Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

[flakbait]

Agreed that having the NGF support cruisers and destroyers coming in as close as humanly possible would be critical to any chance of success. But so would having a even marginally `protected` temporary toehold ashore which grounding the half a dozen or more PBs closely together in a location where the absolute minimum of the defending USMC shore batteries could effectively engage them on the far end of either island and everything else being even, if was the IJN landing force commander would want the airfield under attack 1st and foremost if only to prevent it`s use by the defenders, so would choose the eastern end of Eastern Island. And would have more than 150 IJN troops aboard each PB, more like 300 each and the idea of using all 3 obsolete armored ships as stop gap landing craft to assault (but not to BLOCK) the dredged channel between the islands at the same time as the PBs going in on the opposite side of Eastern Island makes sense. Lastly would cram every 25MM mount could scrap together that those ships could reasonably carry onto their decks and superstructures both as added AA and anti battery weapons. The 3 obsolete ships could probably carry 500 SNLF troops a piece or even more, PLUS multiple radios, communications gear and lookouts/ observers on their masts...

[Carl Schwamberger]

Whatever armor the PB carried would not be enough at such a short range. The five inch guns would likely overmatch 13 cm of armor & even if they did not penetrate the strucutre of the PB is liable to come apart as hit accumulate. I was just rereading descriptions of the 13, 15, & 20 cm hits on the battle ship Hiei in November 1942. In theory the ships armor was proof against those USN projectiles, but at ranges of 5,000 down to 1,000 meters the hits were causying serious damage.

Odds are the cannon on Midway island would have opened fire when the PB were clearly visible, somewhere between 1,500 & 5,000 meters at night. If the defense of Wake island is any example any unsuppressed 5" guns would have had a minimum two or three hits before the PB reached the reef. Also at those ranges any of the 75mm AA guns able to engage would have had double the RoF of the heavier guns & had a proportionate number of hits.
Related to this is the question of how deep the water was inside the reef. Was it consistently a meter or less, or were there large areas of 1.5 or more meters depth?

[Hoist40]

There was also some 7 inch guns at Midway which were much more powerful then the 5 inch.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_7-45_mk2.htm

[Carl Schwamberger]

There was also some 7 inch guns at Midway...

Yeah, those have been counted in this thread. I'm trying to exclude best case for the defense. Hits from those are liable to put the target ship out of the battle, or sink it given the lightweight ships of the amphib squadron & its support ship. If those and at least part of the 13 & 7.5 cm guns are not suppressed the landing force is screwed. That is to say suppresion of the defense artillery is one of the requirements for a sucessfull invasion force.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Large open gun emplacements are the most visible and likely targets for NGS and dive-bomber attack.

IIRC, none were targeted, or hit, or destroyed, during the historic attack as they were unknowned to Japanese and remained camoflauged/hidden, but if they open fire or reveal themselves during a sustained operation they will be.

[bdmilne]

The purpose of the Midway operation was to draw out the American Fleet so it could be destroyed. Occupying Midway (or trying to) was the bait. Occupying Midway would have been more of a liability than an asset to the Japanese. They did not have the capacity to keep it furnished with troops and supplies, even if they had sunk the US carriers.

The IJN at Midway would have been better served to have kept the fleet together (skip Alaska). The US would have reacted to an invasion/bombardment of Midway anyway. If the IJN carriers were positioned northeast of the main fleet (behind it), they could have launched an initial strike on Midway, then have the main fleet finish off the defenses of Midway by guns. Midway was not that large. When two Japanese battleships attacked Guadalcanal they flattened the airfield. We had 25000 troops there, not 1500 like on Midway. A lot of marines would have died under such an attack. With the carriers shielded by the main force, the US carriers would have to come to them. Once the US forces found the main fleet (and not the carriers), they would have attacked. The Japanese only had to follow the US planes back and attack. Whether the Japanese took Midway then or not, they could have come back and taken it later.

What would have been interesting is if the US Fleet did not come out to meet the Japanese. They did not have enough oil to stick around for any amount of time more than days, a week or two at most. Even if they take Midway, we could have taken it back later. We could have isolated it and reduced its air force and forced the IJN to come to its defense. That could have been the decisive battle of the war, on our terms, not the Japanese.

None of it really mattered. On the day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the US was building (ships in slips being built) 8 battleships, 12 Essex class carriers (to be expanded to 24), 31 crusiers, and lots of destroyers and submarines. We were building a new fleet larger than the IJN, and we already had a fleet larger than the IJN. The outcome of the war in the Pacific was a foregone conclusion.

[glenn239]

. Midway was not that large. When two Japanese battleships attacked Guadalcanal they flattened the airfield. We had 25000 troops there, not 1500 like on Midway. A lot of marines would have died under such an attack.

Midway is what, two square miles? That six million square yards. Against dug-in targets (and everyone on Midway was dug-in) the area of effect of even heavy shells might only be 3 or 4 yards, or maybe 13 square yards per heavy shell. That would be 500,000 heavy shells.

They did not have enough oil to stick around for any amount of time more than days, a week or two at most

Which was it? Days or two weeks?

None of it really mattered. On the day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the US was building (ships in slips being built) 8 battleships, 12 Essex class carriers (to be expanded to 24), 31 crusiers, and lots of destroyers and submarines. We were building a new fleet larger than the IJN, and we already had a fleet larger than the IJN. The outcome of the war in the Pacific was a foregone conclusion.

The outcome of the war was a forgone conclusion? Stop the presses! This is new information!

Just kidding. Welcome to the discussion.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Looking at the war record of the Nautalus I see it replenished at Midway the night of the 6-7 June. This caused to wonder what USN subs were deployed south of Midway, or near it, and what were the odds of any being in position to attack the Japanese transport/fire support fleet shortly after dawn on L Day?

[Carl Schwamberger]

It appears there were 12 US submarines in the western picket line covering Midway and the carrier TF. At least half refueled at Midway from the 5th through 11th June. In theory at least half could have reach Midway by the 6th had they been ordered to concentrate there. Another three were further east in the "Short Stop" position between Midway & Oahu.

Post battle part of these fanned out to the west is a sort of pursuit of the Japanese to Japan and the Marianas. The Nautalus is credited with sinking the destroyer Yamakaze 25 June. So we can see the torpedos did sometimes explode correctly.