Less Signal Intel For Rommel

[Carl Schwamberger]

This is one I've discussed twice in extended verbal conversations, but cant recall seeing on the web.

Assume the radio signal intel for the Africa Corps & Pz Army Africa is much less than OTL, that is:

1. The Italians do not penetrate the US Black Code & Rommel does not recive updates on the British division/brigade locations almost daily.

2. The signals intel battalion attached to Rommels command is much less capable & is far less effective at filling in info on 8th Army actions.

In other words the German and Italian intel on 8th Army is no better than the Commonwealth intel was through 1941 & to mid 1942. How well can the African Corps come to equaling its performance? This question originated when some friends & I were examining several table top war games on the African campaigns. Most of those were designed back in the 1970s, 1960s, before the role of signal intel in WWII was understood. We were trying to decide how distorted the games were in their depiction of each sides strength by this lack of understanding.

So, how much of the Axis sucess of 1941-1942 was through signal intel, and how close can they come to that sucess without it?

[stg 44]

Interesting question, not sure how much Rommel relied on it and would be cautious without it. I'd say he'd still take risks, but they'd be less informed ones and probably get him into serious trouble, perhaps wrecking his corps and preventing his most important successes, altering his reputation and potentially shortening the North African campaign by up to a year.

[maltesefalcon]

IRL the Afrika Korps et al were defeated by summer 1943. Giving Rommel less to work with will not improve that outcome in Germany's favour.

So we are left to speculate on how much sooner the collapse would occur. If the Brits did it without US involvement, then its hard to quantify.

However if US troops and equipment were needed I think the events would spin out near the same time frame. The US could not contribute much until late 1942 and after that they still needed to get French Africa on side. (And I do think the US was diplomatically vital to getting French troops to cooperate with the Allies.)

[Carl Schwamberger]

Interesting question, not sure how much Rommel relied on it and would be cautious without it.

There is something of a record of this, and assorted analysis. We need those mythical experts to assist us here.

... I'd say he'd still take risks, but they'd be less informed ones and probably get him into serious trouble, perhaps wrecking his corps and preventing his most important successes, altering his reputation and potentially shortening the North African campaign by up to a year.

Tripoli secured in January 1942 does change a lot. I wonder if things can go that well for the Commonwealth?

[stg 44]

Tripoli secured in January 1942 does change a lot. I wonder if things can go that well for the Commonwealth?

Depends on how foolish Rommel gets, but if he plays it more cautious, perhaps it drags out for a while beyond that and just ends earlier with lower losses to both sides.

[MarkN]

This is one I've discussed twice in extended verbal conversations, but cant recall seeing on the web.

Assume the radio signal intel for the Africa Corps & Pz Army Africa is much less than OTL, that is:

1. The Italians do not penetrate the US Black Code & Rommel does not recive updates on the British division/brigade locations almost daily.

2. The signals intel battalion attached to Rommels command is much less capable & is far less effective at filling in info on 8th Army actions.

In other words the German and Italian intel on 8th Army is no better than the Commonwealth intel was through 1941 & to mid 1942. How well can the African Corps come to equaling its performance? This question originated when some friends & I were examining several table top war games on the African campaigns. Most of those were designed back in the 1970s, 1960s, before the role of signal intel in WWII was understood. We were trying to decide how distorted the games were in their depiction of each sides strength by this lack of understanding.

So, how much of the Axis sucess of 1941-1942 was through signal intel, and how close can they come to that sucess without it?

Not as much as some make out.

Tripoli secured in January 1942 does change a lot. I wonder if things can go that well for the Commonwealth?

The Italians captured the 'Black Code' only towards the end of 1941 and shared very little of it with the Germans. So, it had effectively no bearing on operations during 1941. The Germans, however, then broke the 'Black Code' themselves and only then did Rommel start to receive his regular updates. But that wasn't until after his counter-offensive of January 1942. It may have helped in planning of the Gazala attack May-June 1942, but once broken the British were in headlong retreat. Even daily updates would have been out of date on arrival. And clearly it didn't help Rommel at the first battle of el Alamein nor prevent the breakout by the Empire at the second battle of el Alamein. Alamein (late Oct42) to arrival at Tripoli (late Jan43) is just 3 months. How much quicker do you think the Empire would have motored if Rommel was sans Bonner-Fellar updates?

In short, given that Rommel was only receiving regular intel (indirectly) from Bonner-Fellars from February/March 1942, the North African campaign certainly could not have been shortened by a year in its absence.

Considering 621 Sigs Intercept Coy, their intel was principally last minute or actual time tactical information. That information may have helped with last minute tactical decision-making, but was not of great help in strategic decision making. Given the unit was overrun and captured by the Australians during the second Alamein battle, they didn't prove any help in the retreat to Tripoli. Did they help tactically up until then? Undoubtably. Enough to lengthen the campaign by a month or more? Doubtful. Rommel's greatest asset was abysmal British generalship.

[stg 44]

Considering 621 Sigs Intercept Coy, their intel was principally last minute or actual time tactical information. That information may have helped with last minute tactical decision-making, but was not of great help in strategic decision making. Given the unit was overrun and captured by the Australians during the second Alamein battle, they didn't prove any help in the retreat to Tripoli. Did they help tactically up until then? Undoubtably. Enough to lengthen the campaign by a month or more? Doubtful. Rommel's greatest asset was abysmal British generalship.

Seems like it was of great importance in the operational/strategic realm actually:
https://books.google.com/books?id=XnOHC ... nt&f=false

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/radio-ki ... ompany.htm

[MarkN]

Considering 621 Sigs Intercept Coy, their intel was principally last minute or actual time tactical information. That information may have helped with last minute tactical decision-making, but was not of great help in strategic decision making. Given the unit was overrun and captured by the Australians during the second Alamein battle, they didn't prove any help in the retreat to Tripoli. Did they help tactically up until then? Undoubtably. Enough to lengthen the campaign by a month or more? Doubtful. Rommel's greatest asset was abysmal British generalship.

Seems like it was of great importance in the operational/strategic realm actually:
https://books.google.com/books?id=XnOHC ... nt&f=false

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/radio-ki ... ompany.htm

The first link is an advert for a book and tells us nothing about the work of 621 coy.

The second link emphasis what I posited. Thank you.