What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

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Takao
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#901

Post by Takao » 19 Feb 2020, 00:33

glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:23

Interesting. Now, can you cite any estimate of the IJN's fuel reserves in wartime being calculated on a reserve of 22.9 million barrels instead of 42 million barrels?
No, because Japanese estimates were not broken down in such a fashion, only total estimated reserves were used. For instance, the Army-Navy Committee Study of June, 1941 estimated the total POL reserve at 61,045,000 barrels from September 41- September 42, dropping to 28,320,000 for 42-43, dropping to 6,608,000 for 43-44, and by September 1944, it would be -4,405,000. This factors in a DEI conquest with production slowly increasing: production 41-41. 5,035,000 barrels, production 42-43 12,901,000, and production 43-44 23,600,000 barrels. With respective consumption being; 37,760,000 barrels for the first year of war, and 34,613,000 for the next two years thereafter.

The only study that had Japan coming out ahead on the oil game was the August, 1941, Naval Planning Bureau Review which slightly reduced consumption, but drastically increased production - going from 5,035,000 in the first year, to 21,020,000 in the second year, and 41.976,000 in the third year.

All Japanese war planning had one salient point - drastically increased imports from the DEI, otherwise Japan would be out of oil by 1944.

glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:23
Right, but we have not established that bunker oil was specifically required. Ship boilers were basically big fires under a container of water. Not exactly Saturn V rocket technology. It could be the case that bunker oil, being heavier, gave better endurance and high end performance. But does that mean it was required, or just preferred?
Well, first off, ship propulsion, specifically high pressure steam turbine plants, were the "Saturn V rocket technology" of their day - the Germans did not have much success with theirs, nor did the Japanese, while the British plants were very inefficient fuelwise.

As to what the boilers could and could not burn...Why don't you What If all the Axis capital ships into wood burners. The Axis has plenty of wood to burn, thus it would solve their oil problem. The Germans could also get millions of tons off the Soviets at little cost.

The fact still remains that you are grasping at straws trying to make this work.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#902

Post by Takao » 19 Feb 2020, 01:21

glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:50
Nobody said anything about an "early collapse" of Britain. In fact, the long discussion on the defensive value to the Axis Powers in holding Gibraltar against the Anglo-Americans in the Med is completely incomprehensible WRT an "early collapse" of Great Britain. Only Sealion had the theoretical prospect of an "early collapse" of Great Britain, and even that was more to make them willing to negotiate than any decisive military victory.
Anything less than an early collapse of Britain, is Hitler not being serious about Britain...the whole premise of this thread.

Playing the attrition game is just wasting Germany's time until the US or USSR enters the field.


glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:50
Convoys in the European theatre that were completely or nearly completely annihilated in WW1 and WW2 tended to be attacked by squadrons of surface warships.
They were also few and far between...you have posted one example from WW1 and one example from WW2.

A rather small sample set don't you think?

glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:50
The idea that surface raiders in this position working with subsurface and aerial forces would not pose a serious threat to maritime communications is one that has no merit. The idea that combined arms tactics would be decisive to the outcome of the war is also out of the question. The concept of Goldilocks and Three Bears. The Axis occupation of Gibraltar is neither Momma Bear (no threat at all) nor Papa Bear (Britain's defeat in WW2), but rather, Baby Bear, (somewhere in the middle).
And where in the Battle of the Atlantic do we see this perfect storm coming together?

The major convoy battles took place to far out for the Luftwaffe to reach. Communications between the three were tenuous at best, and ineffective at worst. There were few instances were German surface raiders were able to call in U-Boats to join the fray. You only assume the best results for Germany, whereas I take a more pessimistic view based on empirical facts in evidence.

glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:50
It seems odd to me that you would argue an Axis fleet is both no threat at all in the Atlantic, but also at the same time, one that is so dire a threat the British must strip their Eastern defenses to protect against it.
No more odd than your argument that there is no threat at all in the Atlantic that the British do not change their naval disposition, but one so dire that the Americans must keep their 4 carriers and 2 fast battleships in the Atlantic while paying no never mind to the Pacific.

Pot calling the Kettle black.


glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:50
Two things. First, a single battleship escorting a convoy is not a deterrent to three or more attacking battleships, and two defending battleships would not deter an attack by four, five or six battleships.
Well, outbound convoys travelling in ballast don't need escorts. Second, only important convoys (tankers/troopships) would need heavy protection, less important convoys could be toyed north out of harm's way. Third, giving the rule of thirds, it is most unlikely in the extreme, that the Axis would field four, five, or six battleships(especially given the temperamental German powerplants). Fourth, there are no guarantees that the axis force would even find any convoys - as they often didn't.

glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:50
Second, there might have been several dozen convoys in the North Atlantic at any one point. If the British are concentrating their slower battleships into squadrons of three or four ships in order to be effective, then they could protect only a fraction of their convoys. Since the battleships themselves were too slow, these could not bring Axis warships to battle unless luck intervened, (fluke encounters in heavy weather or lucky carrier strikes).
Only a fraction of the numerous convoys need protection. A good many will be out of range of the Italian BBs.

Again...the slow British BBs don't need to bring the Axis battleships to battle. You have the Axis battleships coming to them. How many times do I have to repeat this salient fact of your what if.

Fluke encounters and much more numerous carriers favor the British.

Then, all of this is academic if the British sieze the Azores when it looks as if Gibraltar will fall.


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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#903

Post by glenn239 » 20 Feb 2020, 19:13

Rob Stuart wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 22:18
glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:50
Convoys in the European theatre that were completely or nearly completely annihilated in WW1 and WW2 tended to be attacked by squadrons of surface warships.
No Allied convoy was completely or nearly completely destroyed by Axis surface ships in the European theatre during WW2.
Some Italian convoys were destroyed in WW2. Two British convoys on the Scotland-Norway route were destroyed (or nearly destroyed) by German squadrons in 1917.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#904

Post by glenn239 » 20 Feb 2020, 19:29

Takao wrote:
19 Feb 2020, 00:33

No, because Japanese estimates were not broken down in such a fashion, only total estimated reserves were used.
Anything I can recall reading indicates the IJN's reserve was estimated at about 2 years of war on 42,000,000 barrels. The primary consumers were the navy and the merchant marine, with the army in a distant third, (the army had its own ships too, of course). You are suggesting that about 20,000,000 barrels of the 42 million in the reserve could not be used by the primary consumers - Japanese ships. Do you have any source that states this?

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#905

Post by glenn239 » 20 Feb 2020, 20:10

Takao wrote:
19 Feb 2020, 01:21
Anything less than an early collapse of Britain, is Hitler not being serious about Britain...the whole premise of this thread.
Playing the attrition game is just wasting Germany's time until the US or USSR enters the field.
The USSR may well indeed enter the war without Barbarossa, but whoever said the target would be Germany?
The major convoy battles took place to far out for the Luftwaffe to reach. Communications between the three were tenuous at best, and ineffective at worst. There were few instances were German surface raiders were able to call in U-Boats to join the fray. You only assume the best results for Germany, whereas I take a more pessimistic view based on empirical facts in evidence.
The assumption is that Axis surface, air and subsurface forces working together - combined arms - would be more effective than U-boat working on their own. You are not actually disputing that, are you?

In terms of Luftwaffe support, this would be limited by aircraft type, base location, and carrier availability. The most useful aircraft in the BoA was the Condor due to its long range. One side effect of no Barbarossa would be to allow increased production of this type, (but not in enough numbers to matter once the USA was in the war.)
No more odd than your argument that there is no threat at all in the Atlantic that the British do not change their naval disposition, but one so dire that the Americans must keep their 4 carriers and 2 fast battleships in the Atlantic while paying no never mind to the Pacific.
The Allied problem was that their 21kt battleships couldn't effectively protect the SLOC against a strong enemy squadron. Carriers were much better.
Well, outbound convoys travelling in ballast don't need escorts. Second, only important convoys (tankers/troopships) would need heavy protection, less important convoys could be toyed north out of harm's way. Third, giving the rule of thirds, it is most unlikely in the extreme, that the Axis would field four, five, or six battleships(especially given the temperamental German powerplants). Fourth, there are no guarantees that the axis force would even find any convoys - as they often didn't.
A submarine might be able to see the smoke of a convoy at maybe 50 miles and travel at 10kt in day, maybe 15 miles at 10kt at night. Let's call it a 2,000nm search area for one day. An aircraft travelling to 250nm on a dogleg search might be able to search 15,000 square miles in its flight, or about 10 times as efficient as a submarine. A line of ships therefore considerably more efficient than a wolfpack strung out on a search picket - its search area with the ships and aircraft is far greater, and so is its speed of concentration. (U-boats struggled to move fast enough to intercept convoys due to their slow speed. If a convoy was moving at 10kt and a U-boat at 14kt, the submarine's intercept ability is poor - a 4kt tail chase closing speed. A 10kt convoy versus a 26kt warship squadron is a 16kt tail chase closing speed - 400% better for the attackers).
Again...the slow British BBs don't need to bring the Axis battleships to battle. You have the Axis battleships coming to them. How many times do I have to repeat this salient fact of your what if.
Repeat what? How one R Class battleship deters four attacking battleships? It can't. It gets sunk. How four "R" Class battleships can protect a convoy? Sure, but what about the 18 other convoys? The British will need the American Atlantic Fleet if Gibraltar falls, otherwise, they'll be hard pressed in the Atlantic and will suffer greater losses in the campaign. "Greater losses" doesn't mean the Axis win the war. It just means more of a pain for the RN in the Atlantic, more US assistance would be necessary, and the date of the KM's defeat in the BoA would be pushed back from May 1943 into as late as 1944.
Last edited by glenn239 on 20 Feb 2020, 20:18, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#906

Post by Richard Anderson » 20 Feb 2020, 20:16

glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 19:13
Rob Stuart wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 22:18
glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:50
Convoys in the European theatre that were completely or nearly completely annihilated in WW1 and WW2 tended to be attacked by squadrons of surface warships.
No Allied convoy was completely or nearly completely destroyed by Axis surface ships in the European theatre during WW2.
Some Italian convoys were destroyed in WW2.
Were the Italians "Allied"?

Meanwhile, I know of one Italian convoy "completely or nearly completely annihilated", which are the rest of your "some"?
Two British convoys on the Scotland-Norway route were destroyed (or nearly destroyed) by German squadrons in 1917.
Is World War I now World War II? Or do you just enjoy shifting goalposts? :lol:
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#907

Post by glenn239 » 20 Feb 2020, 20:32

Richard Anderson wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:16

Some Italian convoys were destroyed in WW2.

Were the Italians "Allied"?
I said some convoys in the "Atlantic theatre". Takao added "Allies".
Meanwhile, I know of one Italian convoy "completely or nearly completely annihilated", which are the rest of your "some"?
Targio, Duisburg and Skerki Bank come to mind.

Is World War I now World War II? Or do you just enjoy shifting goalposts? :lol:
Do you think the German ability to shoot straight had declined in the meantime?

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#908

Post by Richard Anderson » 20 Feb 2020, 20:44

glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:10
The USSR may well indeed enter the war without Barbarossa, but whoever said the target would be Germany?
Oh, don't be coy now, please let us know who the target is... :lol:
The assumption is that Axis surface, air and subsurface forces working together - combined arms - would be more effective than U-boat working on their own. You are not actually disputing that, are you?
You have difficulties telling the difference between an "assumption" - what you just created - and reality, which is what happened. The reality is that "Axis surface, air and subsurface forces" were rarely capable of working together in joint and combined operations. If they cannot manage to do that then they cannot gain the benefits of the synergies you describe.
In terms of Luftwaffe support, this would be limited by aircraft type, base location, and carrier availability. The most useful aircraft in the BoA was the Condor due to its long range. One side effect of no Barbarossa would be to allow increased production of this type, (but not in enough numbers to matter once the USA was in the war.)
It is also limited by the inability of the various services and national governments to cooperate effectively.

BTW, no, Barabrossa was not the reason increased production of the Condor wasn't allowed...about the only thing making it suitable for long-range reconnaissance and maritime strike was its range, otherwise it was a mediocre aircraft with a poor track record.
The Allied problem was that their 21kt battleships couldn't effectively protect the SLOC against a strong enemy squadron. Carriers were much better.
Except that every time one of those enemy squadrons encountered one of those lone 21kt battleships they turned away.
A submarine might be able to see the smoke of a convoy at maybe 50 miles and travel at 10kt in day, maybe 15 miles at 10kt at night. Let's call it a 2,000nm search area for one day. An aircraft travelling to 250nm on a dogleg search might be able to search 15,000 square miles in its flight, or about 10 times as efficient as a submarine. A line of ships therefore considerably more efficient than a wolfpack strung out on a search picket - its search area with the ships and aircraft is far greater, and so is its speed of concentration. (U-boats struggled to move fast enough to intercept convoys due to their slow speed. If a convoy was moving at 10kt and a U-boat at 14kt, the submarine's intercept ability is poor - a 4kt tail chase closing speed. A 10kt convoy versus a 26kt warship squadron is a 16kt tail chase closing speed - 400% better for the attackers).
Except, oddly enough, in practice it rarely worked that way. Typically, a U-Boot stumbled upon a convoy and then was torn between immediate attack or radioing a contact report. If they made the report, sometimes their location report was accurate, sometimes some other U-Boot vectored in, and sometimes they attacked and sank ships. Sometimes. However, that sequence never occurred regularly enough for such a schematic to work.
Repeat what? How one R Class battleship deters four attacking battleships? It can't. It gets sunk. How four "R" Class battleships can protect a convoy? Sure, but what about the 18 other convoys? The British will need the American Atlantic Fleet if Gibraltar falls, otherwise, they'll be hard pressed in the Atlantic and will suffer greater losses in the campaign.
What four attacking battleships? The Italians? Yet again, they do not have the range to loiter awaiting a contact report while cruising the mid-Atlantic. The only vessels capable of doing that are the Bismarck, Tirpitz, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, Lützow, and Scheer. Are four out of the six to remain as a squadron waiting for someone to find a convoy escorted by a single R or are they laying in wait at Brest, La Rochelle, or Ferrol with their Italian allies waiting to spring out into the Atlantic like angry rabbits? Oh, except that first they need to get to Brest or La Rochelle or Ferrol and then ignore the Bomber Command attacks on them that forced them to shift to Germany, which means they have to break out again, rinse, repeat.
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#909

Post by Richard Anderson » 20 Feb 2020, 20:55

glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:32
I said some convoys in the "Atlantic theatre". Takao added "Allies".
Um, Glenn, you were replying to Rob Stuart, not Takao. :lol:
Targio, Duisburg and Skerki Bank come to mind.
Yes, Tarigo [not Targio] was what I was thinking of, but yes Duisberg as well and I had forgotten Skerki Bank. What's the common factor in the three? Hint: it's not a more powerful British naval task force intercepting and annihilating an enemy convoy. It's also not an air-naval battle so working on combined arms synergies.

No, I probably shouldn't be coy either. Radio intercept was the common factor. The ability to tack and locate the enemy before intercepting them to best advantage.

Do you think the German ability to shoot straight had declined in the meantime?
No, but their ability to project naval power declined considerably.
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 20 Feb 2020, 21:48, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#910

Post by Rob Stuart » 20 Feb 2020, 21:14

glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 19:13
Rob Stuart wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 22:18
glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:50
Convoys in the European theatre that were completely or nearly completely annihilated in WW1 and WW2 tended to be attacked by squadrons of surface warships.
No Allied convoy was completely or nearly completely destroyed by Axis surface ships in the European theatre during WW2.
Some Italian convoys were destroyed in WW2. Two British convoys on the Scotland-Norway route were destroyed (or nearly destroyed) by German squadrons in 1917.
Neither of these examples has any bearing on the vulnerability of WW2 Allied convoys in the Atlantic to attack by Axis surface ships based in Spain. The Italian convoys you refer to were much smaller than the Allies' Atlantic convoy (i.e., it doesn't take a lot of firepower to destroy a convoy of five or six ships) and since the Med is a lot smaller than the Atlantic the Italians had very little scope for routing their convoys.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#911

Post by Takao » 20 Feb 2020, 21:34

glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 19:29
Takao wrote:
19 Feb 2020, 00:33

No, because Japanese estimates were not broken down in such a fashion, only total estimated reserves were used.
Anything I can recall reading indicates the IJN's reserve was estimated at about 2 years of war on 42,000,000 barrels. The primary consumers were the navy and the merchant marine, with the army in a distant third, (the army had its own ships too, of course). You are suggesting that about 20,000,000 barrels of the 42 million in the reserve could not be used by the primary consumers - Japanese ships. Do you have any source that states this?
Well, Glenn, I have already given you my sources.

Further, you only asked about the bunker oil reserve, which as previously stated was around 21,717,000-22,804,000 barrels of bunker oil.

You did not ask about the IJN reserve of unrefined crude oil which was 9,041,000 barrels, or POL products already distributed to bases & ships which was 5,802,000 barrels.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#912

Post by Takao » 21 Feb 2020, 00:19

glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:10
The USSR may well indeed enter the war without Barbarossa, but whoever said the target would be Germany?
Yes, Finland would be easy picking for a resurgent Soviet Army.


[
glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:10
The assumption is that Axis surface, air and subsurface forces working together - combined arms - would be more effective than U-boat working on their own. You are not actually disputing that, are you?
Your assuming that German surface, air, & subsurface forces combined with Italian surface, air, and subsurface forces all come together in a perfect harmony. Yet, where do we see this happening in WW2? Not very often for the Axis. Indeed, very few British convoys had ships sunk by Axis surface, air, and subsurface forces.

You seem to forget that this failed miserably when the Germans tried to coordinate with the Italian submarines. The Italian submarines were actually better off on their own. Quite contrary to your assumption.


glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:10
In terms of Luftwaffe support, this would be limited by aircraft type, base location, and carrier availability. The most useful aircraft in the BoA was the Condor due to its long range. One side effect of no Barbarossa would be to allow increased production of this type, (but not in enough numbers to matter once the USA was in the war.)
Probably not, as I would think that fighter & bomber production would be increased so as to maintain the more immediate pressure of bombing Britain. Or will this be yet another PoD, the death of Goring?

The Fw-200 was only the "most useful" because it was all the Germans had for this type of work. In reality, it was not all that great, and suffered heavily in the face of fighters and better shipboard AA.

Also, the Fw-200 threat was nullified when the British altered their convoy routes to avoid the Bay of Biscay.


glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:10
The Allied problem was that their 21kt battleships couldn't effectively protect the SLOC against a strong enemy squadron. Carriers were much better.
The 21knot battleships worked well enough in the Atlantic & Med. The British also had several carriers to confront this "threat."

glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:10
A submarine might be able to see the smoke of a convoy at maybe 50 miles and travel at 10kt in day, maybe 15 miles at 10kt at night. Let's call it a 2,000nm search area for one day. An aircraft travelling to 250nm on a dogleg search might be able to search 15,000 square miles in its flight, or about 10 times as efficient as a submarine. A line of ships therefore considerably more efficient than a wolfpack strung out on a search picket - its search area with the ships and aircraft is far greater, and so is its speed of concentration.
Unfortunately for you, the German capital ships hardly ever used their Arados to search for targets. They relied on radar and the eyeball. Indeed, when the Scharhorst & Gneisenau sorties on their commerce raid, it was their fast support ships that accounted for the majority of first sightings. Thus nixing this supposed advantage. Therefore you are limited to land-based aircraft which will be far less effective due to their limited range.


glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:10
(U-boats struggled to move fast enough to intercept convoys due to their slow speed. If a convoy was moving at 10kt and a U-boat at 14kt, the submarine's intercept ability is poor - a 4kt tail chase closing speed. A 10kt convoy versus a 26kt warship squadron is a 16kt tail chase closing speed - 400% better for the attackers).
U-boats are not scared off by British capital ship escorts...Axis surface vessels are.

glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:10
Repeat what? How one R Class battleship deters four attacking battleships? It can't. It gets sunk. How four "R" Class battleships can protect a convoy? Sure, but what about the 18 other convoys?
How many of those 18 convoys are in range of the short-legged Italian battleships...Few?...None?

glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:10
The British will need the American Atlantic Fleet if Gibraltar falls, otherwise, they'll be hard pressed in the Atlantic and will suffer greater losses in the campaign.
Not if they take the Azores, which they will probably do if Gibraltar is under threat of falling.

Further, concentrating all Axis surface forces at Gibraltar essentially defeats the German Twin Pole naval strategy.

It also implies that the Axis surface fleet will suffer greater losses in the campaign. Difference is the British can absorb losses better than the Axis can.

glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 20:10
"Greater losses" doesn't mean the Axis win the war. It just means more of a pain for the RN in the Atlantic, more US assistance would be necessary, and the date of the KM's defeat in the BoA would be pushed back from May 1943 into as late as 1944.
So? The war being more of a pain for Britain is implied by no Barbarossa.

However, it does not imply that the KM's defeat in the BoA would be pushed back from May, 1943. Indeed, it points to the opposite, especially with more US assistance, the Italian abandonment of the Med, no need to continuously reinforce Malta, etc.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#913

Post by Rob Stuart » 21 Feb 2020, 02:05

Takao wrote:
21 Feb 2020, 00:19
Also, the Fw-200 threat was nullified when the British altered their convoy routes to avoid the Bay of Biscay.
The Fw-200 threat was also nullified by the fitting of merchant ships with catapults from which Hurricanes could be launched, and then by escort carriers with Hurricanes or Wildcats.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#914

Post by Takao » 21 Feb 2020, 03:08

Rob Stuart wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 21:14
glenn239 wrote:
20 Feb 2020, 19:13
Rob Stuart wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 22:18
glenn239 wrote:
18 Feb 2020, 19:50
Convoys in the European theatre that were completely or nearly completely annihilated in WW1 and WW2 tended to be attacked by squadrons of surface warships.
No Allied convoy was completely or nearly completely destroyed by Axis surface ships in the European theatre during WW2.
Some Italian convoys were destroyed in WW2. Two British convoys on the Scotland-Norway route were destroyed (or nearly destroyed) by German squadrons in 1917.
Neither of these examples has any bearing on the vulnerability of WW2 Allied convoys in the Atlantic to attack by Axis surface ships based in Spain. The Italian convoys you refer to were much smaller than the Allies' Atlantic convoy (i.e., it doesn't take a lot of firepower to destroy a convoy of five or six ships) and since the Med is a lot smaller than the Atlantic the Italians had very little scope for routing their convoys.
British code breaking efforts also helped a good deal. As did the fact that the British had radar and the Italians didn't was another major factor.

As you state, none of these have any bearing on the Axis ability to destroy British convoys in the Atlantic.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#915

Post by Orwell1984 » 21 Feb 2020, 15:01

Since we’re assuming one offs are how things will always work, I don’t see why we can’t use the example of Convoy HX84 as a template.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convoy_HX_84

Hardly a resounding Axis success for an attack on a convoy that was poorly escorted and attacked by a major German surface vessel. No total annihilation happened. Most vessels escaped.

Makes for an interesting point of reference differing from some other viewpoints though.
Last edited by Orwell1984 on 21 Feb 2020, 16:23, edited 1 time in total.

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