The Wiki OKW quote is not correct : Keitel never was commander in chief of the WM and thus the others could not circumvent him . Hitler took over from Blomberg because there was no one else available .stg 44 wrote:Hitler basically was OKW:MarkN wrote:No it didn't.stg 44 wrote:Talking about the strategic conduct of the war falls into Hitler's lap, ...
Hitler set policy. He did NOT create the military strategy to deliver that policy; the OKW/OKH/OKL/KM did that.
Hitler had a reputation for meddling in military decision-making - a reputation based upon meddling in military affairs AFTER the Generals' strategy for success had failed. They failed because, despite being excellent tacticians, they were incompetent strategists. If it was not incompetence, then what was it that allowed them to believe they could succeed against such odds? Was it arrogance? Hubris? Or something else? It is only the deluded or ignorant that fall back on the falsehood that it was all Hitler's fault.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oberkomma ... _WehrmachtKeitel was a stooge for Hitler as was von Brauchitsch. Hitler handpicked the officers he wanted that would obey as the primary criteria.The OKW was established by decree of 4 February 1938 on the occasion of the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair, which had led to the dismissal of Reich War Minister and Commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht, Generalfeldmarschall Werner von Blomberg. Hitler took the chance to get rid of his critics within the armed forces. The Reich War Ministry was dissolved and replaced with the OKW led by devoted General Wilhelm Keitel in the rank of a Reich Minister, with Alfred Jodl as Chief of the Operations Staff. Nevertheless, all Supreme Commanders of the armed service branches, like OKH Chief General Walther von Brauchitsch, had direct access to Hitler and were able to circumvent Keitel's command. The appointments made to the OKW and the motive behind the reorganization are commonly thought to be Hitler's desire to consolidate power and authority around his position as Führer and Reich Chancellor (Führer und Reichskanzler), to the detriment of the military leadership of the Wehrmacht.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Keitelhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walther_v ... rld_War_IIAccording to David Stahel, among the generalship Keitel was "well known and [...] reviled as Hitler's dependable mouthpiece and habitual yes-man."[1]:277Brauchitsch was involved in early coup attempts, but wimped out ever time they got close to acting and eventually told the other plotters he wanted no part in their schemes. Prior to Barbarossa he then ordered the army to just accept Hitler's orders for 'harsh measures' in the East and stop complaining about Nazi racial policies.Although he personally disliked Nazism, he borrowed immense sums of money from Hitler and became dependent on his financial help.
....
Even though Brauchitsch was in charge of operational affairs during the Polish and French campaigns, he had very little influence, as a whole, as to the war's progress.
....
However, Hitler invited a group of officers to lunch, and Manstein was among them. He managed to present his plan directly to Hitler. The following day, Hitler ordered Brauchitsch to accept Manstein's plan, which the Führer presented as his own.[34]
The two top generals in the command structure then were stooges for Hitler; they might have had their say in planning, but Hitler was their boss that they'd bow down to whenever he told them to do something.
In terms of strategy perhaps we are disagreeing on the definition of the world, certainly the choice to go to war with Poland, Russia, and the US were all Hitler's decisions with the military largely just obeying the order (in the case of the US Doenitz was pushing for war for a while). The plan for the conduct of the wars was partially Hitler's partially not, but then the campaigns of 1939-40 were largely operational in nature rather than strategic. In Barbarossa Hitler was didn't come up with the invasion plan, but he set the priorities and would not accept Halder's recommendations about Moscow, instead constantly seeking out the opinions of people that were either personally loyal to Hitler and would validate his wishes or had their own motives like Guderian, who just wanted his Panzer Group to stay intact and would accept any option that would enable that, while of course taking major bribes from Hitler personally, so wasn't nearly as willing to disagree as he would have been otherwise.
How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
I'd love to see source on that. The War Ministry was abolished because Hitler wanted more direct control over the military and did not appreciate that Blomberg and Fritsch stood up to him at the Hossbach Conference. Also the source says he was chief of OKW, which replaced the War Ministry:ljadw wrote: The Wiki OKW quote is not correct : Keitel never was commander in chief of the WM and thus the others could not circumvent him . Hitler took over from Blomberg because there was no one else available .
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Keitel
In 1937, Keitel was promoted to the rank of full general (Generaloberst). In the following year, after the Blomberg–Fritsch affair, the War Ministry was replaced by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), and Keitel was appointed as its chief. This effectively made him Germany's War Minister, and accordingly, he was appointed to the Hitler Cabinet. However, the cabinet never held a formal meeting after the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair. Soon after his appointment, he convinced Hitler to appoint his close friend, Walther von Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
For a brief period in October 1938, Keitel was Military Governor of the Sudetenland. In February 1939 Keitel again became chief of OKW, a post he held until the end of the war.
During World War II, Keitel was one of the primary planners of the Wehrmacht campaigns and operations on the Western and the Eastern fronts. He advised Hitler against invading France and opposed Operation Barbarossa. Both times he backed down in the face of Hitler and tendered his resignation, which Hitler refused to accept.
Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
MarkN wrote: Your liberal use of (those) wiki quotes only serves to demonstrate your lack of understanding of the subject. It's a repeat of our last discussion where you thought the liberal use of quotes from another dubious source was enough to camoflage your complete ignorance of the subject matter.
Feel free to actually post a counter-source if you've got an issue with mine.
Hitler had his handpicked politically safe officers around him, i.e. men appointed on the merit of their loyalty/relationship to Hitler. By picking yes-men to advise him Hitler pruned the strategic level of command of strategic independent thought, rather he installed men who would feed back to him advice he wanted to hear. In terms of planning look at the Barbarossa order, he laid out the objectives, i.e. the strategy for the campaign, and let his subordinates work out the operational plan to make that happen. The military plan they developed was the operational, not strategic plan. I think you're misunderstanding the different between strategy-operations-tactics, which is a common mistake and hardly the first you've made.MarkN wrote: Hitler set the policy after taking soundings from his close coterie of sychophants. The Generals didn't just obey orders, they developed the military plan - ie the military strategy - to deliver the objectives of policy. Their plans, their military strategies, failed to deliver the objectives. Was it through strategic incompetence, arrogance, hubris or other?
Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
Hi Mark:MarkN wrote:Before and during Fall Gelb, the Wehrmacht leadership was divided as to whether Manstein's 'sickle' plan would work. After it did, at least in the tactical sense it did, the opponents to deep penetration by limited panzer/mechanised/motorised forces melted away. The tactical successes of May/June 1940 seemed to have completely clouded the thinking such that the Soviet Union was perceived as the same game all over again. A complete and utter failure to grasp the 'strategic' context of what they were up against.
I agree with the "complete clouding of thinking." David Stahel, IMHO, does a fine job of highlighting this groupthink mentality.
Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
1) There is NO proof for the claim that Keitel opposed Fall Gelb and Barbarossastg 44 wrote:I'd love to see source on that. The War Ministry was abolished because Hitler wanted more direct control over the military and did not appreciate that Blomberg and Fritsch stood up to him at the Hossbach Conference. Also the source says he was chief of OKW, which replaced the War Ministry:ljadw wrote: The Wiki OKW quote is not correct : Keitel never was commander in chief of the WM and thus the others could not circumvent him . Hitler took over from Blomberg because there was no one else available .
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_KeitelIn 1937, Keitel was promoted to the rank of full general (Generaloberst). In the following year, after the Blomberg–Fritsch affair, the War Ministry was replaced by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), and Keitel was appointed as its chief. This effectively made him Germany's War Minister, and accordingly, he was appointed to the Hitler Cabinet. However, the cabinet never held a formal meeting after the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair. Soon after his appointment, he convinced Hitler to appoint his close friend, Walther von Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
For a brief period in October 1938, Keitel was Military Governor of the Sudetenland. In February 1939 Keitel again became chief of OKW, a post he held until the end of the war.
During World War II, Keitel was one of the primary planners of the Wehrmacht campaigns and operations on the Western and the Eastern fronts. He advised Hitler against invading France and opposed Operation Barbarossa. Both times he backed down in the face of Hitler and tendered his resignation, which Hitler refused to accept.
2) He tendered his resignation in 1942 only,after the failure of Fall Blau
3 ) The War Ministry was abolished,because Hitler refused to become war minister : Blomberg was war minister and had the meaningless title of commander in chief of the WM .Hitler succeeded him in both functions ,but , Keitel replaced him de facto as war minister , but he was not war minister: he had only the ceremonial rank of minister.
4 ) There is no proof that Keitel and Brauchitz were close friends and that Keitel convinced Hitler to appoint Brauchitz as OBdH .
5) Keitel was NOT,NEVER a primary planner of the WM campaigns
6 ) Brauchitz was NOT fired because Barbarossa failed: Barbarossa failed in the summer and Brauchitz was replaced in december only , because he was very ill,since several weeks and unable to conduct the Ostheer .
6 ) Maybe a detail : but the translation of General Oberst by Full General (a US military expression) is questionable .
7) When Hitler became also OBdH, this appointment was expected to be temporary .
8 ) Normally the successor of Blomberg had to be an army general,but there was no one available : Fritsch (the normal candidate ) was out because of a scandal, besides, even without the scandal, he could not succeed Blomberg, as he opposed vehemently the attempts from Blomberg to become the commander of the WM . the chief of staff of the army (beck ) had forbidden all his collaborators to have any contact with anyone from the war ministry . Other army generals were to low in rang and in seniority : Goering was already GO (5 stars) and there was no army general available with 5 stars .
Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
Gorque wrote:Hi Mark:MarkN wrote:Before and during Fall Gelb, the Wehrmacht leadership was divided as to whether Manstein's 'sickle' plan would work. After it did, at least in the tactical sense it did, the opponents to deep penetration by limited panzer/mechanised/motorised forces melted away. The tactical successes of May/June 1940 seemed to have completely clouded the thinking such that the Soviet Union was perceived as the same game all over again. A complete and utter failure to grasp the 'strategic' context of what they were up against.
I agree with the "complete clouding of thinking." David Stahel, IMHO, does a fine job of highlighting this groupthink mentality.
This is a questionable conclusion .
Besides, it is wrong to say that the "sicle " plan (English expression ) was Manstein's plan .
Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
Hi Ljadw:ljadw wrote:Gorque wrote:Hi Mark:MarkN wrote:Before and during Fall Gelb, the Wehrmacht leadership was divided as to whether Manstein's 'sickle' plan would work. After it did, at least in the tactical sense it did, the opponents to deep penetration by limited panzer/mechanised/motorised forces melted away. The tactical successes of May/June 1940 seemed to have completely clouded the thinking such that the Soviet Union was perceived as the same game all over again. A complete and utter failure to grasp the 'strategic' context of what they were up against.
I agree with the "complete clouding of thinking." David Stahel, IMHO, does a fine job of highlighting this groupthink mentality.
This is a questionable conclusion .
Besides, it is wrong to say that the "sicle " plan (English expression ) was Manstein's plan .
I think you are confusing me with Mark regarding the Sichelschnitt reference.
As to the questionable conclusion, are you referring to the Sichelschnitt, Stahel's conclusions or what?
Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
In our previous discussion I posted source documentation that indicated you were entirely ignorant of the subject. You ignored it completely as it didn't fit your narrative and continued to post dubious sources as some sort of camouflage of your ignorance. You made it clear that you are not interested in historical facts and realities, you are only interested in 'winning' internet arguments. Your card was marked at that point. In fact, our discussion only started because you were seeking information to win an internet argument elesewhere!!!!stg 44 wrote: Feel free to actually post a counter-source if you've got an issue with mine.
Why not?stg 44 wrote: In terms of planning look at the Barbarossa order, ....
He did. And as you have previously opined, you've misunderstood/misread the document and think the objectives were different to those actually written.stg 44 wrote:... he laid out the objectives, ....
No, it's not a 'strategy' for the campaign. It is an 'order' (directive to be precise) with some basic outline ideas of how he sees it should be done. Those ideas being ones that he has been advised are possible after consultation with his military advisors.stg 44 wrote: ... i.e. the strategy for the campaign, ...
The Generals were indeed left to work out the plan on how it should be implemented.stg 44 wrote: ... and let his subordinates work out the operational plan to make that happen.
They delivered a 'tactical/operational' plan when they should have delivered a 'strategic' plan. That was a key part of the reason for the failure.stg 44 wrote: The military plan they developed was the operational, not strategic plan.
I don't think you have a clue what you are writing about. Something you have demonstrated on several occasions across many threads. One of which I was closely involved in.stg 44 wrote: I think you're misunderstanding the different between strategy-operations-tactics, which is a common mistake and hardly the first you've made.
Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
I am referring to the claim that the whole concept of Sichelschnitt was the work of Manstein . There was a very big difference between what Manstein proposed and what was executed in may 1940.Even a Manstein fan as Frieser admitted this in the Blitzkrieg legend .Manstein proposed a Sichelschnitt with 2 arms : the first would,after Sedan, go to the coast, the second would go to the Swiss border . Sichelschnitt was not that revolutionary :Gorque wrote:Hi Ljadw:ljadw wrote:Gorque wrote:Hi Mark:MarkN wrote:Before and during Fall Gelb, the Wehrmacht leadership was divided as to whether Manstein's 'sickle' plan would work. After it did, at least in the tactical sense it did, the opponents to deep penetration by limited panzer/mechanised/motorised forces melted away. The tactical successes of May/June 1940 seemed to have completely clouded the thinking such that the Soviet Union was perceived as the same game all over again. A complete and utter failure to grasp the 'strategic' context of what they were up against.
I agree with the "complete clouding of thinking." David Stahel, IMHO, does a fine job of highlighting this groupthink mentality.
This is a questionable conclusion .
Besides, it is wrong to say that the "sicle " plan (English expression ) was Manstein's plan .
I think you are confusing me with Mark regarding the Sichelschnitt reference.
As to the questionable conclusion, are you referring to the Sichelschnitt, Stahel's conclusions or what?
In the first Fall Gelb variant 4 PzD would start south of the Meuse
In the second :also 4
In the third 5
In the fourth : 7
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Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
Thank you Mark for injecting a little reality into this fantasy fest.MarkN wrote:No it didn't.
Exactly. Hitler set policy. So did Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. All then absorbed input from their military staff on how that policy could be implemented through strategy.Hitler set policy. He did NOT create the military strategy to deliver that policy; the OKW/OKH/OKL/KM did that.
Yep, so did Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. The major difference was in most cases they heeded the strategic advice of their staff, especially when the failure to do so resulted in disaster or the united opposition of their staff. However, they weren't always successful and various policy announcements - such as Roosevelt's aircraft and tank goal pronouncements, had potentially detrimental strategic effects. In the U.S. though, by the 1960's the military staff became yes-men, agreeing that every policy could be strategically implemented successfully. Thus, Vietnam, Lebanon, Gulf War I, Gulf War II, and the GWOT.Hitler had a reputation for meddling in military decision-making - a reputation based upon meddling in military affairs AFTER the Generals' strategy for success had failed. They failed because, despite being excellent tacticians, they were incompetent strategists. If it was not incompetence, then what was it that allowed them to believe they could succeed against such odds? Was it arrogance? Hubris? Or something else? It is only the deluded or ignorant that fall back on the falsehood that it was all Hitler's fault.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
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Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
Gee, I feel your pain. Somehow you have managed to reach the conclusion that because i criticize someone "relying" (often incorrectly) on "Dupuy" that somehow I am criticizing Dupuy. Far from it. I also tend to "push back" when data corrections I have previously "mentioned" get ignored and the false data gets reinserted into the equation.Stiltzkin wrote:1) I was not merely relying on Dupuy and I feel I have to push back on your statements especially when you mention me.Since Sitzkin was already being argued against for the problems with Dupuy, I didn't feel I needed to push back on his statements
Yep.2) You might as well follow such a thinking pattern "I do not like Gravity and think there are reservations with it. I think evolution is false, the earth is flat and 500 years old". You can quote as many Wiki articles as you want, I cannot see how you have managed to touch the performance of any army in here. This has nothing to do with the Wehrmacht by itself but rather all military organizations.
Indeed, and I rather suspect I am more aware of the "warts and all" of the American Army, especially WRT to World War II, than you are. However, I do not like to see those warts incorrectly characterized or see nonexistent warts created by dishonest "researchers" relying on the echo chamber that is Wikipedia.Here is the truth: Personal bias, that is why most people have a problem with the calculations. But "MUH ARMEEEH IS DA BEST" (have you no shame).
Gee, I feel your pain for some reason.(snip) If you quote or mention my name, at least do not mix it up with false statements and misinterpretations, especially in the face of your personal ignorance (not being capable of understanding quantified models).
Lanchester does? Really? Lanchester's square law was developed as his assumptions about what air combat would be like. I doubt he ever tested them to any data. Nor am I aware that he incorporated anything other than weapons counts into the equation?For you personal information, they do not just rely on "body count" (a revelation of the indepth examination conducted by most posters in here), but many other factors from leadership, morale, posture, logistics, weather, dispersion, vulnerability - Lanchester does but it can be also be modified.
To be exact, Dupuy translated Clausewitz's oral formulation into a mathematical one.Simple logic, independent of Dupuy, Lanchester, Clausewitz (yes he did postulate certain laws), Vegetius, Miyamoto Musashi, Sun Tzi, or any other prolific researcher/theorist who ever existed:
You need to include Jim Taylor in that group. Arguably the expert on Lanchester and his equations.You can refine the model in many ways, you can add "fluid movement simulation", battle termination, reinforcements, non GHQ units, combat power loss due to logistics, direct fire, non linear, indirect fire, add modifiers for postures, envelopment etc. etc. Bracken, Helmbold, Osipov exponents, integrate accordingly add partial integration, Sums what not. Some models work better with ancient armies, other with modern (linear, to 3/2, to square, you can also add a logarithmic scale). You can also include their inventory, the number of tanks or even radios if you weigh them accordingly.
Agreed, but language is important...attackers tend to suffer higher numerical losses, but defenders, especially when they lose, tend to suffer higher proportional losses."Oh but they lost", yes you don't say, the question here is however how they performed. If a country like Luxembourg gets overrun by a larger country and that little country managed to inflict higher losses on their enemy, then you have to ask "why was that"? Independent of facts such as a victory or defeat. You simply give this performance a number.
You can argue "but some factions are more willing to take losses" (true) , attackers generally take higher losses, but still the idea here that "we have a higher focus on the operational level", is nothing more than a Soviet construct in order to explain their high losses. The sum of the losses on the tactical level translates into the sum on the operational level and so on.
Interesting factoid...what is the source?Nobody seems to care about the fact that USMC units were on average 30% more effective than Japanese units.
Good points, but "efficiency" is a different thing from "effectiveness". I would argue the IDF history demonstrates it to be very efficient and effective...albeit that has never translated into a durable and favorable - to Israel - strategic resolution.Nobody in his right mind will argue that Vietcong units outfought American units, but if you truly question all these findings, then I will simply maintain: "Vietcong troops were better than US troops, please refute my statement".
Which leads me to the final question: How do you measure efficiency? Getting the job done on the expense of 30,000,000 Soldiers (because every country on this earth can afford such a toll)? Personally, I admire the IDF's efficiency.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies
You posted a document and declared your interpretation was the only right one. When I disagreed you became massively butthurt and obsessed with me, since then following my posts in subforums you've never been before to only comment on my posts. Really, you've got a bit of an issue trying to pretend that your view point is the only right one in every argument, so don't project your problems on to me. I even got a PM warning me about your personality issues from another forum patron.MarkN wrote: In our previous discussion I posted source documentation that indicated you were entirely ignorant of the subject. You ignored it completely as it didn't fit your narrative and continued to post dubious sources as some sort of camouflage of your ignorance. You made it clear that you are not interested in historical facts and realities, you are only interested in 'winning' internet arguments. Your card was marked at that point. In fact, our discussion only started because you were seeking information to win an internet argument elesewhere!!!!
Whatever warped interpretation of our previous disagreement in another forum subsection has no bearing on this point.MarkN wrote: He did. And as you have previously opined, you've misunderstood/misread the document and think the objectives were different to those actually written.
It is in fact an strategy for the campaign:MarkN wrote: No, it's not a 'strategy' for the campaign. It is an 'order' (directive to be precise) with some basic outline ideas of how he sees it should be done. Those ideas being ones that he has been advised are possible after consultation with his military advisors.
https://www.cc.gatech.edu/~tpilsch/INTA ... xcerpt.pdf
Hitler laid out the strategic goals/plan for the war, his staff carried out the operational planning to make it happen. There is bleed over between strategy and operations with the planning/organizing of the conflict by OKH and OKW, but Hitler issuing the decision to go to war, goals for the war, objectives for the war, and even the grouping of armies to obtain objectives were firmly within the purview of strategy, in fact the most clear part before the bleed over with the operational level of war.Three Levels of War
USAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE)
Air and Space Power Mentoring Guide, Vol. 1
Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997
Strategic Level
The strategic level focuses on defining and supporting national policy and relates directly to
the outcome of a war or other conflict as a whole. Usually, modern wars and conflicts are
won or lost at this level rather than at the operational or tactical levels.5 The strategic level
applies to all forms of war and conflict from military activities short of war through
insurgent, conventional, and nuclear warfare. This level involves a strategic concept, plans
for preparing all national instruments of power for war or conflict, practical guidance for
preparing the armed forces, and leadership of the armed forces to achieve strategic
objectives. Determining US national security strategy is the responsibility of the NCA. The
armed forces contribute through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially to the
military component of the national security strategy.6
Operational Level
The operational level is concerned with employing military forces in a theater of war or
theater of operations to obtain an advantage over the enemy and thereby attain strategic
goals through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.13
In war, a campaign involves employment of military forces in a series of related military
operations to accomplish a common objective in a given time and space. In activities short
of war, a campaign consists of a series of related military, economic, and political operations
to accomplish a common objective in a given time and space. Commanders should design,
orchestrate, and coordinate operations and exploit tactical events to support overall
campaign objectives. Where and when to conduct a campaign is based on objectives, the
threat, and limitations imposed by geographical, economic, and cultural environments, as
well as the numbers and types of military resources available.
14
You can take NATO's definition too:
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/aap6.pdf
military strategy
That component of national or
multinational strategy, presenting
the manner in which military
power should be developed and
applied to achieve national
objectives or those of a group of
nations.
I don't think you understand strategy either or the role all played in conceiving and setting strategy. Stalin and Churchill both were notorious for their meddling with disastrous consequences.Richard Anderson wrote: Exactly. Hitler set policy. So did Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. All then absorbed input from their military staff on how that policy could be implemented through strategy.
Which is generally consistent with operational level of warfare, but the goals and general guidelines, aka the strategy, was laid out by Hitler with his staff left to figure out the operational plans to achieve it.MarkN wrote: The Generals were indeed left to work out the plan on how it should be implemented.
Hitler delivered the strategic plan, they were tasked with carrying it out via the operational plan. What different method of planning do you think they should have done to qualify their plan as 'strategic'? The key reason for the failure was the intel failure to determine how powerful the Soviets actually were, a host of operational mistakes, very poor logistics planning, Hitler's flawed strategic concepts for the campaign, and of course Hitler refusing to accept what intel that came in that threatened the conceptions he had about Soviet strength. David Glantz details that quite well in a number of his books, including the Barbarossa single volume and Stumbling Colossus.MarkN wrote: They delivered a 'tactical/operational' plan when they should have delivered a 'strategic' plan. That was a key part of the reason for the failure.
Opinions are like assholes, everyone has one. :roll:MarkN wrote: I don't think you have a clue what you are writing about. Something you have demonstrated on several occasions across many threads. One of which I was closely involved in.