Better British preparation for WW2

[Ianseymour95]

What was wrong with the British military during the early stages of the war? How was it that they were defeated in the East/West in nearly every battle during the first few years of the war?

Was it poor defence spending/preparation? Could disasters like Singapore be different if they assessed threats from Japan?

[T. A. Gardner]

We could start that the Fleet Air Arm was devastated by the way the government arranged their aircraft development and funding. With the RAF having a big say on their budget and handling much of their aircraft design, the FAA was crippled. It didn't help that within the Admiralty, the FAA was a poor cousin at best.
Had the RN started the war with a relatively modern carrier fighter, dive bomber, and torpedo plane of the sort Japan and US had, and had those aircraft in sufficient numbers, the RN would have lost fewer major combatants and would have devastated the KM and RM far worse than they did.

The disaster in Singapore was inexcusable. Britain had been at war for two years. There was no reason whatsoever that the British Army and Commonwealth units stationed in Malaysia shouldn't have been reasonably well trained and equipped. Nor was their any reason that those units couldn't have prepared well in advance of the Japanese invasion for such an occurrence.
The British, and local commanders, instead treated Malaysia as if the nation and Britain were still at peace. Preparations for a possible war with Japan proceeded at a leisurely pace. There was no reason whatsoever that a regiment of tanks couldn't have been supplied, even obsolescent ones. But, no tanks were. For all intents, Malaysia was an almost forgotten place in the Empire.
In aircraft things were no better. Malaysia got the hand-me-downs and obsolete leftovers from elsewhere. There weren't even enough pilots to man all the available aircraft and those pilots that were available often had few flying hours to their credit.

[Sheldrake]

What was wrong with the British military during the early stages of the war? How was it that they were defeated in the East/West in nearly every battle during the first few years of the war?

Was it poor defence spending/preparation? Could disasters like Singapore be different if they assessed threats from Japan?

That is a full course of study....

Try reading
David Fraser - "And we shall shock them"
Corelli Barnett - The Audit of War
David French "Training Churchill's Army"

The early chapters of the official histories tells the story from the home team
Economics
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... con-2.html

Production
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... index.html

Navy
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... index.html
Army
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... index.html

RAF
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... index.html
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... index.html

Mediterranean
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... index.html

Re Japan. The threat from Japan was assessed but had to take third place to the actions by Germany and Italy. It could have been handled better if the British had finessed their air defences and shifted some spitfires and air defence C3 to Singapore. That would have been a gamble and taken a pessimistic view of the value of "leaning into France"

[Sheldrake]

duplicate post

[Sheldrake]

We could start that the Fleet Air Arm was devastated by the way the government arranged their aircraft development and funding. With the RAF having a big say on their budget and handling much of their aircraft design, the FAA was crippled. It didn't help that within the Admiralty, the FAA was a poor cousin at best.
Had the RN started the war with a relatively modern carrier fighter, dive bomber, and torpedo plane of the sort Japan and US had, and had those aircraft in sufficient numbers, the RN would have lost fewer major combatants and would have devastated the KM and RM far worse than they did.

In other words a second consequence of the decision to allow the RAF to form an independent air force, competing with the Army and navy for funds and allowing both services to ignore the overlap between air and sea.

One pillar of British pre-war defence policy was investing in the deterrent effect of Bomber Command. The famous phrase "the bomber will always get through". This was good for RAF pre-war funding, and an excuse for not investing in a modern substantial army. However, Bomber Command did not deter Hitler, wasntl able to get through in daylight and could not achieve any military effect at night. In retrospect a wasteful failed policy.

So maybe we can blame the RAF for Britain's inadequate preparations for WW2

[Ianseymour95]

Could you say if it was purely a one on one war between Britain and Japan (No threat from Germany, US involvement etc) then Britain would eventually win?

Would either side have any advantages against each other?

[maltesefalcon]

The British had a very small force in France in 1940. In fact Belgium supplied more troops. But the loss there was due more to poor battlefield planning and an outdated command/control/communication network. Since France supplied the bulk of the troops and it was their network that was at issue, its tough to blame the UK for the 1940 debacle.

Politics were to blame as well. Politicians in Britain and France insisted that Belgium be included as an ally, even though the Belgians refused to cooperate until the 11th hour. By that time the Dyle Plan was all but useless, especially since Belgian troops hoped to fight only on their own miniscule patch of ground.

Armed with same basic equipment and troops, the British Army did much better in Africa a short time later.

But yes both the UK and USA were caught napping in Asia.

[Sheldrake]

Politicians in Britain and France insisted that Belgium be included as an ally, even though the Belgians refused to cooperate until the 11th hour. By that time the Dyle Plan was all but useless,

The Belgians were part of the France Belgian defence accord until 1936, when the Belgians decided they were better off relying on neutrality than on French willingness to stand up to Hitler. Neither country came out of that well

[T. A. Gardner]

We could start that the Fleet Air Arm was devastated by the way the government arranged their aircraft development and funding. With the RAF having a big say on their budget and handling much of their aircraft design, the FAA was crippled. It didn't help that within the Admiralty, the FAA was a poor cousin at best.
Had the RN started the war with a relatively modern carrier fighter, dive bomber, and torpedo plane of the sort Japan and US had, and had those aircraft in sufficient numbers, the RN would have lost fewer major combatants and would have devastated the KM and RM far worse than they did.

In other words a second consequence of the decision to allow the RAF to form an independent air force, competing with the Army and navy for funds and allowing both services to ignore the overlap between air and sea.

One pillar of British pre-war defence policy was investing in the deterrent effect of Bomber Command. The famous phrase "the bomber will always get through". This was good for RAF pre-war funding, and an excuse for not investing in a modern substantial army. However, Bomber Command did not deter Hitler, wasntl able to get through in daylight and could not achieve any military effect at night. In retrospect a wasteful failed policy.

So maybe we can blame the RAF for Britain's inadequate preparations for WW2

To some extent, yes.

Compare the RAF and the Luftwaffe in 1939... Göring wanted control of the KM's carrier aircraft. That led to the demise of the Graf Zeppelin and the German navy having any sort of aircraft carrier. The Luftwaffe controlled the coastal patrol aircraft too. These were neglected until it became politically expedient to send some maritime patrol bombers into the Atlantic. Then you see a handful of FW 200 Condors (usually less than a dozen) becoming "The Scourge of the Atlantic."
The RAF was much the same way. The FAA wanted aircraft but were starved of funds. They were saddled with obsolescent or obsolete aircraft in 1939. The worst of that bunch was the Blackburn Roc, a "fighter" so pathetically bad it could barely get airborne. During the war, new FAA aircraft designs were relegated to minor manufacturers like Blackburn or Fairey because the RAF didn't want their own aircraft production compromised in any way.
Then there was Coastal Command. This effort was part of the RAF not the FAA. Coastal Command got the hand-me-downs and left overs from other RAF branches, starting the war with the very marginal Avro Anson. If anything, the RAF's neglect of the maritime patrol mission cost Britain a considerable number of merchant ships sunk... But "the bomber always gets through!" :roll:

The British Army did get it right motorizing their forces entirely and getting rid of the horse. That the cavalry accepted that stands in stark contrast to other militaries of the time.

[maltesefalcon]

Preparation for war involves more than money, training and equipment. There is the human factor. Lucky for us and bad for Hitler, both the UK and USSR forces had courage and discipline in the face of adversity. Neither folded under pressure, even when it seemed all was lost.

Hitler underestimated the willingness of both nations to stand up to him and he ultimately paid the price.

[Gorque]

What was wrong with the British military during the early stages of the war?

Perhaps they expected a repeat of the prior struggle and were slow to adapt?

How was it that they were defeated in the East/West in nearly every battle during the first few years of the war?

Old tactics and being on the defensive?

Was it poor defence spending/preparation?

There was a depression still in progress and gov't revenues were scarce.

Could disasters like Singapore be different if they assessed threats from Japan?

I believe that Singapore received a substantial sum of monies to improve the defenses during the thirties.