Kingfish wrote:Guaporense wrote:As the internet's impression of the Eastern front. The reality was very different: tank and anti tank guns only consumed 6% of the ammunition over 75mm of the German army. Hence, only a small fraction of the firepower of the army was related to tank warfare.
Ammunition usage is not indicative of a weapon system's value. Case in point: in terms of tonnage the amount dropped by USN dive bombers were minuscule compared to the heavy bomber fleets, but who is going to say the USAF B-17s and B-24s had a more significant impact on the war in the pacific?
In the fraction of casualties inflicted tanks were certainly way less than 6%. While the fraction of total casualties inflicted by airpower was usually less than 5%. From 1941 onwards, WW2 in Europe was a war of attrition and infantry inflicted over 90% of all casualties.
Dupuy's Numbers Prediction and War estimates the Fraction of firepower in the air in 60 engagements in Italy from September 1943 to June 1944, on average for all 60 engagements the fraction of total firepower in airpower were:
Allied firepower ----- 5.23%
German firepower --- 2.85%
So, ground weapons usually represented 95-97% of the firepower in ground warfare engagements (more actually considering the density of aircraft sorties in the Eastern front was much lower than in Italy), how was that distributed?
By weight in 1944, German ammunition consumption was composed of, among rounds over 75 mm only:
Mortars ----------------- 8.9%
Tank and anti-tank ---- 6.0%
Infantry Guns -------- 10.6%
Field Guns ------------ 60.9%
Heavy Artillery --------- 7.2%
Railroad Artillery ------ 0.5%
Rocket Artillery -------- 5.9%
from:
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/ ... 1579064253
Artillery in all it's forms was 85.1% of the ammo consumption, mortars were 8.9% while tank and anti-tank guns were only 6.0%.
On the internet people often discuss tanks and aircraft as if they were responsible for inflicting the vast majority of casualties but that was not remotely the case: combined, they were responsible for much less than 10% of inflicted casualties, probably less than 5%. Tanks were specialized weapons made for specialized functions: armored spearheads to penetrate the enemy's frontlines. Aircraft's main role in the war was in temporarily disrupting logistical supply and psychologically harassing the ground troops, and not in actually inflicting losses on the enemy. And since WW2 was a war of attrition after 1941, the role of infantry divisions, whose weapons inflicted >90% of all casualties, was overwhelmingly more important than tanks and aircraft combined in deciding the outcome of the war.
These facts help to explain why the Allies didn't win the war so easily: the USSR had 3 tanks produced for each German tank in 1941-1943, while the WAllies had 10 to 1 superiority in airpower in 1943-1944. Thing is, in terms of infantry related firepower, despite being heavily outnumbered, the Germans had a comfortable superiority over the USSR: in 1944 they fired 1.540.933 tons of shells while the USSR fired back 1.000.962 tons, which enabled them to inflict massively disproportional casualties on the Red Army that mostly offset their vast numerical inferiority in everything, from manpower, to tanks, to aircraft.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz