.
2) The Battle of Britain favored the British, at 84% chance of winning. This is a full standard deviation from the above.
3) The Battle of Britain was always likely to be won by the British, at ~98% chance of winning. This is two full standard deviations from (1).

Rather than them pulling out all stops, the best odds they give the Germans are 50/50. The other options favor the British, the last decisively so. They then ran five simulations and only the first, which was CF1, showed the British still winning the battle with any high degree of success. All others showed the Royal Air Force being subjected to such attrition that they were forced to concede the battle, granting the Germans aerial superiority over Southern England.

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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by ljadw » 30 Dec 2020 15:01

History Learner wrote:
30 Dec 2020 12:58
ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2020 12:55
About Barbarossa starting on June 10 instead of June 22 : this is not a serious argument as it would benefit more the Soviets than the Germans : the Soviet mobilization would start 10 days earlier .
Soviet mobilization had started in April; how exactly did that work out for them? Likewise, it grants an additional two weeks of good weather for combat. Move up Operation Typhoon by two weeks and you grant it almost a month of fighting before the Fall rains/snows start with all of its logistical impact.
Real Soviet mobilization did not start in April, but on June 22 .Between June 22 and July 1 the Soviets mobilized 5,3 million men (Art has given in the past more detailed figures ) ,if Barbarossa started earlier, the Soviet mobilization started earlier .
That it grants an additional two weeks of good weather for combat does apply to BOTH sides : thus also for the Soviets .
In the HTL (Barbarossa on June 22 ) Halder wrote after 11 days of fighting (July 3 ) : it is not an exaggeration to say that the campaign is won .Why ? Because the standing Soviet forces were defeated before the Soviet mobilization and because he hoped that there would be no Soviet mobilization .
Five weeks later (11 August ) Halder wrote the opposite : we have underestimated the Soviets.And also :everything that has sofar been achieved is for nothing . Why : because much earlier than was supposed to happen, much stronger Soviet reserve forces appeared at the front .
In the ATL (Barbarossa on June 10 ) Halder would say the same .He would say on June 21 : the campaign is won and on July 31 : everything that has sofar been achieved is for nothing ,
About Typhoon : it failed, not because of the weather,but because of the Soviets . Besides its chance to succeed was 1 on 10 million . (Before Typhoon Hitler was already planning operations for 1942 ) And if it succeeded, the Soviets would continue the fighting .

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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by ljadw » 30 Dec 2020 15:46

History Learner wrote:
30 Dec 2020 13:04
ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2020 11:51
History Learner wrote:
30 Dec 2020 08:12
ljadw wrote:
29 Dec 2020 19:09
Marita (attack on Greece ) was already decided in the period when Barbarossa was decided .
The weather issues for Barbarossa were not the heavy spring rains, but the continuing winter weather resulting in a late thaw.
For Barbarossa : you argue as if there were no Soviets,and that the German defeat was caused by the weather. German mistakes or failures in the West .And this was not so .
If AGS had to take Kiew,that meant that Barbarossa had failed .The same for Moscow or Leningrad .The only possibility for a German victory was that the Red Army would be defeated WEST of the Dniepr ( not decimated ) which would cause /and would be caused by the collapse of the Soviet regime and all the rest would be a piece of a cake .Kiew,Moscow, Leningrad would not be taken, they would voluntarily surrender to the Ostheer,and the first German units would not remain in these cities,but would go as far and fast as possible to the East .These cities had no military importance.
And if the Soviets did not collapse in 1941 they would not collapse in 1942,but in 19454 the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
The fall of the USSR had to happen in the Summer, but 12 days more of Summer weather would not help the Ostheer : they had almost 3 months of Summer weather and failed. 12 days more would not make a difference .
About Britain and the superiority of the LW in the South : Liverpool was not in the South and Liverpool was more important than London .Coventry is not in the South but in the West Midlands north of London .Manchester is also north of London .
The range of the German fighters was limited to the coast,thus the bombers could not go much farther,unless they attacked at night and when they did it,it resulted in a very low efficiency .
The Bf 101 had only 10 minutes of flying time when he arrived at the British coast,this means that the LW could never have air superiority and could not eliminate Briton's manufacturing industry in the South .
Operation Marita was launched precisely because of British aid, which here would not be available. Hitler's decision to commit to the operation came four days after the British landed on Crete, as Hitler was highly concerned this would result in an air campaign against Romanian oil. If the Royal Navy is depleted in the Mediterranean and/or the British Army has its resources too thin, this would not happen and thus no Marita. By early 1940, the Greeks had exhausted their ammunition supplies and were on the verge of defeat anyway by the Italians, so no British means no need by Berlin to intervene. Likewise, Yugoslavia will be keeping an eye on said developments and those will lend themselves nicely to the Pro-Axis viewpoint.

Now, moving onto Barbarossa, said late thaw led to the flooding season being later, as I said. This made the May start date unfeasible and then equipment shortages from the Balkans campaign resulted in the June 21nd date. Said flooding, however, was over by June 10th and if there is no Balkans Campaign, said equipment issues are likewise avoided. Moving onto your other points, I must say they are divorced from reality entirely. For example, you state "Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad would not be taken"......when we know for a historical fact Kiev was. Not sure what's going on there or the claim that Moscow, Leningrad, etc had no value because that's blatantly untrue:
In addition to the symbolism of the city’s name, by 1939 Leningrad was also an important Soviet industrial center, responsible for 11 percent of the USSR’s industrial production. Thus, Leningrad became German Army Group North’s major objective from the start of the massive surprise Nazi sneak attack on June 22, 1941. In fact, Leningrad’s fall was the key to all of Nazidom’s vast, projected Northern Theater of Operations’ goals during August 1941-January 1944.​
If you wish for that to be explained in terms of military production:
Some researchers of the Siege of Leningrad consider that in the besieged city new military equipment wasn’t issued, and only its repair was carried out. Official reports don’t confirm this point of view. During the second half of the year 1941, (November – December of this year were one of the most difficult months), Leningrad gave to the front 713 tanks, near 3000 cannons, more than 10300 mortars, 480 armoured cars, 58 armoured trains. In July – December, 1941 Red Army received more than 3 million shells and mines, 40000 rockets, big quantity of other military equipment. It is a lot of or a little? The following comparative data are in this regard indicative: in the second half of the year 1941 in Leningrad was released 10,1 % from all cannons made in the country, 23,5 % of mortars and 14,8% of tanks. About 52% of mines and 68 % of the shells spent by the front during this period was made in Leningrad.​

Produced cannons, mortars and ammunition went not only to the Leningrad front, but also under Moscow. In the hardest period of the Moscow battle over 400 cannons, about 1 thousand mortars of various calibers and nearly 40 thousand armor-piercing shells were sent from the besieged Leningrad . On November 28, 1941 the commander of the Western front G. K. Zhukov sent the telegram to Leningrad: “Thanks to Leningrad people for the help to Moscow in fight against blood-thirsty Hitlerites”​
Without industrial output or the manpower contained in cities, the Red Army cannot sustain itself and will be defeated; I get the German planning was to destroy it within the first 400 km but that was not the only path to victory. I also find it extremely odd you take their planning at face value but then reject their outlooks elsewhere; to be honest, it's a pretty obvious double standard.

The German plan to destroy the Red Army west of the DD line ,with the hope that this would result in a civil war in the Kremlin,was the ONLY way to destroy the USSR. All the rest is Cold War propaganda from the defeated German generals ( Manstein, Halder, Guderian ) to embellish their blazon .
And it failed almost immediately .See the diary of Halder where he first claimed that the war was won,to be obliged a few weeks later too admit that they had underestimated the Soviets ( which was an indirect way to blame FHO );this was wrong :the failure of Barbarossa in the Summer was not caused by German ( = Hitler ) mistakes,as the German generals lied after the war ,but by the fact that notwithstanding the initial setbacks, the Soviet regime remained master of the situation .
Militarily the USSR was indefensible, but its Achilles tendon was its political regime. If that collapsed, it was over,if it did not collapse,it was also over: for the Germans .
The Germans hoped that the regime would collapse in the Red Army was defeated before the regime could mobilize its superior manpower and industrial resources .
The Germans failed in the Summer, close to their depots and with a numerical superiority .
The loss of Kiew,the encirclement of Leningrad did not help the Germans .The fact that the Germans had still to fight in the late Autumn for Kiew, Moscow and Leningrad was a proof that not only the Soviets were not defeated, but that they became stronger every day ( from June 22 on ).
I know that the German plan was to defeat the Red Army in the first 400 km or so; I'm saying that's not the only way and all evidence points in my direction. Case in point is your claim that the Red Army grew stronger after June 22, but it did not:
The Red Army is often portrayed as overwhelmingly powerful in 1942; for quantitative reasons as much as anything else. In reality it was numerically far weaker than it had been in June of 1941. For instance, in spite of concentrating production on key weapons systems like tanks, aircraft and artillery and mortars the Red Army's stocks hadn't come anywhere close to pre-war levels. In June of 1941 the Red Army had 22,600 tanks on its books. In May of 1942 this total had fallen to 9,325 such machines. Aircraft had dropped from 20,000 to 14,967. Artillery and mortar stocks were down from 112,800 to 107,795 on the eve of the 1942 German summer campaign. Moreover, the increased focus on tank, artillery, and aircraft production that had even enabled the Red Army to maintain such those numbers came at the expense of other very important items - not least of which being truck production.
Can you explain how this situation would be any better with the loss of the manpower and industrial output of cities such as Leningrad or Moscow? This isn't the 18th Century; Armies need vast amounts of supplies and ready access to manpower sources. Even if the Red Army survives the initial German blows, it doesn't matter if they don't have the fuel, food, munitions, equipment or men to sustain itself.
I disagree with your quote : the tank and aircraft figures are meaningless : most of the tanks and aircraft were not operational in June 1941,a lot of tank divisions had to many tanks, others had no tanks .
The loss of Leningrad and Moscow would not help the Germans . Only the capture of the armaments industry of the Urals (Magnitogorsk ) would be decisive, but the Germans had no chance to go at Magnitogorsk .
About the tanks :
The operational forces and the Stavka reserve had on June 22 1941 15843 tanks and SP guns of which only a part in European Russia of which 13366 officially serviceable ( and everyone knows what officially means ),half of the tank divisions fell apart during their advance to the border .
For the inoperational forces :these had 7263 tanks and of these 5325 were theoretically serviceable .
There was a general shortage of drivers,technicians, spare parts, ammunition, fuel, trucks ,infantry ..
There were 54000 mortars (with the same problems as the tanks ),54000 field and coast guns (the latter were useless ) and 10000 AA guns (also with a lot of shortages ).
Source :
radikal.ru/Fs48.radikal . ru/i121/0907/94/c98b4ce67a3b.jpg.htlm
The military districts of western Russia had in June 1941 22000 field/coast guns, 22000 mortars ,10700 tanks and 7500 aircraft . Same source
In May 1942 the operational forces had 21000 guns and 43000 mortars,2000 tanks and 6800 aircraft and with the low tank number
they were still able to stop the Germans .
About the war production : Leningrad produced in the second half of 1941 444 KV tanks,and there was no possibility to capture Leningrad in July or August ,no tanks in 1942,1943,1944 and 10 IS tanks in 1945 .Moscow produced 507 tanks . Most tanks were produced at Nizhniy Tagil : some 25000 And this city is located at the Urals 25 km in Asia .
4896 tanks were produced in 1941 /2,24589 in 1942, 19907 in 1943 .
Source : Production of AFVs ( by Amvas ) at the defunct Armchair General Site .

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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by ljadw » 30 Dec 2020 19:19

About the air superiority over SE England : on itself this was unimportant and for Britain and for Germany .
This air superiority would not mean that the Germans would win ''the BoB ',and if the Germans won '' the BoB '',there was no reason why Britain would give up .
The LW needed air superiority over SE England to protect the landing ground forces, but the LW needed also air superiority over the Channel to protect the invasion fleet against BC and the RN .
The LW could not do both .
If they protected the invasion fleet ,the landing troops would be eliminated by the Home Forces .
If they concentrated on the coast, the invasion fleet would be destroyed by the RN and BC.
An invasion was possible ONLY AFTER Britain collapsed : if in September the royal family and Winston left for Canada and there was chaos in Whitehall,than ,only than would an'' invasion'' be possible .
But air superiority would not give the needed transport ships, neither the needed good weather . The weather alone made an invasion impossible already on September 1 .
Besides ,on day ONE of Sealion, FC would leave its safe airfields north of the SE for the coast and defeat the LW,while the Home Forces would eliminate the landing troops and BC and the RN the invasion fleet .As the German fighters could remain at the coast for only 10 minutes and Spitfires/Hurricanes much longer ,and as Spitfires/Hurricanes could intervene several times every day ,it is obvious that the German Fighters would have no chance .
About Marita : the point is that the decision to invade Greece had NO influence at all on the day to start Barbarossa .Thus no Marita would have also no influence on Barbarossa .When Marita was decided in December 1940, the start of Barbarossa was not decided : it would depend on the weather .
Other point : it is not so that at the start of 1941 the Italians were very close to defeat Greece .
About Yugoslavia : this did not cause the delay of Barbarossa : without this invasion, Barbarossa would also be delayed.
Last point : the British decision to send forces to Crete was not such a threat for Germany , as the Romanian oil was not that important for Germany at the end of 1940 . If the presence of the RAF was that dangerous,Hitler would not have waited til May 1941 to launch Mercury . Besides : could give someone the period when the first RAF attacks on the Romanian oil started ? There were no attacks before Mercury .Prior to April 1941 there were no RAF units permanently stationed on Crete .
I will also reply on the argument of the attacks on the Ruhr : notwithstanding these attacks, the German war production increased in 1944,and there is no evidence that without these attacks,the increase would be bigger .
The relation (causal or not ) between the air attacks on Germany and the German war production is almost impossible to make .
Combat aircraft : 1943 : 19000, 1944 : 35000.
There is no proof that without the attacks on the Ruhr,the Germans would have produced 40000 combat aircraft in 1944 .
Besides : what could they do with 40000 combat aircraft,or 35000 combat aircraft ? Without the crew,technicians, fuel for 40000,35000 combat aircraft, these would be useless .Aircraft that were not used were useless ,and to use them, you need fuel and crew .
It is the same for tanks and artillery .

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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by ljadw » 30 Dec 2020 21:10

Using Churchill as a source ( post 1202 ) is not a wise thing, because Winston was known for his exaggerations . Things as :
There is only one important thing : to defeat Rommel
or
only one thing frightened me : the U Boats, silent and invisible .
Other thing from Post 1202 : MacKay saying that 31 August was the worst day for FC . This is something meaningless,as on August 31 ,Sealion was no longer feasible , even if the LW gained air superiority, and the reason was very simple : the weather .
Winning /losing the Battle of Britain was important only if this had a result . That is something MacKay is forgetting .What he is also forgetting is that a British loss (aircraft/pilot ) and a German loss (aircraft/pilot/crew ) were totally different things .
Something else about the FC losses on August 31 : before that day ,thus in 30 days of August , FC had some 17000 day sortie,and in September also 17000 day sorties .Losses of FC from August 5 til September 1 381 ,from September 2 til September 29 :363. Thus the impact of August 31 was not that big .
Same source.

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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by History Learner » 31 Dec 2020 11:52

Okay, rather than clutter up the thread further with five individual responses, I'm going to post as a compendium to the points made.

First, specifically regards to the Battle of Britain, I've already pointed out the issues with regards to relying upon the sortie rate. Yes, a smaller force can make up for its aforementioned weakness by being better about getting its planes in action but this only goes so far. Case in point is North Africa in late 1942/early 1943, where the Luftwaffe temporarily had air superiority thanks to its all weather air fields in Tunisia giving it a higher sortie rate. Same for the Germans again in early 1945 in Poland, where the Soviet advance had placed them into a position far behind their own air bases and thus allowed the Germans to achieve more sorties. Did the Germans manage to retain this advantage? No, and that's because ultimately the weight of casualties and superiority in numbers began to bite into them. So far you have failed to provide a reasonable explanation for why this would not occur to the British who were at the end of a unfavorable loss rate in terms of pilots and planes, according to both contemporary and Post-War analysis.

It also strikes me as odd how Churchill isn't reliable according to you, but Halder is despite you directly acknowledging how rapidly the latter flip flopped in his diary over the course of the campaign.

Moving behind the sortie issue, you cite the weather as making an invasion impossible but that's directly contradicted by wartime documentation and Post-War analysis. It wasn't until the end of October that the Royal Navy came to the conclusion that weather rendered the invasion impossible according to Operation Sea Lion by Peter Flemming, with several invasion dates with excellent weather being noted; from 19th September to the 26th, conditions in the Channel remained below sea state 4, and thus were excellent for a landing. As such, we can safely say the weather was fine and no barrier to the invasion.

Moving onto the specific issue of the invasion and associated operations, again, you're making a lot of false statements. Case in point is the claim German fighters could only operate for 10 minutes over the Channel; in actuality, it's 10 minutes over London, which is quite a bit further inland than the Channel Coast. This means that not only would the invasion fleet be covered by air superiority, but so too would the beachheads themselves. The idea that the Luftwaffe could not do both either is a novel one, given we historically saw them able to suppress shipping in the Channel while also escorting bombers to their targets in the interior. That a depleted Royal Air Force could somehow prevent the Luftwaffe from continuing to achieve what it was already is an argument that requires evidence that I have yet to see you make.

I think you've lost cite of what the original argument of mine was, which was that even a failed landing was strategically a benefit for Germany. As you note, they did have a serious lacking in landing craft, which meant that casualties during said failed landing would be minor and sustainable, but to achieve this would require the British Military as a whole to fling itself into such a situation as to take casualties it could not sustain itself, case in point among the Royal Navy. Scapa Flow is 22 hours from the straits of Dover, meaning the Germans would have plenty of advanced warning and for about the last 3-4 hours before reaching the straits, the Royal Navy would be exposed to escorted air attacks from the Luftwaffe. From there, the Dover Straits serve as a bottle neck, confining the surface fleet into a narrow area which the Germans will have filled with naval mines, U-Boats and E-Boats while the Luftwaffe would still be present.

I ask the assembled audience reading this to consider what happened to Force X in December of 1941, and then take the above in context with regards to the Home Fleet. Remember, too, that Tirpitz and Bismarck are coming in 1941 with all that entails, and the Italian Navy has yet to be struck as it was has historically in November of 1940. To take such losses to, at the best case scenario, sink a minor assortment of transports is a net benefit to the Germans and Axis at large by every stretch of the imagination; even better is if, like any rational Navy, they scatter their transports or return them back to French ports before the Royal Navy shows up.

Finally on this particular front, I'm not entirely sure what you're getting at with the Ruhr because you're talking about 1944 when the citation I've provided and made explicitly clear several times is that of the RAF's early 1943 campaign, not 1944. Further again, you're still spouting off claims that just have no basis in reality; for the record, yes, despite you saying otherwise, the Germans did build 40,593 aircraft in 1944 but that is extremely besides the point? Yes, German production increased in 1944, but that was after a year of stagnation and after the collapse of German plans to double their output in 1943. Both contemporary German documents, Post-War analysis by the likes of Adam Tooze, and, finally, Speer himself in his private writings, confirm the effects of the campaign. Again, it seems odd to me you take Halder's diary as an article of faith, but then dismiss such in all other cases, in this instance Speer on the 1943 production collapse and earlier with regards to Churchill and the air campaign.

With that done, we thus most to the effects on Operation Barbarossa.

First and foremost, we need to dispense with the erroneous claim the Soviets only began mobilization on June 22nd; that's false and has been repeatedly debunked by none other than David Glantz, first in his Stumbling Colossus book but then also in his When Titans Clashed. By May of 1941, Moscow had initiated a call up, and dispatched no less than 800,000 men to the frontiers and Glantz states this process was ongoing when the German invasion began. Likewise, the two sources you have provided about the state of the Red Army in early 1942 are either, as you state, defunct entirely or attempting to go to the link you provided produces a 404 error. Even taking them at face value, however, shows that your original contention of the Soviets only growing stronger into 1942 does not bare itself out. Further, you then completely move the goalposts and make the following claim:
The military districts of western Russia had in June 1941 22000 field/coast guns, 22000 mortars ,10700 tanks and 7500 aircraft . Same source
In May 1942 the operational forces had 21000 guns and 43000 mortars,2000 tanks and 6800 aircraft and with the low tank number
they were still able to stop the Germans .
Even then, however, we know your claim here isn't correct here, to cite from When Titans Clashed by David Glantz:
New mechanized forces required new equipment. Despite the enormous dislocation involved in moving its industry eastward, the Soviet Union was already beginning to outproduce German factories. By a phenomenal effort, the factories in the Urals and the Transcaucasus produced 4,500 tanks, 3,000 aircraft, 14,000 guns, and more than 50,000 mortars before active operations resumed in May 1942. Not all of these weapons were of the first quality, of course. In particular, the voracious desire for tanks meant that the Soviet Union cranked out thousands of T-60 and T70 tanks during 1942, simply because such light vehicles could be built on existing automobile assembly lines. These tanks lacked sufficient armor and armament to fight their German counterparts and were phased out in 1943. Still, despite such design limitations the growing Soviet weapons production eventually helped overwhelm the invaders.8
Again, as a general note, it's notable that the two sources provided by yourself are unable to reviewed by anyone else, and simply reviewing a mainstream historian rapidly debunks them. As for the other question posed, what happened in 1942, the answer is simple: the two front war aspect really began to kick in for Germany. Despite such, however, Germany still managed the major victory at Kharkov and then launched Operation Blue after clearing the Crimean, resulting in vast swathes of territory being conquered.

To move onto the more specific criticisms, again, I've cited the Soviet records and contemporary statements by Zhukov among others to show the value of cities such as Moscow and Leningrad. I get you personally don't believe such, but that does not invalidate the historical facts I've presented with my evidence being linked and thus accessible for review. Again, the double standard of taking Halder at face value but rejecting the Soviet documentation is pretty obvious here. To take this further, why did the Soviets fight for Leningrad and Moscow if they didn't hold any value? Wouldn't the wiser strategy be to let the Germans take them, and thus further overstretch their logistics? If the Red Army is the invincible machine you assert, apparently unbothered by the need for manpower replacements and industrial production of needed supplies, their historical strategy makes no sense, no?

And, finally, for Marita here you go:
Army Group South's initial plan envisioned a double envelopment during Phase 1, employing First Panzer Group in the North and 12th Army coming out of Rumania. Hitler soon decided against this course of action, and besides in April he ordered 12th army to Yugoslavia and Greece. Eleventh Army took over duties in Rumania but these combined forces would not be ready for 22 June 1941, giving Barbarossa its staggered start in the south. Therefore von Rudenstedt would fight mainly a frontal war, punctuated by occasional penetrations and except for Kiev relatively small encirclements.

ljadw
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Re: Battle of Britain

Post by ljadw » 31 Dec 2020 13:00

About Marita : its influence on Barbarossa in meaningless : Marita did NOT delay Barbarossa,and even with Marita, AGS did its secondary mission very well . The main center of gravity was in the Center .
That Kiev was captured only lately was not caused by the absence of 12 th Army ,but by the fact that the Soviets were reinforcing very fast the Southern front .
Besides, an earlier capture of Kiev would not cause a Soviet collapse .Kiev was captured at September 19, and the Soviets did not give up . There is no evidence that if Kiev was captured at September 10, or September 1, or in August ,the Soviets would give up .
The fall of Kiev,or Leningrad,or Moscow, etc would NOT cause the collapse of the USSR, but the collapse of the USSR would cause the fall of these cities .
The only reason why the Soviets did fight for Leningrad was political : the capture of Leningrad would be exploited by the German propaganda . It is the same for Moscow. Besides, there was no such thing as a battle to capture Moscow : the Germans attacked DIRECTION Moscow hoping that the Soviets would risk their last reserves (of which the Germans assumed for obvious reasons that they were very low ) to defend the city . And they were wrong : Zhukov told Stalin that Moscow could not be saved by sacrificing his reserves , Stalin agreed and was going to leave Moscow, but at the last moment, Zhukov changed his opinion .
This proves that the fall of Moscow would not force the Soviets to give up .
The Soviets would give up only if in July the Soviet soldiers were surrendering and deserting massively and if this caused civil war at the Kremlin .

ljadw
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Posts: 11586
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: Battle of Britain

Post by ljadw » 31 Dec 2020 14:27

History Learner wrote:
31 Dec 2020 11:52


It also strikes me as odd how Churchill isn't reliable according to you, but Halder is despite you directly acknowledging how rapidly the latter flip flopped in his diary over the course of the campaign.

Moving behind the sortie issue, you cite the weather as making an invasion impossible but that's directly contradicted by wartime documentation and Post-War analysis. It wasn't until the end of October that the Royal Navy came to the conclusion that weather rendered the invasion impossible according to Operation Sea Lion by Peter Flemming, with several invasion dates with excellent weather being noted; from 19th September to the 26th, conditions in the Channel remained below sea state 4, and thus were excellent for a landing. As such, we can safely say the weather was fine and no barrier to the invasion.

Moving onto the specific issue of the invasion and associated operations, again, you're making a lot of false statements. Case in point is the claim German fighters could only operate for 10 minutes over the Channel; in actuality, it's 10 minutes over London, which is quite a bit further inland than the Channel Coast. This means that not only would the invasion fleet be covered by air superiority, but so too would the beachheads themselves. The idea that the Luftwaffe could not do both either is a novel one, given we historically saw them able to suppress shipping in the Channel while also escorting bombers to their targets in the interior. That a depleted Royal Air Force could somehow prevent the Luftwaffe from continuing to achieve what it was already is an argument that requires evidence that I have yet to see you make.



I ask the assembled audience reading this to consider what happened to Force X in December of 1941, and then take the above in context with regards to the Home Fleet. Remember, too, that Tirpitz and Bismarck are coming in 1941 with all that entails, and the Italian Navy has yet to be struck as it was has historically in November of 1940. To take such losses to, at the best case scenario, sink a minor assortment of transports is a net benefit to the Germans and Axis at large by every stretch of the imagination; even better is if, like any rational Navy, they scatter their transports or return them back to French ports before the Royal Navy shows up.
About Winston : On July 10 he told the War Cabinet that Sea Lion would be a suicidal operation .And, as The BoB had only sense (militarily ) to make SL possible, this means that losing or winning the BoB had no military results .
And people as Robinson, Bungay,Gordon also concurred with Churchill : SL as it was planned,with the aim as it was given, had no chance of succeeding .
SL could ONLY succeed after Britain had given up .And than SL as it was planned, had no sense .And as FC could not be eliminated and was not eliminated ....
The weather : SL could not start before September 20 and would last not weeks,but months . This was out of the question .Overlord also could not start in September .
About the German fighters : I stick to my point that they could not operate longer than 10 minutes over England, which made the bombers totally indefensible .
A German Jäger could not at the same time protect transport ships against attacks by BC and the RN and protect landed ground forces against attacks by the Home Forces . An aircraft can not be at two different places at the same time .
And that FC would be depleted is meaningless as the Jäger also would be depleted .
The Tirpitz/Bismarck in 1941 have no place in a discussion about the BoB and SL. The same for the Mediterranean .
The only way for SL to be possible would be a small SL ,transporting a small occupation force ( NOT invading force ) AFTER a British capitulation . The BoB could never produce a British capitulation . Only things in the US could do this .
As long as Britain did not give up, SL was impossible : if RAF was eliminated, the RN would destroy the invading fleet, if RN was eliminated the Home Forces would eliminate the landed units .
And: Jodl said on August 13 that Germany could not afford a failed SL as the political consequences would be worse than the military results .
Räder said on July 28 that it would take 10 days to transport and land the first wave,which means that the second wave could start only in October (20 September + 10 days = 30 September )

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