Stalin doesn't purge the military?

[ljadw]

At the same time of Uranus, the Soviets attacked AGC along its whole front .And the Third Romanian Army that was attacked,covered a front of 100 miles . The same as the Fourth Romanian Army .

[stg 44]

At the same time of Uranus, the Soviets attacked AGC along its whole front .And the Third Romanian Army that was attacked,covered a front of 100 miles . The same as the Fourth Romanian Army .

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_operation#Principles

The first echelon used raw firepower and mass to break the layered enemy defences, but the second echelon operational reserves combined firepower and mobility, something lacking in the former.

https://media.defense.gov/2017/Mar/31/2 ... ARFARE.PDF

The Soviets stress mass; the Germans, tactical finesse.

...

The Germans are the notable exception. They follow Clausewitz's distillation. His logic is encapsulated in a number of concepts like Schwerpunkt, which has a rough equivalence to the favorite Soviet principle of mass or concentration.

...

Above all, however, both during the Great Patriotic War and thereafter the Soviets believed in speed and mass.

...


The second principle governing Soviet-style maneuver warfare is usually known as mass and, more elaborately, as the principle of unequal distribution of forces along the front line with the aim of concentrating forces for the main blow on the decisive sector.
Generally, the intent was to attack a weak place in the enemy's defense and move rapidly to the rear areas and flanks of his main shock grouping and to terrain where combat forces, primarily task teams, could exploit success.
In the Great Patriotic War, mass was the chief principle upon which the Soviets operated to make their heavy-handed breakthroughs and, by overwhelming rearward forces, to gain tempo and momentum thereafter.
Up to 60-80 percent of the artillery and 90-100 percent of tanks and aviation available to a given front were concentrated on breakthrough sectors comprising 3-15 percent of the front.
Such concentrations on the axis of the main attack gave the Soviets a superiority over the enemy of three to six times in infantry, three to 10 times in artillery, four to 10 times in tanks, and two to 10 time in aviation.
Success in breakthroughs, the tempo thereafter, and even the casualties and required logistics have been positively correlated with concentration.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

15,745 officers discharged for political reasons is not "very small". During the 1920s the German Reichswehr only had 4,000 officers in total, and we know what they begat!

15,743 officers is the equivalent to the entire manpower of a full division!

15,743 is also around 15% of the Soviet officers you post existed in 1936.

Furthermore, one rather suspects that a large number of those classified in other categories were also political. Given the wider national and military culture, is it really likely that 14,181 officers were dismissed solely for drunkeness?

Or that trumped up "crime" charges weren't used to dismiss others?

Or that the officer corps was so unhealthy that 10% had to retire prematurely for "medical" reasons?

On top of this is the fact that the puge was most draconian amongst the higher ranks, whose professional development takes longest.

I would suggest that there was nothing "very small" about Stalin's milityary purges in either their scale or their impact.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

Drunkenness was and is still a big problem in Russia

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

The Red Army did not attack along the whole front of either 3rd or 4th Romanian Army. In the case of 3rd Army they attacked on two very narrow fronts from two bridgeheads they had earlier established when the overstretched Italians had been holding the line. After the breakthroughs, which were not easy and required the premature commitment of exploitation armour, they then proceeded to surround those Romanian divisions to the east and left at least three Romanian divisions to the west largely untouched. This was not a broad front offensive but a highly focused double breakthrough..

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

Yes, drunkness was and is a big problem in Russia, but it is also a problem for which there is a very high level of cultural tolerance, precisely because it is so pervasive.

At the start of WWI the Russians tried to restrict the sale of vodka to improve military and national discipline but, because such a high propoprtion of the government's tax income came from alcohol, they quickly had to back down.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sheldrake]

At the same time of Uranus, the Soviets attacked AGC along its whole front .And the Third Romanian Army that was attacked,covered a front of 100 miles . The same as the Fourth Romanian Army .

Lj you have a point, but only up to a point. About 20 years ago David Glantz pointed out that Stavka didn't always follow its own doctrine. Stalin ordered a broad front pursuit after the initial successes in winter 41-42, a tendency to be repeated throughout the war.

However, the most successful Red operations were not conducted in this way. Furthermore, there is a big difference between ordering a broad front attack as per the wide spread objectives for Op Barbarossa Eisenhower's 194-45 strategy and attacks to pin down reserves while concentrating forces at a decisive point. Whatever attacks were made against AGC in Nov 1942, the main effort and breakthrough sectors were against the 3rd and 4th Rumanian Armies. 100 miles isn't a particularly long distance for operational maniouvre. Within each Front force was concentrated on a chosen sector. The Red Armour was concentrated against two out of four corps of 3rd Rumanian army. https://weaponsandwarfare.files.wordpre ... wnmfzo.jpg

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Sheldrake,

The Soviet offensive wasn't against two Romanian corps, but against narrow fronts within those two corps.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

Yes, drunkness was and is a big problem in Russia, but it is also a problem for which there is a very high level of cultural tolerance, precisely because it is so pervasive.

At the start of WWI the Russians tried to restrict the sale of vodka to improve military and national discipline but, because such a high propoprtion of the government's tax income came from alcohol, they quickly had to back down.

Cheers,

Sid.

The source I consulted looks reliable (the comments less ) : Awfull Avalanche :On the Stalin Purges of the Soviet Military :one can read that from those who were discharged for drunkenness, theft,etc (14181) 6719 were fired in 1935, BEFORE the start of the purges . The source gives also examples of drunken officers shooting on people and against each other .

There is also no proof that those who were discharged were "better " than those who remained : the two war chiefs of staf (Shapochnikof and Wassilewsky) were capable officers who were not fired .

Most senior officers before the purges had only a short career (10/15 years) ,a lot of them had no serious military training :example : Tukhachevski who was promoted from lieutenant to general at the age of 27 .

[Yuri]

Drunkenness was and is still a big problem in Russia

You are confusing problem with the tradition which is strictly observed especially in the army.
By the way. If, say, the person yesterday got drunk to the point of unconsciousness, if it is to ask - to what state he was drunk yesterday? the answer will depend on the profession of this person.
For example:
Mathematician - in zero.
Chemist - fell in the precipitated.
Electrician - in arc.
Military - like tank.
Pilot - stood on the autopilot.
Railroad men - in draisine.
The shoemaker - in footbed.
Etc

[Yuri]

Hi ljadw,

15,745 officers discharged for political reasons is not "very small". During the 1920s the German Reichswehr only had 4,000 officers in total, and we know what they begat!

15,743 officers is the equivalent to the entire manpower of a full division!

15,743 is also around 15% of the Soviet officers you post existed in 1936.
Sid.

You are a bit wrong I think.
15000+ in five years, therefore the average for the year will be 3%, not 15%.

[Yuri]

I believe that there is no single answer to the question about the impact of the purges on the fighting capacity of the army. Judgments can only be estimated. In my opinion (I've studied this issue) impact the purges more positively, than negative. Many of the "old cadres" were burdened by the experience of the civil war, and built this experience in the absolute. Withdrawal this group could be considered a positive factor. On the other hand methods that were used, not always can be called acceptable.

[Stiltzkin]

The purges had as much impact on the RKKAs performance as Partisans on that of the German Army.

[Yuri]

The purges had as much impact on the RKKAs performance as Partisans on that of the German Army.

Comparison is not correct. The guerrillas had purge the Wehrmacht no different to one who was: a teetotaler or an alcoholic; immoral was being purged, or on the contrary an impeccable family man; a complete Nazi or his opponent.
For partisans there was one distinguishing feature of the candidate the purge's list - his uniform.

[Yuri]

Drunkenness was and is still a big problem in Russia

Now Australian men drank Russian vodka and sing Russian songs:
But from the taiga to the British seas
the Red army is the strongest all.

After appearing in the First channel of the Australian male choir Dustyesky became an overnight sensation.
One of the members of the group told the Australian TV channel ABC,
to assemble and speak, motivated them a love for vodka and Russian folk songs.

Original news Inotv:
https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2017-05-31 ... tralijskie