How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Allies

[Richard Anderson]

Dupuy estimated that German effectiveness in the attacks they failed was 189% the effectiveness of the American and British forces in a sample of 78 engagements. NPW page 104.

As usual, he says nothing of the sort, on "NPW page 104" or anywhere else. What he did say on page104, that in those cases of failed attacks by the Allies in the 78 cases from 1943-1944, the score effectiveness of the Germans versus the Allies was 1.89 to 1. However, if you actually read to the following page - instead of making things up that aren't there - you wil see that Trevor noted that score effectiveness and combat effectiveness are not one and the same and that in fact, CEV is roughly the square of the square effectivness

Please all note that while I now will await more bleating about my "insults" and the "double standards" of the moderators, the only thing I have done is point out, yet again, how this poster consistently and knowingly posts false and deceptive statements.

[Richard Anderson]

Whether the US Army's opinion is similar, is irrelevant. I

Whatever you say, clearly the opinion of the US Army has more weight than that of various AHF members, but I agree, it is not good to base ones knowledge on anecdotal evidence.

Um, sorry, but that is not "U.S. Army opinion". What you quoted is the "opinion" of Trevor Dupuy and Gay Hammerman...Soldier Capability - Army Combat Effectiveness (SCACE) was a study contracted with HERO, which was then a division of T. N. Dupuy Associates, Inc., by the U.S. Army's Soldier Support Center, which was a part of TRADOC. That is why after Trevor's introduction there is the usual disclaimer:

"The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other documentation."

Your inference that the U.S. Army's opinion coincided with that of Trevor is incorrect...much of the Army's time and effort was spent in trying to disprove Trevor's opinions, albeit without much avail.

[Richard Anderson]

That's pure BS. The Germans failed at Salerno even though they had numerical superiority and the Allies lacked air superiority. The Germans threw 3 panzergrenadier, 3 panzer, and a strong motorized infantry (1st Fallschirmjager) division against 3 Allied (2 British 1 US) infantry divisions and lost. The Allies held their beachhead.

Sorry Terry, but I have corrected you on that before I believe and I refuse to put up with reposted nonsense from you any more than I will from one of the other posters.

The Germans in fact "threw" one more or less full strength division into that fray - 16. Panzer. The rest were elements of divisions at most. For example, 1. FJD was busy conducting a delaying action against the British landings in Calabria and so contributed no more than a two-battalion KG. HG was a division in name only after its battering in Sicily, as were 15. PGD.

[Kingfish]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Anzio
The Allies outnumbered the Germans at all points of the battle:

Strength
Allied:
Initially: 36,000 soldiers and 2,300 vehicles
Breakout: 150,000 soldiers and 1,500 guns

German:
Initially: 20,000 German soldiers + five Italian battalions (4,600 soldiers)
Breakout: 135,000 German soldiers + two Italian battalions

Not at all points

From the same source:
By early February, German forces in Fourteenth Army numbered some 100,000 troops organised into two Army Corps, the 1st Parachute Corps under Schlemm and the LXXVI Panzer Corps under Lieutenant General Traugott Herr. Allied forces by this time totalled 76,400 (including the recently arrived British 56th Infantry Division, under Major-General Gerald Templer, which arrived complete on February 16)

The above disparity doesn't tell the full story, for the Germans were able to concentrate for the main attack, while the allies had to defend the entire perimeter (although some sectors were lightly held), and thus the ratio was much greater.

And again that doesn't even factor in Allied air and naval gunfire superiority.

True, but this was offset by the Germans holding excellent observation positions along the Alban hills.

[Stiltzkin]

Um, sorry, but that is not "U.S. Army opinion". What you quoted is the "opinion" of Trevor Dupuy and Gay Hammerman...Soldier Capability - Army Combat Effectiveness (SCACE) was a study contracted with HERO, which was then a division of T. N. Dupuy Associates, Inc., by the U.S. Army's Soldier Support Center, which was a part of TRADOC. That is why after Trevor's introduction there is the usual disclaimer

The point here is that it is an authorised Army document, even literally stamped. This means that this was done on their behalf. They could easily dismiss it and not publish it at all.
Nonetheless, since nobody in here is capable of providing any other method or any "contraposes", I work with what is available.

Your inference that the U.S. Army's opinion coincided with that of Trevor is incorrect...much of the Army's time and effort was spent in trying to disprove Trevor's opinions, albeit without much avail.

The paired comparisons are however.
And they certainly couldn't, so instead they realized that they had to introduce certain reforms.

[stg 44]

True, but this was offset by the Germans holding excellent observation positions along the Alban hills.

How? They had stronger defensive positions hold the line with fewer forces, but simply could not throw the superior numbers/firepower/air power of the Allied landing forces back into the sea. If anything it is a testament to their abilities that they were able to prevent a breakout and a black mark that the Allies could not break out given their advantages, especially early on when the Alban Hills were open for the taking.

That said I don't buy into the Dupuy 'calculations' about relative German to Allied solider combat ability/worth.

[Stiltzkin]

Maybe I should run the QJM on Army Group Center in July 1944 when it was obliterated in a Soviet offensive...

Threw Bagration into my equation: Range 2.34-2.46. 100 troops of Army Group Center can engage 234-246 (adjusted for posture, morale, logistics) Soviet troops and make it an even fight.
Strengths:
RKKA: 2.411.600
AGC: 849.000
Losses:
Soviet casualties 770.888
Axis casualties: 399.096

CEV is roughly the square of the CEV.

That makes little sense. One could argue that skill and efficiency are two different things. The CEV is based on the casualty infliction potential of a group, the SQRT of this efficiency is the effectiveness relative value of that engagement (score effectiveness can be tied to several individual units).

CEVgermanvsallied.jpg (47.93 KiB) Viewed 567 times

Units (here featuring the Italian campaign) can be in a similar range, despite the overall values being more dispersed. The 88th did really well (one of the major reasons for this was leadership).
A general misconception is that people assume that 1 soldier will be the equivalent of : X,X amount of soldiers which is false (to assess this type of combat it would make the model very complicated and more stochastic), but rather at least 100 units : XXX amount of units and it also does not mean that the respective unit can dig it out in the long run, especially not if the (unfavourable) force ratio is kept up. Reinforcements and battle termination of course need to be included. It is generally better to split engagements into several parts and make a more thorough analysis, but I have noticed that the values do not change much. The defensive posture modifier fluctuates around 1.396 but it is usually higher for the force that will also sustain lower losses independent of their stance, despite defense being the stronger form of combat.

Also one point, accusing Dupuy of any bias: He was surprised about his findings and never really used this as a form of criticism regarding the performance of the US Army in the ETO. War is as scientific as it is an art. Battles can be predicted and quantified.

[Richard Anderson]

The point here is that it is an authorised Army document, even literally stamped. This means that this was done on their behalf. They could easily dismiss it and not publish it at all.

I'm sorry, but you quite literally, and obviously, have no idea what you are talking about. You have never engaged in contracting with the U.S. Army or any other DOD agency, Try reading the disclaimer again...it is emphatically NOT an "authorised" or authorized U.S. Army document. If it was so, then there would be no disclaimer statement. It was produced to a U.S. Army Soldier Support Center RFP and SOW, so was of course "done on their behalf" because they PAID for it. However, no, under U.S. DOD contracting it is unlikely that they could either "easily dismiss it" or "not publish it at all"...it was bought and paid for - it was the product for which the Government paid good coin of the realm for.

Nonetheless, since nobody in here is capable of providing any other method or any "contraposes", I work with what is available.

I have absolutely no idea what you imagine you are saying there, so I have no response.

The paired comparisons are however.

Are what? If you would care to complete the sentence in a legible form, then I might be able to respond. However, since again I have no idea what you might be saying, I cannot.

And they certainly couldn't, so instead they realized that they had to introduce certain reforms.

"They" couldn't what? Again, it is difficult to fathom what you think you might be saying. And who is "they"? The U.S. Army? Do you imagine the U.S. Army introduced "certain reforms" because of Trevor's work? Seriously? :roll: Please provide some details of when and where and who funded those "reforms"...I assure you, I am all ears and eagerly awaiting the fruits of your research into the "reforms" instituted by the U.S. Army because of the HERO/DMSi/TNDA/TDI studies produced 1970-2008...especially since I was rather closely involved during the last 22 years of that period and have difficulty recalling them myself for some odd reason. :roll:

[Richard Anderson]

CEV is roughly the square of the CEV.

That makes little sense.

My fault for typing hastily and late...but you might have realized if you ever bothered to actually look at NPW. That should have been "CEV is roughly the square of score effectiveness"...as Trevor said on page 105.

[Kingfish]

How? They had stronger defensive positions hold the line with fewer forces, but simply could not throw the superior numbers/firepower/air power of the Allied landing forces back into the sea.

I'm not suggesting those positions made the task of defeating the allied beachhead any easier. My point was that the allied superiority in NGF and air power was not entirely one sided.

[stg 44]

How? They had stronger defensive positions hold the line with fewer forces, but simply could not throw the superior numbers/firepower/air power of the Allied landing forces back into the sea.

I'm not suggesting those positions made the task of defeating the allied beachhead any easier. My point was that the allied superiority in NGF and air power was not entirely one sided.

Alright, but I was responding to the false claim that the Germans outnumbered the Allies both at Salerno and Anzio and that the Allies didn't have fire or air superiority. Also in terms of the Alban Hills, that was up for grabs, the Germans acted quicker despite being surprised, while the Allies dallied early on when they had the initiative, to their cost.

[jesk]

In Italy there were decisive events of World War II. Albert Kesselring without coordination with the Supreme command has handed over on May 2, 1945 group of armies in Italy. After that the new leadership of Germany has refused continuation of war and capitulated.

[Kingfish]

Alright, but I was responding to the false claim that the Germans outnumbered the Allies both at Salerno and Anzio and that the Allies didn't have fire or air superiority.

The link you provided shows its not a false claim.

Also in terms of the Alban Hills, that was up for grabs, the Germans acted quicker despite being surprised, while the Allies dallied early on when they had the initiative, to their cost.

The capture of the Alban hills is still a hotly debated topic. Few people dispute that Lucas could have pushed to route 6 early on, but if he should have is another matter altogether.

[stg 44]

The link you provided shows its not a false claim.

We must have different eyes then. Quote what you claim proves that from the link.

The capture of the Alban hills is still a hotly debated topic. Few people dispute that Lucas could have pushed to route 6 early on, but if he should have is another matter altogether.

I'm not saying pushing to Rome, but at least the Alban Hills+ plus a river defense line to put the Germans on the defensive, secure a perimeter against counterattacks with the high ground, and also cut supply lines to 10th army.

[Kingfish]

We must have different eyes then. Quote what you claim proves that from the link.

Sure, this is the first sentence in the section titled "German counterattacks" from your Anzio link:

By early February, German forces in Fourteenth Army numbered some 100,000 troops organised into two Army Corps, the 1st Parachute Corps under Schlemm and the LXXVI Panzer Corps under Lieutenant General Traugott Herr. Allied forces by this time totalled 76,400 (including the recently arrived British 56th Infantry Division, under Major-General Gerald Templer, which arrived complete on February 16)[

I'm not saying pushing to Rome, but at least the Alban Hills+ plus a river defense line to put the Germans on the defensive, secure a perimeter against counterattacks with the high ground, and also cut supply lines to 10th army.

I never mentioned Rome.

Again, this is a hot topic and one that has been debated on this forum.
I'd be more than happy to discuss it but prefer to do so in the appropriate thread.