What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

[JAG13]

Germany couldnt wage a 2 year war against the USSR, they expected to run out of fuel

Uhhhh.... You might be forgetting the length of the war on Eastern Front.

That was THEIR expectation at the start of Barbarossa, THEY indeed turned out to be wrong in that regard, maybe you are forgetting that?

Provide one shred of evidence that the reason Germany planned an X-week Barbarossa campaign is they'd run out of fuel in week X+1.

Strawman.

[Loïc]

hello

I see no references to the French rail network being "mostly destroyed" by June 1940. 350 railway tunnels and bridges destroyed in total (requiring repair), but the big effect for France was apparently in the massive requisition of French engines and rolling stock.
(...)
Still waiting for your citation on the claim that the French rail network was mostly destroyed in June 1940.

ljadw is right about this point, it was at a such point that the Germans allowed even Railway Engineers sappers companies of the French Army of the Armistice to cross the demarcation line and operate in the Northern occupied zone despite this one was forbidden to the French Army

the destruction and the material losses are considerable. The report drawn up in 1942 by the Secretary of State for Communications, Jean Berthelot, shows the extent of the disaster:

“Almost all of the major railway lines were cut: 450 bridges under rails, 27 tunnels, 70 overpasses were destroyed or badly damaged. [...] More than 2,500 road works were partially or totally destroyed. "

Circulation is interrupted on the 9,700 km of waterway network, mainly concentrated in the North and East, where the fighting took place. Airfields are also paralyzed.
https://books.openedition.org/igpde/3282?lang=fr

[TheMarcksPlan]

Germany couldnt wage a 2 year war against the USSR, they expected to run out of fuel

Uhhhh.... You might be forgetting the length of the war on Eastern Front.

That was THEIR expectation at the start of Barbarossa, THEY indeed turned out to be wrong in that regard, maybe you are forgetting that?

Provide one shred of evidence that the reason Germany planned an X-week Barbarossa campaign is they'd run out of fuel in week X+1.

Strawman.

So basically you heard on the History Channel that the Germans were about to run out of fuel in Barbarossa and have not a shred of evidence or your own analysis to back it up. Good to know.

[HistoryGeek2019]

Regarding fuel consumption, Stahel relays the following in Barbarossa.

The November 1940 report of General Eduard Wagner:

Such an undertaking, he frankly assessed, would allow for an advance of between 700 and 800 kilometres given projected fuel consumption.

The February 1941 report of General Georg Thomas:

Fuel stocks were also dwindling with the situation being described as ‘serious’ and projections indicating current supply would suffice for the deployment of forces in the east and just two months of active operations.

On 8 February, three days after Hitler's instruction that further studies be conducted, Thomas informed Keitel and Jodl of the fact that aircraft fuel would only last until the autumn, vehicle fuel for the first two months of operations and rubber supplies until the end of March.

Halder's March 1941 diary:

Despite the clear pressure on German forces operating in the east Halder then matter-of-factly noted the observation of Major-General Wagner, that fuel reserves would last for just three more months. To this worrying observation Halder nevertheless added the note: 'Fuel preparations adequate.'

[TheMarcksPlan]

Regarding fuel consumption, Stahel relays the following in Barbarossa.

Thanks for providing the goods. Every Barbarossa ATL I've done has devoted quite a bit of time and effort to describing the fuel delta, so I'm not saying there's no reason for concern, just that for numerous reasons fuel needn't have been a binding constraint on deeper Barbarossa advance.

Such an undertaking, he frankly assessed, would allow for an advance of between 700 and 800 kilometres given projected fuel consumption.

Wagner's statement is made in the context of the stupid Barbarossa plan to advance at breakneck speed without consideration of rail support. As Stahel states:

The lines would first have to be reset to accommodate German trains, but this could not be undertaken at anything approaching the speed necessary to sustain the operational timetable. The solution therefore hinged on supporting the panzer and motorised divisions as far to the east as possible with wheeled transport. Determining whether this was possible or not depended entirely on estimates of fuel consumption and ammunition expenditure which, owing to the many unknown variables, were ultimately decided upon by the maximum transport capacity of the vehicles, and not any informed projection of conditions.

Stahel, David. Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) (pp. 132-133). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.

Thus when Halder states "fuel preparations adequate" he's not wrong per the original ridiculously stupid Barbarossa concept: after three months the SU would have collapsed, Wehrmacht soldiers would be bathing leisurely in the Volga, fuel wouldn't matter.

In a universe with a Barbarossa planned for ~18 months of campaigning, however, most of the fuel burden on the trucking columns is replaced by coal-burning locomotives moving over tracks whose adequate reconstruction was well within Germany's capabilities, as is under discussion here: viewtopic.php?f=66&t=233840.

Baldly to assert that Germany would have run out of fuel if it planned a longer Barbarossa is to assume OTL fuel burn levels and assume that German lacked the means, and that its officers lacked the wherewithal, to adapt planning to goals. And as I've written elsewhere, pausing the advance after the first bound (only necessary in AGC's sector) would have had many logistical and military benefits.

I know this is off-topic in the thread so feel free to move discussion to an appropriate thread, such as my or HistoryGeek's or anyone else's Eastern Front threads.

[Avalancheon]

Well for starters Italy was pursing a seperate but parallel war strategy, and would not have tolerate German interference in the Mediterranean. Jutt because Germany decides on something does not mean the Italians agree. And before their defeat by compass they were unwilling for any German interference in what they regarded as their zone.

Yeah, and that strategy was dead on the rocks after the Italians were defeated in North Africa, East Africa, and in Greece. They needed the Germans to bail them out of their own mess, and beggers don't get to be choosers. The Italians would have to abide by the terms set by their more powerful Ally.

Also before the Italian army is defeated during compass, there is an extra 140,000 Italian troops in North Africa (as they had not been killed or captured) and require to supplied. This actually makes a lot harder to bring in German troops before this happens as the ships and ports are simply busy supplying the Italian troops and there isnt the spare capacity created by the British removal of these troops. It took 6 weeks to get 1 panzer division into north Africa with this historical spare capacity,.

Who said this was happening before operation Compass? I certainly didn't. In fact, I specifically said that Germany could only pursue a Mediterranean strategy after a successful resolution of their problems with the USSR. The Molotov conference was in November 1940. Planning the strategy would take place the next month, and implementing the strategy would take place months after that. Your caveat has no relevance.

That is still not long enough to create and train new paratrooper divisions. Also the German just don;yt have enough transport aircraft. Capacity like that takes longer to create.

6 or 7 months is sufficient to raise additional airborne divisions, along with the Ju-52 transports they need. You are making mountains out of molehills.

The Effect of Malaya is often over stated. the Aircraft that bombed ports did not come from Malta.

No it isn't. The ships and aircraft that operated from Malta were of pivotal importance in terms of the interdiction campaign against the Italian convoys. Without Malta, the central Mediterranean would be an Axis lake; transport ships could transit from Libya to Italy at will. The port of Benghazi would be used in preference to Tripoli, greatly reducing the distance the truck convoys had to travel to bring supplys up to the front.

There not enough j-52's to more enoughg to make a real difference. Railways line supplies, construction battalions, it;s reduction in actual fighting capacity and a year to build the railway. It's pretty long term investment not going to achieve much in the short term.

As I said, the fall of Malta produces significant and immediate benefits to the Axis forces. Ships can unload much more supplys at Benghazi. Over a period of several months, the railway can be extended from Benghazi out to Derna. That would produce another logistical surplus for the Germans and Italians.

Anyway, if Britain stands alone successfully as they really did in 1940, the only real change would be no or reduced Lend-Lease in 1941. So greater reliance in building up British and Canadian industry. The real problem isn't industry though, its financial...the loss of Lend-Lease without American loans substituted would cripple the British war effort.

Quite right.

Quite wrong. if Britain stands alone it's more lend lease not less as the supplies to the Russian can be redirected.

So if I am to understand, you disagree with Richards point? (Which was predicated on the assumption that Britain manages to survive a renewed German onslaught in 1941)

[Avalancheon]

1 The 3 million men of the Ostheer on June 22 were still a minority of the manpower of the WM .

You are twisting and turning like a snake. Compare this statement with your original: ''The war on the Eastern Front did never tie the bulk of the German military, but the bulk of the German ground forces .'' I feel no need to respond further to this.

2 No Eastern Front does NOT mean a bigger AK,because it was impossible to supply a bigger AK and because a bigger AK could not operate in Libya,which was a desert . Comprende ?

Its cute that you try to copy me.

Anyway, my scenario wasn't contingent on the Axis sending more divisions to North Africa. It was specifically focused on solving the logistical problems that hamstrung the Afrika corps.

3 Malta was NOT interdicting the supplies to NA : 15 % of what was sent to NA was lost,of which 2/3 by Malta = 10 % and if these 10 % arrived in NA,it would not help but hinder the Axis .The Axis got sufficient fuel .

Citation needed.

4 The Germans were NOT doing most of the fighting : you have been looking too much to Allo,Allo.

You are entitled to your own opinion, ljadw. NOT to your own facts.

5 It was farther from the Ruhr to Tripoli than from Berlin to Moscow and it took weeks before supplies that left the Ruhr could arrive at the ports of NA and again weeks for these supplies to arrive at the fronline .

And your point is...?

[TheMarcksPlan]

I specifically said that Germany could only pursue a Mediterranean strategy after a successful resolution of their problems with the USSR. The Molotov conference was in November 1940. Planning the strategy would take place the next month, and implementing the strategy would take place months after that. Your caveat has no relevance.

Forgive me for not having followed the whole thread - can you point me to where you articulate the resolution of the USSR issue? I'm presuming this is some kind of deal regarding Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, etc.?

[Avalancheon]

No they could not. Increased production in 1944 was more than just diverting more resources.

production efficiency -production of existing types of aircraft becomes easier the longer it iis in production, the amount of man hours to make an me109 fell something like 30% each year it was in production. diverting more resources will not mean these production efficiencies will be realized any sooner than they were histrionically.

And there is also more aircraft factories that were built in 1942,1943 that were used in 1944. Resources are not instantly transferable form one production item to another. Infrastructure is often needed to increase prodcution that takes time to build. And new workers, new factories take time to reach production effectiveness of old ones.

The Idea that 1944 production could just be achieved by a chnage of focus and resources is a deeply flawed idea.

Its a complicated subject, granted. But there is reason to believe that in the absence of operation Barbarossa, Germany could have greatly expanded its aircraft production. The exact numbers are up for debate.

It is true. German military spending reached 70% of national income by 1944, while the UK peaked at 55% and the USA peaked at 42% (see: Mark Harrison, the Economics of WW2). There is no reason to limit the time period to the "first few years" of the war. Germany was not in a position to do anything to the UK in the "first few years" other than terror bomb cities and sink merchant ships - and we already know where that got them in the OTL.

The scenario is about what WW2 would look like without the Russo-German war. Thus, a focus on military spending in 1941 and 1942 is crucial. Theres little use in pointing to Germanys spending in 1944, when they were stuck in a losing war on multiple fronts.

And the Germans reached peak aircraft production and deployment in 1944. It didn't create an "impenetrable" air zone over Germany. It just created lots of dead Luftewaffe pilots.

You miss the mark slightly. If the Reich reach peak aircraft production in 1942, they would be able to make their air space impenetrable to the Anglo-Americans.

[Avalancheon]

The stronger the RN was in Egypt, the weaker the RN would in the Atlantic and Home Waters. Ships can't be in two places at once

Good luck convincing him of that. pugsville is a notorious Teaboo. He thinks the Royal Navy has magical properties.

The fall of Malta does not threaten the British in Egypt?

Funnily enough, pugsville is contradicted by Winston Churchill (who he worships).

The Prime Minister was blunt with Auchinleck, telling him in a cable from London that the loss of Malta “. . . would be a disaster of the first magnitude to the British Empire, and probably fatal in the long run to the defense of the Nile delta.” Strategically, should Malta fall, the Germans and Italians would gain absolute aerial and naval supremacy, turning the Mediterranean into an Axis lake.
-Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel, by Daniel Allen Butler

I specifically said that Germany could only pursue a Mediterranean strategy after a successful resolution of their problems with the USSR. The Molotov conference was in November 1940. Planning the strategy would take place the next month, and implementing the strategy would take place months after that. Your caveat has no relevance.

Forgive me for not having followed the whole thread - can you point me to where you articulate the resolution of the USSR issue? I'm presuming this is some kind of deal regarding Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, etc.?

I didn't actually get around to articulating that. I simply pointed out that a political resolution is a crucial precondition for a Mediterranean scenario.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I didn't actually get around to articulating that. I simply pointed out that a political resolution is a crucial precondition for a Mediterranean scenario.

Respect for at least acknowledging the problem. Most folks here and elsewhere who criticize the Barbarossa decision and recommend a Mediterranean Strategy simply take it for granted that Stalin and the world's largest army sit quietly while Hitler builds planes and boats and creates an ideologically hostile hyperpower on Soviet borders.

Suggesting a political resolution implies you have at least a hunch as to how the Nazis and Bolsheviks coexist - at least for long enough for Hitler to defeat the West (maybe mass-production of those "Coexist" bumper-stickers and distribution everywhere?). I don't see how such a solution is possible but it seems so obvious to me that I haven't given it much thought and might be missing something really big. Would be curious to hear your outline of the solution. Maybe Hitler gives extraordinary technical assistance to Japan, allowing them to build their land forces sufficiently to threaten Stalin's rear during a years-long Mediterranean strategy? The more historically-based alternate path is for Hitler to accede to all Stalin's demands regarding Turkey and the Balkans, provoking a Soviet attack on Turkey and Anglo-Soviet war. Obviously that's going to change a lot regarding the Mediterranean strategy, as Hitler/Mussolini have to share more with Stalin.

As I said, the fall of Malta produces significant and immediate benefits to the Axis forces.

Totally agree. Anybody who analyzes Malta simply by the number of ships its garrison sunk is walking blind. Malta forced shipping into convoys that had to sail far afield of direct Italy-Libya routes, decreasing Italian practical lift capacity by an order of magnitude. By concentrating cargo-offloading into convoy arrival dates, it likewise reduced the monthly/seasonal capacity of the Libyan and Italian ports: instead of being able to use their full capacity round the clock, they'd face a wave of offloading requirements followed by periods of dormancy. Likewise for the truck and coastal shipping resources emanating from the ports.

[ljadw]

1 The 3 million men of the Ostheer on June 22 were still a minority of the manpower of the WM .

You are twisting and turning like a snake. Compare this statement with your original: ''The war on the Eastern Front did never tie the bulk of the German military, but the bulk of the German ground forces .'' I feel no need to respond further to this.

2 No Eastern Front does NOT mean a bigger AK,because it was impossible to supply a bigger AK and because a bigger AK could not operate in Libya,which was a desert . Comprende ?

Its cute that you try to copy me.

Anyway, my scenario wasn't contingent on the Axis sending more divisions to North Africa. It was specifically focused on solving the logistical problems that hamstrung the Afrika corps.

3 Malta was NOT interdicting the supplies to NA : 15 % of what was sent to NA was lost,of which 2/3 by Malta = 10 % and if these 10 % arrived in NA,it would not help but hinder the Axis .The Axis got sufficient fuel .

Citation needed.

4 The Germans were NOT doing most of the fighting : you have been looking too much to Allo,Allo.

You are entitled to your own opinion, ljadw. NOT to your own facts.

5 It was farther from the Ruhr to Tripoli than from Berlin to Moscow and it took weeks before supplies that left the Ruhr could arrive at the ports of NA and again weeks for these supplies to arrive at the fronline .

And your point is...?

AboutMalta :
Axis deliveries of material 1940-1943
Italian : 1,499,000 GRT arrived .Lost 261000 GRT
German :739000 GRT arrived. Lost : 179000 GRT
1760000 GRT was sent for the Italians ( including civilians ) of which 261000 GRT was lost ,which is 15 %
918000 GRT was sent for the Germans,of which 179000 GRT was lost,which is 19 %
Total sent :2,678,ooo GRT,lost 440000 GRT.
Almost everything was sent by the Italian merchant fleet and escorted by the Regia Marina .And only 2/3 was lost by aircraft/submarines operating from Malta.
Source : The Italian Navy in World War II (Sadkovich ) P 343.

[ljadw]

As I said, the fall of Malta produces significant and immediate benefits to the Axis forces.

Totally agree. Anybody who analyzes Malta simply by the number of ships its garrison sunk is walking blind. Malta forced shipping into convoys that had to sail far afield of direct Italy-Libya routes, decreasing Italian practical lift capacity by an order of magnitude. By concentrating cargo-offloading into convoy arrival dates, it likewise reduced the monthly/seasonal capacity of the Libyan and Italian ports: instead of being able to use their full capacity round the clock, they'd face a wave of offloading requirements followed by periods of dormancy. Likewise for the truck and coastal shipping resources emanating from the ports.

This is a lot of nonsense .
The fall of Malta could result at maximum in the transport of some 15 % additional supplies to the ports of NA, and it is more than dubious if these ports could unload and stock these additional supplies . And we know that the Libyan road capacity was not big enough to transport additionall supplies from the orts to the front .
Besides : for more supplies to be sent to NA, more supplies (more than the 2,678,000 GRT that were sent ) would be needed ,and there is NO proof that a lot of supplies were waiting between the Ruhr and Naples on merchant ships to be sent to NA. The opposite(= a lot of merchant ships waiting in the ports on supplies to go to NA ) is more likely .
And, most ''convoys '' consisted of ONE or two M/V because the LIbyan ports had not the capacity to unload big amounts of supplies .
The fall of Malta would not increase the number of M/V in a convoy .

[ljadw]

Winston was wrong when he said that the loss of Malta would result in the long run (haha ) in the loss of Egypt : already in 1940 the RN proposed to give up Malta, but Winston refused, because of the political results of this .

[pugsville]

AboutMalta :
Axis deliveries of material 1940-1943
Italian : 1,499,000 GRT arrived .Lost 261000 GRT
German :739000 GRT arrived. Lost : 179000 GRT
1760000 GRT was sent for the Italians ( including civilians ) of which 261000 GRT was lost ,which is 15 %
918000 GRT was sent for the Germans,of which 179000 GRT was lost,which is 19 %
Total sent :2,678,ooo GRT,lost 440000 GRT.
Almost everything was sent by the Italian merchant fleet and escorted by the Regia Marina .And only 2/3 was lost by aircraft/submarines operating from Malta.
Source : The Italian Navy in World War II (Sadkovich ) P 343.

Thanks for posting this. It;s important to put Malta into context. When you have a logistical pipeline that is too small for the forc4s you are trying to support every loss hurts. But teh removal of Malta does not solve all the Axis supply problems.