Hitler spares czechoslovakia.

[Helmut0815]

Would Hitler succeed against Poland in March?

Well, I think he would have succeeded, but without the czech armory and without the czech heavy industries the Wehrmacht had to fight much harder and longer. In March 39 the Wehrmacht Heer lacked of heavy artillery and had only a very few medium Panzers III & IV. In reality the czech T-35 and T-38 tanks were the backbone of the german panzer force. The germans also wouldn't be able to stop an allied counter attack in the west.


regards


Helmut

[lahoda]

Ok. That is two what-ifs, not that there is anything wrong with that:
* Hitler don't invade rump-Czechoslovakia in March 1939 AND attacks Poland instead. An interesting what-if.
* Germany is certainly signifcantly weaker than in the real war.
* However, there will still not be a west front, the Soviets will still attack East Poland three weeks or so into the war.
* Poland will still be toast, Germany and the Soviets will still clash and go to war.
* But everything will be in slow motion compared to the real war.
* Whatever happens in West Poland doesn't matter much as Poland will be toast the minute the Soviets attack in the east.
* And the Soviets will attack to get back what the Poles conquered in 1920.
* That and also Stalin's absoulute hatred of anything Polish guarantees a Soviet attack.

Sounds logical, but in March 1939, there was no Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Would they be able to get one? There is that three way treaty of France, USSR and Czechoslovakia from 1935, which would not cease to exist, as Czechoslovakia is still there. Let's assume the Slovaks get their autonomy as in OTL, but they didn't establish the separate state. Ruthenia is thus still part of Czechoslovakia (minus part annexed to Hungary). Yet Czechoslovak army is paralyzed and it isn't much of a force. But they continue the development and production of tanks (LT-38, V-8-H) and planes (B-35, A-300).

I'd say what happens in the West matters, Poland might be strong enough (and Germany weak enough) that the front won't stall, which might make Stalin to think twice to attack Poland. Also, given the economic situation in Germany, they can't afford long war.
And what about relationship between Czechoslovakia and Poland? It was pretty bad, but can it turn any better. Does it make any impact?

[Lars]

* There will be no Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
* The pact only came along because of British and French percieved hostility towards Germany.
* This percieved hostility (and the real hostility) will be lower towards Germany without a German invasion of rump-Czechoslovakia.
* The French and British perception was that their relationship with Germany actually improved after Munich but before the invasion of rump-Czechoslovakia.
* If Germany takes all of Poland the Germans a much closer to Moscow.
* No Molotov-Ribbentrop pact makes it paramount for the Soviets to get their 1919-border back towards Poland.
* Remember the Germans and the Soviets are still mortal enemies without the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

[lahoda]

* There will be no Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
* The pact only came along because of British and French percieved hostility towards Germany.
* This percieved hostility (and the real hostility) will be lower towards Germany without a German invasion of rump-Czechoslovakia.
* The French and British perception was that their relationship with Germany actually improved after Munich but before the invasion of rump-Czechoslovakia.
* If Germany takes all of Poland the Germans a much closer to Moscow.
* No Molotov-Ribbentrop pact makes it paramount for the Soviets to get their 1919-border back towards Poland.
* Remember the Germans and the Soviets are still mortal enemies without the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

OK, no Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Agree.
Yep, German and French-British relations were much better in that period, still Poland had a treaty with France and the reason for the attack on Poland was not comparable with Sudeten question that was abused by Hitler in Munich 1938. Not sure if this would mean DOW by France or they will just turn blind to attack to Poland, or sometihng in-between (like material help, volunteers).
Soviet attack is dependent of the German success. I read a transcript of Molotov speach mid-September 1939 and he excused their attack of Poland on fact that Polish government (with whom they had non-agression pact) ceased to exist and they grabbed the land to protect Belarus and Ukraine citizens living in Poland. If Poland would be able to stop weaker Germans with any authority, there might be no attack from Soviets.
What do you think would be the relation between Poland and Czechoslovakia? Do you see any chance that their relation, driven by Beck vs. now-gone-Beneš animosity, has chance of improvement? Might that be any factor?

[glenn239]

* Germany and the Soviet Union has no Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in this world.

Hitler would not have invaded Poland under any circumstances without an agreement with the Soviet Union.

The question is whether Stalin is inclined to partition Poland if the Czech army is still in play. Put that way, does the existence of the Czech army advantage Germany or the USSR? I'd say clearly the USSR. So Stalin will agree to partition Poland because he's in better circumstances than historically when he did the exact same thing.

[lahoda]

* Germany and the Soviet Union has no Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in this world.

Hitler would not have invaded Poland under any circumstances without an agreement with the Soviet Union.

The question is whether Stalin is inclined to partition Poland if the Czech army is still in play. Put that way, does the existence of the Czech army advantage Germany or the USSR? I'd say clearly the USSR. So Stalin will agree to partition Poland because he's in better circumstances than historically when he did the exact same thing.

Do you think such agreement was really feasible in 3/1939. Not sure if existence of Czechoslovak army was that big advantage to Stalin, even if there was still the treaty between these two coutries and France. I can't see Czechoslovakia helping attacking Poland, quite opposite if there is still the Czechoslovak army, it might convice Poland to strike some sort of a deal.

Even if there is a agreement of USSR with Germany, do you think Germany would be as successfull as in 9/1939?

[Carl Schwamberger]

It was better. Both nations had used the two years to develop their next generation weapons and ramp up production. Which was essential. France had completely reorganized its aircraft industry & was starting mass production of the new models. Britain had also retooled and expanded its aircraft production. Since France collapsed its difficult to precisely predict its probable war plane production for 1941, but its clear the two together could have out built Germanys actual production of 1941 by better than 50%, possibly 100%

Sure, it is clear that military production in Britain was better compared to their production in 1938, same for France. Their trajectory in production outperformed Germany. Agree on that. Was the overal military situation, with all aspects accounted for, relative to the strength of Germany in 1938 got better in 1940.

Overall yes. The difference was narrower in 1940, the advantage still substantial. Germany did not win in 1940 because their industrial production made a larger & more powerful military, they won because of some bad decisions by the French military leaders & politicians, and some good decisions by a few German leaders. Had those not matched we'd be having a very different conversation here.

No I don't mix those two dates. Do you believe that British and French foreign office was naive enough that by "throwing Czechoslovakia of sleigh" (to use your words - like it ) and ceding the border areas, which - by pure coincidence - also had pretty much all the defensive installations Czechoslovakia built, they didn't know they made it a low hanging fruit ripe for immediate picking. I agree both France and Britain were surprised in March 1939, at least their reaction (given that they "guaranteed" new Czechoslovak borders defined in Munich (and Viena) Treaty) was very weak.

One of the points historians of the era make is how naive Chamberlain was, & many of his staff as well. The idea that a government would immediately make such a radical violation of a important treaty was unthinkable too them. There was also the fact that such violation would make that government entirely untrustworthy and a international piarah. That a the violator would not care was not believable to them. For five years the majority of British and French politicians had been ignoring the evidence of nazi ideology or what their intelligence service had told them. The occupation of Bohemia was a profound shock, wrecking the Appeasement doctrine, weakening badly the pacifist and profacist factions, and strengthening the likes of Churchill. This political shock wave extended to the US with important consequences. The Appeasement of Germany with the Sudentland was to buy the Anglo French 2-3 years of time. Occupying Bohemia showed it had not.

Another point in the economic war is the Anglo/French won the political fight over US neutrality.

That is true, but do you think it can be linked either to Munich or annexation of Bohemia and Moravia? I thought that only happened after the start of the Polish campaign but I am not sure on that one. But I doubt it was a calculated move designed by Chamberlain in a way "lets appease Hitler till US are forced to send us some planes".

In the case of France the effort started earlier. French plans for rearmament and strategy looked a lot more successful if they could get around the Neutrality Acts and access US industry for war materials. France had considerable fiscal reserves & those could be leveraged into a substantial advantage were US industry directly available. US businessmen knew it, a huge portion of US exports went to Europe and they did business with the French daily. For Depression era industry millions of dollars worth of explosives vehicles, or aircraft was something worth lobbying over. Its no accident some of the earliest Warhawks bending Roosevelts ear were industrialists.

[Tom from Cornwall]

The Appeasement of Germany with the Sudentland was to buy the Anglo French 2-3 years of time.

The trouble with arguments like these is that there is no evidence (at least none that I have seen) that either Chamberlain or Daladier returned home and immediately sat down with their defence chiefs to say "right, we've just bought you 2-3 years" and then set out to accelerate their rearmament plans.

Occupying Bohemia showed it had not.

Even after the German occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia, there were highly placed politicians and civil servants in the UK who would have been willing to appease Hitler more if he had showed signs of being willing to negotiate rather than just take what he wanted by force.

Regards

Tom

[Lars]

lahoda,

Czechoslovakia after Sudetenland went to Germany was in such a turmoil - think the Slovaks - that Czechoslovakia would probably not amount to much of a player in case Germany invades Poland in March 1939.

glenn239,

Hitler would be perfectly happy to take on Poland without a Molotov-Ribbentrop pact if France and UK hadn't guaranteed Poland's western borders. The reason for the historical Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was UK's and France's position, something that doesn't exist as much in this scenario.

[wm]

Everybody started armaments more or less concurrently but nobody expected war so quickly, eventual "D-Day" was expected in 1942.

Even Poland, the closest neighbor didn't suspect anything till March 1939. Polish "D-Day" was planned in 1942 too.
And Polish diplomats were believed to be best informed in Berlin, they met with the Germans more frequently than anybody else.

btw post-Munich the French appeased as though there were no tomorrow.

[Carl Schwamberger]

..
The trouble with arguments like these is that there is no evidence (at least none that I have seen) that either Chamberlain or Daladier returned home and immediately sat down with their defence chiefs to say "right, we've just bought you 2-3 years" and then set out to accelerate their rearmament plans.

You are correct, but your remark has the conversation backwards and dated on the wrong side of the Munich crisis.

From 1934 in the UK there had been a tension between a fast deficit causing rearmament program & a fiscally sound long program. As Chancellor of the Exchequer Chamberlain had been a key player in seeing the longer term 10 year program emplaced in 1935. That was not the end of stand pressure grew for a accelerated program. Three and half years later Chamberlain as PM was faced with Germany that seemed willing to risk war, that his Marshals had clear evidence Britain could not be effectively defended in 1938, and that a accelerated program might bring Britain to a minimum level circa 1941. One historian described Chamberlain appeasing his Marshals & the defense hawks first with effort to buy time. Fact is he did not want war at all, & said so, but he had to shape policy to fit necessary compromises. Historians from Kliene-Albrandt to James Snell refer to this view of events.

France was in a similar situation, tho its claimed the warhawks were much stronger there, and willing to take larger risks with Paris being burnt to the ground. That the French would have been willing to take the risk had Britain backed them is part of this. Perhaps that leaves to much on Britain, perhaps not. I'm much less cognizant of French politics.

Even after the German occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia, there were highly placed politicians and civil servants in the UK who would have been willing to appease Hitler more if he had showed signs of being willing to negotiate rather than just take what he wanted by force.

Regards

Tom

Certainly there were. Some in France as well. The rabid anticommunists, profacists, ect... were opposed to war with Germany and argued for further deals. There was a faction that argued France was no longer dominate in Europe and should concentrate on developing its empire. Appeasement for them was a cheaper option than a costly war.