How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies

[Stiltzkin]

You spoilt it! No fair. I bet he was going to say Dupuy...

Looks like the US Army (partially) shared his beliefs. I smell the inability to deal with the subject matter and instead see people ridiculing the work of others which reveals a high concentration of insecruity in dealing with these evaluations, i.e. I am still waiting for better counter arguments than this

[Gorque]

Hi Stiltskin:

Those are interesting documents that you are sharing with us. What study are they from?

[T. A. Gardner]

You spoilt it! No fair. I bet he was going to say Dupuy...

Looks like the US Army (partially) shared his beliefs. I smell the inability to deal with the subject matter and instead see people ridiculing the work of others which revleals a high concentration of insecruity in dealing with these evaluations, i.e. I am still waiting for better counter arguments than this

You'd be wrong. As Rich Anderson will affirm, I'm sure, I know the math side of Dupuy's QJM model as presented in Numbers, Predictions, and War pretty thoroughly. My argument with it drives backwards from the results and formulas used. The equations aren't equations. The variables are often guesses. I to date have been unable to reproduce any of Dupuy's results myself as the book doesn't give anywhere near enough original data to do it even with what are supposed to be three very detailed examples in Figure 4-3.

I could go through how the CEV is arrived at from the end equation PR/PR (for attacker and defender) to the original results equations he had (R-R)/5 = (P/P)-1, or P/P = (R-R)/5+1 and how these aren't even equations as when set to zero they are false in every case except by accident.

I like using the battle of Crecy as an example of how the QJM fails miserably because it's a static model. When you take the battle as a series of Dupuy's outcome "equations" over time (eg., a sum of the outcomes with respect to time from 0 to the end of the battle) it works out much closer to reality. However, Dupuy dismisses time (and space) as unnecessary variables, however important, out-of-hand (see pg 38).
The Crecy example demolishes that argument as time and space in terms of the battlefield are absolutely central to the British victory.

[Stiltzkin]

I like using the battle of Crecy as an example of how the QJM

Then you did not understand it well. It is more suitable for evaluations of modern battles, but in case you are wondering they are using the reworked TNDM, nonetheless it still confirms the theory.
Should you still be somehow not convinced, I would suggest to read v. Crevelds Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 or alternatively, confirm Dupuy's theories by utilizing Lanchester or Osipov's laws - I can assure you that the values will not differ much. Interestingly, the US Armies opinion does not contradict the established CEV.

However there is another interesting thing, namely that if we specifically look at divisional level engagements in the ETO 1944, from Christopher A. Lawrence, War by Numbers Understanding Conventional Combat , we can see that the Allies could seldomly achieve success when fighting on equal terms, a sign of a qualitative difference.

Those are interesting documents that you are sharing with us. What study are they from?

US Army Training Doctrine and Command, Soldier capability- army combat effectiveness Volume III Historical Combat Data and Analysis

[Guaporense]

The problem faced by Germany, vis-s-vis the Allies, was a lack of manpower not only to fight their campaigns but also to produce their weapons and provide for the general economy. A manpower multiplier was needed through standardization of industrial processes and outputs and enhanced firepower for the units in the field, e.g. earlier introduction of the infantry assault rifle, etc.

Nah, that's not going to cut it. They needed to perfect human cloning: to produce massive armies of cloned soldiers.

In terms of per soldier effectiveness they were already far better than the Allies, being about 150% as effective as British or American soldiers and 300% as effective as Soviet soldiers in inflicting casualties.

So expecting an even higher superior margin of per soldier effectiveness versus the Allies was unreasonable, the only way to change the tables would be to make the German manpower barrel bigger.

As with the other postings subsequent to your post, what sources can you refer to or what raw data can you provide that supports your argument regarding effectiveness/soldier and for what point in time are you writing about?

Point in time? The entire first half of the 20th century. From the beginning of the century to the end of the Second World War the German armed forces were the most effective military force in the world.

Sources? Pretty much everybody who knows history is aware of the higher fighting power of the German army. Good references are Van Creveld, Zetterling, Trevor N. Dupuy and Christopher A. Lawrence. Even admirers of the Red Army like Glantz characterized the German army as the most formidable fighting force of the 20th century.

But even historians dealing with non-military aspects of warfare like Harrison, Broadberry and Niall Ferguson are well aware of the German military superiority, these historians usually put the reason for Germany's defeat in both world wars as due to superiority in Allied resources.

In my opinion, superiority in economic resources explains the victory of France+UK+US over Germany in WW1. It doesn't explain the Soviet victory over Germany in WW2, since the USSR, controlling Siberia and some parts of Eastern Europe had far less economic resources than Nazi Germany who controlled most of Europe. The Soviet victory was obtained through the sacrifice of a large fraction of their population to compensate for their economic inferiority over the Nazi Empire plus some marginal help from other Allied countries like the US, the UK, Brazil and Polish resistance fighters.

As an aside, my post was not just about combat forces, but also about production, military and civilian.

If German soldiers were vastly more effective than Allied soldiers that implies that they were well equipped and supplied. Therefore, "production" was not a problem. If German munitions production were higher than historically it wouldn't have altered anything. The binding constraint was manpower and not munitions or capital goods. This is proven that in 1944, despite massive increases in output of fighters, the Luftwaffe did not manage to increase it's capability for executing sorties. The reason is that they lacked pilots and fuel to operate additional fighters. Lack of oil was the fundamental constraint for Germany not building up a larger air force.

The historical fact is that 80 million ethnic Germans declared war on pretty much the entire rest of the world, a world whose population was 2.2 billion. Eventually they would be defeated. What's interesting is why it took so long for the Allies to win and not that they were defeated.

If the Allies were competent they would have defeated Germany in 1939: the German army attacks Poland and then France and UK attack Western border of Germany, defeat the tiny and badly trained force in there, occupy Germany, remove Hitler from power. Instead, the Allies managed to do incredibly badly in WW2: they did nothing to save Poland, instead awaited for the German army to train and equip itself for the May 1940 offensive, managed to lose France, Belgium and the Netherlands, plus 7.5 million men they had in continental Europe, while evacuating .3 million men to the UK (of which a substantial fraction was delivered back to France and surrendered to the Germans). Then they manage to lose about 21 million tons of ships to U-Boats and other peripheral German forces before taking control of the Atlantic ocean, while the US spends 1.9 times their pre-war GDP on the military (which is about 5 times the German pre-war GDP) while the Soviet Union has to sacrifice about 15% of it's population to drive the German army back to Berlin.

Overall, in WW2 the Allies had to conscript 70 million soldiers to defeat a country whose population in 1937 was 68 million over a 6 year long war, while spending the equivalent of 10 years of the German pre-war GDP to do so. :roll:

We ended up with a war involving 80 million ethnic Germans fighting the 450 million strong populations of USSR, US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand plus their manpower from India and Brazil. The fact that the Germans were far more effective than the Allies explain why the war lasted so long since they should have been defeated in 1939 if the Allies were minimally competent.

One could make that same claim in reverse. If the Germans were the super-warriors you make them out to be why didn't they defeat Russia in the two years they were the only land opponent on the continent?

I see you cannot grasp the concept of numerical superiority or any other factors: strategic decision making, weather, logistical difficulties involving vast continental operations, etc, besides tactical effectiveness. Well, your post is nothing more than an ethnocentric based provocation.

[Guaporense]

Don't try to make him think through that chain of logic...his head might explode.

According to the forum rules:

app.php/rules

The first rule of the forum is: "No insults are tolerated (that includes serious national and religious insults)." Personal remarks in posts are strongly discouraged, and personal insults are forbidden here.

So, isn't that an insult? How is this tolerated in violation of forum rules?

And again here:

..his head might explode.

I think it already has. The recent Photobucket ransom demand has destroyed all his old posts..................


viewtopic.php?p=2028498#p2028498

This behavior is in obvious violation of forum rules.

[Stiltzkin]

So, isn't that an insult? How is this tolerated in violation of forum rules?

Double standards. Clearly.

This behavior is in obvious violation of forum rules.

They will rather ban you, for pointing it out.

why didn't they defeat Russia

Soviet Union, not Russia. Russia alone did not possess the manpower to do it. People mix this up a lot. Can be easily shown via a calculation.

[Guaporense]

So, isn't that an insult? How is this tolerated in violation of forum rules?

Double standards. Clearly.

This behavior is in obvious violation of forum rules.

They will rather ban you, for pointing it out.

[T. A. Gardner]

I like using the battle of Crecy as an example of how the QJM

Then you did not understand it well. It is more suitable for evaluations of modern battles, but in case you are wondering they are using the reworked TNDM, nonetheless it still confirms the theory.

I understand perfectly. The OLI / TLI equations are for any weapon throughout history, and Dupuy includes examples. He also runs the battle of Austerlitz in 1805, Antietam 1862, Gettysburg 1863, and the Somme Offensive of 1918 in chapter 11. So, your statement it's designed only for modern battles doesn't hold water.

Should you still be somehow not convinced, I would suggest to read v. Crevelds Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 or alternatively, confirm Dupuy's theories by utilizing Lanchester or Osipov's laws - I can assure you that the values will not differ much. Interestingly, the US Armies opinion does not contradict the established CEV.

I'm not convinced. Dupuy's system doesn't equate at all to Lanchester equations as there is no square formula (law) involved. The QJM produces linear results. The QJM also doesn't consider time, which the Lanchester equations do as they can be run as integrations. I can assure you that any reasonable operations analyst wouldn't try to run the CEV sort of results using these as they only involve firepower. Whether the US Army's opinion is similar, is irrelevant. It is an opinion, not something based on math.
Creveld in Fighting Power makes no attempt to quantify the US Army's performance vis-a-vie the Wehrmacht. He discusses it at length and reaches a series of observations without quantification.

However there is another interesting thing, namely that if we specifically look at divisional level engagements in the ETO 1944, from Christopher A. Lawrence, War by Numbers Understanding Conventional Combat , we can see that the Allies could seldomly achieve success when fighting on equal terms, a sign of a qualitative difference.
ETO44 Force Ratios.jpg

Those are interesting documents that you are sharing with us. What study are they from?

US Army Training Doctrine and Command, Soldier capability- army combat effectiveness Volume III Historical Combat Data and Analysis

Doesn't change that the QJM is basically crap. I can't speak for the TNDM model as I haven't studied it. But, starting with the OLI all the way through to the final equations, the QJM is a static, linear model that has such a wide range of variables, that if I were to give it to say 100 mathematicians, historians, etc., and ask them to run it start to finish for a particular battle I'd get 100 different results. That's basically useless in the form it is in as a model.

As an aside... If the Wehrmacht was so effective compared to their opponents, then why is there only one case of German infantry divisions on their own in the West after 1940 actually being able to beat a Western (US / British / Commonwealth) infantry division on the offensive? The Western Allies frequently used their infantry divisions to successfully attack and defeat Wehrmacht divisions of all sorts. Yet, the supposedly superior German forces had infantry divisions comprising 80%+ of their forces that were essentially completely ineffective as offensive units. Why is that?

[Stiltzkin]

He also runs the battle of Austerlitz in 1805, Antietam 1862, Gettysburg 1863, and the Somme Offensive of 1918 in chapter 11. So, your statement it's designed only for modern battles doesn't hold water.

You can do it, but as the TDI staff explicitly states, it has a certain "suitability range".

I understand perfectly. The OLI / TLI equations are for any weapon throughout history, and Dupuy includes examples

It is data fitting, it is also very input heavy, which makes it rather inconvenient. Frederic Vesters cybernetic probability matrix solves complex issues in a much more elegant way and again another verification method.

Doesn't change that the QJM is basically crap. I can't speak for the TNDM model as I haven't studied it.

I am sure you have a better model. Everything which I do not agree on = crap = logic.

I'm not convinced. Dupuy's system doesn't equate at all to Lanchester equations as there is no square formula (law) involved

2.5 with Lanchester for the Kursk Zitadelle Operation, 2.68 with Dupuy's formula. Boom. (2.64 if I adjust for defensive posture).

they only involve firepowe

They clearly involve way more than that, even up to logistics, leadership and morale...

Whether the US Army's opinion is similar, is irrelevant. I

Whatever you say, clearly the opinion of the US Army has more weight than that of various AHF members, but I agree, it is not good to base ones knowledge on anecdotal evidence.

As an aside... If the Wehrmacht was so effective compared to their opponents, then why is there only one case of German infantry divisions on their own in the West after 1940 actually being able to beat a Western (US / British / Commonwealth) infantry division on the offensive? The Western Allies frequently used their infantry divisions to successfully attack and defeat Wehrmacht divisions of all sorts. Yet, the supposedly superior German forces had infantry divisions comprising 80%+ of their forces that were essentially completely ineffective as offensive units. Why is that?

I do not understand your point here. In the 1940 campaign the majority of casualties were inflicted by IDs, the Germans had fewer losses. During 1944 the Germans did not have enough units to defend France in the first place and the WAllies only engaged a brink of the Wehrmacht, also taking a substantial amount losses, I cannot see how Allied units were supposed to be better if A) they were more numerous (look above, divisional engagements) B) They still took (on average) higher losses, while their enemy was practically beaten. This is also what quantifying methods ultimately point out in form of numbers. If faction A has the same losses as B while being outnumbered, it cannot be less effective than B, while also fighting a numerically superior enemy on a second front inflicting higher losses on faction C. Everything else would be illogical and mathematically incorrect.

[Michael Kenny]

The historical fact is that 80 million ethnic Germans declared war on pretty much the entire rest of the world, a world whose population was 2.2 billion

More pathetic excuses for failure. No military organisation has been so comprehensively beaten in the 20th Century than the German Army. Not once but twice.
Note the typical distortion of reality so common to those who believe in the fairy tale of the Uber-Soldier. The Axis is shrunk to its lowest possible numbers and the Allies inflated to 2.2 billion in order to validate this garbage.

[Guaporense]

As an aside... If the Wehrmacht was so effective compared to their opponents, then why is there only one case of German infantry divisions on their own in the West after 1940 actually being able to beat a Western (US / British / Commonwealth) infantry division on the offensive? The Western Allies frequently used their infantry divisions to successfully attack and defeat Wehrmacht divisions of all sorts. Yet, the supposedly superior German forces had infantry divisions comprising 80%+ of their forces that were essentially completely ineffective as offensive units. Why is that?

That was thanks to the "miracles" of crushing numerical superiority, logistical superiority and aerial supremacy. Usually German infantry divisions were defending against enemies with 3-4 times their numbers by that point. Adjusting for the size of the forces, Dupuy estimated that German effectiveness in the attacks they failed was 189% the effectiveness of the American and British forces in a sample of 78 engagements. NPW page 104

Why the attacks failed? Well, the strategic situation in the Western front in 1944 was completely ludicrous. The German army had already lost the war in 1943 and Hitler was a stubborn idiot who refused to see reality, hence the futility of the fighting in a front that was opened long after the war was decided.

[T. A. Gardner]

That was thanks to the "miracles" of crushing numerical superiority, logistical superiority and aerial supremacy. Usually German infantry divisions were defending against enemies with 3-4 times their numbers by that point. Adjusting for the size of the forces, Dupuy estimated that German effectiveness in the attacks they failed was 189% the effectiveness of the American and British forces in a sample of 78 engagements. NPW page 104

Why the attacks failed? Well, the strategic situation in the Western front in 1944 was completely ludicrous. The German army had already lost the war in 1943 and Hitler was a stubborn idiot who refused to see reality, hence the futility of the fighting in a front that was opened long after the war was decided.

That's pure BS. The Germans failed at Salerno even though they had numerical superiority and the Allies lacked air superiority. The Germans threw 3 panzergrenadier, 3 panzer, and a strong motorized infantry (1st Fallschirmjager) division against 3 Allied (2 British 1 US) infantry divisions and lost. The Allies held their beachhead.

At Anzio it was the same story. The Germans built up their forces to eradicate the beachhead and went nowhere. The infantry divisions involved on the German side stalled in place with heavy casualties.

German infantry formations, again and again, proved incapable of offensive action against Western Allied forces after 1940 and at the same time were usually not all that good defensively either

As has been pointed out by several authors criticizing Dupuy, his battle sample grossly over represents panzer and panzergrenadier formations. These comprised no more than 20% of the Wehrmacht as a whole, yet are overwhelmingly the formations in the sample. Try running his system using the typical VG or infantry divisions of 1943 or 44 in them.

Even when the Germans managed to get some degree of numerical superiority, they lost. Look at the Ardennes. It took the entirety of 5th Panzer Army more than 72 hours to overrun a single US infantry division (the 28th) that was spread out on a frontage several times what it should have been holding.
6th SS Panzer Army against the more concentrated US forces on Eisenborn Ridge went nowhere. The various VG infantry formations were essentially useless. Their single success was against the 106th US infantry division that had been in position a whole week and never had been in combat.

Maybe I should run the QJM on Army Group Center in July 1944 when it was obliterated in a Soviet offensive...

It wasn't numbers. It was that upwards of 80% of the German Army by 1944 was composed of nearly useless units comprised of iffy troops equipped with the flotsam that Germany could scrape up to arm them with.

[Gorque]

The problem faced by Germany, vis-s-vis the Allies, was a lack of manpower not only to fight their campaigns but also to produce their weapons and provide for the general economy. A manpower multiplier was needed through standardization of industrial processes and outputs and enhanced firepower for the units in the field, e.g. earlier introduction of the infantry assault rifle, etc.

Nah, that's not going to cut it. They needed to perfect human cloning: to produce massive armies of cloned soldiers.

In terms of per soldier effectiveness they were already far better than the Allies, being about 150% as effective as British or American soldiers and 300% as effective as Soviet soldiers in inflicting casualties.

So expecting an even higher superior margin of per soldier effectiveness versus the Allies was unreasonable, the only way to change the tables would be to make the German manpower barrel bigger.

As with the other postings subsequent to your post, what sources can you refer to or what raw data can you provide that supports your argument regarding effectiveness/soldier and for what point in time are you writing about?

Point in time? The entire first half of the 20th century. From the beginning of the century to the end of the Second World War the German armed forces were the most effective military force in the world.

Sources? Pretty much everybody who knows history is aware of the higher fighting power of the German army. Good references are Van Creveld, Zetterling, Trevor N. Dupuy and Christopher A. Lawrence. Even admirers of the Red Army like Glantz characterized the German army as the most formidable fighting force of the 20th century.

But even historians dealing with non-military aspects of warfare like Harrison, Broadberry and Niall Ferguson are well aware of the German military superiority, these historians usually put the reason for Germany's defeat in both world wars as due to superiority in Allied resources.

In my opinion, superiority in economic resources explains the victory of France+UK+US over Germany in WW1. It doesn't explain the Soviet victory over Germany in WW2, since the USSR, controlling Siberia and some parts of Eastern Europe had far less economic resources than Nazi Germany who controlled most of Europe. The Soviet victory was obtained through the sacrifice of a large fraction of their population to compensate for their economic inferiority over the Nazi Empire plus some marginal help from other Allied countries like the US, the UK, Brazil and Polish resistance fighters.

My asking about a point-in-time and references was to be afforded the opportunity to debate whether or not the figures that you posted was based in fact. Point-in-time is extremely important for comparison purposes as troops with little to no combat experience going up against ones that have seen combat are naturally going to fare worse than if two similarly experinced units were to engage in combat. So once again I ask, at what point-in-time are you referring to?

In regards to your bandying the names of various authors as supposed support of your claims; specific references/quotes/tables are required here. I hope you don't expect others to read these various authors studies. The onus is upon you to produce the corroborating material; i.e. you stated it as fact, now back it up.

As an aside, my post was not just about combat forces, but also about production, military and civilian.

If German soldiers were vastly more effective than Allied soldiers that implies that they were well equipped and supplied. Therefore, "production" was not a problem. If German munitions production were higher than historically it wouldn't have altered anything. The binding constraint was manpower and not munitions or capital goods. This is proven that in 1944, despite massive increases in output of fighters, the Luftwaffe did not manage to increase it's capability for executing sorties. The reason is that they lacked pilots and fuel to operate additional fighters. Lack of oil was the fundamental constraint for Germany not building up a larger air force.

The historical fact is that 80 million ethnic Germans declared war on pretty much the entire rest of the world, a world whose population was 2.2 billion. Eventually they would be defeated. What's interesting is why it took so long for the Allies to win and not that they were defeated.

If the Allies were competent they would have defeated Germany in 1939: the German army attacks Poland and then France and UK attack Western border of Germany, defeat the tiny and badly trained force in there, occupy Germany, remove Hitler from power. Instead, the Allies managed to do incredibly badly in WW2: they did nothing to save Poland, instead awaited for the German army to train and equip itself for the May 1940 offensive, managed to lose France, Belgium and the Netherlands, plus 7.5 million men they had in continental Europe, while evacuating .3 million men to the UK (of which a substantial fraction was delivered back to France and surrendered to the Germans). Then they manage to lose about 21 million tons of ships to U-Boats and other peripheral German forces before taking control of the Atlantic ocean, while the US spends 1.9 times their pre-war GDP on the military (which is about 5 times the German pre-war GDP) while the Soviet Union has to sacrifice about 15% of it's population to drive the German army back to Berlin.

Overall, in WW2 the Allies had to conscript 70 million soldiers to defeat a country whose population in 1937 was 68 million over a 6 year long war, while spending the equivalent of 10 years of the German pre-war GDP to do so. :roll:

You state that production was not a problem and yet the vast majority of the German Army was still dependent upon horses for the movement of men and supplies. How much more efficient would the German Army have been had they been fully mechanized. Lets take a look at standardized production of vehicles and equipment in comparison to the hodge-podge of items the Heer fielded in the early years. (There's that point-in-time question that needs answering) And what about the benefits that could be gained by the standardization of production processes. How many more man-hours did it take to produce a tank as compared to the Allies? How much more firepower could the Germans have brought to bear with more equipment? Then there's agricultural output: How much more efficient would the farms have been had they had more tractors? How much more could a calorically enhanced population have produced had there been more food to consume?

BTW, you forgot to include any of Germany's allies in your comparisons.

[stg 44]

That's pure BS. The Germans failed at Salerno even though they had numerical superiority and the Allies lacked air superiority. The Germans threw 3 panzergrenadier, 3 panzer, and a strong motorized infantry (1st Fallschirmjager) division against 3 Allied (2 British 1 US) infantry divisions and lost. The Allies held their beachhead.

That's some creative accounting.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Baytown
The Germans were already engaged with the Brits before Salerno in Southern Italy with one corps.

The German para-division was already engaged with British airborne too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Slapstick

For Operation Avalanche, Panzer division was near the beachhead during the landings, split into 4 battle groups miles apart, meaning the Germans were outnumbered and moving to contact rather than in prepared positions, while the Allies had naval gunfire support.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_in ... o_landings

Major General Rudolf Sieckenius, commander of the 16th Panzer Division had organised his forces into four mixed arms battle groups which he had placed roughly 10 km (6 mi) apart and between 5 and 10 km (3 and 6 mi) back from the beaches. The Dőrnemann group was just east of Salerno (and therefore were opposite Major General John Hawkesworth's British 46th Infantry Division when it landed), the Stempel battle group was between Pontecagnano and Battipaglia (and so faced Major General Douglas Graham's British 56th Infantry Division), the Holtey battle group was in a reserve role at Persano on the Sele river which formed the corps boundary between Lieutenant General Richard McCreery's British X Corps and Major General Ernest Dawley's U.S. VI Corps, while the von Doering battle group responsible for the Albanella to Rutino sector was 6 km (4 mi) south-east of Ogliastro, somewhat south of the U.S. 36th Division's beaches.[31]


The British X Corps, composed of the British 46th and 56th Infantry Divisions and a light infantry force of U.S. Army Rangers and British Commandos of Brigadier Robert "Lucky" Laycock's 2nd Special Service Brigade, experienced mixed reactions to its landings. The U.S. Rangers met no opposition and with support from the guns of HMS Ledbury seized their mountain pass objectives while the Commandos, from No. 2 (Army) Commando and No. 41 (Royal Marine) Commando, were also unopposed and secured the high ground on each side of the road through Molina Pass on the main route from Salerno to Naples. At first light units of No. 2 Commando moved towards Salerno and pushed back a small force of tanks and armoured cars from the 16th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion.[32] The British Commandos captured the town of Salerno after some serious fighting that cost 40 (Royal Marine) Commando and 41 Commando nine killed and thirty-seven wounded.[33]

The two British infantry divisions, however, met determined resistance and had to fight their way ashore with the help of naval bombardments. The depth and intensity of German resistance forced British commanders to concentrate their forces, rather than driving for a linkup with the Americans to the south.

By the end of the first day the Fifth Army, although it had not gained all its objectives, had made a promising start: the British X Corps' two assault divisions had pushed between 8 and 11 km (5 and 7 mi) inland and the special forces had advanced north across the Sorrento Peninsula and were looking down on the Plain of Naples. To the south, the U.S. 36th Division had established itself in the plain to the right of the Sele river and the higher ground to a depth of 8 km (5 mi), although the 141st Infantry was still stuck near the beach. However, the XIV Panzer Corps commander, Hermann Balck, had seen the 16th Panzer Division's battle groups perform as intended and he had ordered both the Hermann Göring Division south to the battle and later in the day had been able to order 15th Panzergrenadier likewise. Meanwhile, to the south, the 29th Panzergrenadier Division from LXXVI Panzer Corps had also been directed to Salerno.[38] Neither side had gained the initiative.

The Allies started with major numerical superiority, facing only 1 Panzer division acting as a speed bump so that other forces could arrive.

As they did arrive, it was in dribs and drabs and were able to only launch limited attacks in a few places and faced massive Allied fire superiority. By September 16th the Allies well outnumbered the Germans, days into the invasion.

With strong naval gunfire support from the Royal Navy and well-served by Fifth Army's artillery, the reinforced and reorganized infantry units defeated all German attempts on 14 September to find a weak spot in the lines. German losses, particularly in tanks, were severe. In addition, on 14 September and the following night Tedder ordered every available aircraft to support the Fifth Army, including the strategic bomber force. Over 1,000 tons of bombs were dropped during the daylight hours of that day.[58]

The Allied bomber effort continued on 15 September, although slightly less intense than the previous day, as did the naval bombardment. The arrival of the British battleships HMS Warspite and Valiant, with 38 cm (15 in) guns off the beaches provided the Allied troops with a morale boost, although Valiant was not required to shoot and Warspite's 29 rounds fired were awe-inspiring but a minor contribution to the 2,592 naval rounds fired in total that day.[61]

Frankly your characterization of the Salerno battle is utter BS.

At Anzio it was the same story. The Germans built up their forces to eradicate the beachhead and went nowhere. The infantry divisions involved on the German side stalled in place with heavy casualties.

Again, similar situation. The only reason the Germans were defeated early as planned was the commander of the operation being too cautious and letting them recover from the surprise of the landing.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Anzio
The Allies outnumbered the Germans at all points of the battle:

Strength
Allied:
Initially: 36,000 soldiers and 2,300 vehicles
Breakout: 150,000 soldiers and 1,500 guns

German:
Initially: 20,000 German soldiers + five Italian battalions (4,600 soldiers)
Breakout: 135,000 German soldiers + two Italian battalions

And again that doesn't even factor in Allied air and naval gunfire superiority.