Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

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glenn239
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#16

Post by glenn239 » 27 Nov 2014, 19:39

Any battle would have not been one battle, but actually two separate battles, one for Eastern Island (IJA, USMC?) and a second one for Sand Island (IJN, US Army?). These islands were separated by about 1-2km of water and restricted lines of fire, which means the defenders of each island had limited to no capacity to reinforce the other, but the attackers with naval superiority, could concentrate their efforts on one island.

The NAS was on Eastern Island, meaning that the bulk of the Marine defences were there as well? Were there many marines on Sand Island? Assuming the bulk of the defence is on Eastern Island, Ichiki is probably repulsed with heavy losses. But if that ties down most of the defences, does that mean that the SNLF landing on Sand Island might have a chance, especially if the attack reinforces any success?

ChristopherPerrien
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#17

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 27 Nov 2014, 20:41

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
If the Japanese had a well rehearsed procedure for directing the NGF support, had the islands properly mapped out and accurate reference points for orienting the naval guns, robust spotting teams able to asorb casualties & remain effective, had alternate frequencies and routing for gunfire direction on the radios, and a flexible fire plan: then they might have chance.
ty?
The Japanese had absolutely no intel on the defences of Midway or of Midway itself past a few pre-war Pam-AM photos and what maps had been made pre-war, as the only+ last Flying boat scheduled to photograph and performed that recon was shot down/canceled.

Yes it is that bad.

It appears Yamamoto , if he had any strategic/tactical acumen knew/planned a Midway invasion as only a feint to draw US forces. I cannot believe he thought Midway would be "Wake" , with only 500 US troops, 6 months after the start of war.

IMO, he was looking for that "decisive battle" , but not the Japanese idea of the "decisive battle". Perhaps he already knew the war was lost, as it is hinted he conceded that even before the Pearl Harbor op.

I am going to go out on a limb and say Yamamoto was making a last "gambler's throw". He staked all on the Midway naval battle , for being able to stay "in the game". Midway and the Aleutians were distractions for him to be able to do a "last throw". Claims that he was able to push the Midway Op through Japanese High Command , because of the Dolittle raid. I don't think he expected or cared if the Midway invasion worked, but it looked good to his superiors, he really wanted a final glorious Battleship battle 8-) .

I understand Yamamoto was an incorrigible (sp?) gambler and very good at gambling, Midway looks like another write-off bluff/ unimportant side bet to push a personal bet

The old Tsushima battle may have influenced Yamamoto more than we know, he did lose half a hand there.


flakbait
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#18

Post by flakbait » 28 Nov 2014, 05:48

The post of the PT boats present would add an interesting wrinkle into attempting to form up any assault landing forces, especially if those PTs managed to torpedo several of the almost motionless transports disembarking troops. While not the heavily armed barge busting versions used later in the Solomons, New Guinia and the Phillipines none the less these PTs after launching their 4 torpedoes each, would likely go racing in and raking those landing craft at point blank range with their single 20MM cannon and twin .50 cal MGs would probably have NOT helped the SNLF to manage to get ashore in anything resembling an organized coordinated assault. Could easily see any Japanese deck guns even able to get in a clear shot at the attacking PTs easily also killing as many near by Japanese troops and perhaps even more importantly sinking or damaging more than a few of those critically needed landing craft...from the Japanese tactical view this just keeps getting WORSE.

glenn239
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#19

Post by glenn239 » 28 Nov 2014, 15:53

I doubt the PT boats would remain an effective force after the air attacks on the 5th. Once the seaplane base was established on Kure Island and these identified by seaplanes operating there, the covering force could have been sent ahead to eliminate the PT boats in daylight before the transports arrived. This, if air attacks were not able to eliminate them. If the defending coastal artillery engaged the covering force in daylight during the 5th, then Kondo had the option to send in heavy firepower - battleships and more cruisers.

Anyways, the fact that there were two islands appears to have been the sole advantage the attackers possessed. Sand Island had the PBY base while Eastern Island the air strip. The Marine garrison therefore would have been divided. With warship fire dominating the waters between the islands, it would have been no easy task for the defenders to reinforce the other island if its garrison were being overwelmed, whereas the invasion could have switched its emphasis between islands with greater ease.

flakbait
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#20

Post by flakbait » 28 Nov 2014, 19:25

Admittedly the `wooden wonders` were not the toughest of naval craft, but too am not overly certain the Japanese would have initially placed much priority upon destroying them. And while they would obviously could be hit and sunk with a single well placed shell more than 1 badly shot up PT did in fact come back home. With 6 of them suddenly roaring out of the channel with 4 torpedoes a piece even assuming only 1 torpedo hit from each boat against the large slowly moving transports, that`s 6 hits, plus the interferance with the assault waves trying to form up...which ultimately might be a more valuable contribution in the long run.

glenn239
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#21

Post by glenn239 » 28 Nov 2014, 20:48

I don't think much could be expected from PT boats. The marines, OTOH, would probably have proven too tough to overcome. No need to write a novel when the non-fiction section has the same book with the same ending.

flakbait
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#22

Post by flakbait » 29 Nov 2014, 04:51

From the possibility of the ad hoc "mines" working their havoc among those Japanese SNLF troops `fortunate` enough to get ashore to sending the 5 M-2 light tanks charging thru them and churning them up and down the beaches to allowing the transports to actually take their assigned unloading positions before allowing the 1st guns to unleash their fire won`t discount any possibly decisive tactic. You are welcome to write off the PTs, but if were the Midway commander would have used every 1 that survived that long and targeting a ship that was almost motionless less than a couple of miles offshore in broad daylight would have been just TOO tempting a target. Forcing the surviving transports to suddenly get back underway with dozens of fragile fully loaded Dahatsu landing craft surrounding themselves to avoid being sitting ducks for even just the shore batteries would have been IDEAL; could easily see 1/5th of the 1st wave Dahatsus thus run down, or swamped which pretty much would be the utter end of any serious landing attempt short of the crippled ships being deliberately run aground to prevent their sinking. Even with 2X the number of troops and 3X the number of landing craft WILL completely agree the Imperial Japanese landing force was just going to get flat out slaughtered...

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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#23

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 29 Nov 2014, 05:23

glenn239 wrote:Any battle would have not been one battle, but actually two separate battles, one for Eastern Island (IJA, USMC?) and a second one for Sand Island (IJN, US Army?). These islands were separated by about 1-2km of water and restricted lines of fire, which means the defenders of each island had limited to no capacity to reinforce the other, but the attackers with naval superiority, could concentrate their efforts on one island.

The NAS was on Eastern Island, meaning that the bulk of the Marine defences were there as well? Were there many marines on Sand Island? Assuming the bulk of the defence is on Eastern Island, Ichiki is probably repulsed with heavy losses. But if that ties down most of the defences, does that mean that the SNLF landing on Sand Island might have a chance, especially if the attack reinforces any success?
Both islands were defended.
Assuming the bulk of the defence is on Eastern Island,
...should not be assumed. I've nothing in detail on the gun positions. This suggests you do?
" and restricted lines of fire, which means the defenders of each island had limited to no capacity to reinforce the other"
A look at that would sort some of this out.

Attached is a photo of a ammunition bunker still existant on Sand Island, and of a MG bunker adrift on a beach.
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but the attackers with naval superiority, could concentrate their efforts on one island.
If the landing plan is flexible, includes a robust reserve to reinforce success, and communications between the commander afloat and the commanders ashore are in good order then yes it is possible to reinforce success. The fragments I've seen of the landing plan, mostly from quotes from participants are ambigious on this. Having the landing plan or at least some reliable summaries would be helpful here. All I can gather at this point is a Army battalion was to attack one island and a SNLF group the other.

flakbait
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#24

Post by flakbait » 29 Nov 2014, 09:03

Would like to find a DETAILED map of Midway`s defenses in June 1942 as well as Japanese SNLF assault plans if they exist...

ChristopherPerrien
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#25

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 29 Nov 2014, 14:24

flakbait wrote: that was almost motionless less than a couple of miles offshore in broad daylight would have been just TOO tempting a target. Forcing the surviving transports to suddenly get back underway with dozens of fragile fully loaded Dahatsu landing craft surrounding themselves to avoid being sitting ducks for even just the shore batteries would have been IDEAL; could easily see 1/5th of the 1st wave Dahatsus thus run down, Even with 2X the number of troops and 3X the number of landing craft WILL completely agree the Imperial Japanese landing force was just going to get flat out slaughtered...
2x troops is still not 3:1.

More importantly , I can only see this op having a chance if conducted at night. The only 2 successful amphib attacks the Japanese conducted were Wake and Corregidor. Both were night ops(literally had to be).

For some reason I automatically assumed the Japanese would have done this at night, unless the op orders say otherwise. Daylight seems insane , especially given past Japanese experience.

Lack of intel is really going to kill them more than anything, Corregidor they shelled and looked at for months ,and Wake they attacked once and shelled and bombed over two weeks , and then got stupidly lucky(because of Devereau's surrender) to win. In both cases they had time to plan , for Midway , they show up and got two days at most to launch troops heading toward shore, and their numbers are fixed and split between two objectives.

ChristopherPerrien
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#26

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 29 Nov 2014, 14:48

Some tid-bits as I dig for actual Japanese plans and Midway defenses.
The man responsible for planning the Japanese amphibious landing on Midway Atoll was Commander Yasumi Toyama. Toyama laboured under a number of serious disadvantages. The only maps of Midway Atoll in his possession were old and likely to be unreliable. Toyama had no aerial photographs of the atoll because the pilots of Marine Fighter Squadron VMF-221 had intercepted and shot down a Japanese four-engined Kawanishi 97 "Mavis" patrol flying boat that had been approaching Midway on 10 March 1942. This Japanese flying boat had come from Wake Island and had been assigned to carry out a photographic reconnaissance of Midway to provide intelligence for the Japanese amphibious assault on Midway in June.

Toyama had no intelligence concerning the defences of Midway and the number of defenders. The Navy planners expected to face about 750 US Marines, and that would have been the pre-war strength of the Midway Detachment, Fleet Marine Force. The Army estimate was more realistic; they expected that the Marine strength would be closer to 2,000. It was anticipated that the Marines might have between 50-60 planes on the atoll.

Toyama planned a simultaneous attack on Sand and Eastern Islands from the southern side of the atoll where the two islands were close to the reef. The Japanese landing force would number about 5,000, and would be spearheaded by two elite assault units - Captain Minoru Ota's 2nd Combined Special Naval Landing Force numbering about one thousand five hundred marines, and the Army's Ichiki Detachment which numbered about two thousand men and was commanded by Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki.
http://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/Preparations.html

ChristopherPerrien
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#27

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 29 Nov 2014, 15:11

flakbait wrote:Would like to find a DETAILED map of Midway`s defenses in June 1942 as well as Japanese SNLF assault plans if they exist...
I would suggest asking the Midway Roundtable http://www.midway42.org/, I would expect they might have something , in adition to maybe sand-table reproductions.

You could go bother Tully or just ask at Combined Fleet. :)
OP will prolly show up and comment too.
Last edited by ChristopherPerrien on 29 Nov 2014, 15:31, edited 1 time in total.

ChristopherPerrien
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#28

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 29 Nov 2014, 15:15

Still no luck on a beach defense map. However I did find an intersting site with many detailed and even color pictures I have not seen. This caught my eye first. http://peopleus.blogspot.com/2013/11/ba ... l-sea.html
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ChristopherPerrien
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#29

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 29 Nov 2014, 15:26

Frustratingly fuzzy from Fyperwar. :oops: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Midway.html best I can find so far
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glenn239
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#30

Post by glenn239 » 29 Nov 2014, 17:39

That map looks like what Shattered Sword's map is based on. Doesn't detail the specifics of the infantry defenses though, and whether one island had heavier defences, or whether both islands were equally well defended.

Daylight seems insane , especially given past Japanese experience.

Night landings were good at undefended points, but Midway was to be an assault landing, (while underestimating the size of the garrison, the size of the islands and intensive fortification was known). In an assault landing, daylight is better because the attacker has artillery and air power. The warships had something in the order of 100 25mm-ish guns, 40x8" pieces, and around 70-75 x 5" or 5.5". Plus 250 aircraft of Kido Butai and another 30 or so seaplanes. Landing at night would give all that up, which is why they picked dawn.
Both islands were defended.
I wondered whether both islands were being defended equally, or if the bulk of the defences were on one island or the other. Of the two, Eastern Island with the air strip was more important. Tanaka should have had aboard Jinstu by noon on 5 June detailed images of the island and the reef. The weakness to the defence was the open approaches through the reef to the northwest of Sand Island. This was unknown before the battle, but would Japanese photography have shown this, and could Tanaka have revised the SNLF landing plan to account for it? If the SNLF went in on the south shore as per the original plan, (made without adequate photography), it would probably bog down.
If the landing plan is flexible, includes a robust reserve to reinforce success, and communications between the commander afloat and the commanders ashore are in good order then yes it is possible to reinforce success.
The landing plan was not flexible in that it would be one wave for each island. However, from what I've read the follow up waves do not appear to have been pre-allocated, and therefore could be concentrated on one island or the other as the situation evolved. In terms of communication, establishing this with the shore would have been much more valuable than no communication, but a wave pinned down on the reef would be visible without radio communication, so by simply watching the battle, Jinstu probably gains enough information to see whether one, the other, or both landings had failed and were pinned down short of the beach.

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