What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

[glenn239]

Synthetic would not be able to rectify the shortfall from what I've read. But, Soviet supply could, meaning that even if the Axis are short bunker fuel they could, since Barbarossa has never happened, barter with the Russians to obtain it.

Probably not...Russia was not producing that much naval fuel herself.

In 1940, a total of 29,414 million tons of oil was processed at domestic refineries, producing only 883,600 tons of aviation gasoline, 3.477 million tons of automotive gasoline, 5.6 million tons of kerosene, 1.274 million tons of ligroin, 1.459 million tons of diesel fuel, 413,000 tons of naval oil, 9.8 million tons of fuel oil, and 1.469 million tons of various lubricants. Of the 883,600 tons of aviation gasoline produced domestically in 1940, an overwhelming proportion was avgas with low octane numbers of 70 to 74.

http://www.oilru.com/or/47/1006/

Can you show me where it says that the Japanese petroleum reserve of 6 million tons in December 1941, good for the fleet for not more than 2 years, was Bunker C?

[glenn239]

Fundamentally it depends on the nature of the crude. If it is light and volatile "brown" crude then it can be used as an expedient bunker fuel as the Japanese did to their regret. However, I believe that most European crude the Germans had access to was "black" and required refining. The Germans have the further problem that their high-pressure steam turbines as used in so many KM ships were very temperamental operating with even the "safer" Bunker C. I doubt very much they would be willing to risk the Japanese experiment even assuming they had access to suitable crude.

Possible. For the purposes of the discussion let's assume Rob is correct on the fuel issue and go with the historical German production of ship oil plus some total of Soviet imports as per Takao's information.

Yes, the Germans did obtain crude from the USSR under the Pact and so likely could have continued receiving it, but it was never going to be in the quantities they needed given the output of the fields and the Soviet requirements for the same. In 1940, 620,000 tons of crude were shipped from the USSR to Germany...a drop in the bucket of the 29,414,000 tons produced, but it seems unlikely they would increase that.

Unknown. What I've read elsewhere on Soviet oil production in the Cold War suggests that even if Barbarossa had not occurred and Germany assisted the USSR in increasing production, that increases might have been gradual rather than precipitous. Nonetheless, since the Middle Eastern oil was logistically impossible for the Axis to remove to Europe in large quantities even if conquered, the USSR was the other source available, whether Soviet production or captured Iranian or Iraqi production via the SU.

[Rob Stuart]

Roosevelt taking a light- handed approach with Japan does nothing to ensure that the Japanese do not enter the war. The light-handed approach could easily be seen as a sign of weakness on the part of the Western Allies - Britain cannot defend her territories, and the US will not/can not, and Japan moves South anyway.

I don't entirely disagree with you, but the timing of the historical attack on the US, British and Dutch territories was very much driven by the fact that Japan could import virtually no oil after July 1941. It had to either give in to the US demands or move south before it ran out of oil. If Roosevelt had pushed them only part of the way into that corner, instead of all the way into it, the Japanese move south might have happened later than it did, especially if they thought Britain might collapse at any moment under the stronger than historical Axis attack on it in 1941 which Glenn envisions.

[Rob Stuart]

"Iberia" includes Portugal and Andorra, in addition to Spain. Using "Iberia" when you mean Spain is like using "Scandinavia" when you mean Sweden.

Taking Gibraltar and forcing Spain into the war had advantages for the Axis. Occupying Portugal would achieve nothing in addition to that, and would ensure the Allied occupation of the Azores. Not occupying a neutral Portugal looks like the more advantageous option - at least in 1940. After the US entered the war an the Azores were occupied, perhaps a different story.

That was not my point. Could you please stop using "Iberia" when you mean "Spain"???

[glenn239]

And even if we assume that war with Japan would still break out as it did, it does not at all follow that the UK would still be in a position to send to the Far East the same reinforcements that it did historically. In your "what if" scenario you have the Axis navies and air forces putting a lot of additional pressure on the Royal Navy in 1941, in the Atlantic and the Med.

The older slower British battleships would be fairly useless in the Atlantic, so one possible change would be that POW and Repulse (fast = useful) would remain in the Atlantic while two of the "R's" or "Qs" would go in their place to Malaya.

Surely you're assuming that this will result in more RN ships being sunk or damaged - and not only large ships but also the destroyers needed to escort them.

The purpose of North Atlantic convoy raiders was to interdict SLOC, not to sink RN warships. And not all convoys were equal either - tankers being the most important, as Britain was wholly reliant on overseas supply for its oil.

Historically Churchill urged Roosevelt to take a hard line with the Japanese, but if the British are weaker in the Far East than they actually were then Churchill might very well have asked Roosevelt not to take any steps which would provoke the Japanese into going to war. If Roosevelt consequently did not freeze Japanese assets in July 1941 and cut off its oil imports, then the Japanese may have postponed their war until after Hitler invades Russia in 1942.

Germany doesn't ever invade Russia in this scenario. Perhaps Stalin invades Germany instead, or perhaps he does not and instead contents himself with conquering the Middle East and ejecting the British from India, or meddling in the Far East against Japan in China, or meddling in the Far East by arming Japan against the USA, or even a more stringent guarded neutrality. But one thing that doesn't happen is Germany invading the USSR.

You wish to assume that Japan goes to war as it did because you want to limit the number of rabbit holes you go down.

Not at all. I wished to do a snapshot of what the Atlantic might look like with no expectation that this snapshot would be correct with literally an infinite number of other possibilities available.

In fact, you've opened up a huge can of worms by proposing that Hitler invades Spain instead of Russia, and just because it suits you you cannot say that only the worms you want to talk about will get out of the can.

What, the can of worms that Germany does not wind up at war with the United States via Japan? The entire point to the thread is that Germany is "serious" about defeating Britain, meaning that Germany cannot be at war with the Unite States.

[glenn239]

That was not my point. Could you please stop using "Iberia" when you mean "Spain"???

"Iberia" if and when Britain attempts to occupy the Azores, "Spain" if they don't.

The takeaway from that is that Portugal has an incentive to reinforce the Azores with additional troops and aircraft to prevent a British landing, and the Axis have an incentive to supply Portugal with equipment to bolster its defenses. However, once the US enters the war, IMO nothing is going to prevent the Azores from being occupied, therefore, from Portugal being occupied.

[Rob Stuart]

Germany doesn't ever invade Russia in this scenario.

Seriously? You're proposing that during 1941 Germany and Italy would turn the Med into an Axis lake and greatly tighten the blockade of the UK, leading, presumably, to peace with the UK or at least the neutralization of the UK as a base for offensive operations. With his western and southern flank secure, why in hell would he not invade Russia when conditions were even better than they were when he actually invaded it in 1941?

[Takao]

Synthetic would not be able to rectify the shortfall from what I've read. But, Soviet supply could, meaning that even if the Axis are short bunker fuel they could, since Barbarossa has never happened, barter with the Russians to obtain it.

Probably not...Russia was not producing that much naval fuel herself.

In 1940, a total of 29,414 million tons of oil was processed at domestic refineries, producing only 883,600 tons of aviation gasoline, 3.477 million tons of automotive gasoline, 5.6 million tons of kerosene, 1.274 million tons of ligroin, 1.459 million tons of diesel fuel, 413,000 tons of naval oil, 9.8 million tons of fuel oil, and 1.469 million tons of various lubricants. Of the 883,600 tons of aviation gasoline produced domestically in 1940, an overwhelming proportion was avgas with low octane numbers of 70 to 74.

http://www.oilru.com/or/47/1006/

Can you show me where it says that the Japanese petroleum reserve of 6 million tons in December 1941, good for the fleet for not more than 2 years, was Bunker C?

As of December 1, 1941,
Japanese Bunker Oil reserve was between 21.7 - 22.9 million barrels or about 3-3.2 million tons.
Lower number is from USSBS, while the higher number is from Evans & Peattie citing Japanese sources.

[Takao]

Possible. For the purposes of the discussion let's assume Rob is correct on the fuel issue and go with the historical German production of ship oil plus some total of Soviet imports as per Takao's information.

Well, I would not count to much on the Soviets for Bunker oil.

First, they were not producing that much to begin with. Second, they were in the process of building up their own Navy, a process that was cut short in the OTL with the German invasion, but would not be in this ATL.

[Takao]

Roosevelt taking a light- handed approach with Japan does nothing to ensure that the Japanese do not enter the war. The light-handed approach could easily be seen as a sign of weakness on the part of the Western Allies - Britain cannot defend her territories, and the US will not/can not, and Japan moves South anyway.

I don't entirely disagree with you, but the timing of the historical attack on the US, British and Dutch territories was very much driven by the fact that Japan could import virtually no oil after July 1941. It had to either give in to the US demands or move south before it ran out of oil. If Roosevelt had pushed them only part of the way into that corner, instead of all the way into it, the Japanese move south might have happened later than it did, especially if they thought Britain might collapse at any moment under the stronger than historical Axis attack on it in 1941 which Glenn envisions.

Japan's naval reserve was sufficient for about 2 years, give or take. The big problem was the US rearmament programs, specifically the naval construction programs which would be bearing fruit in 43-44. Programs the Japanese knew they could not match. The longer Japan dallied, the US only would get stronger.

Further, with the failure of Japanese diplomatic negotiations with the Dutch in early 1941, Japan increasingly saw the military conquest of the DEI as the only solution, and said as much to the Germans in their early discussions on invading Singapore.


Glenn's idea that there will be a early collapse of Britain, is the product of an over active imagination. The Japanese knew, with the failure of the BoB, that the war would be a long drawn out affair based on attrition.

His idea of having an Axis grand fleet based at Gibraltar and "threatening" British SLOCs is quite whimsical to say the least, given that the battleships proved to be poor commerce raiders from an economical and military standpoint, and could have been done cheaper with u-boats & hilfskreuzers. The problem was that Germany had 4 battleships and, with the fall of France, had no use for them. Hence, shoehorning them into commerce raiding.

This dovetails nicely with his refusal to allow the British to recall their OBBs from the Far East, because in his mind, the OBBs are not a threat. Despite the fact that they could and did readily escort the more important British convoys. Escorting slow convoys does not require fast battleships - knowing that the fast Axis battleships will be coming to them...and those a fast axis battleships will be running away just as fast when the OBBs come into sight.

[glenn239]

Germany doesn't ever invade Russia in this scenario.

Seriously? You're proposing that during 1941 Germany and Italy would turn the Med into an Axis lake and greatly tighten the blockade of the UK, leading, presumably, to peace with the UK or at least the neutralization of the UK as a base for offensive operations. With his western and southern flank secure, why in hell would he not invade Russia when conditions were even better than they were when he actually invaded it in 1941?

Yes, seriously. In terms of why Hitler would not invade the USSR, well, the title of the thread is what if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration. If that is the objective then at all costs - no matter what - Germany must avoid war with the USA and the USSR. And, if going to war with one of them, it must be the USA, since only the USSR had any chance whatever of being Germany's ally in that case, (the USA had a 0% chance of allying with Germany in the case of a Nazi-Soviet War, but the Soviets might have had a 50/50 chance type thing of supporting Germany against the Anglo-Americans). The entry of either (or both) into the war is the precondition for Britain to avoid defeat and partition. Therefore, the act of invading the USSR violates that fundamental principle.

If you want to argue that Hitler was psychologically predisposed to invading the Soviet Union, then no argument here. But Hitler's intentions were not the same thing as Germany's most favorable course of action with hindsight.

[glenn239]

As of December 1, 1941,
Japanese Bunker Oil reserve was between 21.7 - 22.9 million barrels or about 3-3.2 million tons.
Lower number is from USSBS, while the higher number is from Evans & Peattie citing Japanese sources.

Interesting. Now, can you cite any estimate of the IJN's fuel reserves in wartime being calculated on a reserve of 22.9 million barrels instead of 42 million barrels?

Well, I would not count to much on the Soviets for Bunker oil.

Right, but we have not established that bunker oil was specifically required. Ship boilers were basically big fires under a container of water. Not exactly Saturn V rocket technology. It could be the case that bunker oil, being heavier, gave better endurance and high end performance. But does that mean it was required, or just preferred?

[glenn239]

Glenn's idea that there will be a early collapse of Britain, is the product of an over active imagination. The Japanese knew, with the failure of the BoB, that the war would be a long drawn out affair based on attrition.

Nobody said anything about an "early collapse" of Britain. In fact, the long discussion on the defensive value to the Axis Powers in holding Gibraltar against the Anglo-Americans in the Med is completely incomprehensible WRT an "early collapse" of Great Britain. Only Sealion had the theoretical prospect of an "early collapse" of Great Britain, and even that was more to make them willing to negotiate than any decisive military victory.

His idea of having an Axis grand fleet based at Gibraltar and "threatening" British SLOCs is quite whimsical to say the least, given that the battleships proved to be poor commerce raiders from an economical and military standpoint, and could have been done cheaper with u-boats & hilfskreuzers.

Convoys in the European theatre that were completely or nearly completely annihilated in WW1 and WW2 tended to be attacked by squadrons of surface warships.

The idea that surface raiders in this position working with subsurface and aerial forces would not pose a serious threat to maritime communications is one that has no merit. The idea that combined arms tactics would be decisive to the outcome of the war is also out of the question. The concept of Goldilocks and Three Bears. The Axis occupation of Gibraltar is neither Momma Bear (no threat at all) nor Papa Bear (Britain's defeat in WW2), but rather, Baby Bear, (somewhere in the middle).

This dovetails nicely with his refusal to allow the British to recall their OBBs from the Far East, because in his mind, the OBBs are not a threat.

It seems odd to me that you would argue an Axis fleet is both no threat at all in the Atlantic, but also at the same time, one that is so dire a threat the British must strip their Eastern defenses to protect against it.

Despite the fact that they could and did readily escort the more important British convoys. Escorting slow convoys does not require fast battleships - knowing that the fast Axis battleships will be coming to them...and those a fast axis battleships will be running away just as fast when the OBBs come into sight.

Two things. First, a single battleship escorting a convoy is not a deterrent to three or more attacking battleships, and two defending battleships would not deter an attack by four, five or six battleships.

Second, there might have been several dozen convoys in the North Atlantic at any one point. If the British are concentrating their slower battleships into squadrons of three or four ships in order to be effective, then they could protect only a fraction of their convoys. Since the battleships themselves were too slow, these could not bring Axis warships to battle unless luck intervened, (fluke encounters in heavy weather or lucky carrier strikes).

[Rob Stuart]

Convoys in the European theatre that were completely or nearly completely annihilated in WW1 and WW2 tended to be attacked by squadrons of surface warships.

No Allied convoy was completely or nearly completely destroyed by Axis surface ships in the European theatre during WW2.

[ljadw]

Most of the Allied convoys were never attacked by the U Boats, because the U Boats could not detect them, thus the same would happen with the BBs : they also could not detect the convoys .
That the RN could protect only a fraction of the convoys is irrelevant, because convoys without protection would not be detected faster than convoys with protection .