Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

[Rob Stuart]

Once the survivors do get ashore without just about superb and instant NGF support and the means to competently direct it their beachhead is going to be rapidly wiped out.

Counterattacking into an established beach head backed by corps-level artillery firepower would have been virtual suicide for the garrison, even supposing inadequate ship to shore communications.

Why would the Marines need to counterattack? If most of their heavy weapons remain in action, they can prevent reinforcements, ammo, food or water reaching the Japanese troops who make it ashore and can keep the bombarding ships from coming in close. They can then wait until the Japanese make one of their banzai charges, which they will most likely wipe out. And if the Marines do counterattack they won't do a banzai charge along the whole perimeter of the beachhead. They'll aim to seize key ground from which they can dominate the rest of the beachhead. The Japanese troops ashore will suffer from inadequate intra-unit communications just as much or more as from poor shore-ship comms and the defenders' fire will prevent almost all movement within the beachhead, so it will be virtually impossible to react promptly to a Marine counterattack by moving troops to the spot under attack.

[RichTO90]

Agreed, but it is one of the few instances I can think of where strong coastal batteries fired off their entire ammunition supply at Daihatsu-like targets at battle ranges broadly similar to what they’d be at Midway.

"Strong" is possibly a misnomer when applied to the Westkappelle batteries. Only four were truly rapid-firing guns suitable for anti-boat defense - the four ex-British 3.7" AA guns. It is unsurprising it is the one that - according to Zaloga - fired off "most" of its 2,628 rounds (657 per gun), since the 3.7" QF had a sustained rate of fire of 10 rounds-per-minute and a maximum rate of as many as 20 rounds. However, the 15cm Tbtk C/36 maximum EOF was just seven to eight rounds-per-minute and in those conditions probably half that. The 22cm (f) (probably Schneider K532) guns were totally unsuited for engaging small craft given they had a ROF of about one round-per-minute.

OTOH, the eight 3"/50 were capable of a devastating 15-20 rounds-per-minute, the 3"/23 eight to nine, and the 5"/51 the same. Eight highly suitable guns and six moderately suitable guns versus four and four respectively.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
However the massive Demoralization that occurred on Wake, beccause of the Pearl Harbor raid and being "cut-off" , and abandoned, was not present at Midway.

....

Even with that the Wake garrison managed inflict severe casulaties on the second landing force, & effectively destroyed one landing group.

[Carl Schwamberger]

.... And if the Marines do counterattack they won't do a banzai charge along the whole perimeter of the beachhead. They'll aim to seize key ground from which they can dominate the rest of the beachhead. ...

If the survivors accounts are of any use the defenders on Wake did make a charge. About company size, possiblly organized and led by a Master Sgt. This attack left most of the Japanese in that group dead or wounded, with a few survivors scattered in the dunes & brush. Usually on Guadalcanal counter attacks were a series of platoon sized attacks with heavy fire support from HMG and automatic rifles. Tho aircooled MG had been introduced the Marines were not yet practicing much tactics appropriate to MMG or LMG, other than with the BAR.

[ChristopherPerrien]

I am a little fuzzy on the actual date of the Japanese invasion. Would it be the 5th or the 6th? I am thinking the landing was to be the 5th. Many accounts/plans state the 6th but I believe those don't compensate for the "Date line".

Anyway, this operation happening is plausible with one change , the US fleet doesn't show up till the 5th or "maybe" the 6th.

The only problem with that is, the 1st Air-Fleet may even be more unprepared and vulnerable, and tied to Midway on the 5th or the 6th than they were on the 4th, if the "invasion" turns into a "mess". Does the Yamato and Nagato and the rest of the IJN show up and pound the island for 1-2 days? Do they flee? Do they somehow take the island? When do the American show up? If the invasion force is expended on the 5th what do the Japnese do?

The point I am trying to make , is things could well have gone far worse for the Japanese either if they had taken the island or lost the invasion battle. US PBY's would give locations of IJN forces close to MIdway over the proceeding days, giving the USN the ability to close-in or back -off and to "pick and choose Japanese ship/fleet targets. The Japanese fleet would be "near-sighted' with their FM1 Pete's, or even if they decided to use Kates in recon(tying up offensive assets there) compared to the PBY's.

Also there is the issue of more US subs showing up, to attack and shadow IJN forces.

These items may be the real issues why pre-op IJN Staff studies/war-games boded ill for this whole operation.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I am a little fuzzy on the actual date of the Japanese invasion. Would it be the 5th or the 6th? I am thinking the landing was to be the 5th. Many accounts/plans state the 6th but I believe those don't compensate for the "Date line".

Good question. Does it make more sense to sync this to Japanese dates or Hawaiian dates?

Anyway this operation happening is plausible with one change , the US fleet doesn't show up till the 5th or "maybe" the 6th.

Or later. If the USN is unwarned of the date, and not at sea then Nimitz may hold up the carrier deployment until the Saratoga is closer to combat ready (8th June?). He may not wait until the Sara is completely ready, but close enough it can catch up. That could put the US naval intervention back to the 6th. 7th. or even 8th, and perhaps with four carriers.

The only problem with that is, the 1st Air-Fleet may even be more unprepared and vulnerable, and tied to Midway on the 5th or the 6th than they were on the 4th, if the "invasion" turns into a "mess". Does the Yamato and Nagato and the rest of the IJN show up and pound the island for 1-2 days? Do they flee? Do they somehow take the island?

The whole point to this operation is to strike a decisive blow at the US fleet. Attacking Midway is a secondary operation that enables the main op by drawing out the US fleet. (Securing Midway as a possible base is a third hand benefit.) Yamamoto would be thinking to retain his combat power for attacking the fleet, on the 5th or 6th. Nagumos decision to strike the island defense a second time on the 4th is a deviation from Yamotos intent, which I do not entirely understand.

This means that until the US fleet is discounted Yamoto will not direct the main fleet to put its full power vs Midway. He is not going to want to expend the bulk of his ships ammuntion, manuvering fuel, and aircraft ordnance against the island while expecting the USN to steam up onto the horizon.

When do the American show up? If the invasion force is expended on the 5th what do the Japnese do?

Yamotos first intent/priority was to destroy the US fleet. Failure of the landing party is anoying in that context, but not a show stopper. As with Wake a second landing force can be made up. If, anyone sees it as necessary. Yamamotos hope was the remaining US fleet: 2 carriers and 3-4 BB (?) would be sunk & severely damaged leaving the Pacific wide open to unfettered naval ops by Japan. That was hoped to bring the US at last to negotiations for a cease fire & eventual armistice.

The way I see this falling out is the Japanese land on the 6th Hawaiian date. If the USN is already driven off then Yamoto authorizes unfettered support for the landing, including fire support from the main battle fleet. That does not guarantee the IJN would do something outside its regular practice, but it is not impossible. Also more air support, which is more likely than BB bombardment.

If the USN is not encountered until the 6th or later, then the landing force will have only the assigned fire support ships, and very little air support, as Yamamoto will be holding back his combat power for the primary object.

The point I am trying to make , is things could well have gone far worse for the Japanese either if they had taken the island or lost the invasion battle. US PBY's would give locations of all forces close to MIdway over the proceeding days, giving the USN the ability to close-in or back -off and to "pick and choose Japanese ship/fleet targets. The Japanese fleet would be "near-sighted' with their FM1 Pete's, or even if they decided to use Kates in recon(tying up offensive assets there) compared to the PBY's.

Once tactical ops started both sides came under increasing pressure to use radio to adjust battle plans. That allows RDF to enter in & assist in clarifying the intel picture. This works for both sides as the IJN had a capable Signals Intel detachment afloat.

Also there is the issue of more US subs showing up, and attack and shadow.

To digress; WI the Nautalus gets a torpedo hit on a IJN carrier on the morning of the 4th?

To summarize:

1. US fleet defeated 4th or 5th June?

....A. Yes: Then enhanced support for the landing force.

....B. No: Small fire support package for landing force, as planned.

2. US fleet not located defeated 4th - 6th June. Then planned small fire support package for landing force through 6th June. I have trouble seeing a significant reinforcement of fire support occuring on the 7th if the US fleet is not yet found. Maybe some small half measure? Perhaps significant reinforcement of fire support on the 8th if the landing force has survived?

[ChristopherPerrien]

More monkey wrenches for both sides. If the USN doesn't show till the 5th or 6th or 7th ,that puts them at risk of running into the IJN submarine screen. With the 7-8th they gain the Saratoga but the IJN subs are floating around somewhere, As are US subs around the IJN.

The 7th and 8th and prolly even the 6th become very serious issues for the IJN as they would have to be refuelling many ships. Hell, I don't even know if the IJN had the "tankage" to hang around Midway after the 6th.

Kinda weird , but if the Marines on Midway hold out for 3 days(5-6-7), and the USN doesn't show or waits till the 8th, the US wins by default.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I dont know about winning by default, but it complicates things to the IJN. Midway sucumbing on the 6th or 7th was the concept, so there would have to be provision for the entire fleet to remain on station til then, and likely the 8th. I'm sure Glen has enough information on the refueling capability to clarify this for us. OP & other likely have some other info for other aspects of loitering.

[ChristopherPerrien]

I dont know about winning by default, but it complicates things to the IJN. Midway sucumbing on the 6th or 7th was the concept, so there would have to be provision for the entire fleet to remain on station till then, and likely the 8th. I'm sure Glen has enough information on the refueling capability to clarify this for us. OP & other likely have some other info for other aspects of loitering.

What I mean is the IJN has to leave the scene by around the 8th, because of logistics concerns, if there is no " naval battle" at all, leaving the USN a victory by default. Merely taking Midway without a Naval Battle , doesn't justify all the oil the IJN burnt up. The ALeutians were a waste too.


On the dateline.
In discussions, it is best, IMO, to use times reflecting the where a battle is/was , and then including a note/comment for any dateline difference as to observations from a different area. "Tojo Time"

[glenn239]

Why would the Marines need to counterattack?

They wouldn’t need to, and given the artillery support, probably would be wise not to. Holding the airfield means holding the island. In a pinch the defenders could even lose all of Sand Island and still win the battle.

Hell, I don't even know if the IJN had the "tankage" to hang around Midway after the 6th.

Shattered Sword says they had the tankers for a 2 weeks off Midway – to about the 18th of June. With 15 tankers in train, that seems about right. If Yamamoto, no enemy in site, had dispensed with the battleships early on, the carriers could presumably have stayed on even longer.

I am a little fuzzy on the actual date of the Japanese invasion. Would it be the 5th or the 6th?

The invasion fleet could move something like 300-350nm per day, and I think it was about 600nm from Midway around dawn on the 4th. (Would have to check). The plan was to take Kure Island on June 5th, then invade Midway on June 6th. In order to invade Midway at dawn on the 5th, the invasion fleet would have to be no more than 300nm from Midway at dawn on the 4th - I think they were further away than that.

[Carl Schwamberger]

....

The invasion fleet could move something like 300-350nm per day, and I think it was about 600nm from Midway around dawn on the 4th. (Would have to check). The plan was to take Kure Island on June 5th, then invade Midway on June 6th. In order to invade Midway at dawn on the 5th, the invasion fleet would have to be no more than 300nm from Midway at dawn on the 4th - I think they were further away than that.

600nm is the round number given in accounts I found on the web. The time of flight of the PBY attack the evening of the 3rd suggests perhaps less.

[flakbait]

Does anyone have access to the "wish list" the Commander of the 6th Marine Defense Battalion handed to Admiral Nimitz during his May 1942 visit ? Wonder exactly just how much of his requested list he actually received in time for the battle ? Hopefully most of it...

[ChristopherPerrien]

Beer, Booze, and Broads, , I would really like to know if those guys got any of that , before the battle or afterwards.

I think he got everything else within the constraints about anything available , without even asking, as there were people a-lot higher than a mere light colonel concerned about defending Midway.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Does anyone have access to the "wish list" the Commander of the 6th Marine Defense Battalion handed to Admiral Nimitz during his May 1942 visit ? Wonder exactly just how much of his requested list he actually received in time for the battle ? Hopefully most of it...

I've a USMC Historical Div book on this squirreled away somewhere. Not trusting my memory too much... Nimitz s visit was 2 May. Subsequently I clearly remember the Raider companys, a ammunition ship, part or all of a base defense battalion, arrived. Cant say if those had been scheduled before 2 May or after. Neither do I recall what was on the ammunition delivery. or if there was more than one shipment of ammunition. The SBD squadron and the torpedo plane group was sent post 2 May, if my memory is correct.

Have no idea if the Marine fighter group or the PBY reconisance group were reinforced.

[T. A. Gardner]

A lot of what's been said here doesn't address the original question. For a successful assault I'd start at:

1. The US carriers have to be defeated. All three must be sunk or damaged forcing a withdrawal. That in turn would indicate, on average, that the Japanese lose about the same number sunk or damaged beyond continued use. That would leave Japan with one working fleet carrier. So, the next switch would be the whole of the Alaska diversion is diverted and seconded to the landing force. Junyo, Ryuho, and Zuiho are all present with about 100 aircraft total for the express purpose of supporting the actual landing.
The one remaining operational fleet carrier stands by to take on any newly arriving US fleet ships, notably the Saratoga.
This would give the Japanese control of the air over Midway for the landing.

2. The IJA would have to be involved. A single SNLF is not going to cut the mustard taking the atoll. For this I would say a reinforced brigade of about 3000 troops would be sufficient in addition to the original landing force. Sufficient landing craft and small ships to be run aground as at Wake need to be supplied to put the invasion force ashore. You bring a regiment of field artillery, preferably 105mm guns along too.

3. The Japanese shore bombardment doctrine is really pretty pathetic. At this point in the war they are going to use cruisers and destroyers to do the work ahead of the landing. So, what they do initially is once off the islands is plaster Eastern Island thoroughly (well as best they can) then land the SNLF force from patrol boats and landing craft with DD's coming in to direct fire on surviving coast defense guns. There is going to be little or no coordination between the landing force and gunfire support so you put the DD's in close and let them duel it out with the guns.
Eastern Island is much more lightly held and it is certain that within under a day the Japanese, even if suffering heavy casualties, would likely take it.

4. With Eastern Island taken, they land field artillery on that island and then make a dual invasion of Sand Island after a bombardment by aircraft and ships that has been occurring since the landing on Eastern took place. For this landing they use a combination of landing craft, patrol boats, and small boats that push across from Eastern Island through the channel.
Given about 3000 or so assaulting troops it is possible that they could take Sand Island this way even if their casualties ended up being close to 70%+ of the assaulting force. As at Wake the US is likely to surrender well before the Japanese run out of troops.

The big what-if at this point is Saratoga and the US battle line off Hawaii. Both could intervene by June 6 or 7 a couple of days after the original battle ended.
Saratoga versus one fleet carrier and three smaller carriers (and Hosho) along with a couple of seaplane tenders is going to be a nearly one-sided affair not in the US's favor.