How big of a leap in technology did the Germans need to counter the Soviets?

[jesk]

The Germans mobilised 18 million ;not more than 4 million died during the war (excluding the POWs who died in captivity),remains 14 million : if of these 14 million

There were demobilizations of soldiers, leaving in the industry, disabled people.

[stg 44]

See your own post where you cited Ellis'figures of 7,614,790 POWs by the Wallies after the war .

The Germans mobilised 18 million ;not more than 4 million died during the war (excluding the POWs who died in captivity),remains 14 million : if of these 14 million 7,6 million were captured by the Wallies, the conclusion is that 6,4 million were captured by the Soviets .

Or the number of 7.6 million is to low, or the number of Soviet POWs that was mentioned (3.5 million ) is to low . There is a gap of 3 million .

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wehrmacht ... ecruitment

The total number of soldiers who served in the Wehrmacht during its existence from 1935 to 1945 is believed to have approached 18.2 million.[31] The Wehrmacht lost about 10,000,000 soldiers during the period from 1939-1945, a combination of about 2,000,000 KIA, 3,000,000 MIA, and 5,000,000 WIA.[32]

More than 6,000,000 soldiers were wounded during the conflict, while more than 11,000,000 became prisoners.

Deduct disabled wounded discharged from service, deserters, effectively non-combat personnel still counted as part of the Wehrmacht numbers, disarmed enemy personnel never formally 'captured' by the Wallies, plus this:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disarmed_Enemy_Forces

While the Allies had anticipated 3 million surrendering Germans, the actual total was as many as 5 million in American hands by June 1945 out of 7.6 million in northwestern Europe alone, not counting the 1.4 million in Allied hands in Italy.[19] Approximately 1 million were Wehrmacht soldiers fleeing west to avoid capture by the Red Army.[19]

[Richard Anderson]

The figures of 21 AG are understated. British have accepted capitulation of the German armed forces in Denmark, Holland, Norway, northern Germany. In total 3,6 million Germans have got to the British captivity.

Sorry, but no that is incorrect. You missed the total given for the Norwegian surrender. German forces in Denmark surrendered on 4 May 1945 at 2035 hours and made up the bulk of the 98,506 German EPW reported 1-7 May. German forces in Holland and northern Germany surrendered after the capitulation make up the bulk of the 1,322,892 DEF reported by the British after 8 May.

As of 11 June 1945 the updated figures as reported to SHAEF were:

21 AG - 417,063 EPW and 1,322,892 DEF (excluding 456,408 transferred to British custody from NUSA) for total 1,739,955
Scot Force (Norway) - 343,900 DEF (note this somewhat overstates the 327,393 actually surrendered)
TF 135 (Channel Islands) - 26,000 EPW (319. ID)
U.S. Forces - 3,486,153 EPW and 1,738,157 DEF (including 456,408 transferred to British custody from NUSA and 20,000 estimated remaining between U.S. and Soviet zones of occupation)
French - 280,629 EPW
7,614,794 total

[Richard Anderson]

There were demobilizations of soldiers, leaving in the industry, disabled people.

438,352 Wehrmacht wounded, injured, and sick were discharged from the service by 30 November 1944. The only major discharge of Wehrmacht personnel was following the French campaign, when c. 820,000 were discharged "on leave" into industry. However, the expansion of the Wehrmacht for the eastern campaign in 1941 cancelled those. By late 1941, only some 660,000 exemptions for industry remained. No other extensive demobilization occurred.

[jesk]

There were demobilizations of soldiers, leaving in the industry, disabled people.

438,352 Wehrmacht wounded, injured, and sick were discharged from the service by 30 November 1944. The only major discharge of Wehrmacht personnel was following the French campaign, when c. 820,000 were discharged "on leave" into industry. However, the expansion of the Wehrmacht for the eastern campaign in 1941 cancelled those. By late 1941, only some 660,000 exemptions for industry remained. No other extensive demobilization occurred.

ljadw forgot from these figures. Sent them to the Soviet captivity. For example still Model in April 1945 dissolved the Army Group "B". Many soldiers escaped captivity.

[ljadw]

The Germans mobilised 18 million ;not more than 4 million died during the war (excluding the POWs who died in captivity),remains 14 million : if of these 14 million

There were demobilizations of soldiers, leaving in the industry, disabled people.

But they were still captured and became POWs;besides, a lot of them were called up for the Volkssturm .Everyone who could fire a rifle or a Panzerfaust got a rifle or a Panzerfaust .

[ljadw]

(Theoretical ) strength of the Volkssturm : 6 million

1st category : 1.2 million

2nd category : 2.8 million

3rd category :0.6 million

4th category :1.4 million

Hans Modrow (january 1928) later last PM of the DDR ,was called up for the Volkssturm, became POW of the Soviets and returned to Germany in 1949 .

[losna]

And in 1942 the Germans were 50 km from Moscow and refused to take it.

They didn't refused. They hadn't the means necessary to at least encircle Moscow.
By 5 December the German offensive ground to a halt, mainly because of Soviet stiffened resistance and severely degraded combat capabilities.
There were no means by which Germans could have taken Moscow after September '41, and it's obvious that it wasn't a deliberate choice, since Moscow was one of (if not the) the most important goals set for Barbarossa.

The only way to take Moscow for the Germans would've been occupying the whole of Poland in 1939, thus, in 1941, starting from 350 km eastward than in OTL. Given that German advance was mainly limited by logistical issues (their support couldn't operate efficiently at the lenghts imposed by Barbarossa) and not particular geographical features of European Russia - that is mostly a vast plain interrupted at traits by rivers, forsts and marshes straight from Eastern Poland to the Urals, it's conceivable that if starting from pre-1939 borders Barbarossa would have probably led to the encirclement of Moscow from 9 September, and probably prevented its recapturing after a counteroffensive at least for the whole winter.

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I did? If I did, I posted that figure in error...not surprising given the last week. Anyway, these are the figures published by M-H.

Feldheer = Ersatzheer = Heer

1939 2740+965 = 3,705,000
1940 3650+900 = 4,550,000
1941 3800+1200 = 5,000,000
1942 4000+1800 = 5,800,000
1943 4250+2300 = 6,550,000
1944 4000+2510 = 6,510,000

I've checked the data you've posted and they refer to total strenght, thus I was missing something .

[jesk]

They didn't refused. They hadn't the means necessary to at least encircle Moscow.
By 5 December the German offensive ground to a halt, mainly because of Soviet stiffened resistance and severely degraded combat capabilities.
There were no means by which Germans could have taken Moscow after September '41, and it's obvious that it wasn't a deliberate choice, since Moscow was one of (if not the) the most important goals set for Barbarossa.

The only way to take Moscow for the Germans would've been occupying the whole of Poland in 1939, thus, in 1941, starting from 350 km eastward than in OTL. Given that German advance was mainly limited by logistical issues (their support couldn't operate efficiently at the lenghts imposed by Barbarossa) and not particular geographical features of European Russia - that is mostly a vast plain interrupted at traits by rivers, forsts and marshes straight from Eastern Poland to the Urals, it's conceivable that if starting from pre-1939 borders Barbarossa would have probably led to the encirclement of Moscow from 9 September, and probably prevented its recapturing after a counteroffensive at least for the whole winter.

Nooo. The Germans surrounded the Western and Bryansk fronts in a few days. Then there was a mudslide.

[jesk]

The Germans mobilised 18 million ;not more than 4 million died during the war (excluding the POWs who died in captivity),remains 14 million : if of these 14 million

There were demobilizations of soldiers, leaving in the industry, disabled people.

But they were still captured and became POWs;besides, a lot of them were called up for the Volkssturm .Everyone who could fire a rifle or a Panzerfaust got a rifle or a Panzerfaust .

Only in the battle for Berlin this was. On the western front lost more quietly.

[ljadw]

But the men of the Volkssturm were still taken POW,even if they were not committed in the battle .
That there were less Volkssturm units engaged on the Western front, does not mean that less Volkssturm men were taken POW on the Western front .

[jesk]

But the men of the Volkssturm were still taken POW,even if they were not committed in the battle .
That there were less Volkssturm units engaged on the Western front, does not mean that less Volkssturm men were taken POW on the Western front .

The number of civilians among German prisoners in the USSR is estimated at 400,000. For example, in the Battle of Budapest, 35,000 Hungarians were captured. There were only 5 thousand of them. The necessary figure was supplemented with civilians and drove to the rear.

[losna]

Nooo. The Germans surrounded the Western and Bryansk fronts in a few days. Then there was a mudslide.

The argument that you're suggesting could well be applied to the battle of Stalingrad: Germans reduced to a mere mile or so the Soviet-held territory west of the Volga, but nonethless they didn't expelled Soviet forces from the city. You could well argue, applying the same logic used for the failed Operation Typhoon, that Germans simply didn't want to take the city. The same can be applied to the Leningrad Siege, or the failed attack toward Murmansk, or the failed Operation Blue... operations that were stopped in the proximity of success or not very short of it.

It becomes quite absurd, actually, and it is far more logical to accept that Germans were stopped by something that wasn't in their control.

[jesk]

The argument that you're suggesting could well be applied to the battle of Stalingrad: Germans reduced to a mere mile or so the Soviet-held territory west of the Volga, but nonethless they didn't expelled Soviet forces from the city.

Absurd logic. In Stalingrad, four infantry divisions fought, Moscow was supposed to be surrounded by a hundred divisions.

You could well argue, applying the same logic used for the failed Operation Typhoon, that Germans simply didn't want to take the city. The same can be applied to the Leningrad Siege, or the failed attack toward Murmansk, or the failed Operation Blue... operations that were stopped in the proximity of success or not very short of it.

Leningrad Germans did not want to take, Murmansk too. In the summer of 1942, Hitler threw 3 mountain division from Murmansk to the south of Russia.

It becomes quite absurd, actually, and it is far more logical to accept that Germans were stopped by something that wasn't in their control.

You just need to study history, instead of logical conclusions to you.

[ljadw]

The argument that you're suggesting could well be applied to the battle of Stalingrad: Germans reduced to a mere mile or so the Soviet-held territory west of the Volga, but nonethless they didn't expelled Soviet forces from the city.

Absurd logic. In Stalingrad, four infantry divisions fought, Moscow was supposed to be surrounded by a hundred divisions.

Hundred ?

The strength of AG Center was 70 divisions and the intention was NEVER to surround Moscow .