How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

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Takao
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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Takao » 05 May 2020 14:24

EKB wrote:
05 May 2020 07:20
T. A. Gardner wrote:
04 May 2020 22:24
EKB wrote:
04 May 2020 21:48
glenn239 wrote:
04 May 2020 18:25
EKB wrote:
03 May 2020 18:34
Bikini Atoll is still considered uninhabitable.
from your Bikini reference, the Allies now have the H-bomb in 1945?

No. The point is that you dismissed the catastrophic effects of a radioactive blast.
It is a very slow killer.

Your statement is at variance with the death of Midori Naka. And the Japanese soldier in the attached photo.


Japanese soldier radiation victim Nagasaki.png


http://www.aasc.ucla.edu/cab/200708230008.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midori_Naka
Actually, it is not at variance. You are comparing those who were directly exposed to the original bomb blast radiation. As opposed to US troops who would only be exposed to the background radiation & possible fallout. Unless you are walking within 750-500 meters of ground zero(radiation levels drop of quickly beyond that), you exposure to radiation will be limited.

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Terry Duncan » 05 May 2020 14:45

Wont the fallout from the blast take effect on the water supply troops may use as they move into an area? How long could troops 'occupy' a position within 1-2 miles of the detonation without taking too much damage from background effects?

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by glenn239 » 05 May 2020 16:21

Richard Anderson wrote:
04 May 2020 19:53
No, the transition would have continued to a Very Heavy Bomber force of about 10,000 B-29. Why if they already had a force of 2,000 B-29 in mid-1945 would they choose to decrease it to prosecute a war against "more advanced defenses"?
Took a while to get back to where I left this thread off. Got some traffic in the past day or two!

Anyways, doesn't matter if the force was 1,000 or 2,000 B-29's by mid-1945 if in January 1945 the USAAF starts raiding Germany in addition to its commitments against Japan, (or do the Americans magically get extra production?). 375 per month is enough production to keep some B-29 sized bomber force going on both fronts, but they're certainly not building up to 2,000 by summer 1945. They'd be lucky to have a frontline of 1,000 in both theatres combined would be my guess. So, the primary instrument in the war in Europe will be the B-17, B-24, and Lancaster well into 1946.
Yeah, assuming Me 262 outfitted with P&W F100 and AIM-9L and you've got a dangerous combination. Actual Me 262 with Jumo 004 and unguided rockets? Not so much.
I don't know if I've ever seen the stat for the number of bombers shot down per firing pass over Germany. With cannons I'd guess something like 1 bomber per 15 to 25 firing passes. With rockets, I'd guess more like one bomber down per 4 firing passes.

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by History Learner » 05 May 2020 16:55

Michael Kenny wrote:
05 May 2020 04:59
History Learner wrote:
05 May 2020 04:32


The German Army had 300 divisions, so technically accurate.
How many 1940 Divisions does that translate into?
To whose army and to what relevancy to the matter at hand?
Michael Kenny wrote:
05 May 2020 04:47
History Learner wrote:
05 May 2020 04:28


Name where they can land. When it came down to it, the place was France and then they only had three options:
You might want to do a bit of reading as to where Hitler thought the Allies were going to land next. It was not just 'France'.
For example why were so many German troops tied up in Norway?
Sure, the Germans emplaced divisions in Norway and in Belgium and Netherlands too for good measure; they still expected the main landing to come in Palais de Calais. As a result, by June of 1944 of the 58 divisions in Western Europe, over 40 were in France. Seems like Berlin pretty well understood the same logistical constraints and the nature of the terrain as London and Washington did.

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by History Learner » 05 May 2020 16:58

Michael Kenny wrote:
05 May 2020 04:55
History Learner wrote:
05 May 2020 04:32


If you refuse to read up on the actual history, sure. Germany's plan was to take over the continent and secure Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, with all else being periphery; in that respect, a Navy is pointless,
If you refuse to read up on actual history then for sure you will not understand why the UK would never stand back and allow that to happen. Any attempt to 'secure Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' was going to mean a war with the UK and thus if you wanted to keep control of a newly conquered 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' you had to defeat the UK. You could not defeat the UK without a Navy and thus any nation starting a war against the UK without a Navy in order to protect her new empire was a short-sighted nation. I guess you could say Germany fell at the first hurdle.
Sure, the UK would be opposed but they could do nothing to stop such on its own. For reference, see Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of Great Powers for the industrial balance in 1937:

Image

With the conquest of Western Europe and the USSR, the German Reich would have the resources and industrial base to ensure the UK could never force it out of such. As I've said before, it's a matter of basic math here; Germany would have 32.6% of global war making potential while the UK would have just 10.2%. The largest Navy in the world is irrelevant unless they suddenly grow tracks to come upon land like a leviathan.

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by History Learner » 05 May 2020 17:21

T. A. Gardner wrote:
05 May 2020 06:05
That was a special ops landing consisting of about 500 men. Hardly a mass invasion intended to make a permanent lodgment on an enemy coast. Even Dieppe was a "raid" and not intended to remain on the beachhead. Got any where the Allies landed a large (division +) force and intended to stay on the beachhead but were pushed back into the sea?
Your original contention was that not a single amphibious landing failed, so you're moving goalposts. If you'd like a larger divisional size landing, take your own Dieppe Raid, which you blithely dismiss despite the fact their plan was to hold the city for two tides, not just a quick raid; in this they categorically failed.

Outside of direct failures, let us look at near failures, and in that regard we have Omaha Beach, the Salerno Landings, and numerous others. Tell me, how exactly are seven divisions supposed to overpower, let's say 10, in fortified positions? And no, "just because" is not a valid argument. Otherwise, I'm forced to ask you why didn't the Allies just land directly in Germany itself or, perhaps, Tokyo Harbor instead of Iwo Jima?
Germany never intended to devote massive resources into an air war. There are several reasons for that, foremost among them is the lack of sufficient fuel and industry to support a really massive air force in a long-term war of attrition. The Luftwaffe was set up for short, intense impulses of activity followed by long periods of low rates of operation.
Aside from that, a purely defensive Luftwaffe is a loser in any case as it doesn't provide Germany with a way of winning, only a means of possibly staving off defeat.
And this tells me you really have no idea what you're talking about. Let us review The Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze, shall we?

Page 408:
"For obvious reasons, the Germans followed the Anglo-American air programme particularly attentively. In the autumn the Wehrmacht assumed that aircraft deliveries to Britain were already running at the rate of roughly 300 per month.36 This was not yet overwhelming, but given that German output barely exceeded 1,000 planes per month it was already important in tilting the balance in Britain's favour. The real threat, as the Germans fully understood, was that the trans-Atlantic flow would soon increase dramatically both in quantity and quality. The long-term potential of American industry was brought to the Air Ministry's attention by a variety of industrialists.57 And all the evidence suggests that Goering's officials responded. Indeed, the signs are that over the winter of 1940-41 the Luftwaffe leadership was focusing as much attention on the industrial prerequisites for the coming air war with Britain and America as it was on the imminent invasion of the Soviet Union. As we shall see in the next chapter, from the autumn of 1940 onwards huge investments began to be made in capacity expansion. And it was above all the threat of American deliveries that motivated the Reich Air Ministry to undertake a serious effort to enrollthe conquered territories of Western Europe as a manufacturing base.5"

Pages 424-425:
"With hindsight it is hard to avoid the conclusion that after the defeat of France Germany would have done better to adopt a defensive posture, consolidating its position in Western Europe, attacking British positions in the Mediterranean and forcing the British and the Americans to bomb their way onto the Continent. Given that the Red Army ultimately proved to be the nemesis of the Wehrmacht, this is hard to deny. But what is too often ignored in such counterfactual arguments is the growing awareness in Berlin that, even after the occupation of Western Europe, Germany did not have the upper hand in a long war against Britain and America. The chronic shortage of oil, the debility of the European coal mines and the fragility of the food chain, made it seem unlikely that Germany would in fact be able to 'consolidate' its conquests of 1940 without falling into excessive dependence on the Soviet Union. Even if this were possible, the combined manufacturing capacity of Britain and America vastly exceeded the industrial capacity currently under German control and this, in turn, spelled disaster in a protracted air war. The German army, on the other hand, had proved its ability to achieve decisive victory against what were thought to be the strongest armies in Europe. When we bear this range of factors in mind it is easier to appreciate why a defensive strategy seemed like a second-best in the autumn of 1940. After the defeat of France, the dream of a gigantic land empire seemed within reach, and, given the industrial strength looming on the other side of the Atlantic, there was no time to waste."

Pages 450-451:
"The floodgates in Luftwaffe planning finally opened in the summer of 1941 with the completion of the army's Barbarossa programme and the long-awaited decision to shift priority to the air war. In June 1941 the Air Ministry proposed a doubling of output to 20,000 aircraft per year over the following three years.72 To implement this expansion, Goering's staff came to an agreement with Fritz Todt to carry out the reallocation of resources from the army to the Luftwaffe in a 'consensual fashion'. Todt himself was to oversee the identification of spare capacity and to ensure continuity of employment for army contractors.73 Days after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe revealed the full urgency and ambition of its new plans. At a meeting with representatives of the OKW, State Secretary Milch announced that, as of 1 May 1941, German intelligence believed that combined British and American output had exceeded that of Germany and Italy. The United States alone was turning out 2,800 high-performance aero-engines per month. On current trends, Anglo-American output would be twice that of the Axis by the end of 1942. 'There is not a minute to lose...', Milch declared.

By the summer of 1942 Germany needed to increase its production of aircraft by 150 percent, to roughly 3,000 planes per month.74 The precise target set by Milch was new, but not the basic thrust of his comments. As we have seen, the expansion in productive capacity had already begun in the autumn of 1940. Milch's new target of 3,000 aircraft per month, however, required a further scaling up. Since earlier in the year Krauch had been envisioning a medium-term increase in the production of air fuel from 1 to 1.5 million tons. Now he raised his target to no less than 3 million tons. Given the cost of the hydrogenation process, it was unrealistic to assume that this could be produced from German coal. Hydrogenation was
simply too expensive. Krauch's promise therefore hinged on the assumption that the Wehrmacht would conquer the Caucasus in the next few months and that Germany by 1942 would be importing Russian oil at the rate of at least one million tons per annum.75

Here was the perverse logic of Barbarossa in a nutshell. The conquest of the oilfields of the Caucasus, 2,000 kilometres deep in the Soviet Union, was not treated as the awesome military-industrial undertaking that it was. It was inserted as a precondition into another gargantuan industrial plan designed to allow the Luftwaffe to fight an air war, not against the Soviet Union, but against the looming air fleet of Britain and the United States."

So yes, the entire rationale behind Barbarossa was to give Germany the resources needed to fight the Anglo-Americans in the air war, as I said.
Sure it did. The program was severely cut back in funding in 1946 because the war ended. Even so, MX 774 developed a missile that had potential to carry a nuclear warhead to about a range of 600 to 700 miles with sufficient accuracy to hit a city dead on. The Azuza guidance system developed for it was used in one form or another into the 1970's. The airframe designed by Convair's engineer Charlie Bossart is still the standard for liquid fueled ballistic missiles today. Reaction motors got gimbaled nozzles to work replacing the horribly inefficient graphite veins on the V-2. The whole program in wartime would have produced an early IRBM.
Of course, the US also was working on what amounted to cruise missiles as an alternative and one of these would have sufficed as well.
I'd love to see some citations in this regard.
Not true at all. As 1950's testing in Nevada proved--conclusively-- you could march troops across ground zero of a nuclear weapon detonation as little as 30 minutes afterwards.

That's known because the US Army did just that in more than one test. Many of the above ground shots had spectators not far from the detonation

I suspect your knowledge of the effects of radiation is seriously limited. If anything the troops would have more chance of dying in terms of the battle space from being shot or hit by shrapnel from a shell the enemy fired than from the resulting radioactivity from use of a nuclear weapon, and they would not have any particularly noticeable side effects from their exposure in the short term.
Two images does not constitute an actual argument. For what Military leaders were actually seeing in reports and first hand, let's look to Hell To Pay by D.M. Giangreco:

This would have amounted to six nuclear detonations in a triangular zone measuring sixty-five by forty by forty-five miles with up to three more blasts within this area or points to the north. The War Department’s official position on radioactivity at this time, as stated in an August 12, 1945, press release, was that “the bomb is detonated in combat, at such height above the ground, as to give the maximum blast effect against structures, and to disseminate the radioactive products as a cloud. . . . Practically all the radioactive products are carried upward in the ascending column of hot air and dispersed harmlessly over a wide area.”41 However, an internal report issued after the July Trinity test of a nuclear device in New Mexico described dangerous “hot spots” roughly twenty miles from ground zero. They included a ten-mile strip of U.S. Highway 380 and an area dubbed “Hot Canyon” along the path of the blast cloud. 42

The close proximity of Bingham, New Mexico, to one of the areas receiving a heavy dusting of fallout, and the fact that two families near the “Hot Canyon” may have received large doses of radiation, was enough to prompt the Manhattan Project’s medical chief to warn that “this site is too
small for a repetition of a similar test.”43
Yet in spite of this sensitivity to possible radiation sickness and death, the expectation of dreadful casualties from purely conventional warfare during Olympic was so real that Marshall felt that tactical use of nuclear weapons was fully worth the risk, in spite of the possibility that potentially hideous consequences may have awaited some unknown number of the hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers and Marines fighting their way through a nuclear battlefield. In addition there would be tens of thousands more men stirring up the radiated dust during base and airfield construction.

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Michael Kenny » 05 May 2020 17:26

History Learner wrote:
05 May 2020 16:58




Sure, the UK would be opposed but they could do nothing to stop such on its own.
Britain stood up to Hitler in 1939. It was the prime mover in creating an Alliance to stop his expansion plans. It had setbacks but at no time was it ever going to allow Germany to control 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' If you could just get past your fixation on ground Army size you might learn something about strategic planning. Short term temporary local tactical successes do not a war win.

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Politician01 » 05 May 2020 17:35

As noted before: if the USSR falls by the end of 1942, the Germans have to keep troops there, they will have casualties due to partisans and they cant extract all the resources they need quickly, howevere it leaves them with a situation 100x better than OTL.

They get spared the horrendous casualties of the 1943-1945 period. They can send a LOT more soldiers into fighting against the Wallies and a LOT more people into their factories. They save a LOT of fuel, can develop Jet fighters and AA Rockets faster than OTL. The R4M in combination with the 262 was absolutely devastating for the Allies OTL, in this ATL it will be 10x worse.

After NA, the Allies cant just sit around, they have to invade. Problem is if they attack in Italy they will experience horrendous casualties for very little gain. If they attack in Normandy they will get slaughtered. OTL there were around 120 000 Osttruppen in Northern France (forced Russian, Ukranian ect consripts from the East) that surrenderd quickly and allowed the Wallies to bypass formidable defences - not the case ATL.

The British are running out of manpower by 1944 - both their army and work force is shrinking - the Americans are busy with Japan and cant fight a two front war without the Russians engaging the bulk of the German Army.

OTL the Germans introduced the proximity fuse in early 1945, leading to a trippling of downed Allied Bombers. In this ATL, they will get it probably a few months earlier with thousands of additional AA guns due top no Russian front and increased production. Also they will have trained personell on ALL Flak guns, compared to OTL where half of all Flak guns were manned by children/women/ forced conscripts from the East by 1944.The Allies cant take such losses.

From Donald Nojboer: German Flak defences vs Allied heavy Bombers 1942-1945 pp 73- 74, besides thousands of shot down Allied Bombers, flak alone damaged an incredible 9000 British and 66 000 American Bomber! (sic!).And on page 75:

"Averaging it out to 3,400 rounds per victory, the cost of manufacturing the shells required to bring down a heavy bomber totalled 267,440 Reichmarks or US$106,976. The cost of a fully equipped B‑17 was approximately US$292,000, the B‑24 totalled US$327,000 and the Lancaster £320,000. These figures do not take into account the cost accrued in the manning of either bombers or flak batteries, or the development and constructionof specialized equipment required for these weapon systems. In a straight comparison, the cost of US$107,000 per victory for the heavy flak guns was a more than fair return. Add in the cost of repair for the thousands of damaged bombers and Aircraft that returned to base but had to be scrapped and the ratio increases still further in the flak gun’s favour. The exchange in blood also favoured the flak batteries. While tens of thousands of highly trained Allied aircrew perished or were wounded by flak, the Flakwaffe suffered minimal casualties during air raids. In the war of attrition, the heavy flak gun proveda lethal adversary."

If Roosevelt is insane enough to demand "unconditional surrender" even after the fall of Russia, he will probably lose the election in 1944, making room for a President Ready to negotiate. Considered the increase in the American public opinion to negotiate with Germany after the Problems encountered in Normandy - a jump from 20% to 40% of all People questioned (Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt,American PublicOpinion, and The WarAgainst Nazi GermanySteven Casey p 153) - it is resonable to assume that increased casualties over several years will lead to more than 50% of Americans demanding a peace treaty.
Last edited by Politician01 on 05 May 2020 17:51, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Michael Kenny » 05 May 2020 17:37

History Learner wrote:
05 May 2020 17:21


Your original contention was that not a single amphibious landing failed, so you're moving goalposts. If you'd like a larger divisional size landing, take your own Dieppe Raid, which you blithely dismiss despite the fact their plan was to hold the city for two tides, not just a quick raid; in this they categorically failed.

This is absurd arse-covering. 'Raids' are not the same as 'landings'. There is absolutely no comparison between the two.



History Learner wrote:
05 May 2020 17:21
Outside of direct failures, let us look at near failures, and in that regard we have Omaha Beach, the Salerno Landings, and numerous others. .............
What about the 'near successes' of Norway and Crete? In both Campaigns the Germans were very close to a total defeat. One sides good luck is anothers bad luck.

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Michael Kenny » 05 May 2020 17:51

Politician01 wrote:
05 May 2020 17:35
They save a LOT of fuel, can develop Jet fighters and AA Rockets faster than OTL. The R4M in combination with the 262 was absolutely devastating for the Allies...........
I counter this with accelerated development of Allied 'secret weapons (in that there is no 1944 weapons cancellations and rushed measures to negate any obvious German superiority) means we have Allied Jets and guided missiles that remove all (temporary) German advantage. In all wars there is only a brief window when one side has a clear advantage. The 'other side' always comes up with a fix.


Politician01 wrote:
05 May 2020 17:35
............. in this ATL it will be 10x worse.
Are you sure about 10x? Why not 7.367% worse? This is pure wish-fulfillment.

Politician01 wrote:
05 May 2020 17:35
After NA, the Allies cant just sit around, they have to invade. Problem is if they attack in Italy they will experience horrendous casualties for very little gain.
In your imagination. How exactly are these horrendous casualties to be inflicted? Are the Germans working on a guided bullet where every fifth round is a kill? Maybe you are confused and think it will be as easy to despatch a fully quipped Allied soldier as it is to murder women and children in a Russian village or a concentration camp?

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 May 2020 18:04

glenn239 wrote:
05 May 2020 16:21
Took a while to get back to where I left this thread off. Got some traffic in the past day or two!
Yes, social distancing seems to be leading to an expansion of the number of people adding interesting notions to this silliness. :lol:
Anyways, doesn't matter if the force was 1,000 or 2,000 B-29's by mid-1945 if in January 1945 the USAAF starts raiding Germany in addition to its commitments against Japan, (or do the Americans magically get extra production?). 375 per month is enough production to keep some B-29 sized bomber force going on both fronts, but they're certainly not building up to 2,000 by summer 1945. They'd be lucky to have a frontline of 1,000 in both theatres combined would be my guess. So, the primary instrument in the war in Europe will be the B-17, B-24, and Lancaster well into 1946.
Move the goalposts much?

The Germans somehow magically defeat the Soviets in some undefined way at some undefined time in 1942. In this, or is it one of the other threads, that magic is done by the Germans magically being aware that they need more tanks instead of aircraft to defeat the Soviets in some undefined way at some undefined time in 1942, so immediately on rising to power in 1933 Hitler tells Goering to "blow off, I got this cool colonel in the Heer that needs to build more tanks so we can defeat the Soviets in 1942". So, anyway, I would expect the upshot would be a weaker Luftwaffe, even less capable of defense of the periphery of the Reich that it was historically. Unless, obviously, the Luftwaffe magically gets built up in 1943 to oppose the CBO.

Anyway, why would they need to deploy B-29 to England in 1944 when they have perfectly adequate heavy bombers that with weaker Luftwaffe opposition is going to be more effective earlier? Is that because the German heavy industry is going to magically transfer to Ukraine, because the Germans also magically realize that the weakened Luftwaffe they create to win against the Soviets in 1942 isn't going to be strong enough to defend the Heimat?

Sorry, its hard not to be sarcastic when seeing 59 pages of poorly defined and undefined PODs heaped one upon another in order to keep the whole rickety edifice from crashing down.
I don't know if I've ever seen the stat for the number of bombers shot down per firing pass over Germany. With cannons I'd guess something like 1 bomber per 15 to 25 firing passes. With rockets, I'd guess more like one bomber down per 4 firing passes.
Glenn that isn't a "stat", its at best an estimate and more like an opinion. A stat is that in all of 1945, when the Me 262 was operational, the American Air Forces lost 199 heavy bombers to enemy aircraft in four months, compared to 1,516 heavy bombers to enemy aircraft in the twelve months of 1944. So at least a 39.4% loss of effectiveness, despite the introduction of the magical Me 262.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Politician01 » 05 May 2020 18:18

Michael Kenny wrote:
05 May 2020 17:51
I counter this with accelerated development of Allied 'secret weapons (in that there is no 1944 weapons cancellations and rushed measures to negate any obvious German superiority) means we have Allied Jets and guided missiles that remove all (temporary) German advantage. In all wars there is only a brief window when one side has a clear advantage. The 'other side' always comes up with a fix.
Sure - if you can prove that these projects were indeed cancelled and that they would have been ready in 1945 without cancellation or that they could have been accelerated.
Michael Kenny wrote:
05 May 2020 17:51
Are you sure about 10x? Why not 7.367% worse? This is pure wish-fulfillment.
Considered there is no Russian juggernaut sucking up German manpower and overruning German production centers East of Berlin in 1944/45 10x is a good estimate.
Michael Kenny wrote:
05 May 2020 17:51
In your imagination. How exactly are these horrendous casualties to be inflicted?
By having 40 divisions stationed in Italy instead of the 20 that were there OTL? Why do Anglos allways get so upset when they get confronted with the truth that without the USSR the simply are to weak to defeat Germany?

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Michael Kenny » 05 May 2020 18:29

Politician01 wrote:
05 May 2020 18:18


Sure - if you can prove that these projects were indeed cancelled and that they would have been ready in 1945 without cancellation or that they could have been accelerated.
My proof is in the same book that gave you a 10-fold increase in Allied bomber losses. Check it out.

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Peter89 » 05 May 2020 19:20

Politician01 wrote:
05 May 2020 18:18

By having 40 divisions stationed in Italy instead of the 20 that were there OTL? Why do Anglos allways get so upset when they get confronted with the truth that without the USSR the simply are to weak to defeat Germany?
Kenny is a respected member of the AHF, he is just sensitive of wehrabooid comments. The Wallies could win with or without the USSR, if not in May 1945 then in September 1945. We are talking about a few months of diffrence.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: How bad would Allied casualties be if the Reich defeated the USSR?

Post by Politician01 » 05 May 2020 19:38

Michael Kenny wrote:
05 May 2020 18:29
My proof is in the same book that gave you a 10-fold increase in Allied bomber losses. Check it out.
Problem is the Me 262 and R4M were there OTL. Because of the Soviet Front, their development was hampered, they were produced only in limited numbers and the Allies had to deal with them only for a few months. This all changes massively ATL.

Your supposed Anglo wonderweapons came in 1946/47 after the Anglos stole German Technology, Patents and Scientists. And you cant prove that ATL they would have been ready faster.

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