How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

[EKB]

So, the Germans pretty much lost the electronics war by the beginning of 1944 and weren't going to get back in that race anytime soon. Without workable radar sets for blind fire control in overcast, their flak was seriously degraded and adding more of it, even doubling it, wasn't going to result in substantially higher casualties. Guns weren't the problem, crappy outdated electronics were.

the B-29 in Korea suggests that rocket armed ME-262's would be highly effective against this extremely expensive plane.

Successful interceptions by Me 262s above 30,000 feet were rare. Germany never fixed the flame out issue on the Jumo 004 caused from doing routine throttle corrections. And that problem had nothing to do with materials, it was a design or construction flaw.

The MiG-15 was in a different class; faster than Me 262 by about 130 mph. Also the MiG-15 could climb about 14,000 feet higher.

Even if Germany had those weapons in your ATL, they would have a limited effect on a fleet of high-flying B-29s with a better cruising speed than older bombers. Enola Gay released its most deadly cargo from a height of over 32,000 feet.

Yes, the B-29 would certainly negate most of the German flak defenses. OTOH, you mention that only 5% of German flak guns were the 128mm variety. What percentage of Allied heavy bombers in 1945 were B-29's? I see total B-17/24, Lancaster, Halifax production by 1945 was about 45,000 while B-29 production by 1946 was 3,970. Would even 10% of the Allied bomber force be B-29's by mid-1945?

What number is a sufficient for B-29s?

[TheMarcksPlan]

The B-29's didn't bomb at high altitude over Japan and probably wouldn't have over Germany either.

This is because the U.S. only discovered the jet stream via B-29 operations (Japanese knew of it earlier). US didn't have a means to bomb accurately from high altitudes given the jet stream.

So either the B-29's are going to bomb within the effective ceiling of German Flak or they're going to spread their bombs over the German countryside.

In any event, Germany will be more than capable of shooting down the B-29's with Ta-152's, Me-262's, Do-335's, etc.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I picture under the no-USSR scenario 1944 being the peak year of flak importance falling off to jets and rockets in 1945, but never doing worse than maybe a 1% attrition rate.

For political reasons Germany would never have done away with a large Flak arm, even if its fighters have marginalized the Wallied bomber offensive.

Under conditions of high Wallied bomber losses, we'd see at least a decrease in the number of raids on Germany (more likely their cessation). This follows directly from higher losses, which means you get fewer raids per bomber.

In that state, each deployed Flak battery shoots fewer shells, meaning a lower ratio of ammo : weapons production and less spent on replacement barrels. Also fewer accidents. The Flak arm probably ends up being larger in terms of battery/tube numbers at the same overall expenditure level.

Each time the Wallies do launch a raid, they face more guns and those guns are not worn-out as in OTL. Flak would kill/damage a larger percentage of bombers per raid, while perhaps showing a minor decrease in overall kills.

As Westermann's Flak explains, the performance of the Flak arm decreased dramatically as the war continued. Some of this was due higher operating altititudes but a lot owed to worn-out barrels and crew fatigue. Those conditions don't exist in this ATL, as the Wallies don't have the ability to raid Germany day after day with relatively low losses.

[T. A. Gardner]

So, the Germans pretty much lost the electronics war by the beginning of 1944 and weren't going to get back in that race anytime soon. Without workable radar sets for blind fire control in overcast, their flak was seriously degraded and adding more of it, even doubling it, wasn't going to result in substantially higher casualties. Guns weren't the problem, crappy outdated electronics were.

The history of SEAD and ECCM in the Cold War suggests that it was flatly impossible that one side would "lose" such a contest. Rather, the advantage sways back and forth as new equipment is introduced. But, there is a more important difference than Germany vs. the USSR. There is the fact that the Allies were using 4-engine piston driven bombers for their offensive, and this type of aircraft was already obsolescent by 1944. The B-29 was a significant improvement, but not available in the numbers necessary, at least in 1945. And even then, the B-29 in Korea suggests that rocket armed ME-262's would be highly effective against this extremely expensive plane, while the Allies just didn't have jet fighter with the range to escort bombers from the UK to Germany.

The problem for the Germans is their electronics industry is faced with increasing obsolescence of the basic products they are putting out like tubes, a serious problem with production capacity, and a lack of engineering capacity to fix the former. Germany relied heavily on Dutch and French electronics manufacturers during the war, particularly the Dutch Philips corporation.

But, Dutch Philips's management and most of the engineering staff fled Holland ahead of the German occupation and took as much of the intellectual property of the company with them as they could. So, while the company was a major tube producer for the Germans, it wasn't innovating much in the way of new products.

So, the problem for the Germans was they couldn't innovate in this field as fast as the Allies were.

As for the B-29 since one plane carries the equivalent of 2 to 4 B-17 / 24 bombers in payload, fewer would be needed for the same tonnage delivered.

The other problem the Germans face is that by mid 1945 Allied bombing radar and methods make night bombing nearly as effective, or as effective as daytime bombing. If daytime fighter opposition truly became a problem, the US could switch tactics. Then given the wartime production schedule push out bombers like the B-45 Tornado for daytime work.
That presents a new issue for the Germans. The altitudes have rendered flak useless and planes like the Me 262 now need a working pressurized cockpit as well as having little speed advantage over the bombers they have to intercept. Germany had serious problems getting pressurized cockpits to work on their planes outside a few very specialized ones.

This brings us back to the Germans now needing AAM's and SAM's neither of which they had much development work beyond some missile designs on. Certainly their proposed control systems, along with the crude ones they did try, were not up to the task of actually working with any real success.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I see total B-17/24, Lancaster, Halifax production by 1945 was about 45,000 while B-29 production by 1946 was 3,970.

In August '45 the US had 986 B-29's operating from the Marianas. USSBS Pacific Report, p.5.

Had those 986 bombers been flying against thousands of Ta-152's and other German interceptors, they would have been destroyed long before August.

[T. A. Gardner]

I see total B-17/24, Lancaster, Halifax production by 1945 was about 45,000 while B-29 production by 1946 was 3,970.

In August '45 the US had 986 B-29's operating from the Marianas. USSBS Pacific Report, p.5.

Had those 986 bombers been flying against thousands of Ta-152's and other German interceptors, they would have been destroyed long before August.

According to Monogram Close-Up #24 on the Ta 152, Germany produced 67 of these historically. If production were ten times that it doesn't equate to "thousands."

[EKB]

The B-29's didn't bomb at high altitude over Japan and probably wouldn't have over Germany either. This is because the U.S. only discovered the jet stream via B-29 operations (Japanese knew of it earlier). US didn't have a means to bomb accurately from high altitudes given the jet stream.

B-29 crewmen could not lower the jet stream over Europe.

either the B-29's are going to bomb within the effective ceiling of German Flak or they're going to spread their bombs over the German countryside.

Your source Westermann writes that B-17 squadrons bombed from a normal altitude of 24,000 feet to 27,000 feet, near the maximum height of 88-mm bursts. The B-24s went in from 20,000 feet to 24,000 feet and took about three times more losses to flak, (p.292, 370).

For political reasons Germany would never have done away with a large Flak arm, even if its fighters have marginalized the Wallied bomber offensive … As Westermann's Flak explains, the performance of the Flak arm decreased dramatically as the war continued.

Yet in August 1944, Adolf Hitler told Albert Speer that flak gun production must increase five-fold and production of German fighters must stop because the Jagdwaffe failed to deliver victory.

Germany will be more than capable of shooting down the B-29's with Ta-152's, Me-262's, Do-335's, etc.

There is no reason to think the Me 262 or Ta 152 would reach maturity faster (let alone exist) after a German victory over Russia in 1941. The real timeline shows that Adolf Hitler expressed no serious interest in the Me 262 until the summer of 1943, when Germany was in retreat on several fronts.

Hermann Göring was even less enthusiastic about jets. He cut funding and engineering in 1940. Four years later he had no faith in the Me 262. In December 1944, after the shooting down of a Mosquito, Göring said that it was a fantastic feat for a jet with engines that stop above 6,000 meters and fall apart over 750 kph.

Like the Panther tank and Tiger II, the Ta 152 was a reaction to inadequacy of German weapons. That is the enduring paradox for the Nazi Germany alt.history movement. They want to imagine early victories could take place, but they want the high-tech toys that came later, kept in the same timeline. That doesn’t track because those weapons were responses to battlefield defeats, not victories.

Those conditions don't exist in this ATL, as the Wallies don't have the ability to raid Germany day after day with relatively low losses.

We can’t know what conditions might exist in this ATL. We do have proof that Hitler’s demands for advanced weaponry differed according to battlefield results.

Let’s circle back to the actual material effect of the Me 262, which you exaggerate. For example Kurt Welter claimed to have shot down 33 Mosquitoes, but only three (possibly four) can be linked to a lost aircraft and crew. I have not seen a complete listing of his victory credits, but not all were jet-related. At least seven Mosquitoes were claimed by Welter while flying a Bf 109 with JG 300.

[glenn239]

Even if Germany had those weapons in your ATL, they would have a limited effect on a fleet of high-flying B-29s with a better cruising speed than older bombers. Enola Gay released its most deadly cargo from a height of over 32,000 feet. German fighters would spend more fuel and more time getting to that altitude, which means they that would have less time to find and attack targets. As well, a lengthy climb to such lofty heights reduces engine life. That means increased maintenance and more engines needed by the defenders.

The main weakness of this what-if thread, is that it envisions a world where Nazis are not stupid like they were in real life. There is no such world, then or now.

I just read on a link yesterday that the Germans cancelled an anti-radiation missile intended for use against Allied bomber navigation transmitters in England - cancelled it just after it had demonstrated proof of concept in testing. That didn't strike me like a bright move, so I see what you mean about dumb German decisions. But, had it gone operational, this would presumably have been a problem for the Allies if Germany holds France into 1946, since the only certain defense against anti-radiation missiles is to shut off the transmitters, which is not what you want to be doing in the middle of a big raid.

On the B-29's, they could either carry a big bomb and drop accurately at lower altitude or they could fly very high with a lighter load and far less accuracy. Also, they didn't exactly demonstrate combat durability against the MIG-15 in Korea. Overall, I'm not so certain that they'd be the panacea being suggested.

[T. A. Gardner]

Even if Germany had those weapons in your ATL, they would have a limited effect on a fleet of high-flying B-29s with a better cruising speed than older bombers. Enola Gay released its most deadly cargo from a height of over 32,000 feet. German fighters would spend more fuel and more time getting to that altitude, which means they that would have less time to find and attack targets. As well, a lengthy climb to such lofty heights reduces engine life. That means increased maintenance and more engines needed by the defenders.

The main weakness of this what-if thread, is that it envisions a world where Nazis are not stupid like they were in real life. There is no such world, then or now.

I just read on a link yesterday that the Germans cancelled an anti-radiation missile intended for use against Allied bomber navigation transmitters in England - cancelled it just after it had demonstrated proof of concept in testing. That didn't strike me like a bright move, so I see what you mean about dumb German decisions. But, had it gone operational, this would presumably have been a problem for the Allies if Germany holds France into 1946, since the only certain defense against anti-radiation missiles is to shut off the transmitters, which is not what you want to be doing in the middle of a big raid.

There were several German projects to design something like this. All proved inaccurate in testing. The usual one trotted out is the BV 246 Hagelkorn, a glide bomb. Targeting Allied "navigation" transmitters would have little effect on anything. GEE wasn't used as a combat navigation aid past about 1942 because it was already being jammed. Oboe was extremely difficult to detect and jam as it used a very tight beam. TACAN and LORAN didn't appear until well into 1944. Even targeting British radar like Chain Home would have been difficult due to the nature of the array.

But, since the weapons to be used weren't particularly accurate it was rendered moot as an option.

On the B-29's, they could either carry a big bomb and drop accurately at lower altitude or they could fly very high with a lighter load and far less accuracy. Also, they didn't exactly demonstrate combat durability against the MIG-15 in Korea. Overall, I'm not so certain that they'd be the panacea being suggested.

They would have proved more difficult to intercept and would have rendered most German flak as near useless. That would require new tactics and technology to counter. The objective here isn't that the B-29 would be countered, but rather that the Germans would have to keep changing things to stay even. That's an expensive proposition and one the Germans proved, repeatedly, unable to afford. It wasn't that they didn't invent neat stuff, they did. But, perfecting it where it could be produced and used in mass operationally, was usually beyond them.

[glenn239]

What number is a sufficient for B-29s?

Conventionally a quick google says 34,000 sorties and 157,000 tons of bombs dropped on Japan. TMP says that by mid-1945 the Americans had nearly 1,000 B-29's operational. Another quick google says 900,000 tons of bombs dropped on Germany in 1944. Answer to your question might be something about 4,000 in frontline service plus 10,000 produced per year for attrition replacements?

Ljadw suggested that the B-29 might employ the A-bomb on Germany. That would certainly cause things to get much bloodier and brutal, but would it be decisive? Seems like history avoided a very dark what if indeed.

[EKB]

What number is a sufficient for B-29s?

Conventionally a quick google says 34,000 sorties and 157,000 tons of bombs dropped on Japan. TMP says that by mid-1945 the Americans had nearly 1,000 B-29's operational. Another quick google says 900,000 tons of bombs dropped on Germany in 1944. Answer to your question might be something about 4,000 in frontline service plus 10,000 produced per year for attrition replacements?

It would not be necessary for all USAAF bomb squadrons to be equipped with B-29s. No one built a one-size-fits-all air force.

[T. A. Gardner]

One thing is for certain, the USAAF would have to upgrade their airfields in Britain and elsewhere to handle B-29's. Right after WW 2 ended in the ETO the US and Britain jointly upgraded three bases to handle B-29's and post end of the war Britain started operating some B-29's as the Washington B1.



The USAAF installed pits for nuclear weapons at two of these bases as well.

[TheMarcksPlan]

the enduring paradox for the Nazi Germany alt.history movement.

Can't tell what your motivation is, of course, but there appears to be some background belief operating in which you're on a crusade against the "Nazi Germany alt.history movement." That's going to reduce the productiveness of our engagement; it might explain why several of your points respond to what you think I'm saying (what "movement" members say) rather than what I've said.

[ljadw]

What number is a sufficient for B-29s?

Conventionally a quick google says 34,000 sorties and 157,000 tons of bombs dropped on Japan. TMP says that by mid-1945 the Americans had nearly 1,000 B-29's operational. Another quick google says 900,000 tons of bombs dropped on Germany in 1944. Answer to your question might be something about 4,000 in frontline service plus 10,000 produced per year for attrition replacements?

Ljadw suggested that the B-29 might employ the A-bomb on Germany. That would certainly cause things to get much bloodier and brutal, but would it be decisive? Seems like history avoided a very dark what if indeed.

I did not mention the type of aircraft that would be used .
But the historical truth is that the nuclear weapons were conceived to be used against Germany, not Japan, and that they would be used against Germany if Germany had not surrendered in August 1945 .
Would their use be decisive ?
Maybe/probably in the following scenario :
August 1 1945 : a nuclear bomb is dropped on Rastenburg
August 2 1945 : a nuclear bomb is dropped on Berchtesgaden .
If needed ,on August 3 a nuclear bomb would be dropped on Berlin .
There would be no save place for Hitler to hide or to operate .

[glenn239]

EKB t would not be necessary for all USAAF bomb squadrons to be equipped with B-29s. No one built a one-size-fits-all air force.

By "not be necessary" what you actually mean is "flatly impossible". A quick google indicates that B-29's lost about 450 aircraft (all causes) in the Pacific Theatre, mostly in 1945 against weaker Japanese defenses. US production should be adequate to field several hundred B-29's and keep them at strength, but the rest of the bomber force - thousands of aircraft - would be the older types, Lancasters, B-17's, etc.

I think the Allies would need to flatten the German oil production in order to cripple the Luftwaffe. This would then allow for an invasion once they had air supremacy over Northern France and German armor was crippled by fuel shortages. I don't think the A-bomb would prove to be a panacea - it would just cause more dispersal of populations out of the city centers. How vulnerable was Germany's synthetic oil production to A-bomb attack?