That's interesting that you've now accepted that the 6th Panzer division did have Tigers at Kursk, yet you're still trying to point out some kind of misinformation I've given you.Yoozername wrote:Thank you for supplying the odd mis-information that you don't seem to comprehend...An indication of the difficulties the river caused can be gagued from the fact that of the entire 6th Panzer division, only a Dozen tigers.. managed to get across the Donetz that evening.. the attack came to a halt to await the rest of the Division.
1. So, answer a direct question...how many Tigers got across..of the total amount that you claim that 6th Panzer division had? You claim they had a company, no? So, a dozen got across. Explain what your logic is?
2. Your quote seems to imply that the Tigers had to wait for something...the attack came to a halt...they had to wait for the rest of the division...wait for what? Can you supply information about what else got across? Do you argue with the hope that others supply the information you seem to 'lack' or misinterpret?
Ok, Tigers got across and the other Panzers that could. Supply information regarding the Panzers "that could"...?Don't you mean that my thought would be that it's the Tigers that couldn't cross and the other Panzers that could?
Now regarding no.1 if you look carefully at that link detailing the histories of Tiger units, you'll see a couple of things.
That at the start of the battle they had 45 tanks, a full complement (you can see it described here, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_he ... #Formation right next to the part detailing how "Maintenance troubles and the mechanical unreliability of the Tigers posed a continuous problem, so often the units would field a smaller number of combat-ready tanks."), 42 of which were operational. Lets split 42 over three, seeing as we already know that 503 was parcelled out into three lots shall we?
It's 14. Whereas there's a Dozen in the 12 that managed to 'get across the Donetz that evening'(no doubt behind schedule). So German logistics were unable to support the assault crossing of a complete tank company (seeing as we've begun calling these parcels companies here) on the first day.
When they can't support one company of Tigers, how are they going to support more?
Lets look further at that link. By the 31st of July in the 503rd there are 7 losses to combat, yet only 9 out of 38 tanks are operational. So they've lost 26 tanks to breakdowns or damage & are unable to put them back in the field, yet only 7 to combat. That's more than 3 to 1 & there aren't any replacements. That doesn't describe a tank which is being supported with adequate repair facilities - a necessary component of logistical capacity for mechanized units.
Regarding No.2, it's in the link if you care to read it. There was some infantry that also got across. As for the other tanks, they had to wait for the engineers to try to get bridges across the river, that's why they couldn't cross.
Is your issue with the information that it is easily searchable with it's references a hyperlink away or are you having difficulty combining the criticisms other commenter's have pointed out to the topic of the thread that you started, i.eYoozername wrote:And, the Luftwaffe thing...should we just think you cut and paste and have no reason?
with the elaboration I've given to them?BDV wrote:And the best way to employ the Tiger was not to employ them at all... Any tank above 39 tons is a burden that flimsy German logistics just can't cope with.Tim Smith wrote:The best way for the Germans to fight the Battle of Kursk would be not to fight it at all...