continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

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Don71
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Re: continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

#31

Post by Don71 » 23 Jul 2018, 14:19

Perhaps you should read in this foum, there are hundreds of proofs.
The Germans were short of oil from the start. Certainly one can wage a limited war as against France, the war against the USSR being Hitler's goal would have been unthinkable with 1/3 less oil.
Germany was no longer able to supply the Italian navy since 1941, the Kriegsmarine had had no reserves for more than 4-5 months since the beginning of the war, and from 1942 the pilot training was drastically reduced due to a lack of gasoline, with the corresponding consequences. Numerous armored operations stood since 1942 already under reserve, Hoth could not move the 4th Panzer Army from the summer of 1942 in the run-up to Stalingrad as he wanted for lack of gasoline. When the Romanian oil was gone, the Allies immediately gained the absolute air supermarcy.
These were just a few examples of how the lack of oil affected since the beginning of the war mainly the war against the UdSSR..

ljadw
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Re: continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

#32

Post by ljadw » 23 Jul 2018, 22:00

Don71 wrote:
23 Jul 2018, 14:19
Perhaps you should read in this foum, there are hundreds of proofs.
The Germans were short of oil from the start. Certainly one can wage a limited war as against France, the war against the USSR being Hitler's goal would have been unthinkable with 1/3 less oil.
Germany was no longer able to supply the Italian navy since 1941, the Kriegsmarine had had no reserves for more than 4-5 months since the beginning of the war, and from 1942 the pilot training was drastically reduced due to a lack of gasoline, with the corresponding consequences. Numerous armored operations stood since 1942 already under reserve, Hoth could not move the 4th Panzer Army from the summer of 1942 in the run-up to Stalingrad as he wanted for lack of gasoline. When the Romanian oil was gone, the Allies immediately gained the absolute air supermarcy.
These were just a few examples of how the lack of oil affected since the beginning of the war mainly the war against the UdSSR..
1) The Germans were not short on oil from the start :there were no oil problems for Fall Weiss, Fall Gelb, Weserübung, Battle of Britain, U Boat war
2)Shortage on oil is something meaningless , because more oil does not guarentee a better strategic situation ;in 1940 Germany had 6,7 million ton of oil,in 1941 8,3 million ton, in 1942 8,6 million ton, in 1943 10,3 million, in 1944 6,4 million .
3) That Germany was no longer able to supply the Italian navy in 1941, is a meaningless clincher, as this had no effect on the operations of the Italian navy which was able to supply in 1941 and 1942 its forces in the Balkans, and the Axis forces in North Africa .
4)That Hoth was blocked in 1942 was not caused by a general shortage of oil, but by the fact that the Reichsbahn was not able to transport the needed oil to its destination;there is no proof that there was no oil available in Germany .
5) The pilot training was not reduced to a lack of gasoline, but because the front units needed more replacements, and more replacements were only available if the training was reduced .
6) The Allies had already absolute air supremacy before the loss of Romania .
Some figures :

Aircraft fuel
1940 : production 966000 ton/ consumption 863000/reserves 613000
1941 :production 910000/consumption 1.274000/reserves 254000
1942 :production 1.472000/consumption 1.426000/ reserves 324000
1943 production:1.917000 /consumption 1,825000/reserves 440000
1944 :production : 1.105000/consumption 1.403000/reserves 146000
Even in 1944 the consumption was higher than in 1941.
For Diesel , the production and consumption were higher in 1941 than in 1940 and 1942 and, from what I have read it was Romania that supplied the Italian navy, not Germany .


thaddeus_c
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Re: continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

#33

Post by thaddeus_c » 24 Jul 2018, 09:24

sorry if my post about Romania was confusing or confused the issue, suffice to say the Romanian oilfields were a critical resource for Germany and were treated as such.

they were only able to receive half Romanian production, in part because they were not able to fulfill barter arrangements. MY view Germany would have been better off to invade Romania than USSR!

ljadw
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Re: continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

#34

Post by ljadw » 24 Jul 2018, 10:55

thaddeus_c wrote:
24 Jul 2018, 09:24
sorry if my post about Romania was confusing or confused the issue, suffice to say the Romanian oilfields were a critical resource for Germany and were treated as such.

they were only able to receive half Romanian production, in part because they were not able to fulfill barter arrangements. MY view Germany would have been better off to invade Romania than USSR!
NO :
The Germans did not receive 50% of the Romanian oil production in 1940,only 1,3 million ton.
Later they got more (2,1 million in 1941 ) ,but it was still limited because of transport problems, because the Romanian oil production was going down in WWII,because Romania also needed oil and because other countries (Turkey, Italy ) also needed oil .
The invasion of Romania and the stealing of its oil would result in the collapse of Romania .Besides the Germans did not invade the USSR for its oil .
In 1940 Romania produced 5,81 million ton;domestic consumption was 2,308 million, exports were 3,492 million of which 1,3 million for Germany .

thaddeus_c
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Re: continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

#35

Post by thaddeus_c » 24 Jul 2018, 13:30

ljadw wrote:
24 Jul 2018, 10:55
thaddeus_c wrote:
24 Jul 2018, 09:24
sorry if my post about Romania was confusing or confused the issue, suffice to say the Romanian oilfields were a critical resource for Germany and were treated as such.

they were only able to receive half Romanian production, in part because they were not able to fulfill barter arrangements. MY view Germany would have been better off to invade Romania than USSR!
NO :
The Germans did not receive 50% of the Romanian oil production in 1940,only 1,3 million ton.
Later they got more (2,1 million in 1941 ) ,but it was still limited because of transport problems, because the Romanian oil production was going down in WWII,because Romania also needed oil and because other countries (Turkey, Italy ) also needed oil .
The invasion of Romania and the stealing of its oil would result in the collapse of Romania .Besides the Germans did not invade the USSR for its oil .
In 1940 Romania produced 5,81 million ton;domestic consumption was 2,308 million, exports were 3,492 million of which 1,3 million for Germany .
OK, my statement was they were ONLY able to receive half the oil production of Romania. that means AT MOST they received half of production in any given year.
Last edited by thaddeus_c on 24 Jul 2018, 14:06, edited 1 time in total.

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Robert Rojas
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RE: Not So Continued German - Soviet Cooperation.

#36

Post by Robert Rojas » 24 Jul 2018, 14:04

Greetings to both citizen ljadw and the community as a whole. Howdy ljadw! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Tuesday - July 24, 2018 - 12:55am, your commentary has piqued my curiosity about the POLITICS OF OIL within the nation of Romania during the early phases of the Second World War. Given that the nation of Romania joined the Axis Alliance on November 23, 1940, in terms of prioritization, what methodology did the government of Ion Antonescu actively employ to sate the varying petroleum needs of National Socialist Germany, Fascist Italy and, of course, Romania itself? Beyond the principal members of the Axis Alliance, how many OTHER nation states were also clients for the consumption of Romanian petroleum and how were their varying petroleum needs prioritized? I see that you did mention Turkey as a Romanian consumer. Given its approximation to Transcaucasia, did Turkey ever acquire petroleum through the Soviet Union via Azerbaijan once Romanian petroleum went elsewhere? Finally, what was the nature of the transportation problems experienced by Romania in the distribution of its petroleum output? Did Romania ship via railroad of via pipeline? Now, I fully realize that you did NOT broach this suggestion, but I would be remiss if I failed to point out that the conquest and subjugation of Romania at the hands of National Socialist Germany would be wholly unnecessary after the events of November 23, 1940. Thank you in advance for entertaining my pointed inquiries. Well, that is my latest two cents or pfennigs worth on this expansive topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day no matter where you just might happen to find yourself on Terra Firma.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

ljadw
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Re: continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

#37

Post by ljadw » 24 Jul 2018, 21:14

Already before the war, Romania was faced by a big problem :it had to export oil,but reserve enough oil for its own economy and this,while the oil production was going down .1936: 8,7 million ton, 1940 : 5,8 million ton .
Its oil transports happened by sea, by cistern vessels on the Danube and by railroad.
In 1938 ,74 % of the oil exports happened by sea (Mediterranean for Britain and France and Italy and also via the Black Sea, with as only possible destination Turkey ),21 % was transported on the Danube by cistern vessels and 5 % by railroad ,Source = A low and dishonest decade .
During the war : Germany's part increased but was still limited by transport problems : it was impossible to send the 2,963 million ton of oil for Germany in 1941 via the Danube, (the cistern vessels had only a capacity of 200000 ton , but the problem was solved by transporting a big part of it not to Germany but to the German forces in the SU .
In december 1941, Romania exported 287196 ton of oil ,of which 142297 to Germany, 70098 to Italy,15171 to the Reichsprotektoraat and 14219 to Switserland .
After the war Antonescu said during his interrogation in Moscow by the Cheka that during the war 75% of the oil exports went to Germany and the rest to Italy,Turkey and Bulgaria .
Source : History of Romanian oil Volume II P 215.
In 1936 Romania exported 6,684 million ton of which
1,072 million to Germany
866000 to France
846000 to Britain
653000 to Italy

thaddeus_c
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Re: continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

#38

Post by thaddeus_c » 26 Jul 2018, 13:57

the pre-war planning of Germany was for use of Romanian and Polish oil and oil shale from Estonia, there was no distinction drawn between willing and unwilling exploitation. Polish and Estonian sources were traded away to the USSR, while Romania submitted to German domination after Soviets had taken a large shark bit of their territory.

it is possible that Germany could have retained their little trading bloc of Finland and the Baltics during their negotiations with Soviets but impossible to have kept Polish oil region simply due to geography.

the rationale for German invasion of Romania at some point after Poland would be to gain total control over oil. they were not able to obtain 100% of production historically and struggled to fulfill their barter arrangement for portion they did obtain.

under a scenario in which Germany foregoes invading USSR the oil is critical, Romanian army useless (to Germany) and in fact a threat to their control. the historical division of the country also kept Hungary from fortifying the Carpathian Mtn. line, which proved critical in 1944.

1940 total control of oil in the region would convince Great Britain and USSR of the sustainability of Germany war machine or at least enter into their calculus

Sid Guttridge
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Re: continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

#39

Post by Sid Guttridge » 27 Jul 2018, 06:03

Hi ljadw,

You are essentially right.

The Romanians' oil production had peaked earlier in the 1930s and they were intent on conserving their dwindling reserves. They were thus resistant to German pressure to produce as much as possible during the war.

And, yes, the Italian fleet was largely dependent on Romania for oil resupply over 1940-43. Italian tankers were able to move it relatively safely from Constanza, through the Bosporus, Aegean and Adriatic to Italy.

Cheers,

Sid.

ljadw
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Re: continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

#40

Post by ljadw » 27 Jul 2018, 16:32

The following is from Deutsche Ölpolitik im Zeitalter der Weltkriege (Eichholtz) PP 359 and 360 : Germany expected the following oil deliveries from Romania in 1941 :
to Germany 2,5 million ton of oil
to Italy : 1 million ton
to other countries of Central Europe : 0,5 million ton
for Romania would remain 1,5 million ton
As the refining would cost 500000 ton,this means that Romania had to produce 6 million ton .
An other condition was to expand the use of the Danube and the railways for the transport of the oil .
But, Romania was not able to profuce 6 million ton: its production went down from 5.777.000 ton in 1940 to 5.665.000 in 1941.

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Robert Rojas
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RE: Not So Continued German - Soviet Cooperation.

#41

Post by Robert Rojas » 27 Jul 2018, 22:46

Greetings to both citizen ljadw and the community as a whole. Howdy ljadw! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Tuesday - July 24, 2018 - 11:14am, old yours truly would like to convey my appreciation for both your technical information and individual perspective on the thorny subject of Romanian petroleum production during the time period encompassing year 1936 through year 1941. This is quite a fascinating subject especially as it relates to both Adolf Hitler's ambitions in Eastern Europe and Benito Mussolini's ambitions in the Mediterranean Basin. On the continuing matter of petroleum production, at least in terms of the reality of year 1936, was the decline in Romania's petroleum output as a result of limited pumping capacity OR was the decline in Romania's petroleum output as a result of some of its THEN KNOWN oil fields going dry? Incidentally, was Romanian crude oil actually refined within Romania as well? If not, was the refining process carried out within the nation state that actually procured that crude oil? Now, after the events of June 10, 1940, did Fascist Italy continue to ship its procured crude oil from Romania with oil tankers or did Fascist Italy wisely switch to rail transport after its declaration of war against France and the British Commonwealth? Finally, in terms of the continuing issue of transportation, was the thought of constructing pipelines ever broached by Romania OR by anyone else for that matter? Once again, thank you in advance for entertaining my pointed inquiries. Well, that's my latest two cents or pfennigs worth on this expansive topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day no matter where you just might happen to find yourself on Terra Firma.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

thaddeus_c
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Re: RE: Not So Continued German - Soviet Cooperation.

#42

Post by thaddeus_c » 28 Jul 2018, 04:58

Robert Rojas wrote:
27 Jul 2018, 22:46
On the continuing matter of petroleum production, at least in terms of the reality of year 1936, was the decline in Romania's petroleum output as a result of limited pumping capacity OR was the decline in Romania's petroleum output as a result of some of its THEN KNOWN oil fields going dry? Incidentally, was Romanian crude oil actually refined within Romania as well? If not, was the refining process carried out within the nation state that actually procured that crude oil? Now, after the events of June 10, 1940, did Fascist Italy continue to ship its procured crude oil from Romania with oil tankers or did Fascist Italy wisely switch to rail transport after its declaration of war against France and the British Commonwealth? Finally, in terms of the continuing issue of transportation, was the thought of constructing pipelines ever broached by Romania OR by anyone else for that matter?
there were existing oilfields exhausted coupled with a lack of development of new prospects. this coincided with German control of the oil concessions, they blamed Romania for bureaucratic delays while Romanians blamed them for lack of capital investment, probably both were accurate.

there was huge refinery capacity at Ploesti and oil transported there from at least some of the fields by pipeline. have never seen a reference to longer range pipeline project(s) perhaps transport on Danube or use of tankers seemed more facile.

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RE: Not So Continued German - Soviet Cooperation.

#43

Post by Robert Rojas » 30 Jul 2018, 05:48

Greetings to both citizen thaddeus_c and the community as a whole. Howdy Thad! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Friday - July 27, 2018 - 6:58pm, old yours truly would like to convey my appreciation for your continued insights on the matter of Romania's Petroleum Industry. This is one strategic topic of interest that seems to generate more questions than answers. Given the critical importance of Romania's Petroleum Industry to both National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, what would be the motive OR motives for Berlin's apparent reluctance to infuse capital investment with Bucharest's development and expansion of its oil fields? In light of Berlin's purported tight fistedness on this matter, did Bucharest simply drag its bureaucratic feet on the development and expansion of its oil fields until Berlin became a bit more forthcoming with financing? And in terms of financing, where did Rome fit into the scheme of things? Finally, I see Romania was using river barges to ship some of its petroleum output. Assuming that the bulk of the river barge traffic was headed upstream along the Danube River to Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia, Austria and Germany, was there any "FRICTION" between Budapest and Bucharest as that river barge traffic made its way though Hungary? Given the historical animosities between these two nationalities, did Budapest ever attempt to extort "TRIBUTE" from Bucharest for the right to ship its petroleum through Hungarian territory? It should be noted and not be forgotten that Hungary joined the Axis Alliance on September 27, 1940 and Romania joined the Axis Alliance on November 23, 1940. I cannot imagine that any squabbling between Budapest and Bucharest would be "appreciated" by Berlin. It's some just some speculative food for thought. Goulash anyone? Well, that's my latest two cents or pfennigs worth on this POLITICS-BY-OTHER-MEANS topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day no matter where you just might happen to find yourself on Terra Firma.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

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Re: RE: Not So Continued German - Soviet Cooperation.

#44

Post by thaddeus_c » 30 Jul 2018, 07:34

Robert Rojas wrote:
30 Jul 2018, 05:48
Given the critical importance of Romania's Petroleum Industry to both National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, what would be the motive OR motives for Berlin's apparent reluctance to infuse capital investment with Bucharest's development and expansion of its oil fields? In light of Berlin's purported tight fistedness on this matter, did Bucharest simply drag its bureaucratic feet on the development and expansion of its oil fields until Berlin became a bit more forthcoming with financing? And in terms of financing, where did Rome fit into the scheme of things? Finally, I see Romania was using river barges to ship some of its petroleum output. Assuming that the bulk of the river barge traffic was headed upstream along the Danube River to Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia, Austria and Germany, was there any "FRICTION" between Budapest and Bucharest as that river barge traffic made its way though Hungary? Given the historical animosities between these two nationalities, did Budapest ever attempt to extort "TRIBUTE" from Bucharest for the right to ship its petroleum through Hungarian territory? I cannot imagine that any squabbling between Budapest and Bucharest would be "appreciated" by Berlin. It's some just some speculative food for thought. Goulash anyone?
my impression is that perceived lack of investment in Romanian oil industry was simply German modus operandi that extended to all areas? their own synthetic fuel program was stalled at the onset of war. as far as Italian investment? they had 3% share of production pre-war thru Prahova not certain if they lost that as did British, French, Dutch and Americans? can imagine that once Germany fully in charge they would be reluctant to invest further? concerned as to exactly whom their investment would benefit?

of course there are basic differences between German and Romanian aims, the former to maximize production short term, the latter to maximize the value of their resource.

have never seen mention of Hungary stalling oil deliveries (or any other river traffic)?

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Re: continued German-Soviet cooperation or Axis USSR

#45

Post by ljadw » 30 Jul 2018, 13:04

About the decrease of the Romanian oil production, the problem was that the wells became exhausted and the production costs were increasing.To be able to produce as much as in 1936, big investments were needed ,which would make the exported oil more expensive and and would make it more difficult to export:Venezuela,Mexico would react by decrease their prices .It was cheaper for the companies who owned the Romanian oil to invest their money elsewhere ,where cheap oil was waiting .
Although the Romanian oil exorts were going up from 3,867,000 ton in 1930 to 6,661,1000 in 1935, their value was going down from 10,4 billion lei in 1930 to 8,6 billion lei in 1935 .
It would last decennia before the big investments would produce a small return . Thus, Standard Oil, Royal Dutch Shell,... considered Romania as a loss and were retreating .
And, there was the fact that in WWI, the Romanian oil industry had been destroyed , and, as a new war became possible,there was the risk that it would suffer the same fate .

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