What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
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Michael Kenny
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1051

Post by Michael Kenny » 26 Mar 2020, 20:29

glenn239 wrote:
26 Mar 2020, 20:13
German army was about 180 division at the time of Barbarossa is my understanding (from memory 120 in the east, maybe 40 in France, 20 elsewhere). The Italian I think peaked around 80 or 90.
Compare a 1944 Panzer Division to an Allied Armoured Division and see the difference in equipment.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1052

Post by Michael Kenny » 26 Mar 2020, 20:33

glenn239 wrote:
26 Mar 2020, 20:27
It's American firepower in the air that will win the war.
That is what Spatz and Harris believed. Boots on the ground win wars.


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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1053

Post by ljadw » 26 Mar 2020, 20:39

glenn239 wrote:
26 Mar 2020, 18:39
ljadw wrote:
26 Mar 2020, 10:09
Where would the Germans get these 200 divisions ? These 200 divisions existed BECAUSE of Barbarossa, without Barbarossa, they would not exist and Germany would still have 150 divisions, not more.
Without the Eastern Front the German requirement might sketch out to be something like this -

Poland/Rumania - 20 divisions
Norway - 30 divisions
Reserve - 20 divisions
France - 100 divisions
Spain - 20 divisions
Africa/Middle East - 20 divisions.

The Italians might be something like this -

Italy - 20 divisions
Africa/Middle East - 10 divisions
Spain - 10 divisions
France - 20 divisions
Balkans - 20 divisions

Total of 210 German and 80 Italian divisions. So figure somewhere around 300 divisions required for the Axis.

German tank and assault gun production to 1944 was -

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_ar ... rld_War_II

So the real question is not the number of divisions, but how many of those 300 divisions would be armored and mechanized because the Eastern Front was not causing massive attrition amongst German vehicles? Maybe 70 with a strong reserve? For the purpose of a general discussion, what point is there for anyone to say that the Allies could land in France in 1944 or 1945 with no Eastern Front? Why not just concede the point? The Allies could consider a push into the Med and/or landings in Norway. But France? Not a chance before 1946, IMO.
No : the Allies were not obliged to win the BoA : the Germans were obliged to do it ,and the day BEFORE PH, the Germans had still not won the BoA : on that day , Britain had gained MORE GRT than it had lost to U Boats . This was the result of the BoA ,after more than 2 years .
With Gibraltar and no war in Russia, the Axis should be competitive in the BoA into the start of 1944, but at that point, American industrial power is going to become increasingly overwhelming and the battle is won. But, the war itself would continue into 1946 at least, meaning that the BoA would continue into 1946. Now, as it happens, in the BoA circa 1945 the KM was making a bit of a comeback based on the introduction of new weapons and submarines. Not enough to overcome massive US industrial output, of course, but probably enough to swing the pendulum operationally back towards the KM to some degree.
The Allies could continue the war when the U Boats attacked the convoys . The presence of the U Boats did not mean that the Allies were losing .
Right, insofar as "Allies" meant the Americans and the British combined and we're talking after 1942.
Gibraltar was irrelevant for he BoA : if you would look at a map, you would see that Gibraltar is farther away from the convoy routes than St Nazaire and Lorient .
About the ''Allies '' : it was already so before PH : the U Boats lost the fighting against the RN,thus they would also lose the fighting against the RN=+US Navy .
Why do you think the Germans started Paukenschlacht ? Simply ,because they had lost the battle of the Atlantic already and because Hitler wanted some sinkings for propaganda aims.
And ,you know what was the result of Paukenschlacht ? An other failure : Paukenschlacht did not prevent the convoys to continue to go from NY to Liverpool and to return from Liverpool to NY .
And, the comeback of the KM in 1945 is a myth : the new submarines failed, as the old models .
Besides : Barbarossa had no influence on the production of U Boats : less tanks does not mean more U Boats : the construction of a U Boat took a year (the training of its crew ? ) ,besides the biggest part of the U Boats failed to sink even ONE merchant vessel .
The Germans knew where the convoys started and where they were going . Thus they had to attack them when they left NY,when they sailed to Liverpool,when they arrived at Liverpool,and the opposite .
They attacked during almost 6 years .
They failed in 1939, in 1940, in 1941,in 1942,in 1943, in 1944, in 1945 .
They had more U Boats in 1941, but failed, in 1942 ,but failed, in 1943,but failed, in 1944 but failed .

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T. A. Gardner
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1054

Post by T. A. Gardner » 27 Mar 2020, 02:13

glenn239 wrote:
26 Mar 2020, 18:39
With Gibraltar and no war in Russia, the Axis should be competitive in the BoA into the start of 1944, but at that point, American industrial power is going to become increasingly overwhelming and the battle is won. But, the war itself would continue into 1946 at least, meaning that the BoA would continue into 1946. Now, as it happens, in the BoA circa 1945 the KM was making a bit of a comeback based on the introduction of new weapons and submarines. Not enough to overcome massive US industrial output, of course, but probably enough to swing the pendulum operationally back towards the KM to some degree.
The problem for the Germans is one of production here too. They aren't going to be able to ramp up U-boat production by much, if any, as there are bottlenecks in components. The largest one is batteries.

https://uboat.net/technical/batteries.htm

Worse, a Type XXI takes way more batteries than previous boats do so you can't build as many in a given time period as you could previous designs.

Gibraltar really makes no difference, particularly if the Allies hold the African side of the straight. Then Gibraltar becomes just a great target for bombing and the straight becomes contested with neither side really able to use it.

In the Atlantic, the problem for the Allies is getting air coverage over most or all of the ocean. This is why the Allies took control of the Azores and Iceland for example. Once they have the ability to patrol the oceans and sufficient aircraft to do that-- roughly by the beginning of 1944 at the latest, U-boats are going to be continually at risk while at sea.

Of course, the problem that was always present is that U-boats cannot exert sea control nor can they effectively take on a 'real' navy and defeat it. They are simply spoilers. That is their strength is in a guerre de course of commerce raiding. Once that is effectively nullified, they have little opportunity or capacity to affect enemy actions. That occurred about mid-43 historically. After that, the U-boat war was simply an attempt to continue to exert pressure on the Allies even as it was now a strategic failure.
The problem for the Germans is they have no alternative, and the Type XXI is not the technological paradigm shift necessary to regain a strategic initiative. That came with the invention of nuclear subs in the 50's, and isn't in the cards for Germany at all.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1055

Post by Politician01 » 27 Mar 2020, 13:21

By the summer of 1940 Britain was a weak Nation covering behind the ocean, screaming for the Americans to help and save them, running out of money and dependent on free deliveries of US resources and war material from 1941 onwards, unable to fight even a tiny 2-3% of the German Army.

Had Hitler then executed Raeders "Mediterranean Strategy", Britain could very well have sought peace before the end of 1941. Not even Churchill could have survived the loss of Malta/Gibraltar/Alexandria/Cairo - the entire Med - within a year.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1056

Post by ljadw » 28 Mar 2020, 10:49

Britain was not running out of money, it had enough money : it was running out of dollars and even in 1941,most of British imports were paid by pounds,because most of British imports in 1941 came from the Sterling zone, not from the dollar zone .
Besides : even in 1941 the importance of Britain's imports was less than what Britain produced herself .

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1057

Post by Politician01 » 28 Mar 2020, 11:08

ljadw wrote:
28 Mar 2020, 10:49
Britain was not running out of money, it was running out of dollars
So Britain was running out of money - thanks for confirming what I wrote.
ljadw wrote:
28 Mar 2020, 10:49
even in 1941,most of British imports were paid by pounds,because most of British imports in 1941 came from the Sterling zone, not from the dollar zone .
Source
ljadw wrote:
28 Mar 2020, 10:49
Besides : even in 1941 the importance of Britain's imports was less than what Britain produced herself .
Source

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1058

Post by ljadw » 28 Mar 2020, 12:36

Most of Britain's imports from the US in 1941 were cash and carry imports, not Lend Lease Imports .
During the war the value of LL was $ 50 billion,of which $ 31 billion for Britain .
In 1941 the value of LL was $ 600 million ( not all for Britain ) . And most of the 1941 LL was not war materials, but food .
Thus it is not so that in 1941 LL was decisive for Britain.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1059

Post by ljadw » 28 Mar 2020, 12:58

HyperWar Chapter IX P236 indicates that most British imports from the US in 1941 were Cash and Carry Imports, not LL imports

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1060

Post by ljadw » 28 Mar 2020, 13:04

It is also not correct to say that in 1941 Britain fought in NA against only a tiny part of the WM : Britain fought in NA against an Italian-German force : there were more Italians fighting in NA than Germans, and the reason why Germany fought in NA was not that it hoped that by going to the Suez Canal,Britain would give up ( the Suez Canal was secondary for Britain ) but because Hitler feared that the capture of Libya by Britain would/could result in the fall of the fascist regime .

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1061

Post by Andy H » 28 Mar 2020, 13:41

Politician01 wrote:
28 Mar 2020, 11:08

Source

Source
Hi Politician01

Its nice to see you asking for sources to back up their claims or more accurately in some cases opinions.
I look forward to seeing your sources when asked to by forum members, when your making certain assertions.

Regards

Andy H

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1062

Post by Politician01 » 28 Mar 2020, 13:58

Andy H wrote:
28 Mar 2020, 13:41
Politician01 wrote:
28 Mar 2020, 11:08

Source

Source
Hi Politician01

Its nice to see you asking for sources to back up their claims or more accurately in some cases opinions.
I look forward to seeing your sources when asked to by forum members, when your making certain assertions.

Regards

Andy H
Since I have beein doint that all the time - no Problem.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1063

Post by Politician01 » 28 Mar 2020, 14:14

ljadw wrote:
28 Mar 2020, 12:36
Most of Britain's imports from the US in 1941 were cash and carry imports, not Lend Lease Imports . During the war the value of LL was $ 50 billion,of which $ 31 billion for Britain . In 1941 the value of LL was $ 600 million ( not all for Britain ) . And most of the 1941 LL was not war materials, but food . Thus it is not so that in 1941 LL was decisive for Britain.
"So vulnerable was Britain in the summer of 1940 that secret plans were laid to sell out Ulster to Eire and the Falklands (a nice touch, this) to Argentina. As the money ran out, the British forfeited their independence and became a client state of the United States".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1940:_Myth_and_Reality

It has been shown that lend-lease aid during the period under review was marginal, even within the restricted sphere of American procurement; but marginal influences, it is worth remembering, can be economically decisive.

Lend-lease deliveries of food during this period were the largest single category; they were valued at $290 millions and represented nearly a third of the total of lend-lease aid. In volume, they amounted to approximately one million tons—about one-fifteenth of the total arrivals of food in Britain for 1941. Their qualitative value was very high. In the first quarter of 1941, British food consumption had fallen to a low level. Not much harm was done at the time because the level had been high during 1940; but, with many years of war still ahead, a great deal of harm would have been done had not American help redressed the balance.

Between the fall of France and Pearl Harbor sinkings of British ships amounted to a third or more of the total tonnage available to Britain in the summer of 1940.21 This was worse than 1917, when German submarines had come close to winning the war. There is no need to demonstrate further the British need for American shipping help. Exact calculation of the help rendered is not, however, a simple matter; even a rough calculation cannot be attempted except in the context of the shipping situation as a whole. This is the subject of the following chapter.Here it will be sufficient to emphasise one central truth. What really counted in 1941 was the assurance of a great output of American ships in the future. Without this assurance, Britain's determination to go on fighting would have been no more than a defiant gesture.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... con-9.html

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1064

Post by Politician01 » 28 Mar 2020, 14:17

ljadw wrote:
28 Mar 2020, 13:04
It is also not correct to say that in 1941 Britain fought in NA against only a tiny part of the WM
Do you just automatically say the opposite of what I say or are you really serious with this statement?

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#1065

Post by Terry Duncan » 28 Mar 2020, 14:50

Politician01 wrote:
28 Mar 2020, 14:14
"So vulnerable was Britain in the summer of 1940 that secret plans were laid to sell out Ulster to Eire and the Falklands (a nice touch, this) to Argentina. As the money ran out, the British forfeited their independence and became a client state of the United States".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1940:_Myth_and_Reality
Great to see you citing such reputable and unbiased sources!

1940: Myth and Reality (ISBN 978-0929587684) is a controversial 1990 book by Clive Ponting and published by Hamish Hamilton. It is a revisionist history of the Second World War, particularly the divergences between the rhetoric and the reality in relation to popular British narratives.


If this topic really cannot get back to a discussion of the points made in the OP then it will be locked.

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