Operation Barbarossa : A close call or Germany was simply outmatched?

[Pavel Novak]

The coup of Prague was NO aggression : aggression is an attack on a country that resists. And Czechia did not resist, there was no shooting .If in 1939 Czechia had resisted, there would be a war and Britain would intervene . If Czechia did not fight, Britain would not fight .

Except that in February 1939 Czechoslovakia in reaction to German ultimatum activated British and French guarantee from Munich Pact but both western powers refused to fulfil their obligation from this pact and officially informed Czechoslovakia that they will not react in case of German aggression. Mobilisation was considered in March 1939 but with British and French violation of their commitments it was decided not to resist as it was pointless. Anyway there was that one instance of shooting because German army on some places crossed border one day earlier before the capitulation took effect.

It is interesting to look on it from German perspective as it showed to Germans that even recent joint British - French guarantee does not have much weight even if supposedly guaranteed country directly requested help.

[ljadw]

Even if B+F had declared war in february 1939, this would not have helped CZ: Hitler would be in Prague before the French could cross the Rhine .

As in 1938 CZ was on its own , as was Poland a few months later : it is an illusion to think that B+ F could prevent a German invasion . They could only fight a long war ,resulting in the liberatiion of CZ by the USSR .

[ThreadCutter]

I think Barbarossa was winnable. Stolfi sets out a great argument I've never seen decisively refuted on here in his book 'Hitler's Panzers East'.

A few things would have to change. While generally, the German's downfall was not considering the economic realities of the war, Stolfi argues that on the Eastern front, Hitler was too obssessed with creating siege lines of defense and securing new resources in the tactical phase, instead of delivering a knockout political blow by capturing Moscow. The idea that a massively unpopular communist leadership could survive as a relevant political entity after having to tuck tail and flee from Moscow (while leaving more than half their population in enemy hands) is ludicrous. The task then becomes taking Moscow in Barbarossa.

Critical and Realistically Possible changes-- When the Brandenbergers seized the bridges over the Dvina on 26 June, Manstein presses the attack, instead of waiting to reassemble with the rest of Army Group North. This is analogous to Guderians decision to continue the blitz past the Meuse in France. No enemy forces were in good order to oppose a sudden blitz from Dvina towards Leningrad. The Soviet forces in the area had just been shattered by Army Group North and were retreating at something near a route. If Manstein keeps the pressure on the retreating soviets instead of waiting for the full strength of Army Group North, taking Leningrad in July 1941 in a coup de main becomes not just possible, but highly probable. All that prevented this, as far as I can see, was uncharacteristic timidity on the part of Manstein. So instead of investiture in September followed by a 900 day seige, Russia looses the entire Baltic Province, a large chunk of population, and a major city. Oh, and Army Group North is now free to reinforce Army Group Center, eliminating the need to decide between crushing dangerous pockets of resistance to the South, and pushing on towards Moscow. With an entire Army group freed up, it's easy to do both.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/04.html

[stg 44]

I think Barbarossa was winnable. Stolfi sets out a great argument I've never seen decisively refuted on here in his book 'Hitler's Panzers East'.

A few things would have to change. While generally, the German's downfall was not considering the economic realities of the war, Stolfi argues that on the Eastern front, Hitler was too obssessed with creating siege lines of defense and securing new resources in the tactical phase, instead of delivering a knockout political blow by capturing Moscow. The idea that a massively unpopular communist leadership could survive as a relevant political entity after having to tuck tail and flee from Moscow (while leaving more than half their population in enemy hands) is ludicrous. The task then becomes taking Moscow in Barbarossa.

Critical and Realistically Possible changes-- When the Brandenbergers seized the bridges over the Dvina on 26 June, Manstein presses the attack, instead of waiting to reassemble with the rest of Army Group North. This is analogous to Guderians decision to continue the blitz past the Meuse in France. No enemy forces were in good order to oppose a sudden blitz from Dvina towards Leningrad. The Soviet forces in the area had just been shattered by Army Group North and were retreating at something near a route. If Manstein keeps the pressure on the retreating soviets instead of waiting for the full strength of Army Group North, taking Leningrad in July 1941 in a coup de main becomes not just possible, but highly probable. All that prevented this, as far as I can see, was uncharacteristic timidity on the part of Manstein. So instead of investiture in September followed by a 900 day seige, Russia looses the entire Baltic Province, a large chunk of population, and a major city. Oh, and Army Group North is now free to reinforce Army Group Center, eliminating the need to decide between crushing dangerous pockets of resistance to the South, and pushing on towards Moscow. With an entire Army group freed up, it's easy to do both.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/04.html

There is the problem of logistics. Manstein sat still on the Dvina because his supply lines were crawling with the disrupted Soviet 11th army and supplies were not getting through. He was immobilized as a result. If Moscow is the goal sending in on to Leningrad is a waste of time and he should have turned East to help Hoth destroy the 22nd army at Veliyki Luki to clear up the joint between the armies groups; 4th Panzer army should have been acting as a flank guard for the move on Moscow rather than diverging and letting Soviet forces setting in the separating joint between the army groups. Leningrad would eventually fall due to supply issues once Moscow fell, so if the strategic objective is Moscow, then going head on after Leningrad was a fatal dispersion of effort. Not only that, but logistically it was nearly impossible to take in July, so would have only fallen some time in late August-September anyway, again a fatal dispersion of effort based on Stolfi's thesis and would require the intervention of VIII Air Corps.

[losna]

I think Barbarossa was winnable. Stolfi sets out a great argument I've never seen decisively refuted on here in his book 'Hitler's Panzers East'.

A few things would have to change. While generally, the German's downfall was not considering the economic realities of the war, Stolfi argues that on the Eastern front, Hitler was too obssessed with creating siege lines of defense and securing new resources in the tactical phase, instead of delivering a knockout political blow by capturing Moscow. The idea that a massively unpopular communist leadership could survive as a relevant political entity after having to tuck tail and flee from Moscow (while leaving more than half their population in enemy hands) is ludicrous. The task then becomes taking Moscow in Barbarossa.

Uhm, and why should Soviets give up after losing the capital, when engaged in a struggle for their very life? Germans would have annexed everithing west of the Urals before stopping.

Critical and Realistically Possible changes-- When the Brandenbergers seized the bridges over the Dvina on 26 June, Manstein presses the attack, instead of waiting to reassemble with the rest of Army Group North. This is analogous to Guderians decision to continue the blitz past the Meuse in France. No enemy forces were in good order to oppose a sudden blitz from Dvina towards Leningrad. The Soviet forces in the area had just been shattered by Army Group North and were retreating at something near a route. If Manstein keeps the pressure on the retreating soviets instead of waiting for the full strength of Army Group North, taking Leningrad in July 1941 in a coup de main becomes not just possible, but highly probable. All that prevented this, as far as I can see, was uncharacteristic timidity on the part of Manstein. So instead of investiture in September followed by a 900 day seige, Russia looses the entire Baltic Province, a large chunk of population, and a major city. Oh, and Army Group North is now free to reinforce Army Group Center, eliminating the need to decide between crushing dangerous pockets of resistance to the South, and pushing on towards Moscow. With an entire Army group freed up, it's easy to do both.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/04.html

Amateurs look at tactics, professionals look to logistics.
WW2 is a excellent example of this: Germans were beaten mainly by sheer numbers and overwhelming firepower rather than by clever maneuvers.
And the Eastern Front is indeed a staggering example in that sense: even after suffering 3.4 million irrecoverable losses in the first six months of war they managed to chase away the Germans, though still taking 3-4 times the enemy losses for two years.
Even if they had taken both Moscow and Leningrad, Stalin would have still fought. Even after the conquest of the Caucasus' oilwells, Soviets would have still fought.
Actually, the only way Germans had to beat the soviets was moving all the Wehrmacht against them, to avoid the overstretching of of the front that made possible the counterattacks.
Say, a 6.55 million Heer plus 0.45 million SS with a frontline strenght of ~4.5-5 million (7 minus 2+ million men in the Ersatzheer and 0.9 regularly convalescent, plus 0.5 mln of Luftwaffe ground troops) with the need to replace ~600k irrecoverable losses (1.26 mln of which 47% dead, missing and invalids) per year (as in the period 1941-42), would have lasted, according to this table

4,55 years [(19,8 - 3,6 - 5,3 - 7 - 1,2) / (1,26 * 0,47)], assuming that all the Kriegsmarine personnel would be drafted (note that in 1939 the KM's size was only 40k men) while the Soviets would have lasted, taking 3.86 million irrecoverable losses (6.3 million casualties with a 61% of irrecoverable losses - that is actually a conservative figure against a fully operation and double sized Wehrmacht (in 1942 they suffered 6.7 million casualties)) would have lasted 4 years ((43,7 - 3,9 - 6,4 - 5 - 5,7 - 7,1) / 3,86).
Note that in the German figures I've assumed that the whole Ersatzheer cannot be pumped into the regular army - when assuming that the out 2 million replacement army 1.2 million can be drafted, Germans can endure some 6.5 years.

[ThreadCutter]

How illuminating! If only the Germans had known that there were more Soviets than Nazis, all could have been avoided! :roll:

You casually write off the devastating political consequences of the loss of Moscow to Stalin's regime. Where do you reform, politically, after losing Moscow and Gorki? Name the city. How stable is the Politburo and Stalin's grip on power in general, after losing essentially all of Russia worth mentioning? How is stability maintained in this situation? Are you unaware that the Stalin's regime could be characterized as despised even before losing the entire European half of his nation to the fascists? But in your 'professional' opinion, Soviet morale and political stability is unassailable because...reasons! After all, Russia has never been knocked out of a World War due to a string of military defeats and a political crisis, right?
Addendum-- if Uncle Joe was so universally beloved, and Soviet morale was as completely unflappable as your theory relies upon how come so many encircled Soviets, you know... surrendered? The vision you paint is every last infantrymen rushing the Panzers with his bayonet, praise to glorious Stalin on his lips!

Long story short-- you completely fail to account for the political realities of war. Considering that war is an extension of politics, I'd say that's a problem. It's difficult to keep an authoritarian war machine running when your top 6 most populace cities have been captured, the majority of your industrial base is under enemy control, your capital is now under occupation, and most of the army you started the war with is dead or in POW camps. Give a couple historical examples of a regime as repressive as Stalin's coming back from that sort of political thumping.

Fun side question-- how does the loss of Moscow affect the political viability of lend-lease from the USA?

Now look at the rail network of the USSR in 1941. Since you are a professional logistician, apparently, explain how an August 41 capture of Moscow, and the loss (to the Soviets) of it's vast rail networks is not a crippling blow. Keep in mind that even if the Germans cannot yet access the Caucus' oil fields in 1941, with Moscow captured, neither can the Soviets. If somehow you manage to mobilize sufficient reserves, without a mutiny or mass desertion, how do you mobilize them more effectively than the Germans can manage their own defensive reserves, given the rail networks available to both sides? Given the open terrain you will be attacking across (into now urban entrenched Wermacht) how do you avoid interdiction by the Luftwaffe or reformed, rearmed Panzer divisions? Under much worse tactical conditions the Wermacht managed to brutalize the Red Army with counterattacks... how would that be different now that they hod essentially every tactical advantage, and the only card the Soviets have left to play is a mass of difficult to mobilize conscripts.

[losna]

How illuminating! If only the Germans had known that there were more Soviets than Nazis, all could have been avoided! :roll:

You casually write off the devastating political consequences of the loss of Moscow to Stalin's regime. Where do you reform, politically, after losing Moscow and Gorki? Name the city. How stable is the Politburo and Stalin's grip on power in general, after losing essentially all of Russia worth mentioning? How is stability maintained in this situation? Are you unaware that the Stalin's regime could be characterized as despised even before losing the entire European half of his nation to the fascists? But in your 'professional' opinion, Soviet morale and political stability is unassailable because...reasons!

As Caligula put it, oderint, dum metuant. The NKVD repressive apparatus was evidently effective, and Nazis were evidently deemed worse than Stalin. You're assuming that Soviets would have toppled Stalin only because of the loss of the capital, and surrendered to the Nazis.
First: as we've seen in 1944-45 Germany, leaders supported by a sufficiently strong ideology and a sufficiently capable political police will stay in the saddle to the very end: had Mao been toppled after the disastrous consequences of the Great Leap Forward? Had Pol Pot been toppled after murdering a quarter of its population? Had Saddam been toppled by the disastrous First Gulf War?
Second: the choice was between Stalin and mass-murdering Germans. Add to this the NKVD's gentle arguments, and the picture is clear.
Moreover, Germans wanted to annex all European Russia, plus the Caucasus, something utterly impossible to satisfy unless by totally defeated institutions. Politically defeated institutions wouldn't accept it.

After all, Russia has never been knocked out of a World War due to a string of military defeats and a political crisis, right?

You're assuming that the loss of moscow would've caused a political turmoil... why? After all, stalin wasn't boasting like Hitler about the power of his armies, nor he did start the fight. At worst, he'd be succeeded by someone else, but the Soviets wouldn't have surrendered immediately,

Addendum-- if Uncle Joe was so universally beloved, and Soviet morale was as completely unflappable as your theory relies upon how come so many encircled Soviets, you know... surrendered? The vision you paint is every last infantrymen rushing the Panzers with his bayonet, praise to glorious Stalin on his lips!

You seem unaware that the 3rd quarter of 1941 was the bloodiest for Germans until late 1944. Not even Stalingrad matched the bloodshed of the summer of Barbarossa. As General Halder put it on July 11 "“the enemy is putting up a fierce and fanatical fight.”. In summer '41 the pockets took even months to be cleared.

Long story short-- you completely fail to account for the political realities of war. Considering that war is an extension of politics, I'd say that's a problem. It's difficult to keep an authoritarian war machine running when your top 6 most populace cities have been captured, the majority of your industrial base is under enemy control, your capital is now under occupation, and most of the army you started the war with is dead or in POW camps. Give a couple historical examples of a regime as repressive as Stalin's coming back from that sort of political thumping.

- "the majority of your industrial base is under enemy control" this is utterly false. Most of the factories were transferred, and what couldn't be transferred was so thouroughly damaged (source: http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v06/v06p-91_sanning.html ) that, for example, steel production was barely at 2% of pre-war production. Furthermore, given the Lend-Lease supplies, actually Stalin could've simply requested more to the US, probably even to the point that all the
- "when your top 6 most populace cities have been captured" we're not playing Hearts of Iron, if those cities are depopulated and/or do not host important factories or logistical nodes, they are of no value. At worst they can be even used as a propaganda tool to arouse patriotism.

Fun side question-- how does the loss of Moscow affect the political viability of lend-lease from the USA?

It doesn't, since Roosevelt was providing supplies to the Soviets as soon as Barbarossa began, and actually provisions intensified as the war worsened, as happened to Britain and also to the Soviets (30% of the Moscow counteroffensive tanks were from the Western Allies).

Now look at the rail network of the USSR in 1941. Since you are a professional logistician, apparently, explain how an August 41 capture of Moscow, and the loss (to the Soviets) of it's vast rail networks is not a crippling blow.

This depends if and for how much Germans can hold Moscow. If they hold it for a month, this will change nothing. If they hold it for a year, the Soviets will surely rebuild railways (and this doesn't take a lot) in the meanwhile, while Germans will be pinned down in Moscow, having to pour most if not all of their troops to counter Soviets counterattacks.

Keep in mind that even if the Germans cannot yet access the Caucus' oil fields in 1941, with Moscow captured, neither can the Soviets. If somehow you manage to mobilize sufficient reserves, without a mutiny or mass desertion, how do you mobilize them more effectively than the Germans can manage their own defensive reserves, given the rail networks available to both sides?

If most if not all railways bring to Moscow, Soviets will simply put divisions on trains and move them until they reach the frontline, while the Germans will be still busy in replacing the wider Soviet gauge with the smaller German gauge.

Given the open terrain you will be attacking across (into now urban entrenched Wermacht) how do you avoid interdiction by the Luftwaffe or reformed, rearmed Panzer divisions? Under much worse tactical conditions the Wermacht managed to brutalize the Red Army with counterattacks... how would that be different now that they hod essentially every tactical advantage, and the only card the Soviets have left to play is a mass of difficult to mobilize conscripts.

Actually Germans were extremely undersupplied and even if in numerical superiority they lost the battle for Moscow. Add to this that panzers and planes were scarce after six months of operations.
"only card the Soviets have left to play is a mass of difficult to mobilize conscripts"
Difficult to mobilize ? The Red Army's size in June 1941 was 3.3 million, and in the end of 1942 was 6.6 million (source: http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.it/2 ... front.html ). They in the meanwhile suffered 7 million irrevocable losses.
This means that they throwed 10.5 million men against Hitler in only a year and a half. That's simply an outstanding performance, and it's precisely what defeated the Wehrmacht, that in the meanwhile had 1.3 million men in other fronts.

[glenn239]

You casually write off the devastating political consequences of the loss of Moscow to Stalin's regime. Where do you reform, politically, after losing Moscow and Gorki? Name the city.

Omsk or Novgorod area would be my guess. The latter might be too close to Moscow (wouldn't want to lose a second seat of power). A city centralized in the remaining Soviet rail net, far enough away that the Germans can't take it, close enough that it doesn't look too far away.

(BTW - given what happened at Stalingrad the next year, did you consider the possibility that the Germans dodged a bullet in 1941 by not reaching Moscow and having the "opportunity" to throw the bulk of their infantry into house to house fighting, all the while thinning their flanks?)

How stable is the Politburo and Stalin's grip on power in general, after losing essentially all of Russia worth mentioning? How is stability maintained in this situation?

I would assume Stalin maintains fighting spirit by going back to the greatest historical moment of modern Russia, the invasion of 1812. Every peasant in Russia knew the story of Napoleon's capture of Moscow and how this led to the destruction of the French army. Stalin just plays up real history.

Long story short-- you completely fail to account for the political realities of war. Considering that war is an extension of politics, I'd say that's a problem.

I skimmed the thread and you've said that Russia could be conquered. On the details, the fall of Moscow being some sort of trigger to an internal revolution. Possible? Can't rule it out because it never happened to be observed. Impression? We recognize the complete impossibility of defeating Russia militarily due to geographical scales, so the search for a shortcut is on. Problem with shortcuts is that oftentimes they look best in the brochure, not so good after you drive it off the lot.

Now look at the rail network of the USSR in 1941. Since you are a professional logistician, apparently, explain how an August 41 capture of Moscow, and the loss (to the Soviets) of it's vast rail networks is not a crippling blow.

It's because the USSR had one key strategic resource that Germany did not - the UK and the USA as allies. It is possible (but seems unlikely to me) that the loss of Moscow would have left the Soviets less able to mount serious offensives against Germany for some years, such that the Allies land in Normandy in 1944 before serious progress is made on the Eastern Front. That could have happened, I suppose. But, given that the Western Front would grind inexorably forward, the German eastern front would crumble as formations moved west to try and stop the US technical juggernaut. Sooner or later, Stalin resumes the offensive and takes Moscow back.

[ljadw]

The USSR had an other key strategic resource that Germany didn't have : SPACE .Moscow was located in the Western parts of European Russia . There were east of Moscow enormous resources who were much bigger than those the Soviets had lost, and Germany could not capture them : the Ostheer could not advance all fighting to the Urals ,the resources between Moscow and the Urals were inaccessible for the Germans .

[glenn239]

The USSR had an other key strategic resource that Germany didn't have : SPACE .Moscow was located in the Western parts of European Russia . There were east of Moscow enormous resources who were much bigger than those the Soviets had lost, and Germany could not capture them : the Ostheer could not advance all fighting to the Urals ,the resources between Moscow and the Urals were inaccessible for the Germans .

True dat. Between endless space and the Anglo-Americans I see no way for Germany to have inflicted a crippling military blow on the Soviets. The argument about taking the capital and hope the regime capitulates is a tacit admission of such because it substitutes a political means to victory. Perhaps, but given that it didn't work for Napoleon, why would it work for Hitler?