What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Rob Stuart
Member
Posts: 1200
Joined: 18 Apr 2009, 01:41
Location: Ottawa

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#46

Post by Rob Stuart » 02 Dec 2014, 02:42

The caption on the 1942 photo attached below reads as follows:

The personnel required to keep one Avro Lancaster flying on operations, taken at Scampton, Lincolnshire.

Front row (left to right); flying control officer, WAAF parachute packer, meteorological officer, seven aircrew (pilot and captain, navigator and observer, air bomber, flight engineer, wireless operator/air gunner and two air gunners).

Second row, twelve flight maintenance crew (left to right; n.c.o. fitter, flight maintenance mechanic, n.c.o. fitter, five flight maintenance mechanics, electrical mechanic, instrument repairer, and two radio mechanics).

Third row, bombing up team; WAAF tractor driver with a bomb train of 16 Small Bomb Containers (SBC), each loaded with 236 x 4-lb No. 15 incendiaries and, behind, three bombing-up crew.

Fourth row, seventeen ground servicing crew (left to right; corporal mechanic, four aircraft mechanics, engineer officer, fitter/armourer, three armourers, radio mechanic, two instrument repairers, three bomb handlers, machine gunbelt fitter).

Back row (left to right); AEC Matador petrol tender and two crew, Avro Lancaster B Mark I heavy bomber, mobile workshop and three crew.


I submit that this photo supports my argument that significantly more ground crew were required per heavy bomber than per fighter. Excluding the aircrew, there are 41 people in this picture. Of course, I'm not saying that each bomber had its own flying control officer, WAAF parachute packer, and meteorological officer. This was obviously not the case. On the other hand, I expect that a four-person bombing up team would be required for every heavy bomber, whereas none were required for a fighter unit, and I'm sure that the flight maintenance and ground services crew required for a fighter would be much smaller.

Unfortunately I do not have access to the establishments for RAF Scampton and its resident squadrons, so I cannot confirm how many ground crew were stationed there, but it's a pretty safe bet that there were a lot more than on any fighter station with a comparable number of aircraft.
Attachments
Lanc.jpg

Fatboy Coxy
Member
Posts: 875
Joined: 26 Jul 2009, 17:14
Location: Essex, UK

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#47

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 02 Dec 2014, 23:40

Re the NZ Buffalo Sqn, further into the article I find

"The ground crews, who had been brought from New Zealand in accordance with the establishment laid down by Air Ministry, were not nearly sufficient to cope with the amount of work to be done. Additional men were posted to the squadron from other units in Singapore, but still they were overworked."

The RAF support services in Malaya/Singapore were poor, so some work may have had to be done at Sqn level, as opposed to a Maintenance Unit. There were a few (151, 152 and 153) forming. I'm guessing this may have been a contributory factor to the need to increase their strength.

Another one I looked at was 151 RAF Wing (yes another 151) with 81 and 134 Sqns sent to Murmansk (Russia) 40 Hurricanes with 550 pilots and ground crew. They also had a training role for Soviet Pilots converting onto the Hurricane. I would imagine they had to be self contained, so would be above the establishment for a 2 Sqn RAF Wing.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/rb ... r-Two.html

I'm thinking if you compare a fighter sqn and a four engine bomber sqn, the fighter sqn will be smaller in terms of personnel. However if we intend to deploy these aircraft outside of the UK, the numbers required will increase significantly. A 4 engine bomber sqn at home might be cheaper in personnel than a fighter sqn abroad. I seem to remember something about Churchill's concerns about the large tail needed to support a relatively small fighting force in the middle east. This criticism was aimed more at the army than RAF, but their tail was significant.
Regards
Fatboy Coxy

Currently writing https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/ ... if.521982/


Politician01
Member
Posts: 441
Joined: 02 Sep 2011, 07:56

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#48

Post by Politician01 » 04 Dec 2014, 18:25

Britain needed bombers to strike against Germany not fighters - with less bombers the damage to German industry would be lower then OTL resulting in a greater German industrial output.

Also where are all the additional pilots going to come from?

Rob Stuart
Member
Posts: 1200
Joined: 18 Apr 2009, 01:41
Location: Ottawa

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#49

Post by Rob Stuart » 05 Dec 2014, 01:03

Politician01 wrote:Also where are all the additional pilots going to come from?
Bomber Command adopted a "single pilot" policy in March 1942. Until then, each of its bombers, even the twin engine ones (except the Blenheim) had two pilots. They could have adopted that policy much earlier, and likely would have if there were going to be more aircraft than there were historically. That would have freed up hundreds of pilots at a stroke. Also, up to 28 February 1942 Bomber Command had lost about 1500 aircraft, the majority of them with two pilots. If all of the latter had carried only one pilot, than well over another 1000 pilots would have been available. As well, I believe that Bomber Command historically sustained proportionately heavier casualties than any other RAF home or overseas command, so if its operations were on a much smaller scale then there would be fewer dead or captured pilots to replace.

I'd also point out that in "what if" scenarios, changing X could imply in change in Y too. In this case, I'm suggesting that aircrew (and ground crew, for that matter) output plans would have been changed if aircraft output plans were changed. For one example, if there were to be no, or many fewer, four-engine bombers than fewer air gunners would need to be trained. Some of the aircraft used to train them would then be available for pilot training and the staff pilots which flew them could have been employed training pilots or sent to front line units.

Some of the additional aircraft produced in lieu of heavy bombers would not necessarily need additional pilots. Our friend phylo_roadking has argued that the strength of the RAF in Malaya could not have been increased to the extent I've suggested due to a lack of facilities. I don't agree, but if we say for the moment that he's right that would not preclude the 188 they did have in December 1941 being replaced by modern aircraft, e.g. Beauforts instead of Vildebeests, Hurricanes instead of Buffaloes, Blenheims IVs instead of Blenheim Is and Hudsons, etc. No extra pilots would be needed for these replacement aircraft. As well, we've seen that fighter squadrons with 16 aircraft generally had 21 pilots. Why not increase their strength to 18 aircraft? I'm aware of a number of occasions when fit and trained fighter pilots serving in front line units were kept idle because their unit had more pilots than aircraft.

I'm not saying that there would be no difficulty finding or training the additional pilots. There would be challenges, for sure, especially up to say the end of 1943, but I think that way and means would have been found to overcome them.

Rob Stuart
Member
Posts: 1200
Joined: 18 Apr 2009, 01:41
Location: Ottawa

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#50

Post by Rob Stuart » 05 Dec 2014, 14:12

Politician01 wrote:Britain needed bombers to strike against Germany not fighters - with less bombers the damage to German industry would be lower then OTL resulting in a greater German industrial output.
Well, Germany did not totally mobilize its economy until early 1943, after it lost at Stalingrad. Until then, there was quite a bit of slack in the economy and industrial output was not greatly affected by bombing. Up to that time the main impact of the Bomber Command attacks was indirect - AA guns being used in Germany instead of at the front, Ju 88s built as night fighters instead of instead of as bombers, etc. The Bomber Command offensive was not heavy enough nor consistently effective until then. But with this proviso I'd agree with the rule of thumb that having a much weaker (or no) Bomber Command offensive would have resulted in greater German production in the sectors impacted by the bombers. (I suspect that tank production would not have been any higher than it was but the Type XXI and Type XXIII submarines might well have gone to sea earlier and in greater numbers than they did.)

But my general point is that the contribution of the Bomber Command offensive to the outcome of the war cannot be measured simply by looking at its direct and indirect impact on the Germans. One also has to consider the opportunities lost to the Allies. The most obvious one was the failure to close the air gap in the Atlantic much earlier than was the case due to the allocation of the longest ranged aircraft to Bomber Command rather than Coastal Command (and the RCAF's Eastern Air Command). It would be hard to produce any firm numbers, but it could probably be shown that the bomber offensive cost X number of merchant ships sunk and it may have meant that Allied shipyards had to produce more merchant ships and escorts, and fewer amphibious vessels and landing craft, than might otherwise have been the case. You may recall that OVERLORD was postponed from May 1944 to June 1944 so that Eisenhower would have another month's production of landing craft. One can at least hypothesize that OVERLORD might have been launched on 1 May and been supported by more tactical aircraft than was actually the case had there been no Commonwealth bomber offensive against Germany.

It is impossible to say with certainty what other benefits may have resulted had the UK produced no (or very few) four engine bombers. It would of course depend on when the change in strategy was adopted. I don't think that it would have been made any earlier than December 1939, when the RAF learned through experience that its bomber formations were unable to defend themselves against German fighters during daylight raids. They then switched to night operations. If the CAS had been unable to convince the War Cabinet that night attacks could be effective, it might have been decided at that time not to proceed with large scale production of the heavy bombers. None were being produced at that time but series production of the Stirling began in August 1940 and the first production Halifax flew in October 1940, so increased production of whatever single engine or twin engine designs were produced instead of these aircraft probably could have started during the second half of 1940 in this scenario. By mid-1941 there could thus have been significantly more fighters and tactical bombers available to the RAF than was actually they case. If these extra aircraft had all been sent to the Med, I'm sure that Greece would still have fallen when it did but maybe enough fighters could have been put on Crete to prevent its loss. The retention of Crete might not have made a great difference in the outcome of the war but it would have helped. On the other hand, the earlier provision of Spitfires to Malta and the strengthening of its bomber force, and the strengthening of the Desert Air Force, could possibly have led to the Axis being kicked out of Africa in 1942 instead of 1943. TORCH might then have been launched in November 1942 against Sicily instead of against Morocco and Algeria. I'm not arguing that this could certainly have happened had there been no Stirlings or Halifaxes. It is of course an optimistic scenario. But I am arguing that the abandonment or curtailment of the bomber offensive would have provided opportunities which could have compensated for the damage not inflicted on the German economy and that the foregoing of these opportunities also needs to be considered when assessing the value of the bomber offensive.

Politician01
Member
Posts: 441
Joined: 02 Sep 2011, 07:56

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#51

Post by Politician01 » 05 Dec 2014, 23:53

Rob Stuart wrote:
Politician01 wrote:
I am arguing that the abandonment or curtailment of the bomber offensive would have provided opportunities which could have compensated for the damage not inflicted on the German economy and that the foregoing of these opportunities also needs to be considered when assessing the value of the bomber offensive.
According to the USSBS - bombing of German industry prevented the production of 18 500 German aircraft between June 1943 and December 1944.

Additionaly during the bombing offensive the RAF destroyed 22 000 German aircraft.

So while building fighters instead of bombers might provide other opportunities for Britain - it would provide opportunities for the Germans as well - just reducing both numbers by just 25% would leave the Germans with an additional 10 000+ aircraft between 1942-1944

Rob Stuart
Member
Posts: 1200
Joined: 18 Apr 2009, 01:41
Location: Ottawa

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#52

Post by Rob Stuart » 06 Dec 2014, 01:33

Fatboy Coxy wrote:Another one I looked at was 151 RAF Wing (yes another 151) with 81 and 134 Sqns sent to Murmansk (Russia) 40 Hurricanes with 550 pilots and ground crew. They also had a training role for Soviet Pilots converting onto the Hurricane. I would imagine they had to be self contained, so would be above the establishment for a 2 Sqn RAF Wing.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/rb ... r-Two.html

I'm thinking if you compare a fighter sqn and a four engine bomber sqn, the fighter sqn will be smaller in terms of personnel. However if we intend to deploy these aircraft outside of the UK, the numbers required will increase significantly. A 4 engine bomber sqn at home might be cheaper in personnel than a fighter sqn abroad. I seem to remember something about Churchill's concerns about the large tail needed to support a relatively small fighting force in the middle east. This criticism was aimed more at the army than RAF, but their tail was significant.
According to Life and Death in Bomber Command, in January 1943 RAF Bottesford had about 2000 people, presumably including the aircrew. At that time, according to other sources, it hosted 467 Squadron RAAF, equipped with Lancasters, and 1524 (Beam Approach Training) Flight, with Oxfords. 467 Squadron had three fights at the time, so it may have had an establishment of 24 aircraft and in fact it dispatched 24 Lancasters on a raid on Dortmund on 27-28 May. So it seems that it took about 2000 people to operate and support the equivilent of 1.5 operational heavy bomber squadrons and one non-operational unit of twin engine aircraft. I suspect that if Bottesford had hosted two two-flight heavy bomber squadrons it would not have needed than the 2000 or so people it had anyway. If this is correct then it appears that it took about 2000 people to operate and support 32 or so heavy bombers based in the UK but only 550 pilots and ground crew to operate 40 Hurricanes deployed to Russia. If we subtract 250 aircrew from the 2000 and 50 aircrew from the 550, then we have 1750 and 500 ground crew respectively, a ratio of 3.5 to 1.

Rob Stuart
Member
Posts: 1200
Joined: 18 Apr 2009, 01:41
Location: Ottawa

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#53

Post by Rob Stuart » 06 Dec 2014, 02:38

Politician01 wrote:
Rob Stuart wrote:
Politician01 wrote:
I am arguing that the abandonment or curtailment of the bomber offensive would have provided opportunities which could have compensated for the damage not inflicted on the German economy and that the foregoing of these opportunities also needs to be considered when assessing the value of the bomber offensive.
According to the USSBS - bombing of German industry prevented the production of 18 500 German aircraft between June 1943 and December 1944.

Additionaly during the bombing offensive the RAF destroyed 22 000 German aircraft.


So while building fighters instead of bombers might provide other opportunities for Britain - it would provide opportunities for the Germans as well - just reducing both numbers by just 25% would leave the Germans with an additional 10 000+ aircraft between 1942-1944
Could you please identify your source for saying that during the bombing offensive the RAF destroyed 22,000 German aircraft? Bomber Command lost about 8000 aircraft during the war. It can't possibly be true that almost three German aircraft were lost for every Bomber Command aircraft lost. Furthermore, Luftwaffe night fighter losses for the whole war totalled 9800. Are we supposed to believe that Bomber Command destroyed every one of them, plus 12,000 other Luftwaffe aircraft?

Politician01
Member
Posts: 441
Joined: 02 Sep 2011, 07:56

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#54

Post by Politician01 » 06 Dec 2014, 11:22

Rob Stuart wrote:
Politician01 wrote:
Rob Stuart wrote:
Politician01 wrote:
I am arguing that the abandonment or curtailment of the bomber offensive would have provided opportunities which could have compensated for the damage not inflicted on the German economy and that the foregoing of these opportunities also needs to be considered when assessing the value of the bomber offensive.
According to the USSBS - bombing of German industry prevented the production of 18 500 German aircraft between June 1943 and December 1944.

Additionaly during the bombing offensive the RAF destroyed 22 000 German aircraft.


So while building fighters instead of bombers might provide other opportunities for Britain - it would provide opportunities for the Germans as well - just reducing both numbers by just 25% would leave the Germans with an additional 10 000+ aircraft between 1942-1944
Could you please identify your source for saying that during the bombing offensive the RAF destroyed 22,000 German aircraft? Bomber Command lost about 8000 aircraft during the war. It can't possibly be true that almost three German aircraft were lost for every Bomber Command aircraft lost. Furthermore, Luftwaffe night fighter losses for the whole war totalled 9800. Are we supposed to believe that Bomber Command destroyed every one of them, plus 12,000 other Luftwaffe aircraft?
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey:

Over-All Report European War:

Page X - Table 1:

Claimed enemy aircraft destroyed or probably destroyed by the RAF: 21 622

RAF losses of Fighters: 10 045

RAF losses of Bombers: 11965

USSBS Aircraft division Report:

Page 82 Table VI-2:

Loss of (German) Aircraft production directly and indirectly caused by bombing July 1943-December 1944 :

18 492 - inlcuding 11 662 single engine fighters - 2691 twin engine fighters and 1150 twin engine bombers

Here the European War over all report:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ussb-1.svg

Rob Stuart
Member
Posts: 1200
Joined: 18 Apr 2009, 01:41
Location: Ottawa

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#55

Post by Rob Stuart » 06 Dec 2014, 15:58

Politician01,

Thanks for the response. Please note that while you stated that "during the bombing offensive the RAF destroyed 22 000 German aircraft", the USSBS says that, first, these are only the RAF''s claims . The number the RAF actually destroyed was undoubtedly a lot less. Second, this is the total claimed for the whole RAF for the whole war and not just "during the bombing offensive". For example, successes claimed by Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain would be included. Bomber Command probably destroyed very few Luftwaffe aircraft other than night fighters and they did not destroy all of the 9800 night fighters lost. The Luftwaffe sometimes employed its night fighters in day operations, against USAAF bombers and other targets, and many were lost in training accidents. RAF heavy bomber guns and bombs probably destroyed relatively few night fighters, albeit losses incurred through operational accidents during sorties against RAF attacks must also be attributed to them. We should also remember that the German night fighter force was a going concern right up to March 1944, when 94 bombers were shot down and 71 damaged out of the 795 which attacked Nuremberg. Bomber Command's direct contribution to the defeat of the Luftwaffe prior to OVERLORD was relatively small.

Regarding the figure of 18,492 German aircraft not produced between July 1943 and December 1944 due to bombing, this figure may possibly be in the ball park. The USSBS was conducted shortly after the war ended, and this is both a strength and a weakness. Possibly subsequent scholarship has revealed that this number is too high but as I'm not aware of what the corrected number might be, I'll go with it for now, but I'd point out the following:

(1) In the scenario I'm putting forward I'm assuming that the USSAF bombing offensive would still be conducted more or less as it actually was, so whatever proportion of the 18,492 in lost aircraft production was due to USAAF bombing would still be lost. And since the USAAF targeted aircraft factories as a high priority and Harris avoided attacking "panacea targets" such as specific industries, let alone specific factories, I would guess that most of the lost production was attributable to USAAF attacks.

(2) Unlike the Commonwealth, the Germans could not have produced enough adequately trained pilots to have manned all these extra aircraft. This would be all the more the case if the RAF was able to inflict more losses on the Luftwaffe earlier in the war than it did, using the extra aircraft produced instead of heavy bombers.

(3) Some of the aircraft not produced would have been transports or trainers, and many of them would have been obsolete designs such as the Ju 87 and He 111.

(4) I'm suggesting that the extra RAF aircraft which could have been produced instead of heavy bombers might have changed the course of the war, to some extent anyway. Maybe the Ruhr could have been occupied by ground forces in September 1944 instead of April 1945, in which case the loss of production from the Ruhr from that date would have been complete and obviously far greater than could have been caused by bombing. It is of course impossible to say how likely this might have been. If the RAF had had more fighter bombers it might have destroyed more German tanks, SP guns, etc during the summer of 1944, but on the other hand maybe the Germans would have had more tanks, SP guns and AA guns at the beginning of the campaign had there been no (or a much curtailed) Bomber Command offensive against German industry.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10056
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#56

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 07 Dec 2014, 15:36

Rob Stuart wrote:Politician01,

Thanks for the response. Please note that while you stated that "during the bombing offensive the RAF destroyed 22 000 German aircraft", the USSBS says that, first, these are only the RAF''s claims . The number the RAF actually destroyed was undoubtedly a lot less. Second, this is the total claimed for the whole RAF for the whole war and not just "during the bombing offensive". For example, successes claimed by Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain would be included. Bomber Command probably destroyed very few Luftwaffe aircraft other than night fighters and they did not destroy all of the 9800 night fighters lost. The Luftwaffe sometimes employed its night fighters in day operations, against USAAF bombers and other targets, and many were lost in training accidents. RAF heavy bomber guns and bombs probably destroyed relatively few night fighters, albeit losses incurred through operational accidents during sorties against RAF attacks must also be attributed to them. We should also remember that the German night fighter force was a going concern right up to March 1944, when 94 bombers were shot down and 71 damaged out of the 795 which attacked Nuremberg. Bomber Command's direct contribution to the defeat of the Luftwaffe prior to OVERLORD was relatively small.
In direct terms yes, however... there is this
...but on the other hand maybe the Germans would have had more tanks, SP guns and AA guns at the beginning of the campaign had there been no (or a much curtailed) Bomber Command offensive against German industry.
That is how large were the resources used to defend Germany against air attack 1942-43 & what would that translate to in combat power elsewhere?

Another consideration..
(1) In the scenario I'm putting forward I'm assuming that the USSAF bombing offensive would still be conducted more or less as it actually was,...


Without the RAF offensive of 1942-43 what happens when the USAAf brings its full weigh to bear in late 1943? How well will the German defense be spun up when the massive day time raids start? Would the Germans have a well organized defnse in place, or would the be scrambling about trying to set up things like damage containment on the ground, warning systems, air defense control, a radar system organized to the levels of OTL, and tens of thousands of AA cannon? So much of that existed because they had been working on it since the RAF raids started in 1941. Without all that already in place in September 1943 would the USAAF efforts been more effective against a weaker defense in 1943 & early 1944?
(2) Unlike the Commonwealth, the Germans could not have produced enough adequately trained pilots to have manned all these extra aircraft. This would be all the more the case if the RAF was able to inflict more losses on the Luftwaffe earlier in the war than it did, using the extra aircraft produced instead of heavy bombers.
The pilot problem was recognized as early as 1942 & never solved. As it was put it to Speer 'It does not matter how many fighters you build, we cant train pilots for them.' In both quantity and quality things were going down hill. In 1943 the RAF & USAAF raised their fighter pilot school training to 300 & 240 hours respectively. German school hours dropped below 240. In 1944 both Allied AF had over 300 hours before the fighter pilot was assigned to a combat unit. The German AF cut the syllbus to 170 hours.

User avatar
bf109 emil
Member
Posts: 3627
Joined: 25 Mar 2008, 22:20
Location: Youngstown Alberta Canada

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#57

Post by bf109 emil » 12 Feb 2015, 12:40

Since most factories producing Bombers where ran at 100% probably the best way to judge or determine extra or increased numbers of 2 engine planes over 4 engine would be to determine production line construction times. Simply having excess engines because of a lower demand does not speed up production or create more aircraft. Yes if production line shut down over there lack of availability or lack of raw material. Was the Manchester Bomber production twice as fast as that of a Lancaster when they converted to building heavies? Basically the same plane, using similar jigs, tooling, personal, etc. IMHO unless more factories are built, I doubt adding 2 engines or removing 2 engines affect production time by the same % as long as material and resources allowed for a larger plane and didn't hamper production stoppages

Von Schadewald
Member
Posts: 2065
Joined: 17 Nov 2004, 00:17
Location: Israel

Re: What if the UK had produced no four-engined bombers?

#58

Post by Von Schadewald » 19 Feb 2015, 19:06

Here my 2010 WI thread if the RAF had had fleets of Manchesters instead of Lancasters, available to pull off 1000 bomber raids much sooner

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... manchester

Post Reply

Return to “What if”