What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

[TheMarcksPlan]

Step 1: Don't invade Russia

Step 2: put all your resources into naval/aviation.
Step 3: watch Stalin build up 500 divisions on your eastern border.
Step 4: lose your natural resources when Stalin doesn't renew trade agreements.
Step 5: watch the U.S. render Step 2 futile via the 2-Ocean Navy Act.
Step 6: choose between resource starvation and futile attack on SU with a weaker Heer vs. a much-bigger RKKA, all while the West bottles/destroys your fleet and ruins your cities.

[HistoryGeek2019]

It can't be denied that Barbarossa was a colossal strategic error by Germany. The entire plan was conditioned on the most absurdly optimistic expectations ("the enemy will simply collapse after a few weeks"), and the reality of the campaign is that Germany got bogged down in highly attritional warfare that it could not sustain while simultaneously waging war against the UK and USA.

The strategic alternative certainly wasn't ideal, but that's the hole Germany dug for itself when it invaded Poland. Throwing away millions of men and most of the country's resources on a roll of the dice simply reflects the delusional state of mind that had taken over the German military hierarchy when they failed to come to grips with their defeat in the First World War.

[pugsville]

It can't be denied that Barbarossa was a colossal strategic error by Germany. The entire plan was conditioned on the most absurdly optimistic expectations ("the enemy will simply collapse after a few weeks"), and the reality of the campaign is that Germany got bogged down in highly attritional warfare that it could not sustain while simultaneously waging war against the UK and USA.

The strategic alternative certainly wasn't ideal, but that's the hole Germany dug for itself when it invaded Poland. Throwing away millions of men and most of the country's resources on a roll of the dice simply reflects the delusional state of mind that had taken over the German military hierarchy when they failed to come to grips with their defeat in the First World War.

It's also indicative of the Nazi Germany strategic planning process and the fundamental flaws therein. The Military Hierarchy had been comprised by yes men and dictates from above. Compounded by the operational focus of the German military doctrine that tended to sideline strategy and logistics. For all the in depth study and assessment of ww1, some key weaknesses were not identified let alone addressed.

Whatever else Nazi Germany decided to do would be done with the same flawed strategic processes.

[TheMarcksPlan]

It can't be denied that Barbarossa was a colossal strategic error by Germany. The entire plan was conditioned on the most absurdly optimistic expectations ("the enemy will simply collapse after a few weeks"), and the reality of the campaign is that Germany got bogged down in highly attritional warfare that it could not sustain while simultaneously waging war against the UK and USA.

A few ways to interpret this statement:

1. Strategic error because Barbarossa was poorly executed (assumption of rapid SU collapse, failure to provide even a contingency plan)
2. Strategic error because Germany could never have beat the SU.
3. Strategic error because Germany could have beaten UK before turning to the SU.

I agree with (1) and disagree with 2/3.
I take it that Glenn239's position is 3 but maybe also 2.

To argue for 3, Glenn must believe that the SU wouldn't have been opportunistic against a Germany fully committed to building the air/naval forces necessary to beat the SU.

[JAG13]

It can't be denied that Barbarossa was a colossal strategic error by Germany. The entire plan was conditioned on the most absurdly optimistic expectations ("the enemy will simply collapse after a few weeks"), and the reality of the campaign is that Germany got bogged down in highly attritional warfare that it could not sustain while simultaneously waging war against the UK and USA.

The strategic alternative certainly wasn't ideal, but that's the hole Germany dug for itself when it invaded Poland. Throwing away millions of men and most of the country's resources on a roll of the dice simply reflects the delusional state of mind that had taken over the German military hierarchy when they failed to come to grips with their defeat in the First World War.

No, it was a sensible gamble, based on the poor show of the Winter War, constant communist purges on the Red Army and available intelligence it could be expected for the RA to crumble... which it pretty much did in the border armies, problem is the RA had a HUGE number of reserves and Stalin had no qualms about throwing them half-armed to simply die while wearing down the Germans.

The Heer did warn of its logistical limitations, the RA would have to be destroyed within 500Km of the border, the Heer could not logistically sustain operations beyond that point, the point was noted and dismissed since "they would collapse anyway".

Many RA soldiers fought to the death... and many surrendered, and they did manage to destroy the original RA but, in the end, it was the intelligence failure that did the nazis in, they simply didnt know the RA had that many trained reserves nor had they correctly assessed the SU industrial capabilities.

[TheMarcksPlan]

It's also indicative of the Nazi Germany strategic planning process and the fundamental flaws therein. The Military Hierarchy had been comprised by yes men and dictates from above. Compounded by the operational focus of the German military doctrine that tended to sideline strategy and logistics. For all the in depth study and assessment of ww1, some key weaknesses were not identified let alone addressed.

Whatever else Nazi Germany decided to do would be done with the same flawed strategic processes.

It wasn't yes-men who undercut German strategy. Soldiers like Halder were every bit as drunk on German superiority pre-Barbarossa as Hitler- more so actually.

It's hard to argue with Hitler's strategic acumen until late 1941 or so, apart from his perception of Soviet strength and endurance. There's really no explanation for how a small country came close to ruining the world, other than Hitler had some rare gifts.

[pugsville]

It's also indicative of the Nazi Germany strategic planning process and the fundamental flaws therein. The Military Hierarchy had been comprised by yes men and dictates from above. Compounded by the operational focus of the German military doctrine that tended to sideline strategy and logistics. For all the in depth study and assessment of ww1, some key weaknesses were not identified let alone addressed.

Whatever else Nazi Germany decided to do would be done with the same flawed strategic processes.

It wasn't yes-men who undercut German strategy. Soldiers like Halder were every bit as drunk on German superiority pre-Barbarossa as Hitler- more so actually.

It's hard to argue with Hitler's strategic acumen until late 1941 or so, apart from his perception of Soviet strength and endurance. There's really no explanation for how a small country came close to ruining the world, other than Hitler had some rare gifts.

Hitler had blundered into a war in 1939 that Germany was not ready to fight.. So yes his strategic acumen could be questions before 1941,

[HistoryGeek2019]

No, it was a sensible gamble, based on the poor show of the Winter War, constant communist purges on the Red Army and available intelligence it could be expected for the RA to crumble... which it pretty much did in the border armies, problem is the RA had a HUGE number of reserves and Stalin had no qualms about throwing them half-armed to simply die while wearing down the Germans.

The poor performance of the Red Army in the Winter War showed that the Red Army had some weaknesses. In no way did it show that the Red Army would simply collapse if attacked on their home soil, which they did not if you read the details of the opening border battles. None of the Soviet Fronts collapsed. The Western Front was encircled, but it continued fighting for more than a weak after it was encircled, many of its men escaped to the east to fight again, and many more hid in the forests and ambushed German supply columns. All of the Soviet Fronts exacted high causalties on the Germans from the opening battles of the war.

The Heer did warn of its logistical limitations, the RA would have to be destroyed within 500Km of the border, the Heer could not logistically sustain operations beyond that point, the point was noted and dismissed since "they would collapse anyway".

Yes, this is exactly what made Barbarossa a stupid idea, even without the benefit of hindsight. To ignore the logistical difficulties of a 3 million man invasion into the largest country by area on the planet is the very definition of stupidity.

[HistoryGeek2019]

1. Strategic error because Barbarossa was poorly executed (assumption of rapid SU collapse, failure to provide even a contingency plan)
2. Strategic error because Germany could never have beat the SU.
3. Strategic error because Germany could have beaten UK before turning to the SU.

Germany could not defeat the Soviet Union in the time needed to prepare a military capable of at least somewhat competing with the UK and USA. To bet it all on the hope that the USSR would collapse in a few weeks has to go down as the dumbest decision in history.

[HistoryGeek2019]

It's hard to argue with Hitler's strategic acumen until late 1941 or so, apart from his perception of Soviet strength and endurance. There's really no explanation for how a small country came close to ruining the world, other than Hitler had some rare gifts.

Germany never came close to ruining the world. It ruined Europe, but that's about it.

All of Hitler's success owes to him getting lucky in Fall Gelb. If the French take the defense of the Ardennes a little more seriously, or cut off the exposed panzer divisions, then Germany loses the war in the summer of 1940.

Hitler had no strategic acumen. If he had, he wouldn't have planned a war against every country in the world that was stronger than his own.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Hitler had no strategic acumen. If he had, he wouldn't have planned a war against every country in the world that was stronger than his own.

It was war against nearly all or no war at all - unacceptable to a black hole of resentment and nihilism like Hitler. If you take his preferences seriously, as I think we should, he'd probably choose his life over a long peaceful regime given the choice. In that frame it wasn't bad strategy that got him war, it was a bad personality or whatever (deeper question than we can answer here). It's sort of like with suicide bombers: you could argue it's a bad personal strategy but not if you share their extra-strategic dreangement.

[TheMarcksPlan]

All of Hitler's success owes to him getting lucky in Fall Gelb. If the French take the defense of the Ardennes a little more seriously, or cut off the exposed panzer divisions, then Germany loses the war in the summer of 1940.

This is an alibi given by many (e.g. Tooze) for the failure to stop Hitler. Yes, the Mannstein plan was brilliant and Hitler was in some sense lucky to have had Manstein (though Hitler deserves credit for elevating Manstein's plan over Halder's).

But historians rarely ask what the likely alternative was. In my view, Manstein only saved France a few more months of doomed bleeding - losses that wouldn't have materially changed the course of the war.

Look at the fundamentals of the Battle of France. Yes it's true that the Allies had rough numerical parity with the Westheer on May 10 but only if you include the Dutch and Belgians, which were never going to endure a German offensive for long. The British, meanwhile, supplied <10% of Allied ground forces.

So you have nearly a one-on-one Germany v. France after the predictable overrunning of the Low Countries.
Germany v. France was a mismatch in 1871 and 1914; it had only gotten worse since: Germany had ~twice France's population and economy in 1940.
France narrowed the deployed forces gap by calling up nearly all men age 20-45; we all know that older soldiers don't perform as well in war (and most of us who've played sports in our 30's or later can see why).

The Allies should have known that mere - and predictably temporary - numerical parity was insufficient to check Germany, whose soldiers outperformed theirs in WW1 per man.

Given the imbalance of potential and actual forces deployed, France surviving into 1941 would have been as anomalous as her 6-week defeat. Even absent the giant OTL Kesselschlacht, the Allies were operationally outmatched by the German concentration of its combined-arms forces at the Schwerpunkt. Whether at the Ardennes or elsewhere, there's no feasible ATL in which the Allies stop a Panzer Group from breaking through (absent something like knowing the German plans months in advance, allowing sufficient anti-tank defenses to be concentrated a la Kursk). Breakthrough means either retreat or encirclement; if it had been the former instead of the latter Paris would merely have fallen a few months later.

It confounds me that historiography views the German defeat as inevitable given the Allies' preponderance of resources and population, but views French defeat as anomalous despite a similar preponderance arrayed against the poor French. The wealth of the UK informs this historical misjudgment; that ignores how little difference the UK made in the Battle of France.

Germany nearly beat France and the UK in 1918 despite having bled out against Russia and despite the arrival of American troops. That the Allies would be confident of victory with no second front is daft; that they expected France even to survive with the UK fielding fewer men than Belgium is flat-out delusional. On the part of the British, I'd lean towards a functional cynicism over delusion.

Hitler's strategic moves and judgment over 1936-39 put Germany in position to win successive and mostly one-on-one fights against enemies she could defeat singly but not all at once. This was strategic daring and political insight of world-historical order. That Hitler blew his shot by not taking the SU seriously doesn't diminish the unique character of his success up to then.

To rehash an argument I've made elsewhere in a now-locked thread, France's only chance was to unite with the SU and/or for the UK to commit itself to the bloody land war required to defeat Hitler. Britain declined to do either, refusing to back Stalin's push for coalition and refusing to build up its land armies. Just as in WW1, the British pulled the European strings towards the war it wanted without any deep commitment to bleed in that war. Here again Britain got what, ultimately, it wanted: the defeat of Hitler without losing millions of men to him. If one asked Churchill on his death bed whether he'd have traded a million more British lives to stop Hitler in Northern France in 1940, he'd almost certainly have said no.

[HistoryGeek2019]

Perhaps you should do an ATL where Germany attacks France in a different sector than the Ardennes. Should be fun.

Edit: I couldn't resist: viewtopic.php?f=11&t=245421

[JAG13]

No, it was a sensible gamble, based on the poor show of the Winter War, constant communist purges on the Red Army and available intelligence it could be expected for the RA to crumble... which it pretty much did in the border armies, problem is the RA had a HUGE number of reserves and Stalin had no qualms about throwing them half-armed to simply die while wearing down the Germans.

The poor performance of the Red Army in the Winter War showed that the Red Army had some weaknesses. In no way did it show that the Red Army would simply collapse if attacked on their home soil, which they did not if you read the details of the opening border battles. None of the Soviet Fronts collapsed. The Western Front was encircled, but it continued fighting for more than a weak after it was encircled, many of its men escaped to the east to fight again, and many more hid in the forests and ambushed German supply columns. All of the Soviet Fronts exacted high causalties on the Germans from the opening battles of the war.

SOME weaknesses? It was a farce, Finland should have been overrun rather quickly, the RA made a mess of it confirming the damage the purges caused.

Really? Because if a front commander is not in control and in contact with its units and everyone is fighting or waiting on their own, that is a collapse. And many fought, and many surrendered... in the end, the Germans did destroy a number of RA troops greater than the original intelligence estimate, had it been accurate, they would have achieved the goal as set and won.

The Heer did warn of its logistical limitations, the RA would have to be destroyed within 500Km of the border, the Heer could not logistically sustain operations beyond that point, the point was noted and dismissed since "they would collapse anyway".

Yes, this is exactly what made Barbarossa a stupid idea, even without the benefit of hindsight. To ignore the logistical difficulties of a 3 million man invasion into the largest country by area on the planet is the very definition of stupidity.

They didnt ignore them, they simply expected to accomplish the objective before then, and the only reason they did it is because the RA had WAY more reserves than expected.

The plan was feasible, but one key fact was wrong and that brought the whole thing down.

Intelligence failure at its finest...

[TheMarcksPlan]

Intelligence failure at its finest..

The intelligence didn't say "there are no reserves." It said "we have no idea about reserves." It was an entirely political decision to ignore the possibility of reserves due to assuming the state would collapse. Halder and the generals enthusiastically supported this political judgment, incorporating it into their operational design of the drive on Moscow.