Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

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flakbait
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#61

Post by flakbait » 10 Dec 2014, 06:25

The complexities of the CRITICAL "real time' ability to effectively communicate between the embarked assault SNLF forces and Japanese NGF ships and aircraft would be THE single most important factor in the assault itself. Whether the assault included the attached PB craft ramming ashore beaching themselves as part of the landing craft wave might in the end be decisive; these ships DID have crow`s nests (look out stations ie, observation/ spotters posts on their masts), radios as well as some light deck guns plus their own crews to bolster the numbers of attackers. Exactly just how close in they can get before being neutralized (grounded, wrecked or sunk) as well as exactly WHERE they manage to (or don`t manage to) get to and in what numbers might ultimately be the deciding factor. Obviously, they themselves are going to be THE 1st priority targets for a short period of time anyway, possibly allowing at least some of the transports further out to safely disembark their troops...SO many variables !

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#62

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 11 Dec 2014, 01:24

flakbait wrote:The complexities of the CRITICAL "real time' ability to effectively communicate between the embarked assault SNLF forces and Japanese NGF ships and aircraft would be THE single most important factor in the assault itself.
It is certainly a huge equalizer. I was just reviewing the NGF fire support in assorted other landings & in those it is clear the ships were unable to do any precision or timely support without fast ship to shore communications. Even off Omaha Beach the destroyers that came to the surf line had severe difficulty locating the German MG & cannon positions. One officer aboard a destroyer off Omaha described watching a US tank ashore firing for a while & then fired where they guessed the target might be based on impacts of the tanks 75mm ammunition. They could see the 75mm ammo detonating, but not the camoflaged bunker. In many cases they were unable to see the intended target due to it being in defilade, or smoke & haze on the target area. In this case it is clear that point blank ranges of 800 to 1200 meters still had major issues in target spotting by the ships. In the end it required the radio communications to be restored to make the NGF as effective as necessary. Off Salerno a German tank regiment manuvering towards the beach on forward slopes could not be spotted by the NGF ships 5000 to 10,000 meters off shore. Radio comm to spotting teams and infantry CP did lead to accurate fires on the manuvering German Pz Div @ Salerno.
flakbait wrote: Whether the assault included the attached PB craft ramming ashore beaching themselves as part of the landing craft wave might in the end be decisive; these ships DID have crow`s nests (look out stations ie, observation/ spotters posts on their masts), radios as well as some light deck guns plus their own crews to bolster the numbers of attackers. Exactly just how close in they can get before being neutralized (grounded, wrecked or sunk)
I think there are some maps linked early in this thread. Looking at what I have here 600+ meters from the high water line looks possible in some places. that is a long way for the landing party aboard to wade (swim?) to dry ground.
flakbait wrote: as well as exactly WHERE they manage to (or don`t manage to) get to and in what numbers might ultimately be the deciding factor. Obviously, they themselves are going to be THE 1st priority targets for a short period of time anyway, possibly allowing at least some of the transports further out to safely disembark their troops...SO many variables !
Stationary makes the gunnery solution so much simpler 8-)


Rob Stuart
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#63

Post by Rob Stuart » 11 Dec 2014, 09:02

flakbait wrote:The complexities of the CRITICAL "real time' ability to effectively communicate between the embarked assault SNLF forces and Japanese NGF ships and aircraft would be THE single most important factor in the assault itself.
Yes, ship-shore comms would be critical, and not just for NGF. I have a copy of the History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals and from it and other sources it's clear that the landing at Dieppe in August 1942 went as badly as it did due in part to the failure of ship-shore comms. The landing forces had a fair number of decent manpack and other tactical radios but most of the signalmen carrying them were killed or pinned down. Few messages reached the force commander on his ship offshore and some which did were misleading, leading him to order his reserve infantry battalion, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, to land as a reinforcement. That unfortunate decision merely added another 544 killed, wounded or taken prisoner to the casualty lists.

ChristopherPerrien
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#64

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 11 Dec 2014, 16:53

I don' think "coordination" is something the Japanese had or even needed with their crude Amphib Ops. Midway is going to be executed just like Wake. One wave in landing craft and rubber boats will be repulsed with heavy losses, the second wave will be converted destroyers crashing into the reefs loaded with whatever survived the first wave plus any secondary supporting troops and whatever extraneous/wasteable sailors that can be armed. They will attack both islands both times.

glenn239
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#65

Post by glenn239 » 11 Dec 2014, 17:04

The Marine defences appear comparable to Dieppe or Omaha, but with the added problem of the coral reef. So an assault over the south shore was likely to fail - radio communication or not, judging from Dieppe and Omaha. Unless one of the assaults got a beachhead and was reinforced.

The question remains whether photo recon from Kure Island on the 5th might have altered the attack plan from the south shore to the north west - the gap in the reef is clearly visible.

flakbait
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#66

Post by flakbait » 12 Dec 2014, 02:55

Even if the NGF support is largely ineffective as was several Allied attempts at it later in WW2 the need for effective co-ordination is still there if only to offer the defenders a tempting choice of numbers of BIG relatively slowly moving juicy targets while getting the Marine defenders at best to partially ignore or at least divide their fire power between the assault waves and those succulent tempting Imperial cruisers which might be able to take a couple of rounds and then dish it back out. Any defending fire NOT put on the landing craft and PBs only helps more SNLF troops get ashore...co-ordinating these efforts again is paramount.

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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#67

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Dec 2014, 06:03

Here are a couple views of the atoll.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midway_Ato ... o_2008.JPG

The navigation channel is & was in 1942 on the south side of the atoll. There are gaps in the reef rim on the north west side of the atoll. Between them & the islands is a 2 - 3 mile streach of sand bars & coral heads. Depth varies with the tide. Skimming this area with Google Earth shows the depth between 12 & 0 meters, but it is not clear if this is average depth, at low tide, or high tide.

The resolution on Google Earth was not enough to clearly identify the remnants of the defense works. Notice that the original airfield has been abandoned & a currently used instalation is on Sand Island.
Attachments
Midway.jpg

glenn239
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#68

Post by glenn239 » 12 Dec 2014, 15:52

The shipping channel would be suicide for a Diahatsu.

The gap northwest of Sand Island looks navigable for Diahatsu direct from deep ocean to the beach in daylight. The distance of several miles is no issue to a Daihatsu. It is also in all probability in the lee of the island, and the waters certainly is calm once inside the reef.

In going to google street view, the airfield on Sand Island has a thick forest to its northwest, that mask the beaches of Sand Island on the north west side from the rest of the island.

If the original plan was executed, I think the likely conclusion is the invasion would be defeated and forced to evacuate. If the gap northwest of Sand Island caused the SNLF to attack through the reef and land on the northwest shore of Sand Island, that could secure a beachhead.

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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#69

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Dec 2014, 16:16

Tides there these days are negligable. http://tides.mobilegeographics.com/locations/5579.html

That site only goes back to 1970, but the changes are not much. This is not unlike Betio island where the variation in 1943 was imperceptible. Maybe a sport diving site will have some info on the Lagoon.

Still cant find a usable map of the fortifications. This web page has a description of the weapons on hand: http://www.wargamer.com/article/3368/hi ... -of-midway

I'd forgotten abut the old 7" naval rifles, saved back when some US predreanoughts were scrapped. If those get a salvo on a cruiser it will be morale boosting for the defense.

RichTO90
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#70

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Dec 2014, 21:46

Carl Schwamberger wrote:Tides there these days are negligable. http://tides.mobilegeographics.com/locations/5579.html

That site only goes back to 1970, but the changes are not much. This is not unlike Betio island where the variation in 1943 was imperceptible. Maybe a sport diving site will have some info on the Lagoon.

Still cant find a usable map of the fortifications. This web page has a description of the weapons on hand: http://www.wargamer.com/article/3368/hi ... -of-midway

I'd forgotten abut the old 7" naval rifles, saved back when some US predreanoughts were scrapped. If those get a salvo on a cruiser it will be morale boosting for the defense.
Carl,

If you can locate a copy of Lt.Col. Robert Heinl's Marines at Midway, June 1942, it contains a pretty good map. The basic organization was:

6th Defense Battalion (Reinforced) – c. 2,130 O&EM
Commanding Officer Col. Harold D. Shannon
Commanding Officer, Eastern Island Group Maj. William W. Benson

Seacoast Artillery Group
Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Lewis A. Hohn
Battery A (2 5-inch)
Battery B (2 5-inch)
Battery C (2 5-inch)
Sand Island 7-inch Battery, Provisional (2 7-inch; manned by Battery B)
Eastern Island 7-inch Battery, Provisional (2 7-inch; manned by Battery A)
Sand Island 3-inch Navy Battery, Provisional (2 3-inch; manned by Battery C)
Eastern Island 3-inch Navy Battery, Provisional (2 3-inch; manned by Battery A)

6th Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Group
Commanding Officer Maj. Charles T. Tingle
Battery D (4 3-inch AA)
Battery E (4 3-inch AA)
Battery F (4 3-inch AA)
Battery G (searchlight)

6th Defense Battalion Special Weapons Group
Commanding Officer Capt. Robert E. Hommel
Battery H (24 .50-caliber MG)
Battery I (24 .30-caliber MG)
Tank Platoon, Provisional (5 M2A4 Light Tanks)

3d Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Group
Commanding Officer Maj. Chandler W. Johnson
Battery D (4 3-inch AA)
Battery E (4 3-inch AA)
Battery F (4 3-inch AA)

3d Defense Battalion Special Weapons Group
Battery K (8 37-mm)
Battery L (18 twin 20-mm on 40-mm carriage)

Provisional Infantry Group
Detachment, 2d Raider (Each company included a weapons platoon of 2 60-mm mortars and 2 .30-caliber M1919A4 MG.)
Company C
Company D
Provisional Marine Companies (Each company included a weapons platoon armed with 2 60-mm mortars, 2 .30-caliber M191A4 MG, and 2 M1916 37-mm guns.)
22d Provisional Marine Company
23d Provisional Marine Company

RichTO90
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#71

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Dec 2014, 22:12

glenn239 wrote:The question remains whether photo recon from Kure Island on the 5th might have altered the attack plan from the south shore to the north west - the gap in the reef is clearly visible.
The "reef gap" was the original Seward Channel to Welles Harbor, unused after the Brooke Channel dredging was completed in 1938. The Seward Channel was considered difficult due to its meandering course and numerous coral heads, which was compounded by shallowness at low tide, which is why the effort was made to dredge the Brooke Channel. In any case, approaches from the Seward Channel were in easy range of the Sand Island 3-inch/23 Battery, Battery A and C (5-inch/51), and Battery D (3-inch/50 AA), so at least ten 3-inch guns. Battery F (3-inch/50 AA) on the extreme eastern end of Sand island also likely would have been able to bear. The overgrown area around the Cable Station on the north side of Sand Island was also where the island's Provisional Infantry Group was headquartered.

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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#72

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Dec 2014, 15:57

Found Heinls text on line: Unfortunatly it does not include the graphics. No photos, maps or illustrations, just the captions. Skimmed through it and found a lot of what has been quoted or referd to here is in that text. Also saw a few cannards or errors. ie: Henil quotes a Japanese admiral describing Captain Flemmings SDB hitting the aft turret of the Mogami. Other evidence does not strongly support this collision.

Back to work

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Takao
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#73

Post by Takao » 13 Dec 2014, 16:49

Internet Archive(for viewing or download):
https://archive.org/details/MarinesAtMidway

Map:
https://ia802607.us.archive.org/BookRea ... 8&rotate=0

With regards to Admiral Soji, he denied his original statement in 1961, as per footnote on pg. 425 of Gordon Prange's "Miracle at Midway."

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#74

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Dec 2014, 18:53

Thanks for the map. Tho it does not show the location of the lighter weapons it gives a idea of the distribution of the defense. From the map and 1940s photos it looks like Spit island was smaller back then. Perhaps it was expanded with dredge spoil from Brooke Channel.

I'm certain there are copies or original of the defense maps for Midway in the Library/archive at Quantico. Many years ago a friend found easily the pre and post battle charts of the Japanese defense on Betio island possesed by the MC Historical Branch. Wish I had been able to obtain copies of his. Unfortunatly Parkinsons disease & related problems intervened to swiftly.

flakbait
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Re: Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

#75

Post by flakbait » 13 Dec 2014, 23:23

The map is certainly better than nothing. With at least 6 batteries covering Brookes Channel could see the Marines` big guns remaining silent until the assault wave was at practically point blank range before unleashing the 1st salvo with fully 1/2 of the SNLF lost before the 1st Japanese steps foot on either island. This of course would all but ultimately doom the assault...with the airfield on Eastern Island would think the majority of the attackers would land there to try to rapidly secure it.

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