Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?

[pintere]

One question that I've often wondered is how the simple, raw capabilities of the Wehrmacht changed during the course of the war on the eastern front. Another way to put this is their combat potential in a vacuum. It is distinct from their relative combat potential, which is more comparative in nature and especially so when taking into account the strength of the opposing army. So when comparing the German army at the start of Barbarossa to a later army on the eastern front, in relative combat potential the Wehrmacht of 1941 was clearly superior to later periods on the Eastern front, even though their objective combat potential might be fairly similar.

As a thought exercise for this concept, I am posing the question of how the German army would fair in attacking Russia in 1941 with their army of 1943 just before Kursk. In essence this means the German OOB, namely equipment, soldiers, motor pool, etc in 1943 would replace that of 1941. However the wider economic and political situation of 1941 (such as fuel supply and weapons production) would apply to this hypothetical army.

I realize that this scenario is totally historically impossible, but that's not the point. What I'm hoping this will enable is to see if the German army late in the war was just as, if not more so, powerful as their early war counterparts with the difference being the presence of other factors that make this fact irrelevant on a practical level.

With that, we can move on to the actual question. Would better weapons, valuable combat experience and proper winter gear give this hypothetical army a greater chance at defeating Russia than the original? Or would the reduced Luftwaffe component, weaker infantry divisions and smaller motor pool ensure victory remains from the German grasp?

[Sheldrake]

So you want to see, if the Germans, having fought in Russia for two years, would have been able to execute Op Barbarossa?

If you want to pit the German army of 1943 against the Red army of 1941 its an almost certain walk over. The scenario is only of interest as a Nazi fantasy.

Are you allowing the Red Army to learn from its mistakes too, and reset to June 1941 with its 1943 technology and state of training? Op Barbarossa would have been as disastrous as Op Zitadelle had it been launched against the red army of 1943.

Had the Germans known in 1941 what they knew in 1943 they might not have invaded the Soviet Union. The real problem with Op Barbarrosa was that military success did not bring about the collapse of the Sovietn state. German racist attitudes reinforced patriotic solidarity. By 1944 they were supporting and recruiting a lot of slavs into their armies.

The Germans would have had a better chance of success had they supported national movements in the Ukraine, Baltic states and other subject peoples of what was in practice a Russian empire. Instead of arrogantly proclaiming a racial war, position the Drang nach ostern as a campaign to liberate the peopels of the SDoviet Union from their communist and russian oppressors.

[BDV]

August 1940 or bust...

[ljadw]

If you want to pit the German army of 1943 against the Red army of 1941 its an almost certain walk over. The scenario is only of interest as a Nazi fantasy.

This is very unlikely;probably it would be a repetition of 1941 .

[Sheldrake]

If you want to pit the German army of 1943 against the Red army of 1941 its an almost certain walk over. The scenario is only of interest as a Nazi fantasy.

This is very unlikely;probably it would be a repetition of 1941 .

1. The German peak strength was just before Op Zitadelle. There were more Germans and their allies than at their peak in September 1941.
https://www.quora.com/What-was-the-peak ... rld-War-II

2. The German army of 1943 was far more powerful and better equipped than that of 1941. In 1941 the Germans tanks were inferior to the latest Red Armour, the KV1 and T34A which were also impervious to the standard anti+tank gun.

3. The Germans had two years of experience fighting the Red Army and operating in Russia. Tactically and logistically the army of 1943 was better prepared to fight the red Army

Barbarossa was a close run thing with the Germans close to taking Moscow. With a qualitatively superiority it would be reasonable to expect a 1943 German army to take Moscow and be better prepared for winter and a Red Army counterattack.

[ljadw]

1 ) This is not correct : at the start of Zitadelle, the Ostheer was quantitatively weaker than in june 1941:1941 4000 tanks + StuG and 3850 aircraft/1943 : 3550 tanks + StuG and 2000 aircraft

2) That's not a wise argument :

The impact of KV1 and T 34 A was almost neglectible;most T 34 and KV 1 were lost in 1941, thus the German ATG was not that bad and German and Soviet tanks were not looking after each other.That the German 1943 tanks (Panther /Tiger ) had more firepower and better protection than the tanks of 1941,does not mean that they would have done better in 1941 : they were subject to mechanical failures, their fuel consumption was greater than that of the 1941 tanks, their speed was lower ,and it is very doubtful that they would have done as the tanks of 1941 = advance to Moscow and Rostock .

Comparison : it is very doubtful that the PzG Kleist would have done better with Panthers/Tigers than with the tanks of may 1940 : how many Panthers/Tigers would have arrived at Dunkirk ?

3 ) I like to see that the 1943 logistics were better than the 1941 logistics :generally in 1941 the Ostheer was well supplied(even in the winter )

Barbarossa was never a close run thing:there was a window of opportunities of 5/6 weeks(as the Germans knew before the start of Barbarossa ) and than it was over (as the Germans knew before the start of Barbarossa ) . .




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[Svrclr]

If nothing else the infantry would have a hard time if it was similar to the 1943 Wehrmacht. Most of the Wehrmacht infantry divisions only have 6 infantry battalions instead of 9. The later war infantry division is not really capable of launching anything more than local counter attacks and fight defensively, even when they were up to strength. The another problem that the 1943 army had was very little in the way of non-divisional artillery. A fair number of additional artillery battalions, particularly heavier guns, or the long range 10cm Cannons were used but lost in the advance on Moscow.

I am assuming that the implication is that the 1943 pattern army would be at full establishment strength. German formations throughout WW2 were always short of materials of all kinds. You simply cannot go to war in 1939 when the peacetime army in the early 1930's was only a small fraction of the early war size. Production was never adequate to the needs, hence why Germans used so much captured equipment of all kinds. In 1941, the TO&E was a better representation of the equipment that divisions had on hand then it was in 1943. In 1943, many German divisions remained in the line continuously and never were brought up to full strength.

[Sheldrake]

1 ) This is not correct : at the start of Zitadelle, the Ostheer was quantitatively weaker than in june 1941:1941 4000 tanks + StuG and 3850 aircraft/1943 : 3550 tanks + StuG and 2000 aircraft (1)

(2) That's not a wise argument :
The impact of KV1 and T 34 A was almost neglectible;most T 34 and KV 1 were lost in 1941, thus the German ATG was not that bad and German and Soviet tanks were not looking after each other.That the German 1943 tanks (Panther /Tiger ) had more firepower and better protection than the tanks of 1941,does not mean that they would have done better in 1941 : they were subject to mechanical failures, their fuel consumption was greater than that of the 1941 tanks, their speed was lower ,and it is very doubtful that they would have done as the tanks of 1941 = advance to Moscow and Rostock .

Comparison : it is very doubtful that the PzG Kleist would have done better with Panthers/Tigers than with the tanks of may 1940 : how many Panthers/Tigers would have arrived at Dunkirk ?

3 ) I like to see that the 1943 logistics were better than the 1941 logistics :generally in 1941 the Ostheer was well supplied(even in the winter )

Barbarossa was never a close run thing:there was a window of opportunities of 5/6 weeks(as the Germans knew before the start of Barbarossa ) and than it was over (as the Germans knew before the start of Barbarossa )

Re 1 Lets play a wargame. I'll take 3,550 Pz IIIL and Pz IVG and stuG with a long 75mm gun and with a smattering of Pz VI and V as assault tanks. You can have 4000 PzIIIJ, Pz38T and stuG with 75mm L24. I'll take 2,000 aircraft with Me109G and Fw190 as fighters. You can have 3800 escorted by Me109E/F3. There is a half generation improvement in technology capability.

Re 2. The T34 and KV1 had two important effects. #1 It was a nasty moral blow to the Germans who were not expectign to face them #2 Defeating these heavily armoured well armed vehicles took time. There is an account , covered in "Small unit actions" which described how a single KV1 tank obstructed the main thrust of Army group North for 48 hours.

[ljadw]

1) That's a wrong wargame , as "your " tanks/aircraft never would fight against "my " tanks /aircraft .

2) The "moral blow" did not prevent the Germans to advance to Moscow/Rosrow


3)There is an other point : both armies had a different mission : the 1941 Ostheer's mission was to defeat as fast as possible the Soviet forces between the border and the D/D line and than to advance as fast as possible to the A/A line = an offensive mission;PzIV,V and VI would do not better than the PzIII and Pz38 t in such a mission :most of the 1943 tanks would not make it to Moscow.Rostow.

The 1943 Ostheer had a defensive mission and the tanks,StuG and aircraft of 1941 would be too weak for such a mission .The 1941 Ostheer would fail in 1943 and the 1943 Ostheer would fail in 1941,because in 1941/1943 everything was different from 1943/1941, not only the mission, but also the opponent .

[pintere]

If you want to pit the German army of 1943 against the Red army of 1941 its an almost certain walk over. The scenario is only of interest as a Nazi fantasy.

I assure you that is not the case. The scenario is purely hypothetical, to help answer the question of whether the experience and technological improvement of the Wehrmacht in two years of war can be considered a net improvement compared to the 1941 Wehrmacht.

[Sheldrake]

1) That's a wrong wargame , as "your " tanks/aircraft never would fight against "my " tanks /aircraft .

2) The "moral blow" did not prevent the Germans to advance to Moscow/Rosrow


3)There is an other point : both armies had a different mission : the 1941 Ostheer's mission was to defeat as fast as possible the Soviet forces between the border and the D/D line and than to advance as fast as possible to the A/A line = an offensive mission;PzIV,V and VI would do not better than the PzIII and Pz38 t in such a mission :most of the 1943 tanks would not make it to Moscow.Rostow.

The 1943 Ostheer had a defensive mission and the tanks,StuG and aircraft of 1941 would be too weak for such a mission .The 1941 Ostheer would fail in 1943 and the 1943 Ostheer would fail in 1941,because in 1941/1943 everything was different from 1943/1941, not only the mission, but also the opponent .

#1 My 1943 army would not only have beaten "your" 1941 army but it would have made a quicker job of dealing with the 1941 Red army. Its Pz IIIL and Pz IVF and 50mm and 75mm anti tank guns would make short work of the Red armour at longer range - and are as mechanically reliable as the Pz IIIJ and PzIVE of 1941. The German army in the east in June 1943 had a lot more firepower as well as two years of experience fighting the Red Army in Russia.

#2 The "Moral Blow"did not prevent the advance to Moscow, but it slowed it and eroded German strength. Positively unhelpful when seeking a quick victory. Take one example. The action at Mtsenk in Oct 1941`cost the 4th Panzer Division ten tanks in a battle that would have been a one sided turkey shoot in 1943. http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/ac ... 941.20055/

#3. So this is your hypotheses? The 1943 German army could not have fulfilled the 1941 mission. You might be right but only because the mission could not be achieved. But the basis is flawed. The 1943 army was stronger in manpower and firepower. It also misses the obvious characteristic of human nature. people do learn from their mistakes. The 1943 German army was designed NOT to repeat the mistakes of 1941.

[ljadw]

I don't see any mistakes in 1941 :the Germans did what they could do with the available forces, but they knew that victory or defeat was depending on the Soviets . The Soviets only .

To have a real chance in 1941, the Ostheer needed to be 200 % stronger in manpower and firepower . But even than, it is probable that the Germans would fail, as more manpower and more firepower would be at the expense of mobility : as long as the Soviets could send more men and material to the front than they lost , the Germans would lose .

The 1943 Ostheer ,even if it was stronger in manpower /firepower, would lack the needed mobility to be at the AA line before the winter .

About the moral blow : you are putting the cart before the horses: the aim was not Moscow, but the defeat of the Soviet Army : the defeat of the Soviet Army would result in the collaps of the Soviet state and that would make possible the advance to Moscow .

[Sheldrake]

I don't see any mistakes in 1941 :the Germans did what they could do with the available forces, but they knew that victory or defeat was depending on the Soviets.

Hmm. I don't suppose you do

However, others have questioned:-

1. The over confident German estimates of Soviet capabilities. "All we have to do is kick the door in and the whole rotten structure will collapse" Would the Germans have really invaded the Soviet Union if they knew their strength. Op Barbarossa was a big mistake full stop.

2. The lack of a clear aim after the Soviet's failed to collapse by the end of July. What was the objective? The destruction of the largest parts of the Red Army they could find? Geographical objectives? If so what? Moscow? The granary of the Ukraine? Leningrad? The destruction of the Soviet regime through through the establishment of nationalist regimes?

3. Lack of preparation for a long campaign. Insufficient logistics to sustain a campaign in the depth of Russia or a winter campaign. Only the formations predesignated as the Russian Garrison were equipped for winter.

4. The decision to besiege rather than assault Leningrad.

5. The late gamble to take Moscow

The Germans did not have to attack the Soviet Union in 1941.

[ljadw]

The hiding reason of the "over confident" estimates was that these estimates were necessary to win .Knowledge of the real Soviet strength was irrelevant for the decision to invade the SU .

Point 2 was not a mistake ,because there was no lack of clear aim : the problem/situation did not change after the summer failure, and the Germans decided to repeat Barbarossa (on a smaller scale) : Typhoon . Typhoon could only start at the end of september,thus point 5 was not a mistake .

The lack of preparations for a long campaign was also no mistake,because only a short campaign could give Germany a decisive victory .
The logistics were sufficient to sustain a winter campaign:at the end of the winter the Germans were still in Russia and the Russians were not in Germany That the majority of the Ostheer was not equipped for the winter before the start of the winter is also not a problem, because the Ostheer improvised .

"That the Germans did not have to attack the SU in 1941 " is irrelevant for the question if there were mistakes during the preparation and during the campaign .

The German leadership was convinced that only a quick and victorious campaign against the SU could prevent a final German defeat, and I think that they were right to undertake Barbarossa as there were no alternatives to prevent a German defeat .

No Barbarossa = defeat of Germany, Barbarossa = a small chance to prevent this defeat .

[BDV]

To have a real chance in 1941, the Ostheer needed to be 200 % stronger in manpower and firepower . But even than, it is probable that the Germans would fail, as more manpower and more firepower would be at the expense of mobility : as long as the Soviets could send more men and material to the front than they lost , the Germans would lose .

So good!

Welcome to the Dark Side!

Valid point; but that was not tried. Smash and grab 1,2,3 was tried instead, Barbarossa, Taifun, Blau.