Better Luftwaffe performance on D-Day

[Yodasgrandad]

I see websites stating that only 2 Luftwaffe planes turned up during the landings and am wondering if there would any impact/differences to D-Day if there were more Luftwaffe planes in the air, maybe to harass the landings? Attack ships?

Did the Germans have any torpedo type weaponry?

Or does it result in more Luftwaffe planes being shot down?

[T. A. Gardner]

One word sums up the difference it'd make, which is none:

Okinawa.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I see websites stating that only 2 Luftwaffe planes turned up during the landings ,,,

Roughly 300 German aircraft were sortied to attack the landing force 6th June. A large portion were shot dow, driven away, or aborted and crashed from mechanical problems. I dont have precise numbers but between 30 & 60 aircraft made it to the Channel and attacked the fleet as per pre invasion orders. I dont think any ships were sunk, but a few were damaged. At the end of the day half the the aircraft were still operational & a additional portion were under repair.

The infamous pair of the movies & pop histories strafed the beach as they had no bombs for attacking ships. A few others tried the same, but were barely noticed or were shot down/driven away.

Conversely the Allies had approx 12,000 aircraft available & ran over 14,000 sorties on 6 June.

Or does it result in more Luftwaffe planes being shot down?

Yes. On subsequent days the Germans made a increasing number of sorties as reinforcements arrived. In a few days they had to accept they aircraft could expect 50%+ losses in day sorties. Attacks were then made at night, with only fighters making defense day sorties.

In July German air strength peaked with as many as 1,300 sorties attempted vs the beachead in 24 hours. Mostly at night.

[Sheldrake]

There were several reasons why the Luftwaffe did not mount more serious opposition to the allied cross channel assault, which should have been impossible had the Germans command of the air.

#1 1944 was a bad year for the Germans technologically. They were in the middle of changing their air force from a piston engined aircraft to jet based force. They had lots of new technology, some of which worked (V1 cruise missile). Others were in sufficiently developed or in enough numbers to be effective. e.g. the air to surface Precision guided air to surface missiles such as the Fritz X and Hs293. The debate about whether the first German military jet should have been a jet fighter or jet bomber probably meant that neither would be available. Add a few hundred Me262 and Ar234 to the Luftwaffe orbat in 1944 and the allies would hvae had more problems.

#2 The Luftwaffe in the West had been run down. The fighter force had been eroded by the intense air battles over Germany. The bomber force was dissapaited in the 1944 steinbock offensive against London.

#3 Luck. Had the germans picked up the invasion fleet earlier they, and the weagther been better, they might have inflicted more damage.

It is worth noting that the Luftwaffe did mopunt day and night attacks on the Normandy beachhead throughout the campaign, in particular on the eastern, British sector which was esiest for them to hit. Many soldiers' memoirs mention the unpleasant experience of being bombed.

[Graniterail]

From January to May 1944 they lost hundreds of aircraft to little gain bombing Britain in blind revenge for Allied bombing of Germany. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Steinbock

Had those aircraft been held in reserve along with those that were already in France as things were, then committed en mass against the British 'Mulberry' harbour just before the Channel storms they would probably have had more of an effect. I doubt it would have turned the invasion back, but it could easily have slowed things down.

[T. A. Gardner]

From January to May 1944 they lost hundreds of aircraft to little gain bombing Britain in blind revenge for Allied bombing of Germany. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Steinbock

Had those aircraft been held in reserve along with those that were already in France as things were, then committed en mass against the British 'Mulberry' harbour just before the Channel storms they would probably have had more of an effect. I doubt it would have turned the invasion back, but it could easily have slowed things down.

It wouldn't have. Look at Okinawa. The Japanese threw about 3,000 aircraft in Kamikaze and regular attacks at the US fleet off shore there, losing nearly 2,000. They had ZERO effect on the amphibious operations or battle ashore. The Luftwaffe was already impotent by D-Day. Throwing several thousand aircraft at the fleet off shore would have done nothing to slow the invasion or the following build up.

They needed a paradigm shift in technology and they didn't have it.

[Graniterail]

It wouldn't have. Look at Okinawa. The Japanese threw about 3,000 aircraft in Kamikaze and regular attacks at the US fleet off shore there, losing nearly 2,000. They had ZERO effect on the amphibious operations or battle ashore. The Luftwaffe was already impotent by D-Day. Throwing several thousand aircraft at the fleet off shore would have done nothing to slow the invasion or the following build up.

They needed a paradigm shift in technology and they didn't have it.

12 Destroyers sunk
15 Amphibious ships sunk
9 other ships sunk
386 ships damaged

Yet the idea that the Germans might have hit something critical & irreplaceable like the lock gates (they wouldn't have known too, but it's not impossible they get lucky) of a Mulberry harbour out of a sortie of several hundred aircraft is out of the question.

I don't think it was a paradigm shift in technology but one in their approach to the war that they needed.
Of course the whole reason they went for revenge attacks on British civilians instead of trying to put together a reserve for a counter-attack against an expected landing had to do with them being Nazi's so it's kind of a moot point to imagine them doing something different.

...
Conversely the Allies had approx 12,000 aircraft available & ran over 14,000 sorties on 6 June.
...

I'm seeing 2,434 fighters and fighter-bombers with 700 light and medium bombers listed over at hyperwar http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-H-DDay/ (pg.7). Can I ask what source you're using?

[Sheldrake]

Yet the idea that the Germans might have hit something critical & irreplaceable like the lock gates (they wouldn't have known too, but it's not impossible they get lucky) of a Mulberry harbour out of a sortie of several hundred aircraft is out of the question.

What are you referring to here? What was the "death star" like key vulnerability of a Mulberry Harbour? They didn't have lock gates. The clever part of the design was to float up and down with the tide.

[T. A. Gardner]

12 Destroyers sunk
15 Amphibious ships sunk
9 other ships sunk
386 ships damaged

And, it had no impact on the US taking the island. Most of the ships damaged didn't even have to leave the theater. They were repaired at the advance base at Ulithi atoll.

Yet the idea that the Germans might have hit something critical & irreplaceable like the lock gates (they wouldn't have known too, but it's not impossible they get lucky) of a Mulberry harbour out of a sortie of several hundred aircraft is out of the question.

The Mullberries didn't have locks. Their biggest value was they created a calm harbor for shipping to unload in. The floating pier system used worked, but as at least the US discovered, it was simply faster for a ship to anchor in the protected water and unload to DUKW amphibious trucks that took their load directly ashore to a dump than it was to unload at the piers provided. LST's simply ran up on the beach and unloaded. The piers were too few to relieve the congestion.
So, there was nothing for the Luftwaffe to really bomb other than the piers. The outer breakwater system consisted of sunken caissons and ships. How can you sink something that's already sunk?

I don't think it was a paradigm shift in technology but one in their approach to the war that they needed.
Of course the whole reason they went for revenge attacks on British civilians instead of trying to put together a reserve for a counter-attack against an expected landing had to do with them being Nazi's so it's kind of a moot point to imagine them doing something different.

By 1944 their only hope, and a thin one at best, lay in some paradigm shifting technology that would neutralize a major component of the Allied forces.
For example, the Germans take the Hs 293 and enlarge it into a SSM anti-ship missile launched from hardened positions along the Atlantic Wall. Maybe something that's a cross between a V-1 and 293. Give it a solid fuel or liquid fuel rocket motor instead of the pulse jet and make it command or otherwise guided. There's so many ships you couldn't miss. It probably wouldn't stop the invasion, but it would have been a lot better than aircraft trying to do it.
Put the same missile on S-boats or other small ships and turn them into the first missile boats.

That's the sort of thing the Germans needed to even stand a chance of stopping an invasion. They weren't looking at that because they simply didn't have the proper point of view on how amphibious operations and naval warfare were conducted by the Allies.

[Hop]

I'm seeing 2,434 fighters and fighter-bombers with 700 light and medium bombers listed over at hyperwar http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-H-DDay/ (pg.7). Can I ask what source you're using?

That figure is for the tactical air forces only (RAF 2nd TAF, USAAF 9th AF). For the RAF ADGB (formerly Fighter Command) flew another 1,246 fighter sorties, and Bomber Command 1,211 bomber sorties. The 8th AF would have added thousands more. This RAF page puts the total allied sorties as 13,743: http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/June6.cfm

[histan]

Guys

You are both right!

Once Hitler had decided in late 1943 that the strategic objective for 1944 was the defeat of the allied invasion of France, then Germany needed some serious strategic thinking and planning for operations in the West that would not deter the invasion but allow it to happen and then defeat it. That would require integrated tri-service planning to identify the possible ways of achieving this and how the activities of all three services would be combined together. I guess that could be called a new approach. They were simply incapable of achieving this.

Once the ways had been identified then the means by which the ways would be implemented would be developed. Looking at the allied side that includes stuff like PLUTO, Mulberry, DD tanks, DUKW, etc. Not only were the German's incapable of "joined up" strategic thinking but they were also incapable of linking scientists and engineers into military planning and military problem solving. So the "paradigm shift" was also impossible.

Regards

John

[T. A. Gardner]

Guys

You are both right!

Once Hitler had decided in late 1943 that the strategic objective for 1944 was the defeat of the allied invasion of France, then Germany needed some serious strategic thinking and planning for operations in the West that would not deter the invasion but allow it to happen and then defeat it. That would require integrated tri-service planning to identify the possible ways of achieving this and how the activities of all three services would be combined together. I guess that could be called a new approach. They were simply incapable of achieving this.

Once the ways had been identified then the means by which the ways would be implemented would be developed. Looking at the allied side that includes stuff like PLUTO, Mulberry, DD tanks, DUKW, etc. Not only were the German's incapable of "joined up" strategic thinking but they were also incapable of linking scientists and engineers into military planning and military problem solving. So the "paradigm shift" was also impossible.

Regards

John

With that I agree. A paradigm shift wasn't happening, and Germany had ZERO means at hand otherwise to defeat an Allied amphibious assault.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'm seeing 2,434 fighters and fighter-bombers with 700 light and medium bombers listed over at hyperwar http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-H-DDay/ (pg.7). Can I ask what source you're using?

That figure is for the tactical air forces only (RAF 2nd TAF, USAAF 9th AF). For the RAF ADGB (formerly Fighter Command) flew another 1,246 fighter sorties, and Bomber Command 1,211 bomber sorties. The 8th AF would have added thousands more. This RAF page puts the total allied sorties as 13,743: http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/June6.cfm

TY

[Carl Schwamberger]

The models to look at for damaging amphibious invasions would be over Sicily, Salerno, & perhaps Leyte. The ratio of Allied to German/Axis aircraft were less lopsided. The results off Okinawa were achieved by turning aircraft into anti shipping cruise missiles. There was some of that off Leyte, but a less significant number, which is easier to subtract from the result. Tactically the air campaigns over Sicilly and Salerno had some spectacular results. Operationally they were a bust as little major adjustment to the landing plan & build up were made. Stratigically the mistakes the Allied planners made impeded them more that the German air opposition.

[Graniterail]

Yet the idea that the Germans might have hit something critical & irreplaceable like the lock gates (they wouldn't have known too, but it's not impossible they get lucky) of a Mulberry harbour out of a sortie of several hundred aircraft is out of the question.

What are you referring to here? What was the "death star" like key vulnerability of a Mulberry Harbour? They didn't have lock gates. The clever part of the design was to float up and down with the tide.

Trying to find the source but essentially they were worried about the kind of progressive collapse that happened at Mulberry A happening at Mulberry B which was damaged by the storm as things went. One piece goes, & (under the storm conditions) like in an Arch bridge it takes the rest with it.

And, it had no impact on the US taking the island. Most of the ships damaged didn't even have to leave the theater. They were repaired at the advance base at Ulithi atoll.

Yes, it didn't stop the Allies. The Axis could get hits though & hits could have slowed the Allies down at Normandy, not Okinawa (which is a different thing to stopping them).

...LST's simply ran up on the beach and unloaded. The piers were too few to relieve the congestion.
So, there was nothing for the Luftwaffe to really bomb other than the piers. The outer breakwater system consisted of sunken caissons and ships. How can you sink something that's already sunk?...

LST's were highly valuable, but they were in short supply. Thus the loss of Mulberry B which was enabling other ships to offload would have slowed supply. Bombardon's did actually breakup and sink during the gale https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mulberry_ ... Bombardons They were intended to be beached moreso than outright sunk.

...They weren't looking at that because they simply didn't have the proper point of view on how amphibious operations and naval warfare were conducted by the Allies.

This is kind of self reinforcing, the reason they didn't use the technology they had was they didn't have the right approach, the reason they didn't develop the technology they needed was they didn't have the right approach.