What part of "Too Little, too late" does not fit the situation?
There was never a "too little, too late". If the situation is unchanged (IRL vs hypothetical), then the chance of winning would not be determined by too late. The fundamental problem people have with understanding the outcome of the war is that it is mostly determined by the massive numerical superiority of the enemy in the East, which is indirectly independent from "competence" and "incompetence" of the Reich.
Economic factors, logistics and weather conditions are significant factors and variables in this conflict, but do not fully explain the outcome of the war. The best way to put it: Had the German Army, the NSDAP etc. acted with 100% competence
(that is of course, how one defines it, I specifically refer to the way they have historically conducted the war), the outcome would have been still
the same, should they enter and attempt to resolve the conflict in the way they historically did. The war was decided the moment their forces halted infront of Moscow. What followed was simply the consequence of a tactically superior force sitting on the Soviets neck, the only reason why the Wehrmacht survived for 3 more years deep in enemy territory.
They did not possess the insight and informations we have today. At Kursk, they still misjudged the USSR's manpower reserves, they were only partly aware of the dimensions. Keeping on the pressure from 41-43 was due to the fact that if the war would continue for a longer period, the chances for the opening of other fronts would occur,"we do not want another Verdun" (which it did) - the primary goal was still knocking the USSR out of the war, preferrably before December 42.
When the desired outcome was not achieved, they panicked, while their thinking behind it was "our sophisticated engineering and superior industry will save us", which it did not. You could have kept producing things indefinitely, it would have not made any impact on the enemy whatsoever (to quote industrials "[im Grossraum] laufend Schrott produziert", there were tons of assets procued in the Grossraum which cannot be fully assessed today, second to Scherner and Streb, Wagenführs data is useless it only gives info on Anlage A goods, which are just part of the Gouvernement), i.e. there was noone left to wield these weapons. The very reason why Germany could keep up the fight up until 45 against such an overwheliming Alliance were their economic strength, ingenuity and discipline and not shortcomings in innovations. Lack of manpower was the reason.
Their approach in defeating the USSR would have to be different, their diplomacy and policies in Europe would have to change.
Improvement of the structures and dozers would have been useful in the prolonged attempt to defeat the USSR (this is of course useless for their historical "Blitz" campaign), basically they would do it like Caesar in Gaul.