Tiger delay in favor of SP Heavy Artillery

[Kingfish]

Because they were much faster to deploy and redeploy as necessary. They did in fact require a lot of movement if used properly and in retreat if not SPed it was more often than not lost because it took hours to assemble/disassemble for movement. The caravan of equipment to haul it and assemble/disassemble it was substantial and it would eliminate the need for a bunch of equipment and manpower to service it.

I can appreciate they were a bear to get into and out of action, but I don't see that need being so great that it would justify the delay of the Tiger.

Put it this way, the Tiger made its debut in Dec '42 and had an immediate impact on the battlefield.
How many 15, 17 and 21 cm heavy guns were lost up to that point as a result of not being able to withdraw quickly enough?

[Yoozername]

Square pegs round hole argument again...stg44 special

[stg 44]

Square pegs round hole argument again...stg44 special

Keep working on that maturity. Maybe one day you'll have a viable argument.

[stg 44]

Because they were much faster to deploy and redeploy as necessary. They did in fact require a lot of movement if used properly and in retreat if not SPed it was more often than not lost because it took hours to assemble/disassemble for movement. The caravan of equipment to haul it and assemble/disassemble it was substantial and it would eliminate the need for a bunch of equipment and manpower to service it.

I can appreciate they were a bear to get into and out of action, but I don't see that need being so great that it would justify the delay of the Tiger.

Put it this way, the Tiger made its debut in Dec '42 and had an immediate impact on the battlefield.
How many 15, 17 and 21 cm heavy guns were lost up to that point as a result of not being able to withdraw quickly enough?

A bunch around Moscow in 1941. I'm not sure the exact number but over 3000 artillery pieces were lost, including army and corps level heavy guns of the 15cm K18, 17cm K18, and 21cm möser variety. Again then during the Stalingrad offensive there were huge losses in equipment during the retreat/pocket operations, over 5000 artillery pieces according to the Soviets (not sure if that includes Romanian and Italian).

[Yoozername]

They lost some in North Africa...maybe they can make the SP amphibious?

[T. A. Gardner]

This would have been a better option for infantry divisions.



Give something like that, or a smaller one for the 10.5cm, to every infantry division to tow their artillery with. Get rid of the horses in artillery regiments. Run the tractors on kerosene maybe. With steel tracks the use of critical materials like rubber is greatly reduced.
They don't have to be fast, they have to be able to tow a gun and maybe a limber cross country. In Russia such a vehicle would be invaluable to infantry divisions. They could go where a truck would be stuck. It really make a difference if the gun were towed at 8 mph by a tractor versus maybe 8 mph with horses. The tractor can go all day with just fuel and maybe a bit of routine maintenance. The horses can't. One guy driving the tractor takes the place of a half dozen or more handling and caring for the horses.
That would be something like 54 small tractors and a dozen larger ones for the 15cm guns. That way you don't end up abandoning guns in the mud, don't have to deal with hundreds of horses, free up manpower too. That'd be like say 5,000 to 6,000 total would motorize virtually all frontline infantry division's artillery.
Another plus is that such a vehicle would have secondary uses as well. Give one a bulldozer blade per battery. That digs the battery in faster. They could be used as recovery vehicles for the unit's trucks and other motor vehicles if they get stuck. With a wench attached the tractor can help limber and unlimber the gun, as well as move it into battery rather than doing all that by hand.

Building specialized SP heavy and super artillery is really a waste since there'd never be that many of them in the field and their use would be limited compared to general use field artillery. Better to motorize the infantry divisions more than concentrate on a specialist vehicle.

[Kingfish]

A bunch around Moscow in 1941. I'm not sure the exact number but over 3000 artillery pieces were lost, including army and corps level heavy guns of the 15cm K18, 17cm K18, and 21cm möser variety. Again then during the Stalingrad offensive there were huge losses in equipment during the retreat/pocket operations, over 5000 artillery pieces according to the Soviets (not sure if that includes Romanian and Italian).

I'm certain the vast majority were divisional field pieces.

Even with the Corp level assets, how many were lost as a result of mechanical breakdown of the prime mover or lack of fuel (conditions that would affect the mech version as well)?

[stg 44]

I'm certain the vast majority were divisional field pieces.

Even with the Corp level assets, how many were lost as a result of mechanical breakdown of the prime mover or lack of fuel (conditions that would affect the mech version as well)?

Of course, just going by production numbers there was no way they couldn't have been, but that doesn't mean the huge corps/army guns were inconsequential, indeed their expense and size meant replacement was difficult (there was a chronic shortage of such heavy guns throughout the war), plus they were specialized weapons that did a job few if any other pieces could, none at the division level. Having a mobile counterbattery weapon that outranged the enemy ones significantly, as the 17cm K18 did, made it utterly invaluable in the East for disrupting Soviet artillery concentrations, especially later in the war. Being able to deploy it rapidly to take Soviet heavy guns under fire was crucial to blunting their ability to attack successfully. We have no idea how many were lost to prime mover issues, but apparently more were lost to being able to rapidly retreat due to how long it took to get them ready to move.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/17_cm_Kanone_18

The 17 cm Kanone 18 was considered a technically excellent long range artillery piece for the German Army, its greatest weaknesses was that it was expensive to build, and it required careful maintenance. It was quite slow to bring in and out of action, fairly difficult to manoeuvre and very slow to move off road, many were lost when their crews abandoned them to avoid capture by advancing Allied forces.

All of the above would be mitigated by being self propelled like the post-war US version:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M107_self-propelled_gun

[Kingfish]

Being able to deploy it rapidly to take Soviet heavy guns under fire was crucial to blunting their ability to attack successfully.

OK, but now contrast that with the ability of an equal number of Tigers in terms of blunting allied attacks.

In justifying the value of a more mobile 17cm K18 you have to take into consideration the absence of a Tiger, which is arguably a far more versatile weapon system.

[stg 44]

OK, but now contrast that with the ability of an equal number of Tigers in terms of blunting allied attacks.

In justifying the value of a more mobile 17cm K18 you have to take into consideration the absence of a Tiger, which is arguably a far more versatile weapon system.

Can you provide some numbers we can work with? Until mid-1943 what specific impact did it have on the battlefield?

[Yoozername]

Being able to deploy it rapidly to take Soviet heavy guns under fire was crucial to blunting their ability to attack successfully.

OK, but now contrast that with the ability of an equal number of Tigers in terms of blunting allied attacks.

In justifying the value of a more mobile 17cm K18 you have to take into consideration the absence of a Tiger, which is arguably a far more versatile weapon system.

He does this all the time. He sees some 'super-solution' to an imagined problem and sees pictures on the internet and models in the hobby store and a light-bulb goes off.

And I am not that against the principle. Just the insipid argument that Tiger chassis would be better off doing it. If a Panzer IV could haul most of it, and a means of quickly using a rear spade to fire, that can allow it to move up to the front, fire deep missions into the Soviet guns/rear, and then quickly move back to it's supporting elements., it might have impact on battles. I imagine a stripped down (minimal armor) panzer IV possibly with simple reinforced suspension.

[Kingfish]

Can you provide some numbers we can work with? Until mid-1943 what specific impact did it have on the battlefield?

Not sure what you mean by numbers? Tank kills?

[stg 44]

He does this all the time. He sees some 'super-solution' to an imagined problem and sees pictures on the internet and models in the hobby store and a light-bulb goes off.

What super solution? It is a minor technical change that would in my view have a larger impact than having Tiger tanks starting in September 1942.

And I am not that against the principle. Just the insipid argument that Tiger chassis would be better off doing it. If a Panzer IV could haul most of it, and a means of quickly using a rear spade to fire, that can allow it to move up to the front, fire deep missions into the Soviet guns/rear, and then quickly move back to it's supporting elements., it might have impact on battles. I imagine a stripped down (minimal armor) panzer IV possibly with simple reinforced suspension.

There isn't an indication that a modified Pz IV could haul anything of the 15cm K18's weight, let along a larger piece. The L30 15cm howitzer it did haul IOTL was already taking the chassis to the limit of it's weight tolerance. The L55 version, more than twice the weight of the howitzer version with recoil mechanism, was beyond it. Perhaps a specially designed Waffentrager could have taken it, but given WW2 technology a VK4501 chassis is likely the lightest that could take the heavy guns. The Panther chassis could haul the L55 15cm K18, there were experiments with that and the 128m K44, but the big guns needed the heavier chassis. As it was the Grille 17 required the rear spades historically.

Can you provide some numbers we can work with? Until mid-1943 what specific impact did it have on the battlefield?

Not sure what you mean by numbers? Tank kills?

I was asking you to quantify the impact of the Tiger I's deployed historically between September 1942-May 1943, since you asked me to contrast the SP heavy artillery with the ability of the Tiger to stop Allied attacks. What is your frame work for discussing that?

Edit:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I#Combat_history
Prior to May 1943 the only significant actions were in Tunisia, a total waste, and around Rostov-on-Don in Winter. No indication that their role was decisive over winter.
This was interesting too:

Against the Soviet and Western Allied production numbers, even a 10:1 kill ratio was not sufficient. These numbers must be set against the opportunity cost of the expensive Tiger. Every Tiger cost as much to build as four Sturmgeschütz III assault guns.

[Stiltzkin]

Every Tiger cost as much to build as four Sturmgeschütz III assault guns

The Tiger was a specialized vehicle, if you lack quantity you have to further invest into quality. The Sturmgeschütz had a different role and cannot be compared to the production cost and time of a Tiger.
I would also like to address the original issue (and analgoue, all similar posts in this forum): Decision making and introduction of new weapon systems, as Dupuy put it: The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, p. 338-340

In modern times — and to some extent in earlier eras — there has been an interval of approximately twenty years between introduction and assimilation of new weapons…it is significant that, despite the rising tempo of invention, this time lag remained relatively constant.

and

Save for the recent significant exception of strategic nuclear weapons, there have been no historical instances in which new and more lethal weapons have, of themselves, altered the conduct of war or the balance of power until they have been incorporated into a new tactical system exploiting their lethality and permitting their coordination with other weapons.

Consequently you will receive a certain impact on the tactical, but as we know, in this respective field the Wehrmacht already enjoyed a substantial advantage, hence such changes can only have a minor influence on the battlefield.
WW2 was hardly decided by the most modern weapon systems.

[Yoozername]

What super solution? It is a minor technical change that would in my view have a larger impact than having Tiger tanks starting in September 1942.

Yes, there is where you go wrong, you think all these 'what ifs' are minor technical changes. Do you have some technical degree that you can share with us?

By May 1943, the Tiger I was a mature weapon system. Its preposterous that the Germans would suddenly think along the lines you do. Or anyone with a technical background for that matter.