German Rope-A-Dope of Sovjet Union in 1940

[BDV]

The Barbarossa is a known failure. Despite an extra year of preparations, the Wehrmacht failed (by a large margin). Changes in the German approach to the attack could have helped, but given the margin of failure, they are not leading to EndSieg.

The alternative scenario I am proposing is related to Germany maneuvering Soviet Union into an attack on Romania, allowing Germany to redeploy its forces from France and engage the Soviet Union starting in beginning of August. Also as a prerequisite is the continuation from the German side of the North Sea posturing, with Germany foregoing the attacks on Holland and Scandinavia. The start of hostilities against Sovjet Union will have major implications on Italian actions in the Balkans and Northern Africa (in that glory-hound Mussolini would have an outlet for his ambitions by helping a member of the Latin Fraternity against the Asian invaders).

Is this a path for a "better" outcome for the Fascist Europe?


P.S. There were multiple objections raised about this scenario by Richard Anderson, when I proposed it on another WHATIF thread. I will post my retort below.

[stg 44]

The Barbarossa is a known failure. Despite an extra year of preparations, the Wehrmacht failed (by a large margin). Changes in the German approach to the attack could have helped, but given the margin of failure, they are not leading to EndSieg.

The alternative scenario I am proposing is related to Germany maneuvering Soviet Union into an attack on Romania, allowing Germany to redeploy its forces from France and engage the Soviet Union starting in beginning of August. Also as a prerequisite is the continuation from the German side of the North Sea posturing, with Germany foregoing the attacks on Holland and Scandinavia. The start of hostilities against Sovjet Union will have major implications on Italian actions in the Balkans and Northern Africa (in that glory-hound Mussolini would have an outlet for his ambitions by helping a member of the Latin Fraternity against the Asian invaders).

Is this a path for a "better" outcome for the Fascist Europe?


P.S. There were multiple objections raised about this scenario by Richard Anderson, when I proposed it on another WHATIF thread. I will post my retort below.

If you mean August 1940, then it is much much worse for the Germans as they lack the supplies they got from the Soviet in 1940-41 AND this is right after the French campaign and during the BoB, which means German supply stockpiles and combat readiness are limited; the Soviets too are relatively limited, but having the Soviets invade Romania likely means the Germans lose their major source of oil supply outside the country. Germany also had no treaty with Romania yet obligating their defense of Romania, so this would be a massive mess up all around. The only country that benefits is Britain.

[losna]

The Barbarossa is a known failure. Despite an extra year of preparations, the Wehrmacht failed (by a large margin). Changes in the German approach to the attack could have helped, but given the margin of failure, they are not leading to EndSieg.

The alternative scenario I am proposing is related to Germany maneuvering Soviet Union into an attack on Romania, allowing Germany to redeploy its forces from France and engage the Soviet Union starting in beginning of August.

I think that a redeployment in two months of the whole Wehrmacht is far fetched. They'll also have to make up for the tank losses in which they incurred, that weren't peanuts.
Furthermore, since they're starting even later than in 1941 they'll be stopped as in OTL by the logistical and rasputitsa issues, but even farther from their objectives.

Also as a prerequisite is the continuation from the German side of the North Sea posturing, with Germany foregoing the attacks on Holland and Scandinavia.

As another user has pointed out, the attack on Holland was a requisite for the success of the campaign.

Is this a path for a "better" outcome for the Fascist Europe?

I think that the only viable strategy for Germany would have been focusing only on the Soviet Union. Your alternative path has still to cope with the heavy strains imposed by the presence of Britain into the war.
Germany had just enough men to wrestle down the Soviets, and thus acquiring the resources needed to wage a war against the Western Allies (obviusly after proper stabilization of conquered territories).
IMHO, the best way to do this would have been either doing heavy scaremongering against the SU to have Poland as an ally or directly invade Poland letting aside everything else, such as Czechoslovakia.
In this way, likely the SU wouldn't have been backed by the US, and would have fallen after some 5 years of war, with something as 4 million irrecoverable losses for Germany - but leaving in the meanwhile a country so bled white that a resistance against Germany would be impossible.

[BDV]

You have to get them [the panzer divisionen] to the new AO, which means motoring them roughly 500 miles to an intact railhead under the control of the Reichsbahn, or waiting for the French rail system to get unsorted, then rail them to the new AO, unload, new motor march, and et cetera. And all from the point the decision is made for this hair-brained scheme - say 1 July - to a proposed jump off of say 1 September, so less than nine weeks. I suspect that at least two weeks and more likely three would be required for the movement, so five weeks to get the operational rates back up? Given the German track record, I suspect a lot of that inventory would be unserviceable on der Tag.

I think that your assessment is too pessimistic. After all, it took the germans less than 10 days to reposition for ROT.

Which brings up another difficulty. You want to execute Barbarossa, with a smaller force, from a flying start, and probably 70 days later than the historic start date...and yet you expect a better outcome? Oh, and if you simply wave hands and declare it to be 1 August or whatever, you have now reduced the inventory even more, while vastly reducing the redeployment and preparation time.

No, this would be, could be no Barbarossa (an all or nothing violent attack); rather, the sides would gradually bring into conflict their forces, much like in WWI.

Er, it had already begun, so waiting is a problem...it is always so much fun to be in an operational unit whipsawed by conflicting organizational change orders affecting personnel and equipment in the course of days. It is a recipe for confusion and missteps requiring more time to repair.

During ROT? Of course, if German military leadership knows that there is a serious possibility that the conflict will continue in the East, no such transitions will be implemented on the fly.

I'm not sure how much is this a need vs. Adolf trying to reap the "peace bonus". Had the war in the West continued, would Germans have demobilized those troops? It obviously was a bigger bonus for the Soviet laborers, who did not have the whiplash between mobilized, demobilized, re-mobilized.

It was part and parcel of the decision to go to war with the Soviets. The rebalancing of forces was required since industry, especially sub-component manufacture was badly hit by the call ups. The likely result would be that German productivity shuts down just as this campaign kicks off, which leaves the Germans in a world of hurt when the campaign stalls. Given everything else, 1941 then likely becomes the turning point year instead of 1942.

I thought that's what Barbarossa was, in some respect? “smiting Britain's continental sword from her hand”

Why yes, but not as some half-assed, off the cuff, opportunistic "let's ally with the Romanians" plan. The decision was to do the necessary preparations for nearly a year and then attack...after pounding the Brits from the air (and with a possible amphibious assault if it looked practicable). A sudden leap east reduces options and increases risks.

Well, obviously, for Germany, on June 26, to decide, well yes, we should engage the Romanians iwould be half assed. The airtransport arm is laying in pieces across the Norse hillsides and in the Dutch marshes. The KM is rusting at the bottom of the fjords and/or in dry dock.

The King was deposed after the Vienna Diktat (one month later); well Romanians did ask the Germans for support, but at that time Germans were still on terms with Stalin.
Um, exactly?

That is, you got your timeline wrong. The Romania leadership, as it existed at the time of the Sovjet ultimatum was plenty strong and reasonably willing to go mano-a-mano with the Sovjets; with German support.

The Finnish War was prosecuted by the four armies raised in the Leningrad Military District. Leningrad also supplied the occupation forces for the Baltic states. Poland was occupied by six armies from the Byelorussian, Kiev, and Moscow Military districts. Operations versus Romania would have been with the Southern Front, under Zhukov, with 32 infantry divisions, 2 motorized infantry divisions of the nascent 2d Mechanized Corps, and 11 tank brigades (one with T-28?). So c. 4,200 tanks, 5,200 artillery pieces, and et cetera. The BT-7, T-28, T-26, and T-37 are a pretty good match against the Romainians.

See, I was worried that operations against Romania would be under a reasonably efficient commander. Jucoff, in addition to his defensive ability that Germans came to respect, was also known for his offensive lack offensive subtlety; from the Moscow Defensive Operation, to Operatsyia Mars, to Berling Offensive Operation. So, serious bloodletting of the Kiev Military District would ensue. Under the scenario, two of the main Soviet military districts have just been bloodied (Leningrad MD in the Winter War, Kiev MD in the assault on Bessarabia), before the Wehrmacht waltzes in to the rescue. The essence of rope-a-dope. That leaves the Moscow MD for the Wehrmach to defeat.

If a single Soviet military district can defeat the Wehrmacht, the only option for Adolf Shicklgruber is to present himself in ashen ripped clothes, barefoot, and with a rope around his neck to the mercy of the Parliament.

Meanwhile, the Romanian General Staff concluded on 26 August that "we are in the situation of being attacked simultaneously by the Hungarians and by the Russians, and with some probability by the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs...The defense of Transylvania with all our forces, while only covering the rest of our frontiers, would lead to the loss of Moldavia, Dobruja, Banat and even Wallachia."

I am not sure how the Germans invading Soviet-occupied Poland will change that?

An attack on Romania, if Germany is supporting her, is an attack on Germany. Pretty positive that neither Bulgaria nor Hungary would be eager to go there. That leaves, if Germany offers support, only Soviet Russia; which Romanians are reasonably eager to fight.

But your point does illustrate the severity of the Romanian predicament, without German support, they would have to confront not only Soviet Russia, but Bulgaria and Hungary, too; unlike Finland. Romania had a recent disastrous experience with multi-front fighting in WWI.

[Kingfish]

The alternative scenario I am proposing is related to Germany maneuvering Soviet Union into an attack on Romania, allowing Germany to redeploy its forces from France and engage the Soviet Union starting in beginning of August.

From the other thread where you proposed this alternative:

I highly doubt the Romanians would be so accommodating as to allow their own country to be turned into a weapons proving ground for two warring behemoths hell bent on territorial conquest.

You need to address this elephant in the room

Edit: sorry, there are two elephants in the room

Also as a prerequisite is the continuation from the German side of the North Sea posturing, with Germany foregoing the attacks on Holland and Scandinavia.

Yeah, you really need to think through the implication of what you just proposed above.

[thaddeus_c]

my scenario is always a division of Romania with the surrounding parties (Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and USSR) either before or after Poland. however this would be for Germany to grab control over oilfields, allowing Soviets to "walk in" to Bessabrabia, cannot imagine they would want to create battlefield there since the oil was such critical resource?

while my thinking is they never should have attacked USSR, a better plan along the lines of "rope-a-dope" and in line with Soviet designs on free access to Black Sea would be operations against Turkey?

who knows? might prompt Turkey to join Axis and participate in (any) Barbarossa? OR entice Soviets to move south into Iran also as defensive measure against Allied bombing of Baku? at the very least Soviets would have to maintain some fair number of troops if they captured Kars?

[BDV]

I highly doubt the Romanians would be so accommodating as to allow their own country to be turned into a weapons proving ground for two warring behemoths hell bent on territorial conquest.

You need to address this elephant in the room

This ain't no elephant in the room, as Romanians begged Germans to make their country a weapons proving ground. As pointed out by R. Anderson, without German support, Romania's strategic situation would be more dire than 'just' the threat of a mass attack from the Kiev Military District. That threat had figured in Romanian political thinking since 1918; when The Bear would decide to march West how could France and (haha!) England do anything?

Also as a prerequisite is the continuation from the German side of the North Sea posturing, with Germany foregoing the attacks on Holland and Scandinavia.

Yeah, you really need to think through the implication of what you just proposed above.

There would be no 1940 drawback from no Weserubung, the right flank did not arrive in time anyway, and that leaves Maastricht as the only boon to Fall Gelb. I am unconvinced that these difficulties would be insurmountable, especially without the diversion of (scarce) Wehrmacht engineering assets to Holland and the loss of air transports in Holland and Norway.

But, for Adolf, there existed no problem without war/murder or threat of war/murder as an answer.

[Kingfish]

This ain't no elephant in the room, as Romanians begged Germans to make their country a weapons proving ground.

Where did you get that notion?

The Russian ultimatum came on June 26th and not surprisingly they wanted as immediate answer. Romania looked at her available options and saw it's only ally capable of providing any real assistance just happened to be engaged in a major land campaign on the other side of Europe.

What could the Romanians possibly beg for?
Did they assume the Russians would quietly wait a few weeks while Germany hashed out the details of a relief force?

There would be no 1940 drawback from no Weserubung, the right flank did not arrive in time anyway, and that leaves Maastricht as the only boon to Fall Gelb.

This is hilarious.
You casually dismiss Weserubung and one-half of Fall Gelb and expect no consequence from it.

[BDV]

Where did you get that notion?

The Russian ultimatum came on June 26th and not surprisingly they wanted as immediate answer. Romania looked at her available options and saw it's only ally capable of providing any real assistance just happened to be engaged in a major land campaign on the other side of Europe.

Can you detail and source this fascinating and extremely novel (from a Romanian's POV) history of the Soviet ultimatum to Romania?

What could the Romanians possibly beg for?

Assurances that Hungary and Bulgaria would not backstab them while fighting The Bear would have been a nice start; that would have cost Germany the price of a diplomatic telegram to the heads of the Hungarian and Bulgarian governments.

Did they assume the Russians would quietly wait a few weeks while Germany hashed out the details of a relief force?

No, they'd be fronting the Red Horde; and with a modicum of luck, get Jucoff sacked for an incompetent attack.

There would be no 1940 drawback from no Weserubung, the right flank did not arrive in time anyway, and that leaves Maastricht as the only boon to Fall Gelb.

This is hilarious.
You casually dismiss Weserubung and one-half of Fall Gelb and expect no consequence from it.

There were consequences aplenty. Not necessarily favourable to Germany in the 1940 timeframe.

Talking about hilarity, please detail the hilarious concept how assets spent fighting Weserubung and those left in place to defend the Norway coast, and those destroyed and stuck in the Dutch marshes HELPED the Wehrmacht in its attack in Belgium?

[Richard Anderson]

I think that your assessment is too pessimistic. After all, it took the germans less than 10 days to reposition for ROT.

And here I thought you were going to get all Jules on me with your "retort"...

The "reposition" for ROT consumed considerably less than ten days, given that ROT began 5 June. The major "reposition" was of the Panzer divisions...and even that was not all that spectacular. However, it is the positions of the German forces at the end of ROT, c. 23 June when the Soviets first reached out to the Germans regarding their land grab that matters, since that was what I was speaking of.

No, this would be, could be no Barbarossa (an all or nothing violent attack); rather, the sides would gradually bring into conflict their forces, much like in WWI.

Just how is that an advantage to Germany?

During ROT? Of course, if German military leadership knows that there is a serious possibility that the conflict will continue in the East, no such transitions will be implemented on the fly.

ROT was finished by 23 June, which is when the Soviet-Rumanian kerfluffle begins. Hitler decided on the expansion of the Panzertruppen on 15 June. The actual orders for formation are sketchy, it is know 15., 17., 18., 19., and 20. were ordered to begin formation as of 26 September 1940, but it appears the 11. 12., 13., 14., and 16. Panzer were ordered c. 1 August, albeit only 11. Panzer actually began organizing then.

In any case, it seems unlikely any of the "German military leadership" would know any such thing, since by 26 June Hitler decided against it and advised Romania give in to the demand lest the Soviets occupy the entire country, implying A. Hitler had zero thoughts about a "rope-a-dope" and rather more concretely realized insofar as Germany was concerned it would be a fait accompli.

I'm not sure how much is this a need vs. Adolf trying to reap the "peace bonus". Had the war in the West continued, would Germans have demobilized those troops? It obviously was a bigger bonus for the Soviet laborers, who did not have the whiplash between mobilized, demobilized, re-mobilized.

It was part and parcel of the decision to go to war with the Soviets. The rebalancing of forces was required since industry, especially sub-component manufacture was badly hit by the call ups. The likely result would be that German productivity shuts down just as this campaign kicks off, which leaves the Germans in a world of hurt when the campaign stalls. Given everything else, 1941 then likely becomes the turning point year instead of 1942.

Just to clarify for those who may have believed that the response was from you... :roll:

Well, obviously, for Germany, on June 26, to decide, well yes, we should engage the Romanians iwould be half assed. The airtransport arm is laying in pieces across the Norse hillsides and in the Dutch marshes. The KM is rusting at the bottom of the fjords and/or in dry dock.

And the Heer had just gone through a hammering in ROT...anyway, glad you are finally noticing some of the problems inherent in your notion.

That is, you got your timeline wrong. The Romania leadership, as it existed at the time of the Sovjet ultimatum was plenty strong and reasonably willing to go mano-a-mano with the Sovjets; with German support.

They were? Then that explains why they rolled over and played nice within 24 hours of the Soviet ultimatum.

See, I was worried that operations against Romania would be under a reasonably efficient commander. Jucoff, in addition to his defensive ability that Germans came to respect, was also known for his offensive lack offensive subtlety; from the Moscow Defensive Operation, to Operatsyia Mars, to Berling Offensive Operation. So, serious bloodletting of the Kiev Military District would ensue. Under the scenario, two of the main Soviet military districts have just been bloodied (Leningrad MD in the Winter War, Kiev MD in the assault on Bessarabia), before the Wehrmacht waltzes in to the rescue. The essence of rope-a-dope. That leaves the Moscow MD for the Wehrmach to defeat.

I don't know how to tell you this, but it actually aides understanding if you can be bothered to use a reasonable facsimile of a recognizable transliteration...I spent quite a bit of time just figuring out WTF you were trying to express there. :roll: :roll: :roll:

So your "analysis" is that since Zhukov/"Jucoff" is in charge of an operation where the imbalance of forces is similar to that in his recent face-off against the Japanese, then the results will be better for the defender? How remarkable.

If a single Soviet military district can defeat the Wehrmacht, the only option for Adolf Shicklgruber is to present himself in ashen ripped clothes, barefoot, and with a rope around his neck to the mercy of the Parliament.

Oh dear. haven't you noticed? You still haven't come up with a reasonable way of getting the "Wehrmacht" there in 72 hours or so... :roll: :roll: :roll:

An attack on Romania, if Germany is supporting her, is an attack on Germany. Pretty positive that neither Bulgaria nor Hungary would be eager to go there. That leaves, if Germany offers support, only Soviet Russia; which Romanians are reasonably eager to fight.

Yeah that certainly explains Germany's actions regarding the 2d Vienna "Arbitration"...

But your point does illustrate the severity of the Romanian predicament, without German support, they would have to confront not only Soviet Russia, but Bulgaria and Hungary, too; unlike Finland. Romania had a recent disastrous experience with multi-front fighting in WWI.

Again, so glad you are finally seeing the problems with Romania being forced to go it alone for at least nine weeks before the "Wehrmacht" shows up to "rescue" them...

[Richard Anderson]

Talking about hilarity, please detail the hilarious concept how assets spent fighting Weserubung and those left in place to defend the Norway coast, and those destroyed and stuck in the Dutch marshes HELPED the Wehrmacht in its attack in Belgium?

I apologize for speaking for Kingfish, but I would much rather see you "detail" what all those "destroyed and stuck in the Dutch marshes" Wehrmacht units were? You know, those ones that did not continue to advance into Belgium becaause they were either "destroyed" or "stuck"? Do you mean the minor elements of 7. Fliegerdivision and 22. Infanteriedivision partly crippled in the air assault? Or the losses to 3. and 4. Panzerdivision at Hannut? Was it the 0.2% per day personnel or the 2.4% per day tank losses that was sufficient to "destroy" them or were they merely "stuck in marshes" when they continued their advance on 16 June into the Belgian plain?

[Kingfish]

Can you detail and source this fascinating and extremely novel (from a Romanian's POV) history of the Soviet ultimatum to Romania?

Sure, here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_oc ... n_Bukovina

The relevant passages:
On June 26, 1940, at 22:00, Soviet People's Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov presented an ultimatum note to Gheorghe Davidescu, Romanian plenipotentiary minister to Moscow, in which the Soviet Union demanded the evacuation of the Romanian military and civil administration from Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina.The Soviets stressed their sense of urgency: "Now that the military weakness of the USSR is a thing of past, and the international situation that was created requires the rapid solution of the items inherited from the past, in order to fix the basis of a solid peace between countries

On June 27, a second Soviet ultimatum note put forward a specific time frame, requesting the evacuation of the Romanian government from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina within four days.

Assurances that Hungary and Bulgaria would not backstab them while fighting The Bear would have been a nice start; that would have cost Germany the price of a diplomatic telegram to the heads of the Hungarian and Bulgarian governments.

Which
a) guarantees nothing since Russia could just as easily counter with its own telegram courting these two countries with a slice of Romania
and
b) does nothing to alter the state on the ground. Historically neither Hungary nor Bulgaria made any noise during this time, and still Romania hoisted the white flag without a shot being fired. IOW, German "support" counted for nothing.

Talking about hilarity, please detail the hilarious concept how assets spent fighting Weserubung and those left in place to defend the Norway coast, and those destroyed and stuck in the Dutch marshes HELPED the Wehrmacht in its attack in Belgium?

See the other thread where you first proposed this.

[Richard Anderson]

The relevant passages:
On June 26, 1940, at 22:00, Soviet People's Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov presented an ultimatum note to Gheorghe Davidescu, Romanian plenipotentiary minister to Moscow, in which the Soviet Union demanded the evacuation of the Romanian military and civil administration from Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina.The Soviets stressed their sense of urgency: "Now that the military weakness of the USSR is a thing of past, and the international situation that was created requires the rapid solution of the items inherited from the past, in order to fix the basis of a solid peace between countries

On June 27, a second Soviet ultimatum note put forward a specific time frame, requesting the evacuation of the Romanian government from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina within four days.

Note too that the Soviets secured German agreement on 23 June, about 72 hours prior to issuing the note to the Rumanians. The "specific time frame" in the second note was agreed by the Rumanians by 0700 on 27 June, i.e., nine hours after the initial Soviet note. The Rumanians agreed that the Soviet entry would begin at 1400 on 27 June, i.e., seven hours later. There simply was little time for deliberations to develop a "rope-a-dope" on either the German or Rumanian side. Mind you, it was also not until 29 June that the Romanian PM expressed its "friendship" with Germany and it was 1 July when they renounced the British and French "guarantees".

See the other thread where you first proposed this.

Except he already said he thought our assessment was "too pessimistic" and that all it meant was that those Wehrmacht troops weren't going to be destroyed and stuck in marshes in Holland and in Norway (well, not in the marshes of Norway), so that answered you...didn't it?

[Kingfish]

So your "analysis" is that since Zhukov/"Jucoff" is in charge of an operation where the imbalance of forces is similar to that in his recent face-off against the Japanese, then the results will be better for the defender? How remarkable.

The only way it could be better is if the Romanians pull back from the border and deployed along the Prut, but that means abandoning Bessarabia, and thus raise the obvious question - why would they reject the Russian ultimatum?

[Richard Anderson]

The only way it could be better is if the Romanians pull back from the border and deployed along the Prut, but that means abandoning Bessarabia, and thus raise the obvious question - why would they reject the Russian ultimatum?

As best I can make out, the defenses of Bessarabia were Third Rumanian Army with III Corps (12th and 15th ID) and IV Corps (7th, 8th, and 14th ID and 2d CavD). Thrid Army's X Corps and VIII Corps were in Bukovina, probably with six infantry divisions and a mountain brigade, while two cavalry divisions and seven infantry divisions were in reserve west of the Prut and Siret. As far as I can tell the few available Rumanian tanks were in reserve.

The Soviets were well prepared for the operation...the Rumanians not so much. The Soviets crossed the Dniester on 28 June and the Prut on 30 June. The 12th Army opposed the Romanian forces in Bukovina, while the 5th and 9th conducted the occupation of Bessarabia. Roughly 20 infantry divisions, 4 cavalry divisions, and the nascent mechanized corps and a number of additional tank brigades with about 2,000 tanks, so about four-to-one or worse, with the Rumanians in an untenable position and no time to redeploy (they abandoned around 53,000-66,000 rifles, 1,350 machine guns, 100 mortars, 201 field guns and howitzers, and 109,000 rounds of artillery ammunition in their flight, while 15th ID disintegrated and about 62,500 troops deserted).