What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 23 Dec 2019 18:58

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
23 Dec 2019 18:42
Richard Anderson wrote:
22 Dec 2019 03:24
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
22 Dec 2019 01:54
pugsville wrote:
20 Dec 2019 11:16
... I;'m interesting in logistics generally so I'll dig aorund and see what i can turn up maybe CARL might have some papers of France 1944 logistics.
You'd want Ruppenthals 'Logistics in Overlord' For your primer, tho it covers just the US Army/AAF/Service Forces. But, it will serve you as a good basis for getting into the weeds as we used to say in the Old Corps. It does make clear the basis for planning for the Commonwealth-21Army Group, but lacks information on the post invasion execution for 21AG. Theres some other histories that serve for 21 Army Group if you want a complete primer. But I'll leave others with more complete knowledge to recommend those.
Sorry Carl, but that is utter nonsense. Don't you know "logistics" is one of the watchwords of anti-wehrabooism? Along with "economics" and "war of attrition". And since they are usually uttered by folks with no economic training and not the slightest idea of logistics, then that means you have no idea what you are talking about...and neither does Ruppenthal, Leighton, Smith, Fairchild and Grossman, Hancock and Gowing, Postan, and et al, nor the anonymous authors of Administrative History of 21 Army Group. :lol: :lol: :lol:
You are right, & I keep trying to cite complete sources rather than cherry picking factoids. I'm just completely out of sync here.
Yeah listing books on a broad topic is a great method of substantiating one's points and not just an avoidance of analysis and independent thought. Given that, someone should revise the rules:
This requirement applies to each specific claim. In the past, some posters have attempted to evade the proof requirement by resort to the following tactics, none of which are acceptable here:

A general reference to a website, or a book without page references; citations or links to racist websites; generalized citations to book reviews; and citations to unsourced, secondary articles or opinions.

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Hopefully they're changed before your posts are deleted.
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Dec 2019 19:18

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
23 Dec 2019 18:42
Richard Anderson wrote:
22 Dec 2019 03:24
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
22 Dec 2019 01:54
pugsville wrote:
20 Dec 2019 11:16
... I;'m interesting in logistics generally so I'll dig aorund and see what i can turn up maybe CARL might have some papers of France 1944 logistics.
You'd want Ruppenthals 'Logistics in Overlord' For your primer, tho it covers just the US Army/AAF/Service Forces. But, it will serve you as a good basis for getting into the weeds as we used to say in the Old Corps. It does make clear the basis for planning for the Commonwealth-21Army Group, but lacks information on the post invasion execution for 21AG. Theres some other histories that serve for 21 Army Group if you want a complete primer. But I'll leave others with more complete knowledge to recommend those.
Sorry Carl, but that is utter nonsense. Don't you know "logistics" is one of the watchwords of anti-wehrabooism? Along with "economics" and "war of attrition". And since they are usually uttered by folks with no economic training and not the slightest idea of logistics, then that means you have no idea what you are talking about...and neither does Ruppenthal, Leighton, Smith, Fairchild and Grossman, Hancock and Gowing, Postan, and et al, nor the anonymous authors of Administrative History of 21 Army Group. :lol: :lol: :lol:
You are right, & I keep trying to cite complete sources rather than cherry picking factoids. I'm just completely out of sync here.
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by glenn239 » 23 Dec 2019 19:56

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
22 Dec 2019 07:59
Wow I almost missed this. Richard and I claim to have each other on ignore but every now and then I'll check to see what he's up to and - whadyaknow? - it's a passive-aggressive dig. Merry Christmas to you as well, Richard!
I'd mentioned to Richard that I thought with a high priority program the Germans and Italians could have built something in the order of 100-200 Siebel ferries and MFP's per month. Richard strongly disagrees with this total, citing real war production rates which (in my opinion) were artificially low due to low priority in the cue due to Barbarossa. What's your take on possible Siebel and MFP production in the Axis Powers by May 1941 assuming that the Axis are going all out on both programs, very high production priority? (I'd picked 200 a month because I thought the 40,000 tons of steel and number of engines about feasible for a major effort).

(BTW, I think that 200 MFP's based at Malta and operating to Benghazi should be able to deliver about 80,000 tons of supply per month, either in port or over the beach at destination).

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 23 Dec 2019 20:09

Glenn239 wrote:What's your take on possible Siebel and MFP production in the Axis Powers by May 1941 assuming that the Axis are going all out on both programs, very high production priority? (I'd picked 200 a month because I thought the 40,000 tons of steel and number of engines about feasible for a major effort)
Don't know enough to ballpark it but certainly far higher than OTL. As I said upthread (or maybe elsewhere?), Germany established an MFP factory on the Danube in September 41 that supplied vessels for Black Sea ops as early as May 42. This shows that investment in MFP production could be rapidly responsive to perceived strategic needs. For the Siebels it's even easier, as they can be assembled from parts produced anywhere with rail access.

I'd have to know something like the man-hours and costs (which captures subcontractor man-hours somewhat) to know the drain on German resources for, say, 1,000 more MFP's. Any references?

FWIW you're 100% correct that Germany could have had more MFP's and Richard is 100% wrong but there's no point in arguing the point with him. He'll want to know the dates of birth and eye color of the proposed additional MFP workforce as a condition of recognizing any plan as feasible.
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by glenn239 » 23 Dec 2019 20:56

Richard Anderson wrote:
22 Dec 2019 14:27
So ABDA is a great example of how to get excellent results from hastily forming a joint and combined headquarters? :lol: :lol: :lol:
ABDA is a good example of how four fleets could be thrown together and still operate with effectiveness. Not sure that getting gutted by Long Lance torpedoes at Java Sea was because of command issues - the USN managed to lose a few battles itself by way of this weapon. If the Italian and German fleets had undertaken combined operations, problems with command and training would no doubt be evident. But the two fleets were manned by well trained crews with decent equipment and doctrine, and the ABDA experience suggests they could have undertaken combat ops with some expectation of success.
Access to ports in Iberia do not facilitate a campaign directed against the principal SLOC in the Atlantic Halifax-Liverpool. Nor do I suspect there was anything near the Bunker C in Iberia required for fleet operations, especially by fuel-hungry military vessels.
Geography is a fundamental, a pre-requisite to naval strategy. Without a central position in Spain the Axis fleets could neither unify nor operate in various theatres with the advantage of internal lines of communication. Conversely, with Gibraltar in British hands the British strategic problem was greatly simplified and the Western Med was opened to the Anglo-Americans for counter offensive operations. Hitler's decision not to take Gibraltar is consistent with just about everything in his treatment of the British; the problem would somehow take care of itself if he took no risks and did nothing in the West.
At best, it gives a few more ports for the few German commerce raiders to work out of, but commerce raiding was a dead-end.
Commerce raiding as practised briefly by the German navy in 1940 was not going to win the war. Combined arms operations, (surface, air, subsurface) was a different and considerably more serious matter because the principle of combined arms is that the combination in operations of unlike weapons systems is synergetic, producing an outcome more than the sum of the parts.
BTW, sorry for the late replies, I am still catching up after being on holiday and out of contact for a while.

Thanks for the info estimate on the LST's.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by pugsville » 24 Dec 2019 00:27

glenn239 wrote:
23 Dec 2019 19:56
(BTW, I think that 200 MFP's based at Malta and operating to Benghazi should be able to deliver about 80,000 tons of supply per month, either in port or over the beach at destination).
Why Malta how is every thing getting to Malta? Distance to Benghazi is 660 Km straight line, round trip 1320 pretty close to max range of a MFP.
Tranto to Benghazi is 1350 km.

Te Round trip from an Italian port is greater the MFP maximum range

You are going to be reducing the load to carry enough fuel for the return trip,. Which will take around 10 days plus loading and unloading times at both ends. Say 14 days. two trips a month. you would be lucky to move 40,000.with 200 MFP.

How more trucks do you need at the other end to move another 40,000 and how long does it take to ship them to North Africa.

10,000 tons a month over 300 miles is 1200 trucks. 40,000 4800 trucks, but serviceability in North Africa you would need 6,000 trucks at least.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by ljadw » 24 Dec 2019 09:00

Does anyone know what was the loading/unloading/storage capacity of the port of La Valletta ?
Talking about 80000 tons per month that could arrive at LaValletta, unloaded, storaged,loaded ,without having any informations about the port ,is not serious .
If La Valletta was used by the Axis,much more than the 80000 of the MFP would need to transit through La Valletta : think on the supplies needed for the MFPs to operate .

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Dec 2019 21:06

glenn239 wrote:
23 Dec 2019 20:56
ABDA is a good example of how four fleets could be thrown together and still operate with effectiveness. Not sure that getting gutted by Long Lance torpedoes at Java Sea was because of command issues - the USN managed to lose a few battles itself by way of this weapon. If the Italian and German fleets had undertaken combined operations, problems with command and training would no doubt be evident. But the two fleets were manned by well trained crews with decent equipment and doctrine, and the ABDA experience suggests they could have undertaken combat ops with some expectation of success.
Nope. ABDA is a good example of a jury-rigged command structure ending in misfortune. Unfortunately your characterization of Java Sea is as faulty as that of the Bat of St Malo engagements. Doorman's "fleet" was not gutted by Long Lance, 3 hit out of 152 fired in the course of seven hours. Between 1633 and 1652, 39 were launched at ranges from 13,000 to 15,000 yards. One hit Kortenaer at 1713. Between 1748 and 1807, 92 more were fired at ranges from 6,500 to 18,500 yards, and all missed. Four were fired at 1933 at 16,000 yards and all missed. Between 2322-2323, 12 were launched at 14,000 yards. One hit De Ruyter and one hit Java.

Meanwhile, Exeter was disabled at 1708 by a fluke 20.3cm hit from Nachi. Electra was disabled and eventually sunk by two 12.7cm hits from Asagumo at 1800. Finally, Jupiter suffered an own goal sinking after hitting a Dutch mine.

Much of what happened was due to Doorman having ineffective control of his forces and his single-minded determination to attack the Japanese transports despite everything, not by some magical capability inherent to the Long Lance.
Geography is a fundamental, a pre-requisite to naval strategy. Without a central position in Spain the Axis fleets could neither unify nor operate in various theatres with the advantage of internal lines of communication. Conversely, with Gibraltar in British hands the British strategic problem was greatly simplified and the Western Med was opened to the Anglo-Americans for counter offensive operations. Hitler's decision not to take Gibraltar is consistent with just about everything in his treatment of the British; the problem would somehow take care of itself if he took no risks and did nothing in the West.
The "opening" was not taken advantage of for two and half years, so I am not clear just how Gibraltar was critical. It was important yes, but so was Malta and Alexandria and control of the Suez Canal even more so.
Commerce raiding as practised briefly by the German navy in 1940 was not going to win the war. Combined arms operations, (surface, air, subsurface) was a different and considerably more serious matter because the principle of combined arms is that the combination in operations of unlike weapons systems is synergetic, producing an outcome more than the sum of the parts.
The German vessels were only useful as commerce raiders, while the Italian ones had no use as raiders and little more use in fleet actions in the Med, which is what they were intended and designed for. Throwing together mismatched vessels does not create a "fleet" in the tactical, operational, and strategic sense.
Thanks for the info estimate on the LST's.
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Dec 2019 21:25

pugsville wrote:
24 Dec 2019 00:27
Why Malta how is every thing getting to Malta? Distance to Benghazi is 660 Km straight line, round trip 1320 pretty close to max range of a MFP.
Tranto to Benghazi is 1350 km.

Te Round trip from an Italian port is greater the MFP maximum range
To be fair, Malta to Benghazi is roughly 360 nautical miles, well within the economical range of the MFP-A, B, and C at 1,340 and the D at 1,120. Catania too is just over 400 nautical miles.
You are going to be reducing the load to carry enough fuel for the return trip,. Which will take around 10 days plus loading and unloading times at both ends. Say 14 days. two trips a month. you would be lucky to move 40,000.with 200 MFP.
They could probably squeeze in a round trip from Sicily/Malta with the fuel on board. At 7 knots economical cruising call it a 115 hour round trip, plus loading and unloading time. Loading at the Italian end isn't a huge problem unless the Mafia gets involved, but the Africa end was always a problem. Port clearance again. A week round trip is probably the best expected, but will drop off as maintenance issues start cropping up from the continuous use.
How more trucks do you need at the other end to move another 40,000 and how long does it take to ship them to North Africa.

10,000 tons a month over 300 miles is 1200 trucks. 40,000 4800 trucks, but serviceability in North Africa you would need 6,000 trucks at least.
Probably, but then I suspect they will be conjured up by the magic of "prioritization" just like the production of 200 MFP per month. :lol:
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by pugsville » 24 Dec 2019 22:41

Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Dec 2019 21:25
They could probably squeeze in a round trip from Sicily/Malta with the fuel on board. At 7 knots economical cruising call it a 115 hour round trip, plus loading and unloading time. Loading at the Italian end isn't a huge problem unless the Mafia gets involved, but the Africa end was always a problem. Port clearance again. A week round trip is probably the best expected, but will drop off as maintenance issues start cropping up from the continuous use.
Thr Speed and range /distance may well be based om being Empty. It would be stnage to go form quoting empty speeds to full speeds/

https://www.naval-encyclopedia.com/cate ... ps/page/8/
"The three engines gave 390HP for 8 to 10.5 knots (empty) but allowed for a much larger range of 1340nm at 7kn"

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by Richard Anderson » 25 Dec 2019 04:50

pugsville wrote:
24 Dec 2019 22:41
Thr Speed and range /distance may well be based om being Empty. It would be stnage to go form quoting empty speeds to full speeds/

https://www.naval-encyclopedia.com/cate ... ps/page/8/
"The three engines gave 390HP for 8 to 10.5 knots (empty) but allowed for a much larger range of 1340nm at 7kn"
I am not so sure. Cargo increases draft, which affects speed, fuel consumption, and range, but the "empty", i.e. standard displacement of the MFP A, B, C, C2, and C2A were all 155 tonnes, while the full displacement was 220. The AFP D1 and D2 full displacement (due to the armor and guns) was 440, reducing range to 430 nautical miles at 9 knots. The 390 HP also did not yield speeds of 8 to 10.5 knots, but rather the design speed of MFP A, B, C, C2. and C2A were all 10.5 knots, except for F100A, 103A, 106A, 108A, and 113A, which used the Deutz diesel and BMW petrol engine combo to achieve 12.1 knots. It was the MFP DM minelayer that was only able to achieve 8 knots, due to reduced horsepower (375), greater standard full load displacement (215 and 256 tonnes) and greater length and breadth (which reduced full load draft).
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by pugsville » 25 Dec 2019 10:55

Richard Anderson wrote:
25 Dec 2019 04:50
pugsville wrote:
24 Dec 2019 22:41
Thr Speed and range /distance may well be based om being Empty. It would be stnage to go form quoting empty speeds to full speeds/

https://www.naval-encyclopedia.com/cate ... ps/page/8/
"The three engines gave 390HP for 8 to 10.5 knots (empty) but allowed for a much larger range of 1340nm at 7kn"
I am not so sure. Cargo increases draft, which affects speed, fuel consumption, and range, but the "empty", i.e. standard displacement of the MFP A, B, C, C2, and C2A were all 155 tonnes, while the full displacement was 220. The AFP D1 and D2 full displacement (due to the armor and guns) was 440, reducing range to 430 nautical miles at 9 knots. The 390 HP also did not yield speeds of 8 to 10.5 knots, but rather the design speed of MFP A, B, C, C2. and C2A were all 10.5 knots, except for F100A, 103A, 106A, 108A, and 113A, which used the Deutz diesel and BMW petrol engine combo to achieve 12.1 knots. It was the MFP DM minelayer that was only able to achieve 8 knots, due to reduced horsepower (375), greater standard full load displacement (215 and 256 tonnes) and greater length and breadth (which reduced full load draft).
since we talking a crash program pretty much aimed at North Africa why not the Kriegtansporter rather than the MFP?

https://rommelsriposte.com/2014/12/20/t ... programme/

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by Richard Anderson » 25 Dec 2019 14:55

pugsville wrote:
25 Dec 2019 10:55
since we talking a crash program pretty much aimed at North Africa why not the Kriegtansporter rather than the MFP?

https://rommelsriposte.com/2014/12/20/t ... programme/
Sure...except read the article. It was a reaction to events in 1941. How does a "crash program" start in 1940 or 1939 or whenever as a reaction to events in 1941? It is the fundamental failure in reasoning of all these type of what ifs. None can ever give a reasonable explanation for why a government or military would take actions impelled upon them in wartime before those actions occur. The best explanation I've heard so far in about 20 years or participating in these wingdings is "they'll think harder" or make prewar "strategic net assessments". :lol: :lol: :lol:
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by glenn239 » 27 Dec 2019 17:12

pugsville wrote:
24 Dec 2019 00:27
Why Malta how is every thing getting to Malta? Distance to Benghazi is 660 Km straight line, round trip 1320 pretty close to max range of a MFP.
Tranto to Benghazi is 1350 km.
I don't know what Axis logistic contingencies would be for a war scenario that never happened. But, if using lighter transport such as Siebel or MFP in open-sea scenarios, it seems logical that the nodes would be as short as possible, meaning that Malta stands out as an MFP/Siebel basing possibility.
You are going to be reducing the load to carry enough fuel for the return trip,. Which will take around 10 days plus loading and unloading times at both ends. Say 14 days. two trips a month. you would be lucky to move 40,000.with 200 MFP.
I didn't estimate on the basis of Italy to Benghazi, but if I had, 40,000 tons per month to Libya for 200 MFP's sounds reasonable. That's why I focused on Crete and Malta, since the former exploits the Salonika rail line to Germany and Crete's proximity to North Africa, while the latter was a deep water port that could act as the transition point for cargoes originating from, say, Trieste or Toulon.
How more trucks do you need at the other end to move another 40,000 and how long does it take to ship them to North Africa.
How many trucks are required is part of an overall logistics calculation in which trucks are but one factor. The other factors being coastal shipping, air transport, and rail transport.
10,000 tons a month over 300 miles is 1200 trucks. 40,000 4800 trucks, but serviceability in North Africa you would need 6,000 trucks at least.
6,000 looks too low to me, quite frankly. I'd be thinking more like 10,000 to 15,000 just as a gut hunch. With Barbarossa, not enough trucks. Without Barbarossa, plenty of trucks available, but - they still have to be shipped to North Africa and filled with gas!

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Post by glenn239 » 27 Dec 2019 17:31

Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Dec 2019 21:06
Nope. ABDA is a good example of a jury-rigged command structure ending in misfortune. Unfortunately your characterization of Java Sea is as faulty as that of the Bat of St Malo engagements. Doorman's "fleet" was not gutted by Long Lance
The ABDA command did as well as could be expected under the circumstances. Had its force structure been a unified command, (ie, all RN or all USN), the outcome would have been about the same.
The "opening" was not taken advantage of for two and half years, so I am not clear just how Gibraltar was critical. It was important yes, but so was Malta and Alexandria and control of the Suez Canal even more so.
The idea being that Torch was the precursor to Italy being knocked from the war, and that Torch was not possible without Gibraltar in British hands. The fact that it took until late 1942 to exploit Hitler's error of 1940 does not excuse the fact that Hitler in 1940 made the error of leaving the door open for the defeat of Italy. (Had the Allies been limited to just Egypt for an advance, it is questionable they even get to Tripoli in 1943).

The German vessels were only useful as commerce raiders, while the Italian ones had no use as raiders and little more use in fleet actions in the Med, which is what they were intended and designed for. Throwing together mismatched vessels does not create a "fleet" in the tactical, operational, and strategic sense.
The reason why combined arms warfare at sea is synergistic is that the strengths and weaknesses of different weapons systems complimented each other, allowing for results beyond the sum of each in isolation. More specifically, the deployment of Italian battleships and cruisers with German battleships and cruisers in Iberia would allow Axis surface forces to break up British convoys, which then could be destroyed in large numbers by U-boats and aircraft - both of which were more effective against ships sailing alone rather than in convoys. The largest effect of Italian forces in the Battle of the Atlantic might actually be in the air in terms of recce, not in the operation of surface forces. The Italian air forces were more attuned than Goering's Luftwaffe to the needs of joint cooperation with naval forces. (Hitler's tolerance of Goering's unbelievable attitudes towards the Battle of the Atlantic is yet another in a long list of reasons why Hitler had risen to the level of his incompetence with the defeat of France in June 1940).

The anti-dote on the British side seems their advantage in aircraft carriers, also, long range 4-engine bombers; preservation of the carriers and threat of 4-engine bomber attack would to some extent deter roaming surface groups which in turn would prevent ,more convoys from needing to scatter.

Sure, Happy Christmas!
You as well!

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