In terms of quality of personnel, in 1941 the German army was of higher quality than in 1943 thanks to lack of serious losses from 1939 to 1941 which allowed them to focus on improving the quality of training and soldiers became highly experienced. In fact, in June 1941 the German army was at it's all time peak of quality, never to be reached again.
The massive increase in equipment production over the next years did not translate into higher stocks of equipment. The reason was simple: a 1941 division with 4 arty batteries needed about 55 guns at and over 105 mm: the German army in 1941 had about 205 divisions and 11,500 guns over 100 mm, hence, they had the correct amount of equipment. Higher equipment output was a function of the need to replace higher losses after Barbarossa. By January they had 11,200 guns over the same categories and a field army of similar size (about 4 million men).
The only advantage the German army in 1943 had over the 1941 army were better tank designs but that was of little relevance: the German army in 1941 did not lack tanks when executing their advances using armored spearheads. The better tank designs of 1943-44 were useful to fight the heavier Soviet tanks but those that did not exist in significant numbers in 1941. Finally I should add that the obsession with tanks in internet discussion is not proportional to their historical importance: artillery, mortars, grenades and rifles inflicted over 95% of all casualties in WW2, while tanks were specialized weapons: they consisted of an armored car with a small artillery piece, a specialized weapon designed to break through front-lines during offensive operations. Tanks were not a basic, essential, weapon. Same applies to aircraft, by the way. WW2 aircraft were very delicate light machines that did not inflict heavy casualties (airpower consisted of usually way less than 5% of the firepower available in ground combat engagements), their role was more psychological than real (the noise of the Stukas was more important than anything these things actually did).
The failure of Barbarossa was due to the underestimation of USSR's determination and capacity to replace losses. To win against the USSR the Nazi command would need to first understand that to defeat the USSR would be really, really hard and would require total commitment. In other words, instead of invading the USSR with 75% of the Wehrmacht they would need to shift resources away from all other fronts to focus almost 100% of the Wehrmacht on Barbarossa. That way they could try invading the USSR with over 200 divisions instead of the historical 153. Also, be prepared to replace more losses than they were historically: The Nazis planned to invade and defeat the USSR in 4 months with about 500,000 casualties. Instead they failed to defeat the USSR and suffered 800,000 casualties in 6 months.
On the quality of the Soviet medical services vis the German one: well, Germany was a more developed country so it was expected for their medical services to be superior. The Soviet Union mobilized 35 million soldiers and got a large fraction of those wounded (like 22,326,905 or so according to Krivosheev) so it was expected that their medical system would not be able to treat all these 22.3 million sick and wounded soldiers very well. While the Germans had 4.43 million soldiers wounded and sick up to January 1945, so a much smaller number of people to treat and given their economy was much more developed, I guess they received better medical treatment, well out of the 4.2 million wounded of the army, "only" 295,659 died of wounds up to January 1945, or 7%. Soviet deaths among wounded and sick is 1,371,504, about 6.5% but that's nearly 5 times more than Germany's on a population slightly more than twice as large. That's it, by official figures.
